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Abstract 
 
The objective of the research is to deepen the understanding on how social norms 
influence wives’s freedom to achieve well-being through their participation in salaried 
vs. reproductive and traditional self employment activities. The capability approach is 
used as a framework of thought and as a means to assess wives welfare.  
Thus the research site was based in two towns belonging to the Tehuacán region. 
Following the NAFTA treaty in 1994, Tehuacán experienced a surge of textile assembly 
plants. These offered salaried job opportunities for women in rural towns of the area 
where previously they where non existent. Information was gathered initially by 
applying in depth interviews followed by a representative survey. 
Social norms are defined as informal moral rules that are enforced by social approval 
and disapproval. Findings indicate that in both towns, three main moral arguments 
sustain the norm discouraging wives’ participation in assembly plants. The first 
indicates that wives are home makers. The second states that women working for 
assembly plants are promiscuous. The last refers to men’s obligation as breadwinners. 
Further, two mechanisms by which social norms influence individuals are recognized: 
internalization of the moral arguments and social sanctions (criticism and gossip) by 
different reference groups. Additionally, because wives live in households they bargain 
their participation in assembly plants with their husbands. Thus the influence of social 
norms on each, wives and husbands was investigated as well as on their decision 
making process. Biprobit regressions relating the extent to which each spouse 
disagrees with the prevailing moral arguments to the probability of wives’ participation 
in assembly plants were estimated. Further, the impact social sanctions of each 
identified reference group have on wives’ probability to work for assembly plants were 
calculated using Probit Regressions. 
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1 Introduction 
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2 
 
 
1.1 Motivation and justification 
 
It is a well known fact that in all parts of the world the economic activities to which 
women allocate their time to are divergent to those of men. In both developed and 
developing countries, there is a tendency for men to take over the main income-
generating occupations while the women are chiefly responsible for reproductive ones. 
This is especially true of married women as they are expected to make these activities 
their priority. While differences in human capital levels by sex account to some extent 
for this trend, a large part of it still remains to be explained. While social norms and 
roles have also been suggested as important determinants of this outcome, there are 
still few empirical economic studies on the extent and mechanisms by which they 
influence this result. 
 Table 1-1: Labour force participation rates by gender, 2007  
 Labour force 
participation 
rate, female * 
Labour force 
participation 
rate, male* 
% Labour 
force, female  
Mexico 44.8 85.2 35.55 
Bolivia 68.2 82.5 45.71 
Colombia 68.6 82 46.06 
Nicaragua 38.5 88.9 30.31 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 32.5 76.5 29.06 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 25.4 74.5 25.18 
Israel 58.9 67.6 45.92 
India 36.2 84.5 28.44 
Afghanistan 29.6 88.6 .. 
Zimbabwe 61.8 80.4 43.81 
Kenya 76.1 88.1 46.4 
Ethiopia 81.2 91.3 47.23 
Nigeria 38.9 72.2 35.51 
United Kingdom 70 82.7 45.3 
Spain 60.5 81.8 41.43 
Italy 50.7 74.6 39.58 
Germany 68.3 81.4 44.46 
*(% of population ages 15-64) 
Source: GenderStats, World Bank.  
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In countries all over the world, female labour force participation rates are lower than 
male ones, Table 1-1. Excluding some countries of Africa, the participation rates are 
related to the economic development of a country. Yet even in developed nations such 
as Germany or the UK women’s participation rates are lower than those of men.  
While the widespread pattern is that women engage in household tasks while men do 
the farm work or work for wages, this varies by region, country and by whether the 
setting is rural or urban. In Africa, women spend more time doing every type of work, 
(agricultural and non-agricultural activities) than men. In Asia and Latin America men 
do more income-generating work while women undertake household tasks (Ilahi 2000). 
It is usual in rural areas of developing countries for household members to diversify 
their time allocation into multiple activities; agricultural, livestock, reproductive and paid 
work. Further, individuals may engage in two or more of these (Horell and Mosley, 
2008). 
Based on (Becker 1991), economists have generally owed these differences in 
participation rates to gendered discrepancies in the accumulation of human capital. 
However, the role of social norms in this outcome has recently been recognized and 
explicitly studied by neoclassical economists (Cunningham 2000; Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing 2003; Fernandez and Fogli 2005; Fletschner and Carter 2008; Kevane 
and Wydick 2001).The aim of this study is to contribute to this new line of research in 
the economics discipline by deepening understanding of how social norms influence 
women’s allocation outcomes.  
Using official data from Mexico from 1987 to 1993, Cunningham (2000), finds that the 
labour supply patterns of male household heads are similar to those of female 
household heads. Yet when women are married their labour supply is contingent on 
their reproductive responsibilities, thus they become the secondary workers in the 
household. What is more, when they do participate in the labour force they generally 
engage in the informal sector so that their income-generating activities are compatible 
with their roles.  As labour participation is primarily restricted for married women, and 
essentially limits them to waged employment, these two subgroups will be the focus of 
the current investigation.   
Here we will focus particularly on the participation of married women in a specific type 
of salaried employment; that of textile assembly plants. To this end, research was 
conducted in two towns of the Tehuacan region in Mexico: San Gabriel Chilac and 
Santiago Miahuatlan. These two rural towns have recently experienced a major 
transformation. After 1994, when the North Free Trade Agreement was enacted, textile 
assembly plants arrived in the region creating salaried employment. As in many 
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regions globally where textile plants have been established, a large share of their 
labour demand was female. This implied that salaried employment opportunities were 
created for women in places where they had not previously existed. The abundant 
demand for female labour plus the persistence of traditional customs in these towns 
made them ideal sites to explore the effects of social norms on married women’s 
participation in assembly plant employment.  
Social norms are defined in this study as informal moral rules (rules that are concerned 
with the principles of right and wrong behaviour) which are followed by a group in a 
society. As moral rules, norms are validated or supported by one or more arguments 
which explain why they are the correct behaviour to follow. In both San Gabriel Chilac 
and Santiago Miahuatlan, three main moral arguments which sustain that women 
should not work in assembly plants were identified. First, women were perceived as 
responsible for childbearing and household tasks. Women who worked in assembly 
plants were seen as neglecting their children, their husbands and their homes. 
Secondly, it was sensed that married women who worked in these plants were 
promiscuous and unfaithful to their husbands. Finally, it was understood that it was 
men’s role to be the economic providers of the family. Thus, husbands would feel they 
failed at this role if their wives entered assembly plant employment. These moral 
arguments are not unique to this area of study as they have been found to persist in 
various communities throughout the world (Cunningham 2001, Ilahi 2000, Kabeer 
2000) Thus, though this study is only representative at the two towns of study, it could 
provide a basis to understand how gendered social norms operate in other areas also. 
Social norms impact individuals in various ways. They can affect the possible 
functionings they are able to achieve, such as the working conditions employers offer 
them and the social benefits they can obtain from the government. Equally, as is the 
focus of this  research, social norms influence individuals’ motivations. This occurs via 
two mechanisms: social sanctions and internalisation of norms.  Social approval and 
disapproval by certain groups will be manifested in the form of gossip and criticism 
advocating for different moral arguments. Because social norms and the moral 
arguments that support them are value laden, a person who violates them may also 
experience feelings of guilt and remorse. 
Given that in these towns social norms indicate that married women should not 
participate in assembly plant employment, they will have an influence on wives’ desire 
to take these jobs via these mechanisms. But even if women perceive that it is best for 
them to enter into waged labour, they usually do not make decisions independently. 
They have to negotiate this decision with other members of their household, generally 
their husbands. Their husbands may in turn experience the influence of social norms 
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on their notions of masculinity and their perceptions of what their wives should do. 
Furthermore, social norms will also influence the power that women have to negotiate 
their labour allocation decisions with their husbands. Thus we will consider both the 
effect of social norms on each spouse’s decisions and negotiating mechanisms. 
In orthodox neoclassical economic models, individuals assess how much income they 
can obtain from engaging in a salaried activity. They then compare how much utility 
they can obtain from the goods and services purchased with it, compared to those they 
can attain by investing their time in alternative activities (including reproductive ones). 
The wage women obtain by working in an assembly plant is generally higher than the 
income they could gain by engaging in alternative activities available to them (Fussel 
2000; Glick and Roubaud 2006; Kabeer and Mahmud 2004; Tiano 1994). Yet the 
impact of salaried employment, especially that of textile assembly plants, on female 
labourers’ welfare has been debated (Barrientos et al. 2004; Barrios Hernandez 2004; 
Carr and Chen 2004; Chant 1995; Robeyns 2003; Sagrario Floro 1995). The working 
conditions of assembly plants can be harsh, for example, resulting in stress and 
tiredness. Yet, it is not only these negative aspects that neoclassical economists do not 
consider. For instance, by working in assembly plants women can increase their self 
esteem and gain a space to interact socially with others.  We will thus attempt to 
discover and consider all the positive and negative effects of salaried employment on 
wives.  
It is to this end that the Capability approach is employed. This approach relies on 
assessing the liberty a person has to achieve functionings, what a person manages ‘to 
do or be’. It is assumed that women have the potential to achieve different functionings 
depending on the activity they engage in (the focus here being only reproductive work 
versus waged employment). Each will have different functionings related to physical 
health, mental well-being, bodily integrity and safety, social relations, respect and 
enjoyment of leisure activities. Even though it is not readily evident which activity will 
provide women with a greater level of well-being, it is possible to asses what restricts 
women’s opportunities to engage in whichever activity they believe will give them a 
superior level of well-being – in the present study, social norms. 
This is another fundamental advantage of the Capability approach, as it evaluates 
individuals’ opportunities, leaving space for agents’ freedom to decide which type of 
functioning to achieve. In this case, wives will obtain different functionings depending 
on whether they engage in assembly plant work or not. Therefore, the focus of this 
research will be on how social norms restrict wives´ opportunities to work or not to work 
in salaried employment, and achieve the functionings corresponding to each state.  
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In summary, this research empirically analyses how social norms restrict wives’ 
opportunities to achieve well-being by influencing their and their husbands’ desires and 
their labour allocation negotiating mechanisms. Social norms, which are informal moral 
rules concerned with right and wrong behaviour, are validated by one or more moral 
arguments. To varying degrees, these are internalised by both husbands and wives. If 
a wife disregards the social norm indicating she should not work, both spouses might 
experience feelings of guilt and remorse. They might also suffer social sanctions in the 
form of gossip and criticism by various reference groups. This research will analyse 
how and to what extent each moral argument has an impact on wives’ employment in 
assembly plants. 
 
1.2 Directly related literature on the effect of social norms on women’s time 
allocation 
 
There are few econometric studies on the influence of social norms on women’s time 
allocation. Generally, the presence of these is deduced indirectly. Fafchamps and 
Quisimbing (2003), for example, use a panel data set from Pakistan to corroborate 
whether the allocation of tasks within the household is driven uniquely by their 
comparative advantage. They find that after controlling for household members’ human 
capital, learning by doing, and personal characteristics, these vary by gender and 
family status. Men specialize in market work and women in household chores. They 
then conclude that something else, which they call social roles, is at play in intra-
household division of labour. Cunningham (2000), in a study mentioned previously, 
estimated a logit regression model for women’s labour force participation using official 
data on Mexico. He encountered that married women are secondary workers and that 
their labour supply is contingent on household responsibilities. Fernandez and Fogli 
(2005) use the 1970 US census to econometrically1 study the effect of individuals’ 
country of ancestry (as a proxy for culture) on labour participation and total fertility rates 
by gender. They find that even after controlling for possible indirect effects on culture, 
these significantly affect female labour outcomes but not male ones.  Yet, these proxies 
affect both female and male fertility rates. Although all these studies show that 
variables related to human capital are not sufficient to explain the divergence of tasks 
by gender and household status, they do not explicitly model, develop a theoretical 
argument for, or explain the mechanism by which social norms influence wives’ labour 
allocation decisions.  
                                                 
1 To this effect they use both a Tobit model to estimate the number of hours worked and a 
Probit to estimate the probability that a person participates in laboured employment.  
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In an innovative analysis, Keavane and Wydick (2001), do explicitly model the effects 
of social norms on household members’ time allocation. To achieve this, they use a 
unitary household model in which utility depends both on pecuniary rewards from 
participating in diverse activities and on the social norms regulating women’s 
involvement in them. The latter are considered to enter the utility function as a cost that 
the household experiences when women’s actions deviate from the female social 
mean.  From this unitary household model, they relate women’s responsiveness on the 
time they dedicate to their husbands’ fields to the higher levels of their husbands’ farm 
capital. Further, they compare the effect of this response in two culturally diverse ethnic 
groups of Burkina Faso, the Mossi and the Bwa groups. In general, women in Burkina 
Faso divide their time between working in their husbands’ fields, working in 
independent income-generating activities and working at home. In one ethnic group, 
the Mossi, women are supposed to work in their husbands’ fields while in the Bwa 
group they are more oriented toward market activities. They conclude that because 
women’s labour allocation changes significantly with husbands’ farm capital within the 
Bwa while it is insignificant for the Mossi group, social norms are present.  
Several aspects need to be noted from this study. On one hand, it does not consider 
that a social norm is validated by one or more moral arguments which may have a 
differential impact on wives’ responsiveness to their husbands’ greater farm capital. 
Further, it assumes that individuals follow norms solely because other individuals in a 
society follow them.  Therefore they do not take into account that individuals might 
internalise norms and as a consequence follow them, independently of whether 
members of their reference group adhere to them or not. Nor do they take into 
consideration that people might comply with the norm because otherwise they would 
be subject to gossip and criticism by members of their reference groups. Finally, as 
they use a unitary household model, they do not acknowledge the distinct influence 
internalisation and social sanctions can have on women’s and their husbands’ 
preferences regarding the women’s employment in assembly plants.  
Another study on the effects of social norms on women’s economic activities is done by 
Fletschner and Carter (2008). Specifically, they study the effects of norms on women’s 
demand for capital to carry out entrepreneurial activities in Paraguay. Theoretically, 
they model women’s demand for entrepreneurial capital as dependent upon her 
reference group’s demand for capital. Yet unlike Kevane and Wydick (2001), they do 
take into consideration that women’s utility might be influenced by social norms directly 
and independently of her reference group’s behaviour. They do this by assuming that 
women’s utility depends on a social environment term, which is not explicitly defined 
but is determined by social institutions and by their male partners. Empirically, they 
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determine who are the members of a women’s reference group by asking them to 
identify female friends and family members who they feel closest to for various social 
purposes. Using a probit regression estimation model they find that women’s demand 
for capital is positively and significantly affected by the behaviour of their reference 
group. A woman is more likely to demand credit the larger the proportion of cooperative 
members in her reference group.  This could reflect social learning, but they argue that 
in the absence of cross gender social effects (men not affected) their results support 
the social norm interpretation. As a proxy of the social environment effect, they use the 
variable indicating whether a woman’s husband opposes her taking a loan and has 
significant bargaining power. They find that this variable negatively and significantly 
affects female demand for credit.   
Interestingly, in the introduction to their paper, the authors recognise that there are 
strongly held beliefs regarding the appropriateness of women undertaking 
entrepreneurial activities. The validating argument which supports these beliefs is 
wives’ role as responsible for reproductive tasks, while husbands are supposed to 
support their family economically. Furthermore, they recognize the existence of social 
sanctions as they state that neighbours gossip about wives when they engage in these 
types of activities. Therefore, while they identify distinct arguments validating the norm 
indicating that wives should not undertake entrepreneurial activities, they do not 
theoretically or empirically consider them. This is true as well of social sanctions being 
enforced by different reference groups. In addition, while they do consider whether a 
husband agrees or disagrees with a wife asking for a loan, they do not consider the 
direct effects of each moral argument on husbands’ preferences either.  
Therefore, this study explicitly considers the various moral arguments which validate a 
social norm. Particularly, it examines the role of their internalisation as well as that of 
the social sanctions enforced by each reference group upholding them. Furthermore, it 
considers the effect of both these enforcement mechanisms on each spouse’s desires 
regarding wives’ participation in a particular type of waged employment, that of 
assembly plants. Importantly, it does so by initially collecting qualitative information via 
in-depth interviews. This made it possible to examine the perceptions and motivations 
of wives and husbands regarding each moral argument against wives’ participation in 
assembly plant employment. The negotiating mechanisms between couples regarding 
wives’ engagement in this type of job were also explored. These were part of the aims 
of the research, but having this information also aided in refining the theoretical 
framework, research questions and the methodology. Finally, this study differs from 
previous ones in that it uses the Capabilities framework as a conceptual framing and a 
means to asses the welfare impacts of wives’ engagement in each economic activity. 
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1.3 Research proposal and thesis outline 
 
The objective of this project, therefore, is to understand how social norms influence 
wives’ opportunities to achieve well-being through their employment in textile assembly 
plants. To achieve this goal, four general research questions were posed: 
 
 
1) What are the functionings wives can achieve by working in assembly plants 
compared to those they can attain by being involved in traditional female 
activities? 
2) How does the internalisation of each moral argument by each spouse influence 
wives’ probability of working in an assembly plant? 
3) How do social sanctions by each reference group, using each moral argument, 
influence wives’ probability of working in assembly plants? 
4) How are decisions regarding women’s employment negotiated between 
spouses and how are they influenced by social norms? 
 
 
The findings relating these questions were separated firstly into qualitative and 
quantitative descriptive information and secondly into statistical and econometric 
analysis. The chapters of the thesis thus followed this structure. Table 1-2 shows how 
each chapter contributes to answering each of the research questions.   
The thesis is thus organised into seven main chapters. Chapter 2 presents the 
conceptual framework. It initially describes the Capabilities approach and provides the 
arguments for which this framework is the optimal one for this research. It then defines 
the concept of social norms and illustrates the mechanisms by which they influence 
individuals’ motivations: internalisation and social sanctions. Next, the way in which 
several lines of thought frame household bargaining and spouses’ power in it are 
compared. This aids in constructing a characterisation of couples’ power to negotiate 
wives’ participation in salaried employment.  Once this is achieved, the complete 
framework is delineated. Finally, the framework is mathematically formalised.  
Chapter 3 details the study’s methodology. First, the choice of the location where 
fieldwork was conducted is justified. Next, the techniques used to collect qualitative 
information and quantitative data are delineated, and how they were interpreted and 
analysed is elucidated.  
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Table 1-2: Elements of each research question covered, by chapter  
Chapter Research Question  Specific aspect of question answered 
Chapter 5 1. What are the functionings 
wives can achieve by working in 
assembly plants compared to 
those they can attain by being 
involved in traditional female 
activities? 
 
? Welfare outcomes spouses perceive 
wives can obtain when wives engage in 
each type of economic activity 
? How social norms, acting as social 
conversion factors, affect wives’ 
achievement of functionings when 
working in assembly plants. 
? Factors influencing the achievement of 
functionings by wives when they work in 
an assembly plant 
Chapter 6 2. How does the internalisation 
of each moral argument by each 
spouse influence wives’ 
probability of working in an 
assembly plant? 
? How each moral argument shapes the 
beliefs and motivations of each spouse. 
 3. How do social sanctions by 
each reference group, using 
each moral argument, influence 
wives’ probability of working in 
an assembly plant? 
 
? How social sanctions by each reference 
group and upholding each moral 
argument are experienced by spouses. 
 4. How are decisions regarding 
women’s employment negotiated 
between spouses, and how are 
they influenced by social norms? 
 
? The mechanisms employed by spouses 
to negotiate wives’ participation in 
assembly plants. 
? How social norms influence the 
mechanisms and arguments couples use 
when negotiating wives’ engagement in 
assembly plant employment. 
Chapter 7 3. How does the internalisation 
of each moral argument by each 
spouse influence wives’ 
probability of participating in 
assembly plant employment? 
 
? Extent to which internalisation of each 
moral argument influences wives’ 
probability of working in an assembly 
plant. 
? Test characteristics of people who 
internalise moral arguments versus those 
who deviate from them. 
Chapter 8 4. How do social sanctions by 
each reference group, using 
each moral argument, influence 
wives’ probability of working in 
an assembly plant? 
 
? Extent to which each reference group 
upholding each moral argument 
influences wives’ probability of working in 
an assembly plant? 
  
 
Chapter 4 describes the process by which textile assembly plants arrived in the 
Tehuacan region of Mexico, and specifically the two towns which are the focus of this 
research; San Gabriel Chilac and Santiago Miahuatlan. Next, the main population and 
household characteristics of these towns is portrayed. In conclusion, the main income-
generating activities available to wives in these two localities are explored.   
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Chapter 5 uses qualitative information to explore the three main moral arguments 
current in both towns, which validate the norm that wives should not work in assembly 
plants. It aims at answering how each moral argument shapes the beliefs and 
motivations of each spouse regarding wives’ engagement in this type of job. It also 
considers how social sanctions by each reference group, by moral argument are 
experienced by couples. The second part of the chapter illustrates how couples 
negotiate wives’ employment in assembly plants. It examines the mechanisms used by 
couples to negotiate about this decision, and how they are influenced by social norms . 
Chapter 6 surveys the welfare impacts of wives’ engagement in assembly plant 
employment versus traditional female activities. It does so by first exploring the welfare 
outcomes spouses perceive wives obtain by engaging in each type of economic 
activity. Special attention is paid to how social norms, acting as social conversion 
factors, affect wives’ ability to achieve functionings by working in assembly plants. It 
also aims at identifying other conditions influencing the achievement of functionings by 
wives when engaging in this type of job. It concludes with a synopsis of all the different 
functionings that can be achieved by working for assembly plants.  
Chapter 7 assesses the effect that disagreement with each moral argument by each 
spouse (as a proxy for internalisation) has on wives’ probability of working in assembly 
plants. As these two factors might be jointly determined, a biprobit regression model is 
estimated. Next, we examine whether specific characteristics of couples have an 
impact on their beliefs in each moral argument. These characteristics are husbands’ 
activity; whether a wife or her husband has lived in a city or was born in one; and 
whether any female relatives work in an assembly plant.  
Chapter 8 uses Probit estimation models to analyse the effect of social sanctions by 
each reference group, according to each moral argument, and directed to each spouse, 
has on wives’ probability of working in an assembly plant. .  
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2  Conceptual framework 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this investigation is to analyse by which means and to what extent 
social norms deter married women’s participation into salaried employment. To achieve 
this, the Capability approach is used. As Robeyns (2000) explains, the Capability 
approach can be used both as a framework of thought and as a way to evaluate 
individual welfare.  This chapter will describe this approach and further expand on why, 
for given both these aspects, is the optimal one for achieving the goals of the research.  
Next, given that there is no widespread convention on the definition of social norms, 
one will be established.  The means by which norms are enforced in a society and 
influence individuals’ motivations will also be outlined.   
Further, as wives negotiate with their husbands the decision to work in a salaried job, 
the effect of social norms on the latter is also considered. Moreover, the outcome of 
this negotiation will depend on the bargaining power of each. For this reason 
bargaining power is also conceptualised.  Finally the whole framework is summarized 
and formalized.  
 
2.2 Well-being and capabilities 
 
This research uses the concept of well-being put forth in the Capability Approach 
developed by Sen (1985; 1990; 1999). This framework places importance in evaluating 
social states according to the richness of human life resulting from them.  It sees 
human life as a set of ‘beings and doings’ such as being well nourished, being healthy, 
being housed, being able to read and write, being confident, escaping morbidity, 
achieving self respect, etc. These beings and doings are referred to as Functionings 
and reflect the state of a person, what he or she has managed to do or be. Even 
though functionings are a very important aspect of well-being, an assessment of them 
alone would not be completely adequate given that they do not reflect the freedom a 
person has to function in a certain manner. The example provided by Sen (1999) to 
illustrate this approach is that of a poor person who is undernourished because he 
does not have the opportunity of having enough food. On the other hand, an ascetic 
will also be undernourished, but because he chooses to be so. Even though being well 
nourished is an important aspect of human life it is essential to respect the choices of 
individuals. In this case, it is important not that the ascetic achieves the functioning of 
being well nourished, but that he has the opportunity to be so. Acknowledging the 
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importance of having the freedom to achieve functionings, Sen thus introduces the 
notion of capability, which refers to the combination of functionings a person has the 
potential to achieve. It reflects a person’s freedom to choose between different ways of 
living. The evaluation of the quality of life, then, is made through assessing the 
capability to function.  
Some functionings can be achieved through the use of commodities. Still, it is 
imperative to recognize that there are some basic functionings that do not depend on 
them, for example having self respect. In the first case, functionings are achieved 
through the consumption of commodities which have certain characteristics. For 
example, Sen (1999) offers the example of how the possession of food gives the owner 
access to the properties of the food, which can be used to satisfy hunger, to yield 
nutrition, to give eating pleasure and to provide support for social meetings. Yet, as 
Robeyns (2000) explains, the characteristics of the goods do not tell us what the 
person will or can do with those properties. For example a person can have a disease 
which makes the absorption of nutrients difficult. That person then may suffer from 
undernourishment even though he may consume the same amount of food as another 
person who is not under nourished. The relation between the good and the functioning 
achieved will depend then on personal characteristics as metabolism, physical 
condition, reading skills and intelligence. This relation also depends on social 
characteristics like infrastructure, institutions, public goods, public policies, social 
norms, discriminating practices, gender roles, societal hierarchies, power relations, 
etc… Robeyns uses the example of a bike: a bike will enable the functioning of being 
mobile, but this mobility will be restricted if, for example, there are no paved roads or if 
a society imposes a social or legal norm that women are not supposed to cycle.  
The Capability approach can be represented by Figure 2-1 taken from Robeyns (2000). 
Thus functionings and functioning capabilities stand midway between commodities and 
utility. They are posterior to the endowment of goods and services and the income 
needed to acquire them, neither which are good indicators of well-being. As Sen (1990) 
states, ‘‘prosperity is no more than one of the means to enriching the lives of people. It 
is a foundational confusion to give it the status of an end. Secondly, even as means, 
merely enhancing average economic opulence can be quite inefficient in the pursuit of 
the really valuable ends.’’ 
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Figure 2-1: A schematic representation of the Capability approach. 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the vector of functionings is previous to the concept of utility which 
for Sen (1985; 1999), in none of its three conceptions, is appropriate to assess well-
being either. Firstly, as he explains, utility can be seen as choice. The problem with this 
approach is that a person’s choice may be guided by a number of motives of which the 
pursuit of personal well-being is only one. This mixture of motivations makes it hard to 
form an idea on the basis of choice information only. This is especially a relevant issue 
when analyzing gendered well-being given that many women may perceive that their 
interests are trivial, choosing as a result states that will not necessarily lead to their 
well-being. The way in which women come to perceive this has much to do with social 
norms and will be discussed in detail later on.  
Secondly, he suggests that utility can also be seen as happiness. The problem with 
happiness is that it is a mental condition. A person in abject poverty who has come to 
terms with his condition can be happy. Additionally, there are also mental states other 
than happiness, such as stimulation, excitement, etc. which are of direct relevance to a 
person’s well-being.  
The third and last way he distinguishes utility is as a desire. The problem with this 
approach is that for an account of well-being to serve as a basis for a utilitarian 
calculus, it must be feasible to present a cardinally and interpersonally comparable 
view of utility. Neither of these types of information can be obtained by just checking 
whether the person’s desires have been realized. 
In addition to being a better reflection of an individual’s the state than the utility 
approach, the Capability approach has the quality of assessing ‘objective’ outcomes. If 
for example one is interested in comparing the functioning of being healthy between 
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men and women, one can obtain objective information with respect to nutrition levels, 
number of visits to the health centre and types and number of diseases obtained by 
sexes. Individual utility, on the other hand, is a subjective perspective that ‘‘has been 
extensively used, but it can be misleading, since it may fail to reflect a person’s real 
deprivation’’ (Sen, 1990). 
For the purpose of this research the Capability approach was considered to be the 
most adequate framework, not only for the advantages previously revealed.  The 
Capability approach is primarily appealing because income is a deficient measure of 
the welfare benefit to women and their families from women’s incorporation into 
salaried employment. Some of these welfare effects will be discussed in the next 
section. Yet also very importantly, the Capabilities approach is concerned with 
evaluating opportunities while leaving space for agents’ freedom to decide which type 
of functioning to achieve. It is an opportunity-based, rather than an outcome–based, 
theory (Robeyns 2000). Social norms will restrict wives’ opportunities to engage in paid 
work. Yet regardless of these norms, it is important to acknowledge that people have 
different characteristics and preferences which will make each state, participating or 
not in salaried employment, attractive or unattractive for them. A wife may find it more 
rewarding to do housework even though working for a wage can allow her to achieve 
some types of functionings. For another woman, housework can be unbearable. As 
Robeyns (2000) explains, ‘’One of the major strengths of the capability approach is that 
it can account for interpersonal variations in conversion of the characteristics of the 
commodities into functionings. The Capability approach accounts for diversity in two 
ways: by its focus in functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space, and by the 
explicit role it assigns to individual and social conversion factors of commodities into 
functionings.’’  
Another important quality of the Capability approach compared to the utility one, and 
which is especially important for this research is that people may lack a notion of 
individual welfare. Sen (1987) provides the example of traditional societies such as 
India, where generally a woman from a rural area, when asked about her personal 
welfare, would find the question unintelligible and would answer in terms of her family’s 
welfare. This is an example of how social norms can shape perceptions and notions of 
deserving. In this case individuals will not be seeking to improve their well-being but 
are instead maximizing their utility. So being deprived is consistent with the utility 
notion of well-being but not with the capability one. Because a key part of the research 
interest is precisely to analyze how social norms affect individual’s perceptions and 
how this influences their well-being, the Capability approach is thus the best framework 
to employ as it uses an objective measure of well-being.   
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Despite the significant advantages the Capability approach offers, there are also 
disadvantages. An important difficulty that arises when applying the Capability 
approach is its operationalization. Further, the number of empirical applications to draw 
examples from is limited.  The operationalization first involves defining the functionings 
that need to be taken into account, given that the Capability approach does not 
prescribe a list of the relevant ones (Robeyns 2000; Qizilbash 2001). For the purpose 
of this research, a pragmatic approach will be taken. The functioning vectors that will 
be taken into account will be those that have been related in some way by the literature 
to the incorporation of women into waged work and those identified by couples in the 
area as significant. Another issue that must be addressed once the relevant 
functionings are defined is how they are to be measured, compared and aggregated. 
This issue will be discussed in depth in the methodology chapter. 
Next I will discuss the ways in which women’s incorporation into paid activities has 
been related to their well-being and link this with the discussion of the Capability 
approach. 
 
2.3 Women’s well-being from participating in paid work versus housework. 
 
In the standard neoclassical economic model, people allocate time to productive 
activities (income generating activities, self-consumption or reproductive ones) 
because they are the means of obtaining goods and services for consumption. 
Individuals weigh how much satisfaction (generally utility) they obtain through these 
goods and services, by dedicating themselves to this type of activity compared to 
spending time in leisure, and then decide how much time to spend in each. Therefore, 
productive activities provide satisfaction as long as they produce goods and services 
for consumption.  
Even in the neoclassical intra-household model in which income-generating activities 
are seen as the means to obtain bargaining power (the utility a member of the 
household will obtain versus that of other household members) what provides utility in 
the end is the consumption of goods and services.  However, the allocation of time in 
different activities is in itself an important part of a person’s life with important 
repercussions for their well-being.  
Feminists concerned with women’s disadvantage in society have highlighted the non-
economic implications for their welfare when they participate in income-generating 
activities. For example, Sagrario Floro (1995) argues that for a serious discussion of 
individual and social welfare it is necessary to take into account the length and intensity 
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of individual’s work time. To this effect, work intensity is defined as the extent to which 
work causes fatigue or stress, is arduous, burdensome or intensive. Related to this, 
Jackson and Palmer-Jones (1999) argue that the burdensomeness of a task depends 
on the type of body one has (female/male, large/small, healthy/unhealthy, 
experienced/inexperienced), which they conceptualize as ‘body capital’.  
Also related to work intensity, salaried employment will have a particularly important 
effect on married women as they are usually responsible for making sure reproductive 
work is completed within the household.  What is more, they generally have to carry out 
these reproductive tasks after completing their jobs.  For this reason, Hochschild 
(1989) referred to the reproductive work wives have to complete after their shifts in 
their salaried jobs as a ‘double shift’.  Having these double shifts is usually tiring and 
stressful and has direct impacts on wives’ welfare and on the way in which they relate 
to their families.  
Robeyns (2003) also examines other effects of the actual gendered division of labour 
which are not related to work time, and which also have an impact on women’s well-
being. She identifies some economic disadvantages such as the risks of specializing in 
unpaid household labour (especially in the case of divorce) and the depreciation of 
human capital through not accumulating work experience when taking care of children. 
She also recognizes the non-pecuniary rewards of participating in the labour market.  
For instance, it enables women to socially interact with others, to have contact with a 
network of colleagues and to have a source of self-esteem. Psychological and 
emotional effects of participating in paid versus reproductive work also surface. Care 
for children can be emotionally very gratifying and less stressful than working in a hard 
and competitive labour market. Further, household chores can be less rewarding, and 
women can feel isolated in their homes and feel under-appreciated for the work they 
do. On the other hand, paid work can be stressful, tiring and boring. Thus, in general 
salaried employment will have both positive and negative non-pecuniary effects on 
women’s welfare. 
Further, women’s well-being will not only depend on whether or not they participate in a 
salaried job, but also on the characteristics which are specific to the place in which the 
activity takes place.  Garment manufacturing factories around the world are identified 
as having dire working conditions. Studies on manufacturing factories from the 
Philippines, Mexico and Bangladesh, have found that employees generally are asked 
to work overtime and sometimes they have to do so without pay. They also have 
challenging production quotas which increase the stress of employees. Added to this, 
employees frequently lack the respect of supervisors, even to the extent that female 
employees have complained about the limited number of toilet breaks they were 
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allowed (Barrientos et al. 2004, Barrios Hernandez 2004, Carr and Chen 2004, Chant 
1995). Further, Carr and Chen (2004) found that contracts are rarely written, and 
benefits such as maternity leave, sick leave, annual leave and health insurance are 
unlikely to be provided. In Bangladesh, Kabeer (2004) noted that female workers who 
were married were also worried about obtaining adequate childcare. In the Philippines, 
Chant (1995) found that as a consequence of the suboptimal working conditions female 
employees experienced a number of illnesses. Employees complained about urinary 
tract infections, kidney problems and menstrual complications due to the limited 
amount of time they had to go to the toilet. They also experienced occupational 
hazards such as backache, eye strain, blurred vision and headaches as a result of 
sitting and concentrating for long periods. Because of the handling and inhalation of 
substances, some had chest infections and skin irritation. Yet although there is room 
for improvement within factories, Kabeer (2004) sustains that working conditions are 
not as critical as activists usually claim. This is true, especially in the light of the limited 
salaried alternatives that women in these regions have. What is more, women workers 
do not only perceive negative aspects of participating in textile assembly plants but 
also positive and important ones. For instance, those identified by Kabeer (2004) are 
regularity of payment, an increase in sense of self-reliance, and an augmented 
involvement in decision-making within the household. Very importantly, most of the 
previous conditions have also been found to exist in the Tehuacan area. This is 
evidenced by the extensive descriptive analysis on textile manufacturing assembly 
plants done by Barrios Hernandez (2003). It can be anticipated then, that participation 
in assembly plant employment both enhances and worsens wives achievement of 
functionings. Further, couples will take some of these into account in their process of 
deciding whether wives should work for textile factories or not. Which functionings can 
be achieved by taking on this type of job, and the conditions that influence their 
attainment, are one of the main foci of this research.  
Summing up, wives achieve pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains from working in textile 
assembly plant jobs. The functionings that can be achieved by participating, or not, in 
them will depend on personal characteristics such as preferences, on the activity’s 
characteristics, and on the working conditions offered in each. What is more, gender 
stereotypes and norms acting as social conversion factors will play an important role in 
influencing the functionings wives can achieve. Next, the concept of social norms is 
characterised. 
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2.4 Social norms 
2.4.1 Definition of social norms 
There is no consensus among academics on a definition of social norms. Generally, 
the meaning depends on the focus of the researcher. To complicate things, they use a 
variety of terms – custom, convention, role, identity, institution, culture and so forth 
– to refer to concepts that are similar to or overlap with notions about norms (Horne 
2001; Biccieri 2006). 
The definition that will be used here is a modified version of that put forth by Rutherford 
(1996). Social norms, then, are defined as informal moral rules (rules that are 
concerned with the principles of right and wrong behaviour) sustained by a group of 
individuals in a society. They are enforced both by the internalization of the moral rule 
by members of a group belief and/or by social approval and disapproval. Rule violation, 
on one hand, will be punished by social sanctions such as gossip, criticism and in 
extreme cases ostracism or violence by others.  On the other hand, it will raise feelings 
of guilt and remorse on the part of the transgressing individual.  
It is useful to differentiate social norms from other rules, to understand them better and 
not to confuse them. 
? Conventions are a pattern of behaviour that is customary, expected and self-
enforcing.  Everyone conforms, because it is in their interest to do so, given 
what everyone else does. Familiar examples include following the rules of the 
road, adhering to conventional dress codes and using words with their 
conventional meanings (Young 1996). 
? Legal Norms are rules enforced by police power and a judicial system that will 
act to punish violations. ‘‘Although most people do not consider punishment to 
be merely a price tag, laws are often designed as if this were the case, so that 
legal sanctions will suffice to deter people from breaking the law. The law does 
not rest on informal sanctions and the voice of conscience, but provides formal 
punishment (Elster 1989b).’’  
? Habits and Routines are maintained by convenience, inertia, rules of personal 
morality and by private conscience. They are personal with no broader social 
significance (Rutherford 1996). Therefore, they are not social rules.  
To make the distinction between social norms and conventions is especially important 
given that some economists use them interchangeably. For example, Dasgupta (2000) 
defines social norms as a ‘behavioural strategy’ (rules such as ‘do this if that happens’). 
By a social norm he means a behavioural strategy that is subscribed to by all. For this 
to occur, the strategy would have to be self-enforcing. This means that for a norm to be 
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a social one, it would have to be in the interest of each party to act in accordance with 
it, if all others were to act in accordance with it too. In short, it would have to be an 
equilibrium strategy. 
However, for a behavioural strategy to be subscribed to by all, it does not have to be 
enforced by social approval or disapproval, or to be moral. A convention is also a 
behavioural strategy that is subscribed to by everyone. For example, in England 
everyone drives on the left side of the road.  This is the best strategy for an individual 
to follow because everybody else drives in the left side. No one follows this rule 
because it is morally correct to do so, but because if they don’t they would crash. The 
distinction would reside in defining the reason for which the behavioural strategy or 
social rule is subscribed to by all. A social norm, as defined here, will be followed and 
individuals will sanction a person who does not obey it, because of its moral content. It 
is important, then, to highlight that the focus of this research will be that of social norms 
and not conventions.  
Biccieri (2006) on the other hand has a definition for social norms that stands midway 
between the definitions of conventions and social norms that have been proposed for 
this research. For her, a social norm exists if a sufficiently large subset of the 
population knows that a behavioural rule exists and is applied to certain types of 
situations.  One of this subset of the population will follow the norm, if he believes that 
a sufficiently large subset of the population will conform to the rule and: a) he either 
believes that a sufficiently large subset of the population expects him to conform to this 
rule; or b) if a sufficiently large subset of the population might sanction his behaviour as 
they prefer and expect him to conform to the rule. Therefore, in her definition of social 
norms she incorporates both the notion of social sanctions and that of the expectations 
of other members of the society. Further, she introduces an additional concept allied to 
that of social norms; a moral norm. A moral norm demands to be followed by an 
individual independently of whether others expect him to conform to it. The reason to 
obey it resides in the norm itself, because it is reasonable. As such, other people’s 
expectations to conform to it are not a good reason to obey it. The example provided 
by Biccieri (2006) is the moral norm of not killing.  A person will not kill another because 
this is what is sensible, not because other expect her not to do it.  
Thus the necessary conditions put forth by Biccieri (2006) for an individual to follow a 
norm differ from those suggested in this research on two counts. Very importantly in 
the definition used for this research, a social norm is a moral rule. That is, a subset of 
the population will believe that following the norm is the appropriate behaviour. 
Therefore, they will subscribe to it independently of what others expect them to do. For 
instance, in some societies individuals will follow the norm of not having premarital sex 
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because they believe this is the appropriate behaviour. They would therefore act in 
accordance with it regardless of whether they expect others to obey it. Yet, Biccieri’s 
definition of a moral norm also contrasts with that employed for social norms in this 
research. In accordance with the later definition, a subset of the population might follow 
the social norm because they expect a sanction from a reference group. They will obey 
it even if they do not themselves consider it to be appropriate. Using the same example 
of the norm regarding not having premarital sex, some might fear the social sanctions 
that might rise if it is known that they did not obey this norm. Thus, they will obey it, 
even if they do not believe it is the correct behaviour to follow.  
A fundamental aspect of social norms which should be highlighted is that because they 
are concerned with the principles of right and wrong behaviour, there are one or more 
arguments which explain why the norm is considered the appropriate conduct. These 
validate and sustain the norm in society. For example, in some cultures arranged 
marriage is a social norm and there are several arguments that legitimize it. One claim 
is that as parents choose the spouse for their children; they are assured that he or she 
will have a similar background in terms of religion, caste and values. It is also claimed 
that arranged marriages are more stable and that divorce rates are lower.   
Thus, the goal of this research is to analyze is how the moral content and the 
arguments that validate the norm affect wives’ opportunities to achieve well-being. 
Special focus is placed on how they influence their motivation to engage in paid work. 
With respect to this the definition of (Kandori 1992), brings light to an additional feature 
of social norms. For him social norms are a ‘specification of a desirable, behaviour, 
together with sanction rules in a community.’ An observations follows form this 
definition. Social norms are considered to be a desirable behaviour by a group in the 
society. However, just because they are desirable, it does not mean they are followed 
by all the individuals in the society. Individuals also have dissimilar characteristics that 
will be in accord or not with the norm. Akerlof and Kranton (2000), identify this in their 
paper. Therefore, ‘persons whose actions are subject to norms (who themselves may 
or may not hold the norm) take into account the norms, and the accompanying 
potential rewards or punishments, not as absolute determinants of their actions, but as 
elements which affect their decisions about what actions it will be in their interest to 
carry out.’ (Coleman 1990) 
As the framework which will be used in the analysis is a capabilities one, the aim is to 
analyse how social norms relating to wives’ labour allocation affect their opportunities 
to achieve well-being. One way in which social norms restrict people’s options is by 
affecting their motivations. For this reason, the following section will analyze how social 
norms are enforced, this is, how they influence people. At social level they are enforced 
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by means of gossip and criticism, and at the individual level through the feelings of guilt 
and anxiety a person experiences if he does not follow a prescribed norm. In the next 
section I will analyze with greater detail these enforcement mechanisms. 
 
2.4.2 Effect of social norms on motivations 
2.4.2.1 Social sanctions 
For norms to be social they must be a) shared by other people and b) partly sustained 
by their approval. Sometimes norms and the arguments which validate them are 
shared by a large segment of the society and in other cases they will be supported only 
by a group within it (Elster 1989b). For gossip to occur the people involved have to be 
part of the segment of the society who approves of the norm, that is, they have to have 
the same idea of what is proper. Merry (1884) distinguishes three phases of gossip. 
First, when a social norm is disregarded by someone, information about the event is 
circulated. Second, this can be followed with the formation of some consensus about 
the moral meaning of that event; how it is to be interpreted. Third, after this there might 
be transformation of shared opinions into some form of action (sanction). This action 
can be manifested in the form of criticism, defined as disapproving comments, by 
people who approve the norm directed to the person who broke it. In more extreme 
cases it can even lead to violence and ostracism. 
I will refer to gossip in the first two phases, as distinct from criticism. This is so because 
the anticipation that gossip might occur if failing to subscribe to the norm might serve 
as a strong incentive to comply with it. This view disagrees with Coleman (1990) who 
argues that gossip in itself does not constitute a sanction given that it can spread 
without the person who is being gossiped about knowing it. It is maintained however, 
that the expectation of an individual that people will disapprove of his action, even if 
they do not explicitly express it, can be perceived by him as a cost for breaking a norm. 
As Merry (1984), explains: ‘Gossip creates cognitive maps of social identities and 
reputations. It forms dossiers on each member of one’s community: who is a good 
curer, who can be approached for loans, who is powerful, who is a witch, who is a good 
worker, and who is a thief.’ People care about their image in society to varying degrees 
and will therefore experience distress when they are gossiped about.  
Additionally, not all groups of people might feel the same right to express their 
disapproval to a violator of a norm. For example, if a woman goes against the norm of 
not working outside her home, people who are acquainted with her might gossip about 
this fact and express their disapproval amongst themselves, but if they are not very 
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close to her they might not express it to her directly. A closer friend or a member of her 
family, however, might feel the right to express this disapproval to her. Making the 
distinction between pure gossip and criticism is therefore crucial if one is to understand 
the mechanisms used by different reference groups and the importance wives place on 
each. This importance may depend on the closeness of the person to the different 
reference groups or by the groups’ moral authority.  
Additional features of gossip deserve special attention. First, gossip flows more readily 
in highly connected, morally homogeneous social networks, and it is here that the 
impact is greatest.  If only minor differences in norms exist, gossip can forge 
consensus, but where fundamental ideas of proper behaviour differ, gossip will be 
stunted (Coleman 1990).  
Secondly, those individuals who are targets of a sanction but have contacts with others 
outside who are not norm-holders are less likely to be compliant with sanctions. So a 
woman who engages in waged labour, might become part of a social group in her 
workplace that does not hold the norm of staying at home. This will support her or 
ameliorate the negative feelings she will experience in the event of criticisms by others. 
Interviewing female garment workers in Bangladesh, Kabeer (2000) found that many 
women in her sample reported starting out with reservations about the propriety of 
factory employment, but changed their minds in the light of the observed presence of 
other women like themselves within the factories. 
Thirdly, gossip ‘attacks a person’s honour and social prestige, but also leads to tangible 
political, economic and social consequences’ (Merry 1984). It is imperative then to also 
analyze whether gendered norms regarding household members’ time allocation have 
these extra costs.  
Fourth, at the household level, it is also extremely relevant to note that when a 
household member violates a norm, not only is he himself or herself subject to gossip 
and criticisms, but members of his family will also be targeted. This is exemplified in the 
following paragraph transcribed by Zapata (2003) from a woman engaged in labour 
outside her home: 
 
‘At the beginning they would say that I, that my husband has no strength of character he does 
not control me, that as is said vulgarly, one is an asshole, he does not know how to control. And 
now they think that I cheat on him with another person, the people then have come to say, the 
person who is out of their home is because they have a lover. Yes, in the beginning that is what 
his friends said.’  
 
Not only is there a social sanction for the partner, who broke the norm, but gendered 
roles are interlinked in such a way that when a partner is violating a norm it directly 
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implies that the other is violating a norm too. Turning back to the previous example, the 
wife leaving home to go to work directly implied that the husband was not observing the 
norm of ‘controlling’ his wife.  Therefore, it is imperative to study how social sanctions 
influence and affect both spouses. This will be explored with more detail in a following 
section of this chapter.  
 
2.4.2.2 Internalization of norms 
 
‘I did notice a little that, for example, I would go out and he would stay alone. He even, look at 
this, when my daughters were small he would make his meal, and for me well I would feel, once 
I even went out, and at ten at night I entered here, between nine and ten at night I entered here 
and he was alone preparing his meal, it gave me so much, a remorse and I said “How is this 
possible? I am working for the people, and the people do not give me anything and my husband 
is making himself his own dinner, and there is no one to serve him, and I used to think, and I 
would stare and stare, and there I would be thinking.” (Odette, Campeche, 1999)’ (Zapata 2003) 
 
These words come from a Mexican woman who participated in a micro-credit scheme 
that required its participants to attend group meetings. It illustrates perfectly how norms 
have a grip on the mind. Given that norms are upheld by moral arguments and thus are 
value laden, a person who violates a norm independently of receiving social sanctions 
may also experience feelings of guilt and remorse which can be considered an internal 
policing system. ‘The process of creating an internal policing system is part of a 
broader process which is ordinarily called socialization.  It is the installation in the 
individual of something which may be called a conscience or a super ego: I will call it 
an internal sanctioning system.’ (Coleman 1990) 
When a person internalizes a moral argument, his sense of agency, the ‘ability to 
define one’s goals and act upon them can be devalued. This problem plays out in the 
literature on gender & well-being in the form of behaviour on the part of women which 
suggests that they have internalized their social status as persons of lesser value’ 
(Kabeer 1999). 
Norms vary in their level of subjectivity, this is, the extent to which a norm has been 
naturalized or internalized by people in the society. ‘Every established order tends to 
produce (to very different degrees and with very different means) the naturalization of 
its own arbitrariness. Of all the mechanisms tending to produce this effect, the most 
important and the best concealed is undoubtedly the dialectic of the objective chances 
and the agent’s aspirations, out of which arises the sense of limits, commonly called 
the sense of reality. When, owing to the quasi-perfect fit between the objective 
structures and the internalized structures which results from the logic of simple 
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reproduction, the established cosmological and political order is perceived as not 
arbitrary i.e. as one possible order among others, but as self-evident and natural order 
which goes without saying and therefore goes unquestioned, the agents aspirations 
have the limits as the objective conditions of which they are the product’ (Bourdieu 
1977). Bourdieu calls the experience doxa to distinguish it from other beliefs which 
imply awareness and recognition of the possibility of different antagonistic beliefs. This 
level of subjectivity will determine the extent to which the norm is widespread in the 
community. 
But how does a doxic norm in a society becomes uncovered?  ‘The truth of doxa is only 
ever fully revealed when negatively constituted by the constitution of field of opinion, 
the locus of the confrontation of competing discourses-whose political truth may be 
overtly declared or may remain hidden, even from the eyes of those engaged in it, 
under the guise of religious or philosophical oppositions.’ (Bourdieu 1977)  
The previous condition put forth by Bourdieu is a chief necessary condition, but others 
such as technological change also need to be acknowledged. Take for example the 
story of how norms relating to women’s employment in strawberry packing plants 
changed in Quiringucharo, a town in Mexico. The women’s realm was the domestic, 
and in the absence of running water and grinding mills for corn, household chores were 
extremely time consuming. Daughters remained clustered in the house, emerging only 
for such tasks as fetching water or washing clothes in the river. By 1970, with the 
availability of electricity, running water and wells for drinking water, domestic chores 
became less onerous and mothers would be more readily forgo their daughters’ 
assistance. The packing plants began selecting women recruiters from the village. 
Generally somewhat older than the majority of workers and well known to the local 
populace, the recruiters served as chaperones. Today, the packing plants are widely 
deemed to be appropriate workplaces for the young women of Quiringucharo (Gail 
1994). Thus, this research aimed to further uncover the household and individual 
characteristics that influence individuals’ internalization of social norms in both towns of 
Tehuacan.  
 
2.4.3 Social roles and social norms 
 
There is a concept which is closely related and interlinked to that of social norms, and 
which is key to the topic on wives participation in salaried employment: social roles. 
This term ‘refers to the behaviour expected of individuals who occupy particular social 
categories. Those categories have included statuses (positions) in social systems, 
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such as fathers in families, clerics in churches and professors in universities. They 
have also included less formal statuses, such as member of a movie audience, jogger 
in a park and consumer in a supermarket. Finally, they have included statuses 
reflecting cultural values of a society such as hard worker, concerned citizen and hip 
Californian (Zurcher 1983).’  
These behavioural expectations are learnt in the process of socialization. Further, they 
can be institutionalized in a society, organization or group, but do not have to be.  They 
can also arise in temporary groups in which shared understandings are developed 
(Zurcher 1983).  Therefore, social roles can be conventions, social norms or rules in an 
institute regarding the expected behaviour of a social category. 
Marriage is a social category within a society. As such, married women and men will 
have roles to fulfil within this institution. Yet the roles each of them has to conform to 
depend on gender and are therefore dissimilar.  As Whitehead (1981) states: ‘Marriage 
based households are constructed by definition on the basis of gender, with economic 
relations within such households also structured by gender.’   
According to Moser (1993), women in developing countries have a triple role. They are 
expected to be responsible for reproductive activities. These include childbearing and 
rearing and guarantee the maintenance and reproduction of the labour force. Women 
are also expected to carry out productive work, but as secondary earners. Usually, 
these income earning activities are done as self employment and are generally carried 
out within the household or in the neighbourhood. Thus, salaried employment is not 
part of a wife’s role as a married woman. Finally women also do some community 
managing work by providing items of collective consumption. Married men, on the other 
hand, have the role of primary income earners. Contrary to wives, they do not have a 
specifically defined reproductive role. Further, their role in the community is that of 
leadership. They organize at the formal political level.   
Therefore, the social norm indicating that a wife should not participate in salaried 
employment in this case is also a social role that wives are expected to fulfil, and is the 
expected behaviour of a woman in the social institution of marriage. Furthermore, it is 
an informal moral rule enforced by its internalization by other individuals and by social 
approval and disapproval. 
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2.4.4 Explaining the content of social norms 
 
But why and how do social norms come into existence? Horne (20001) describes three 
approaches for explaining the existence of social norms. The first claims that whatever 
the reason for initial action, when many people engage in the same behaviour, that 
behaviour comes to be associated with a sense of ‘oughtness’. Therefore, patterns of 
action emerge that then become normative.  
The second claims that norms emerge in response to externalities produced by 
behaviours of others. To the extent that individuals in a group or society benefit from 
others’ behaviours, they will want norms that institutionalize those behaviours. As long 
as people recognise a right to sanction such externality-behaviour and the group has 
the ability to enforce its decisions there are grounds for a social norm to exist. An 
example is the norm of not stealing. People in a society can recognize that the 
existence of this type of norm benefits them and provides them with a positive 
externality. 
The third approach focuses on meanings produced through negotiation. For people to 
interact successfully, they must share a common understanding of the situation they 
are in, their behaviours and their roles. These commonalities have typically been 
developed during previous encounters. For example, there may be tensions when 
husbands and wives attach different meanings to behaviour. For example if a husband 
offers to take care of children, he may perceive it as a gift while the wife may perceive it 
as an entitlement. Therefore, to avoid tensions, spouses need to negotiate common 
meanings for their actions. 
The argument put forth by the evolutionary psychological perspective is consistent with 
the first and second claims. It seeks to discover universal human nature as a collection 
of domain specific psychological mechanisms. A psychological mechanism is an 
information processing procedure or decision rule, acquired through natural and sexual 
selection that allows human beings to solve a particular adaptative problem (a problem 
of survival or reproduction). An adaptive problem, then, leads to an evolved 
psychological mechanism, which produces fitness maximizing behaviour in an 
environment of evolutionary adaptation. Evolved psychological mechanisms are 
therefore responsible for most of the preferences, desires and emotions produced in 
us, which account for human behaviour. However, the environment we live in now is 
very different from that of the environment of evolutionary adaptation and the original 
problem may no longer exist. Nevertheless, norms exist because most people behave 
in certain ways and their actions become statistically expected and socially prescribed. 
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Sanctions exist when many people are negatively affected by others’ non compliance 
with norms (Kanazawa and Still 2001). 
This line of argument is especially significant given that in the discussion of the causes 
of gender inequalities, biological and psychological differences are given considerable 
weight. ‘In modern society we feel that male-female is one social division that works in 
full and realistic harmony with our “biological inheritance” and is something which can 
never be denied’ (Goffman 1987). This is so especially for gendered norms regulating 
allocation of time in different activities within the household. Not everyone agrees with 
this point ‘Critics argue that because a trait is more or less universal, it does not follow 
that it is biological in its origin; there may be cultural factors of a general kind that 
produce some characteristics’ (Giddens 2001). 
Even though feminists have also strongly rejected biological determinism there is a 
new acknowledgement for the importance on gendered body differences. ‘The neglect 
of the body in the gender and development discourses is at least partly a result of 
anxiety about biological determinism which social theorists have, in different ways, 
moved beyond. It is now possible to think about biology and bodies in ways in which 
are not deterministic, since biology is no longer conceived as fixed, unchanging, rather 
the human body is seen as incomplete project whose material form is transformed over 
the passage of a life, through the inscriptions of health and working experience, culture 
and the intentions and choices of actors. Whilst twenty years ago ”body talk” involved 
ideas of biology as destiny, it is now possible to see the body as central to the very 
antithesis of determinism to agency’ (Jackson and Palmer-Jones 1999). 
The research will take a pragmatic approach. The objective of the research is to 
analyze how gendered social norms, once they are already in existence limit or expand 
individuals’ (as members of a household) opportunities to achieve well-being and what 
are the mechanisms or policies that reinforce these opportunities. This does not mean 
that biological differences are not to be taken into account. Given that women give birth 
and breastfeed their children, they will need additional labour conditions or extra help 
from their partners to achieve well-being (if we assume that working outside does in 
fact give them a greater level of well-being). 
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2.5 Capabilities and social norms 
 
It has been maintained previously in the chapter that it is necessary to study how social 
norms shape people’s motivations to understand how they influence their opportunities 
to achieve different functionings. This has some fundamental implications on the way in 
which the Capability approach is to be employed. I will examine the implications of 
social norms on the concept of entitlements, followed by a discussion of the reasons for 
which agency has to be included in the approach. Finally it will be argued that 
rationality cannot be used as a form of motivation. 
 
2.5.1 Entitlements and norms 
The Capability approach is concerned with the opportunities that individuals have for 
achieving well-being. The freedom that a person has in terms of the choice of 
functionings, given his personal features, will depend on his command over 
commodities or entitlements2 (Sen 1999). An entitlement relation applied to ownership 
connects one set of ownerships to another through certain rules of legitimacy. Each link 
in this chain of entitlement relations ‘legitimizes’ one set of ownership by reference to 
another. It will depend on the legal, political, economic and social characteristics of the 
society in question and the person’s position in it (Sen 1981). 
Social norms are a type of rule of legitimacy. We have to distinguish nevertheless 
between those social norms that influence household members’ incentives, and those 
which household members face as a restriction. An example of the first type of norms, 
are those which regulate the labour decisions in the household. In Mexico, social 
norms dictate that women should be the ones to dedicate themselves to housework 
while men should dedicate themselves to waged work. In a society where this is a 
doxic norm (i.e. naturalized) no one will question it and it will become a rule generally 
followed, or an entitlement. However if the norm is not doxic, not everyone will follow it.  
On the other hand, there are also social norms that affect households’ command over 
commodities or the ability to achieve functionings over which household members have 
no decision-making power. An example is that of women in Tehuacan, Puebla who 
receive a smaller wage controlling for age and education (Diaz Nuñez 2002). Another 
example is the lack of respect supervisors have towards women due to the stereotype 
that women are docile and weak. These last norms can be thought of as the social 
conversion factors that influence the means to achieve functionings, in this case 
                                                 
2 Some others like freedom of movement, are independent to the commodities owned by an 
individual. 
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participating in an assembly plant, into the freedom to achieve them, or capabilities. It 
will be an additional aim of this research to examine these.  
2.5.2 Agency and capabilities 
Social norms not only regulate the behaviour of individuals by specifying what is correct 
and what is not, but also end up shaping people’s perceptions of legitimacy and 
therefore their agency. As (Sen 1987) explains ‘Our actual agency role is often 
overshadowed by social rules and by conventional perceptions of legitimacy. In the 
case of gender divisions, these often act as barriers to seeking a more equitable deal 
and sometimes even militate against recognizing the spectacular lack of equity in the 
existing social arrangements.’  
Given that the focus in the Capability approach is to evaluate the opportunities people 
have to achieve well-being, this agency aspect has to be included. However, the only 
agency aspect that materializes in the Capability framework is the choice between 
available functionings and achieved ones. ‘It could perhaps be argued that the 
presence of a distinct self is integral to or taken for granted in the capability approach 
and therefore not a matter of concern in evaluative exercises (that is, exercises that 
seek to measure and/or assess individual well-being and social states).This might well 
be a reasonable assertion in non-traditional societies. In traditional societies, in 
contrast, a woman’s opportunity for achieving well-being would depend on very basic 
aspects of her agency’ (Iversen 2003). Thus when possible, wives’ agency will be 
taken into consideration.  
 
2.5.3 Rationality and norms  
It has been argued that there are two mechanisms by which social norms are enforced: 
one at the social level and another at the individual level. If social norms were only 
enforced at the social level by means of gossip and criticism, rationality could be 
feasibly defended with the argument that individuals weigh the benefits they would 
obtain from not complying with the norm, with the costs which come from social 
sanctions. A man wanting to dedicate himself to housework would therefore make a 
cost benefit analysis of the satisfaction he would get from dedicating himself to this 
activity versus the strong criticism he would receive from his friends and family from not 
complying with the role of a manly man. 
If one continues this argument, the next question that needs to be asked is why people 
sanction others. Sanctioning is not a pleasurable activity. Criticizing your friend can 
provoke unease in the relationship. It can be considered as a cost to the person who 
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sanctions. Axelrod (1986) offered the concept of ‘metanorms’, indicating that 
individuals would themselves be sanctioned by third parties if not they did not do so 
themselves. ‘Unfortunately this leads to an infinite regress’ (Rutherford 1996). ‘People 
do not usually frown upon others when they fail to sanction people who fail to sanction 
people who fail to sanction a norm violation’ (Elster 1989a). Therefore this previous 
explanation is not a satisfactory one.  
Another reason for which rationality cannot be sustained is because social norms are 
also internalized. ‘To examine the process by which norms are internalized is to enter 
waters that are treacherous for a theory grounded in rational choice’ (Coleman 1990). 
Because norms are value laden, the violation of them gives rise to feelings of unease 
such as embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame. To better understand what 
motivates individuals to comply with norms, it is necessary to comprehend the strong 
emotions that norms trigger. Yet Akerlof and Kranton (2000) model the effect of 
internalization of a socially prescribed behaviour by incorporating it into a utility 
function. Whether this is appropriate or not will depend on whether the feelings of guilt 
and remorse which arise from disregarding a social norm still follow the assumption of 
rationality with which a utility function can be determined.  
Additionally, norms in the case of doxa also determine preferences. A woman might 
prefer to dedicate herself exclusively to housework because this is seen as natural in 
the society or and because she has been taught that this is the correct thing to do.  As 
Sen (1987) suggests, people might attach less value to their own well-being and thus 
their personal interest might not be directed toward improving their personal welfare. 
Rationality thus does not seem to be a sufficient explanation for adherence to social 
norms. But can we throw away altogether the argument that rationality acts as a 
motivational structure? (Elster 1989a) argues for an eclectic view where ‘To accept 
social norms as a motivational mechanism is not to deny the importance of rational 
choice. One eclectic view is that some actions typically are influenced both by 
rationality and by norms. Sometimes, the outcome is a compromise between what the 
norm prescribes and what rationality dictates.’  
Because trying to understand how the feelings of embarrassment, guilt and shame 
influence individuals’ actions is a whole study in itself, this concern will not be 
accounted for in this research. Yet the concern related to wives’ perceived preferences 
will be acknowledged using the idea suggested by Sen (1987) in which individuals 
respond to perceived interests instead of utilities. As was discussed in the last section, 
the perception of interest might be influenced negatively by social norms. This might 
lead to these perceptions of interest to differ from a more objective notion of well-being. 
Focusing on perceived interests of women and their husbands, then, will shift the 
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interpretation of these neoclassical models without necessarily changing the 
mathematical properties of the solution. This can lead to a comparison between 
perceived interests and achieved functionings.  
At the social level, the extent to which a social norm is complied with will depend on the 
level of subjectivity of the moral arguments. This will determine the existence of groups 
who subscribe to the moral arguments or not (reference groups) and the existence of 
social sanctions in the society. At the individual level, it will depend on the individual 
characteristics, including his agency aspect, and the level of internalization of the 
arguments. An analysis of how social norms affect individual opportunities has to 
include these last factors, which ultimately affect their decisions (Figure 2-2) 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Social Norms influence on individuals motivations 
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2.6 Capabilities at the household level 
 
Up to now, all the analysis has been on how social norms influence individuals’ desires 
and the mechanisms through which social norms are enforced. What has not been 
taken into account, however, is that because individuals generally live in households 
with others, they usually do not make their decisions independently. If an individual 
desires to undertake an activity, he usually has to arrive at some form of arrangement 
with other members of his household. As Iversen (2003) argues ‘In interpersonal 
comparisons it is necessary to recognize that capabilities often have a distinctly 
interdependent dimension.’ ‘One would expect such interdependencies to be 
particularly stark within the household. This implies not only that the goods and 
services under your control may depend quite strongly on the characteristics of your 
partner, but also that the group-dependent constraints facing your partner will have 
repercussions for you. In short, by affecting the balance of power, possibly in complex 
ways, group dependent constraints will influence the intra-household distribution of 
goods and services; that is the means to achieve in the Capability Approach.’  
These bargaining processes are especially relevant for the Capability approach given 
that they influence the opportunity to achieve functionings. However, assessing how 
these bargaining processes affect the capabilities of household members is not a 
simple task. In the household cooperation and conflict simultaneously coexist (Sen 
1987). 
This is why, to understand how social norms ultimately have their impact on women’s 
labour decisions, it is crucial to explore first the effect of social norms on each 
member’s stance. This secondly should be followed by surveying the mechanisms by 
which the household members come to their decisions and each household member’s 
potential of actually engaging in these bargaining processes.  
Next, I will provide some evidence of negotiation in the household over the allocation of 
time, specifically, bargaining over waged labour. This will be followed by an exploration 
of intra-household economic theories that analyse how decisions are made within the 
household, and their approach to the concept of bargaining power, followed by a 
deeper analysis of these power relations and how social norms influence them.  
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2.6.1 Bargaining over labour 
 
In economics, intra-household models have focused on how household members 
divide between them consumption goods and services (gains from cooperation), which 
have already been produced or bought in the market. The allocation of time to different 
activities by household members will be determined by the maximization of the utilities 
household members obtain from the consumption of goods and services. Nevertheless, 
given a set of goods and services purchased by the household, there exist several 
cooperative arrangements which members of the household can allocate their time to.3 
For example, assume that a household has access only to waged work and 
housework. Several possibilities exist: the wife can do the housework while the 
husband engages in income earning activities, or it could be the other way round where 
the husband does the housework while the wife works for a wage, or they can 
ultimately decide to both do some amount of both types of activities. What makes 
couples decide which of these possibilities will prevail in their household? 
Household members’ human capital, households’ endowment of capital and land, and 
demand for labour will of course have much to do with the allocation of time in a 
household. Social norms, nevertheless, also play an important role in this 
determination. When there is no complete internalization of norms and if women 
perceive that waged work will provide them with well-being, they might engage in some 
negotiation processes with their husbands to engage in these activities.  
From interviews carried out with women on the Mexican border, Gates (2002) finds that 
employment is an important interest for which women negotiate. She found that women 
sometimes offered housework, a financial contribution to the household or specific 
large household endeavours such as house-building, as a bargaining strategy to win 
the right to work. Some wives used economic crisis to justify their interest in working for 
wages. Some women even resorted to threats in their negotiations about seeking 
employment.  
Kabeer (2000) also finds evidence of married women negotiating with their husbands 
the right to take up factory employment in Bangladesh. A common strategy for women 
to overcome men’s resistance was to invoke the welfare of the children. Some women 
had even taken up employment in the face of their husbands’ opposition. 
The process through which household members bargain and the power or chances 
they have of winning consent to their participation in different types of activities must be 
                                                 
3 Most economic models do not take this fact into account given that they assume that there is 
only one productive activity and leisure. The solution on how much time to allocate in which one 
is de facto solved by the maximization of utilities that will follow from participating in each one. 
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analyzed to understand exactly how social norms affect household labour decisions, 
which in turn affect members’ well-being. Next, some economic intra-household models 
are analysed.  
2.6.2 Intra-household models 
The first economic models that took into account the possibility of preference 
differences between household members and analyzed how these bargained over the 
distribution of commodities were those based on the ‘axiomatic bargaining approach’. 
In this approach ‘Bargaining occurs when there are several cooperative arrangements 
and parties have conflicting preferences over them… Parties are assumed to have a 
common interest in arriving at some agreement that is to be’ (Elster 1989b).  The 
determination of reasonable social compromises can be understood as an implicit 
arbitrator who tries to distribute the gains from cooperation in a manner that reflects 
‘fairly’ the bargaining strengths of the different agents. The objective of these models is 
to obtain a rule that assigns a solution to every bargaining problem adopting an 
axiomatic point of view and the origin of the theory is game theoretic (related to ideas 
of cooperative game theory) (Mas-Collell, Whinston et al. 1995). 
Nash (1950) proposed the first bargaining rule, the most prevalent one and the one 
used in cooperative bargaining models. To obtain this bargaining rule, he idealizes the 
bargaining problem by assuming that the two individuals are highly rational, that each 
can accurately compare his desires for various things and that each has full knowledge 
of the tastes and preferences of the other. He also establishes several axioms4 of 
which a very important and controversial one is that of Pareto optimality. This axiom 
states that it should not be possible to improve the outcome of one party without loss 
for the other. Given these axioms, the only possible bargaining rule will be the product 
of their utilities.5 Given a set of feasible utility pairs, the bargaining rule and the 
disagreement point which specifies the utility of the outcome that will be produced if the 
                                                 
4 These include the necessary axioms for having Von-Morgenstern utility functions, another one 
which states that the solution should be invariant with respect to positive linear utility 
transformations, one requiring that if the solution to a larger game remains feasible in a smaller 
game, it should also be a solution in the latter and is the feasible set is symmetrical around the 
45 degree line, with the disagreement point on that line, the solution should also be on that line. 
 
5 Other bargaining solutions have been explored, like that of the Pareto Optimal point which 
equalizes the utility for its members, or the one which maximizes the sum of utilities of the 
parties or some point which implies a larger utility gain from the poor person than for the rich. 
However these do not satisfy one axiom which the Nash bargaining solution does. Elster, J. 
(1989b). The Cement of Society: The Study of Social Order. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, Mas-Collell, A., M. D. Whinston, et al. (1995). Microeconomic Theory. New York, Oxford. 
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parties fail to reach an agreement, a solution to the bargaining problem can be 
determined. 
The disagreement point is determined by the utility one can expect in the absence of 
cooperation with the other player, and is what establishes which Pareto optimal 
agreement is reached. In intra-household models the disagreement point reflects either 
the dissolution of the marriage or the ceasing of cooperation within it. Which one holds 
will depend on the credibility of threatening on each state, which in turn will be affected 
by the payoffs the members can obtain in each state and if there is redistribution of 
assets  upon separation (Fafchamps 2001). The members’ alternative to participating 
in the household economy, or ‘exit option’ will in the end be influenced by ‘a person’s 
independent wealth (non-labour income), their market wage rate, their independent 
basket of consumer goods and a series of Extra-Environmental parameters that  
capture individual or gender specific  well-being outside the household – the state of 
the marriage market, property rights legislation and enforcement, labour or capital 
market discrimination’ (Katz 1997). The threat point or exit option is thus what gives an 
individual bargaining power or the power to achieve a Pareto optimal point to their 
advantage. 
Several criticisms both to this approach and its application to intra-household models 
have emerged. With regard to the approach, a strong criticism is provided by (Elster 
1989b). He argues that ‘Beginning with Nash himself, many writers have felt that the 
cooperative theory of bargaining is an unsatisfactory description of behaviour. Pareto 
Optimality should be derived as a theorem from individualistic premises, not stipulated 
as an axiom.’ As a predictive theory there is no evidence that the outcome of a 
bargaining situation will necessarily be Pareto Optimal. From a normative point of view 
it is not attractive either. Pareto optimality would allow a member of the household to 
have all the resources while the other would not have much.6  This is an especially 
important aspect to bear in mind. The aim is to normatively assess the well-being of all 
members of the household. However, in this research there are two different basic 
concerns from those of the intra-household cooperative bargaining models. One is 
household members’ well-being, not in utility terms but in terms of functionings and the 
opportunity to achieve them (capabilities). The other is the concern for equality in one’s 
opportunities to achieve functionings, not the efficiency of the outcomes. It must be 
made clear nevertheless that to be able to normatively assess a certain outcome one 
cannot ignore the predictive content of the problem, or explain how people react to 
different factors.  
                                                 
6 For critiques to other axioms, see Elster, J. (1989b). The Cement of Society: The Study of 
Social Order. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
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With respect to the application of the bargaining approach to intra-household models 
strong criticisms have been made by feminist scholars. They argue that intra-
household models fail to recognize that household members are treated as gendered 
beings and not just separate individuals. Additionally, the axiomatic nature of the Nash 
solution deprives these models of any institutional content, since they say nothing 
about the way in which threat points are actually utilized in the negotiation process, 
much less about the nature of the conjugal contract that enforces the particular 
allocation of household resource that results from cooperative bargaining (Katz 1997). 
Based on these criticisms Carter and Katz (1997) introduce to intra-household models 
the concept of ‘Voice’, meaning the right and ability to enter into the household 
bargaining process. This concept includes both personal attributes such as boldness 
and lack of fear of disagreement that make members more willing and able to assert 
themselves in the household decision-making process, and institutional characteristics 
such as roles determined by prevailing social norms. Mathematically, the voice 
parameter of an individual is incorporated into the bargaining models as a relative 
weight. 
A special concern which has been addressed previously is the critique of (Sen 1987): 
‘the main drawback of the bargaining problem format applied to gender divisions arises 
not so much from the nature of any particular solution but from the formulation of the 
problem itself… the perception of interest is neither likely to be precise nor 
unambiguous.’ He argues that there are two distinct issues. The first is the perception 
of interest of each household member and some more objective notion of well-being. 
The second limitation comes from not taking into account the perceived contributions of 
members of the family.  In terms of this research, these concerns are addressed by 
focusing on perceived interests instead of utilities and by analyzing how these are 
influenced by the internalization of social norms of each member of the household 
family. 
Agarwal (1997) argues that traditional bargaining models typically employ narrow view 
of the determinants of power within households. She further points out that both 
quantifiable and qualitative factors determine relative bargaining strength within a 
family. Specifically, these can be listed as: ownership of and control over assets, 
especially arable land; access to employment and other income earning means; 
access to communal resources such as village commons and forests; access to 
traditional social support systems such as patronage, kinship, caste groupings, etc.; 
support from NGO’s; support from the state; social perceptions of needs, contributions 
and other determinants of deservedness and social norms. These last are the concerns 
of this research. 
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It is clear that the bargaining solution to any cooperative arrangement in the household 
will depend greatly on the household members’ power. If one is to analyze decisions 
related to women’s incorporation in the labour market, it is imperative then to study 
what it is that gives them and their partners a say in, or the power to decide, these 
issues. Economists have reduced this concept of power to a parameter for the 
convenience of simplification, but the power of household members and the 
mechanisms through which it is enforced is evidently more complex. This is why a 
deeper analysis on these will follow. 
It is also very important to notice that social norms will not only influence a couple’s 
desires for the wife to enter in salaried work, but will also have an effect on the relative 
power of each. If one is to investigate how social norms influence women’s labour 
participation, it is chief to include in the analysis how they influence household 
members’ power too. 
2.6.3 Power  
The meaning of the word ‘power’ has been greatly disputed in the social sciences. As 
Lukes (2005) explains, this disagreement arises because the word ‘power’ is 
polysemic: it has multiple meanings which are appropriate to different settings and 
concerns. This has led to authors using it as it suits them to understand the specific 
question they are trying to answer. Going to the Latin roots of the word helps to better 
understand the discrepancies that have risen with relation to its definition: 
Potentia: signifies the power of things in nature, including persons, ‘to exist and act’. 
Potestas: is used when speaking of being in the power of other. 
Potestas then, is a subset of Potentia. The distinction between them is an important 
one. In the literature, ‘power’ is sometimes used to mean potentia and sometimes 
potestas. I will first explore the latter and then go into the former, which will be the one 
of interest for the actual research. 
 Potestas  
Lukes (2005) constructs the following definition from John Locke’s characterization of 
power: to be ‘able to make, to receive or resist change.’ This scope of power is 
consistently used in the feminist studies of empowerment. For example, a definition is 
provided by Kabeer (1999) who refers to power as ‘the ability to make choices’. Both 
are quite similar given that if someone has the ability to make choices then he/she is 
able to make and resist change.  
The use of this wider view of power by feminists is understandable. Their objective is to 
analyze how it is possible for women to become powerful, or be empowered. 
‘Empowerment entails a process of change. People who exercise a great deal of 
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choice in their lives may be very powerful, but they are not empowered… because they 
where never disempowered in the first place’(Kabeer 1999). Their objective is to 
empower women or to provide them with means that allow them to make choices in all 
aspects of their lives. Feminists’ definition of power needs then to encompass all 
important areas where women can take decisions.  
Given that power, used in this broad sense, manifests itself in numerous ways it is 
useful to categorize it. Rowlands (1997) classifies the different forms of power in the 
following way: 
? Power over: Controlling power, which may be responded to with compliance, 
resistance (which weakens processes of victimization), or manipulation. 
? Power to: Generative or productive power (sometimes incorporating or 
manifesting as forms of resistance or manipulation) which creates new 
possibilities and action without domination. 
? Power with: the whole being greater than the sum of the individuals, especially 
when a group tackles the problems together. 
? Power from within: the spiritual strength and uniqueness that resides in each 
one of us and making us truly human. Its basis is self acceptance and self 
respect which extend in turn, to respect for and accept others as equals. 
Moreover, these different forms of power can operate either at the personal, relational 
or collective level. In the present research the interest is to focus on power at the 
relational level, specifically the processes and mechanisms household members use to 
negotiate wives’ labour allocation in waged work. Specifically, the concern is to 
explicitly analyze the forms of power that restrict members’ capabilities, automatically 
excluding power to and power with from the analysis. This does not mean that some of 
these forms of power will not be included implicitly. Power to, for example, is implied by 
the cooperation of members in the household while engaging in doing tasks. 
Power from within is a key concept for this research and in the capability approach. To 
be able to bargain for ones preferences, one must have power from within. However, 
this concept is almost identical to that of agency. Agency implies the ability to define 
one’s goals and act upon them. Agency is about more than observable action; it also 
encompasses the meaning, motivation and purpose which individuals bring to their 
activity, their sense of agency, or the ‘power from within’ (Kabeer 1999). The concept of 
agency has been more commonly used in the capabilities literature instead of power 
from within. It will also be used in this manner in the research. 
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Potentia and freedom 
This research will take on Lukes (2005) characterisation of power. It is important to 
note that in his conceptualization, the focus is primarily on power in the political sphere. 
For this reason, some adaptations will be made to better suit the discussion at the 
household level.  
Lukes focuses on a subset of ‘potestas’: power as domination or power over. ‘Potestas’ 
refers to the ability to constrain the choices individuals face. Nevertheless, constraining 
the choices of someone may sometimes favour instead of disfavour the interests of 
these who are subject to it, and thus promote freedom. His example is one where the 
government restricts the choices of the population by regulating the use of seat belts or 
when a mother prohibits her child to do something for the sake of the child’s well-being. 
To distinguish between this form of power and those which are not in the interest of 
those subject to it, he defines ‘Power as domination’ which refers to the ability to 
constrain the choices of others, coercing them or securing their compliance, by 
impeding them from living as their own judgment dictate. 
This type of freedom is different to the one Sen uses in the Capability approach. Sen 
(1985) distinguishes between two different types of freedom: ‘Agency Freedom’ and 
‘Well-being’ freedom. A person’s ‘agency freedom’ refers to what a person, as a 
responsible agent, is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals and values he 
or she regards as important. The term ‘responsible’ does not imply that the person’s 
view of his agency has no need for discipline, and that anything that appeals to him 
must, for that reason, come into accounting of his agency freedom. The need for 
careful assessment of aims, objectives, allegiances, etc. and of conception of the good 
may be important and enacting. This is the type of freedom Lukes seems to be 
referring to. Well-being freedom relates to a person’s capability to have various 
functioning vectors and to enjoy the corresponding well-being achievements. The 
capability approach, compared to Lukes, is concerned with well-being freedom. 
Sen (1985) does not imply that agency freedom is not valuable. He only maintains that 
each type of freedom is important for different reasons. ‘The well-being aspect of a 
person is important in assessing a person’s advantage, whereas the agency aspect is 
important in assessing what a person can do in line with his conception of the good.’ 
‘the well-being aspect may be particularly important in some specific contexts, in 
making public provisions for social security, or in planning for the fulfilment of basic 
needs (Sen 1985).’ 
The distinction between agency freedom and well-being freedom is especially 
important in the context of the proposed research. The internalization of norms may 
imply that the notions of deservedness of women are affected. Their incentives then 
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would be different from the enhancement of their well-being. Would they be achieving 
agency freedom? This would depend on whether these women are considered 
responsible or not. This sounds difficult to imply given the negative weight of the term.  
It is not the same to identify as irresponsible a person whose conception of the good is 
to kill people as one who relinquishes his/her well-being for that of others. 
On the other hand, we can be certain that the diminution of a women’s notion of 
deservedness does imply a curtailment of agency as defined by Kabeer (1999): ‘ability 
to define one’s goals and act upon them.’ This curtailment of agency does lead to a 
restriction of well-being agency. As Iversen (2003) explains, if ‘developing the agency 
aspect of Nirmala’s (X) personhood is instrumental to her achievement of equality and 
well-being within the household, it is reasonable to expect this aspect of her agency to 
provide information that will be relevant to an evaluation of her opportunities to achieve 
well-being.’ Because the research objective is to measure household members’ well-
being freedom, special attention needs to be given to agency and a comparison with 
well-being freedom needs to be done.  
2.6.4 Three dimensions of power 
Lukes (2005) argues for a three-dimensional view of power, which basically consists of 
the following aspects: 
One Dimension 
Some forms of power can be observed by identifying specific outcomes to see who 
actually prevails in the decision-making. It is assumed that decisions involve direct 
actual and observable conflict over selected issues that are controversial. The 
conflict is between preferences that are assumed to be consciously made, exhibited 
in actions and thus to be discovered in observing peoples behaviour. In the case 
that corresponds to our study, one-dimensional view of power would prevail if for 
example the wife wants to work for a wage in the factory and her husband does not 
want her to. There will then be an observable power if the woman manifests her 
desire to work but is not allowed to. 
Second Dimension 
Creating barriers that prevent decision-making from being actual and manifesting 
itself as non-decision-making can reflect power. Someone can succeed from 
preventing someone else from bringing up an issue. It therefore includes covert 
conflict. For example, a man may have such authority over his wife that even if she 
desires to work for waged employment, if he does not want her to work she will not 
explicitly express her desire. 
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Both for the first and second dimensions of power, the mechanisms a person can 
use to obtain it are coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation. 
Coercion: A secures B’s compliance by the threat of severe deprivation where there 
is a conflict over values or course of action between A and B. 
Influence: A, without resorting to either tacit or an overt threat of severe deprivation, 
causes B to change his course of action.  
Authority: B complies because he recognizes that A’s command is reasonable in 
terms of his own values either because its content is legitimate and reasonable or 
because it has been arrived at through a legitimate and reasonable procedure. 
Force: A achieves his objectives in the face of B’s non-compliance by stripping him 
of the choice between compliance and non-compliance. 
Manipulation: is an aspect or sub-concept of force, where the compliance is found 
in the absence of recognition on the complier’s part either of the source or of the 
exact nature of the demand upon him. 
Third Dimension 
There are also socially constructed and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, 
and policies by institutions.  A may also exercise power over B by shaping his 
wants by control of information through mass media and through the process of 
socialization. As mentioned before, Lukes (2005) here is conceptualizing ‘power as 
domination’ to analyze its use in the political sphere. Power’s third dimension then 
fits perfectly well with an analysis of the collective level. What about at the relational 
level? 
In this research, the interest is precisely to analyze how these culturally and socially 
patterned behaviours impact the household at a given moment in time. The shaping 
of wants of household members will be closely related to the concepts of 
subjectivity and internalization of social norms and will therefore be of interest in the 
research. But, because the culturally patterned behaviour of groups is not 
established at a given moment by the household members, we cannot talk about 
the power of household member A over B. However because the freedom to 
achieve well-being of a member, say A, is being restricted, it can be said that there 
is power over member A.  
2.6.5 Power at the household level  
The aim of this research, then, is to study how the power of household members 
relates to the intra-household division of activities. Power will therefore refer to the 
ability to constrain the choices of individuals or to be able to take one’s own choices 
relative to the participation on the different activities household undertake. Two crucial 
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remarks need to be made at this point about the exercise of power in one and two 
dimensions. One is that only when the preferences of household members contravene 
each other it is possible for the exercise of power in these dimensions to be present. 
For example, if the woman desires to deviate from the norm and the husband agrees 
she should do this, then there would be no exercise of power even though there might 
be an understanding that he has the capacity or ‘power’ to stop her from doing so if he 
wishes. The second crucial point is that in both dimensions the exercise of power will 
only have one of two outcomes (discrete outcomes): if a wife desires to work for a 
wage, the end result is either that she does or that she doesn’t. Therefore, power will 
be zero-sum. If one person wins, the other loses.  
The exercise of power for a wife X and a husband Y in different dimensions can be 
represented by the following diagram: 
Figure 2-3: Three dimensions of power 
 
 
Power identifies a capacity, not an actuality. Take for example the case in which, 
because of her preferences, the wife decides she wants to engage in waged work, and 
her husband agrees. There is no exercise of power. However, if he were against the 
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idea, there might be an understanding that he has the capacity or ‘power’ to stop her 
from doing so. 
It is crucial therefore to understand which factors enable this capacity or ‘power’ that a 
household member has. The entitlements of a person, including social norms, can 
influence their relative power as a household member. For example, a social norm 
which stipulates that women have to ask their husbands’ permission to engage in an 
activity will provide the husband with all the authority in a relationship and therefore 
with the power to decide whether women are able to engage in waged employment. 
2.7 Complete framework 
 
The objective of this research is to comprehend the mechanisms by which social norms 
restrict women’s opportunities to deviate from their established gendered time 
allocating roles. To achieve this, it is necessary first to understand the different 
functionings these women can achieve by engaging in an activity that agrees with their 
prescribed social norm versus one that would imply a deviation from it. The study will 
focus on reproductive and self-employed occupations as an example of the first type of 
activities and waged work (specifically, assembly plant employment) as an example of 
the second type.  
The possibility of achieving different functionings by engaging in these activities will 
depend on four factors. The first is the activity’s characteristics (gratification, having a 
wage or not). The second relates to the working conditions offered in each place 
(temperature, light, ventilation). The third relates to the human capitaland body capital 
women posses (weight, health).  Finally, it will depend upon the social conversion 
factors (social norms).  
A straightforward assessment of which activity provides wives with greater well-being is 
not straightforward. This is so because wives’ participation in assembly plant 
employment has both positive and negative effects on their achievement of 
functionings. What is more, wives also have dissimilar characteristics and preferences. 
What is considered by one wife as attractive might not be so for another. For this 
reason, the aim will be to identify how and the conditions that influence wives 
engagement in maquilas enhances or worsens wives achievement of functionings. 
The objective is to analyze how social norms influence spouses’ motivations and thus 
restrict wives possibilities to achieve those functionings which are attainable through 
salaried employment. Social norms are validated in a society by one or more moral 
arguments which aim at explaining why the norm is the appropriate behaviour to follow. 
Further there are two mechanisms by which social norms are enforced. One is through 
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the internalization of a norm by people in the society. Given that norms are value laden, 
a person who violates it might experience feelings of guilt and remorse. We can say 
then that norms influence and shape preferences and perceptions of individuals in the 
society. On another hand, norms are enforced through social sanctions upholding each 
moral argument. The violation of a norm will be punished by gossip, criticism and in 
extreme cases ostracism and violence by others. These social sanctions can be 
thought of as costs in which individuals incur in the case of norm violation. 
 
Figure 2-4: Mechanisms by which social norms influence individual’s 
motivations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of women’s time allocation to different activities, social norms will dictate 
the socially accepted occupations they should participate in. Therefore social norms 
through their two enforcing mechanisms, plus a wife’s entitlements (i.e. the wage she 
can receive for waged work given her level of education and experience) and those of 
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her household (representing household’s availability of commodities) added to their 
personal characteristics will influence their desires to deviate from an established norm. 
However, because married women live in households they usually have to negotiate 
their involvement in waged activities with their husbands. Their husbands, in turn, are 
also subject to social sanctions and the internalization of norms relating to their wife’s 
norm deviation. Therefore, the effect of social norms on their perceived preferences 
regarding their wives’ involvement in salaried employment also needs to be explored. 
If a married woman has an interest in deviating from a norm and this desire 
contravenes that of her husband then the outcome will depend on the bargaining power 
and negotiation mechanisms each spouse uses. This power can be classified in 
several ways. In the first dimension there will be power if the wife participates in 
assembly plant employment. On the other hand, the husband will be the one with 
power in this first dimension if she does engage in a salaried job. In a second 
dimension the wife will prefer to dedicate time to wage work but does not explicitly 
express her desire to do so. We can then say that the husband exercises power in this 
second dimension.  There will be power in a third dimension (though it cannot be said 
the husband has it) if the wife does not desire to participate in salaried employment due 
to her internalization of the moral arguments. Figure 2-4 illustrates the mechanisms by 
which social norms influence spouses’ motivation and negotiation mechanisms within 
the household.  
 
2.7.1 Mathematical formalization 
 
A mathematical formalization on the previous framework is complex for the various 
reasons stated previously. To begin with, social norms do not only influence individual 
motivations, but they also act as social conversion factors in their achievement of 
functionings. Furthermore, a violation of a norm can raise feelings of shame and guilt 
with which the assumption of rationality can be difficult to hold. Furthermore, social 
norms also have an influence on household members’ power and the mechanisms that 
each use. Yet for description and depiction purposes, following, a model will be 
established.  
It is challenging to set up a quantitative relation between social norms and individuals’ 
actions. Economists have so far attempted it by using the concept of social interactions 
to connect these two variables. This last term refers to the ‘the propensity of an 
individual to behave in some way that varies with the prevalence of that behaviour in 
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some reference group containing the individual (Manski 1993).’ Social norms are not 
the only reason why these effects might be present, however. The effects may arise 
because of peer influences, imitation, contagion or neighbourhood effects.  Yet, 
Kevane and Wydick (2001) in their study on the effects of social norms on women’s 
time allocation in Burkina Faso use a social interaction term to fully represent social 
norms. Fletschner and Carter (2006), in their study of women’s demand for credit in 
Paraguay, combine the use of this term with a ‘social environmental’ one, which 
identifies the role women inherit and which are articulated by institutions such as the 
church or her spouse.  
Still, neither of these studies account for the two mechanisms by which norms are 
enforced; internalization and social sanctions. This might be due to the definition of 
social norms which is commonly specified in which an individual subscribes to a norm 
given that others subscribe to it as well. It must also be clarified that in this study the 
actions of the members of a wife’s reference group are not directly identified and 
measured as done in Feltchner and Carter (2006) and Bandiera and Rasul (2006). 
Alternatively, wives were asked about their beliefs regarding the behaviour of those in 
their refrence group. Nonetheless, even if the term ‘social interactions’ is much broader 
than the definition used in this research, its mathematical representation will be helpful 
for constructing a model. 
In this section a binary choice model for a married woman’s desire to participate in 
salaried employment will be specified. The model is an adaptation to the one 
developed by Brock, W. A. & Durlauf, S. N., (2001).To this end, we assume there is a 
population of I  wives and each one is identified with an integer ni ,...,1= . Each wife 
faces a binary choice of action { }1,0∈a , where 1=a  if she participates in assembly 
plant employment, and 0=a  if she does not. Further, every wife maximizes her 
expected perceived preference function U . This function will depend upon the 
observable characteristics of wives and the functionings which can be achieved in each 
state; on wife´s beliefs concerning the behaviours of others in the society  (in this 
case, the extent to which wives expect members of their reference group to participate 
in assembly plant employment and to socially sanction them); and on unobservable 
characteristics of wives )1(iε  and )0(ε .   
The expected perceived preference function will also depend on the moral arguments 
which validate the social norm indicating that wives should not participate in assembly 
plant employment.  Thus, if for wife , 1=ia , she will be deviating from this specified 
norm. If she has internalized the norm, she will experience guilt and remorse and will 
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therefore experience a ‘cost’ in doing so. It is assumed that the internalization of a 
moral argument will depend upon how much the norm is followed in the society. 
Additionally, if a wife participates in assembly plant employment each one of her 
reference groups  .,...,1 Kk = , each one a subset of { }n,...,1 that does not contain i , 
will impose a cost on her kip  by sanctioning her using each one of the moral 
arguments.  
Without loss of generality and for simplicity´s sake, it is assumed in the model that 
there is only one moral argument (instead of the three identified in the area of study). It 
is also assumed that the perceived preference function can be additively decomposed 
into the following: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )()(,)(,,)(,, , iikiiiiiiiikiiii aPaSaZaIZaVaPZau εμμμ +++= −− , 
 
where ( )ii ZaV ,  represents the deterministic private utility, ( ))(, , iii aZaI −μ  represents 
the deterministic utility from the internalization of a social norm, ( ))(, kii PaS μ  
represents the utility from social sanctions and )( ii aε  represents a random 
unobservable utility.   
To illustrate the effects of social sanctions parametric assumptions about the perceived 
payoff function are made. Firstly, it is assumed that the private deterministic utility 
function can be represented by a linear function: 
 
( ) ,, iiiiii kahZaU +=  
 
where ( )Zhhi =  and ( )Zkki =  are chosen so that  
 
( ) ii khZU +=,1  , and   
 
( ) ikZU =,0  .  Note that ik can be negative. 
 
This linearization can be done as this function coincides with the original utility function 
on the support of the individual choices. 
Second, it is assumed that internalization of a moral argument has a quadratic effect 
and depends on the mean of others’ actions. The payoff for following an internalized 
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norm has a quadratic conformity effect and iθ represents the desire for conformity with 
the moral argument.  
 
( ) 2)()(,, iiiiiii aaaaZaI −− −−= θμ  
 
The previous argument implies that a norm is felt more strongly the higher the number 
of individuals who obey it. 
Third, it is assumed that each reference group imposes a social sanction in the form of 
a fixed cost kip  when the wife participates in assembly plant employment:  
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Therefore the expected perceived preference function can be expressed as: 
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Therefore, when a wife participates in assembly plant employment she experiences 
two direct costs in doing so: a negative internalization effect whose magnitude depends 
upon the number of individuals in the society who follow the norm, and the social 
sanctions she receives from each of her reference groups.  
When a wife does not participate in assembly plant employment, her utility is: 
 
( ) kPZau ikiiii =− θ,,,,0  
 
Note that if a wife does not participate in assembly plant employment, and thus 
complies with the prescribed norm, her utility will depend only upon her characteristics 
and achieved functionings.  
A wife will desire to participate in salaried employment if: 
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( ) ( ))(,,,0)(,,,1 ikiiiikiii aPZuaPZu −− > μμ 7 
 
Yet, even if she desires to work in an assembly plant job it does not imply that she will, 
because she has to negotiate this decision with her husband. It is assumed that a 
husband will have the same perceived preference function as his wife, which depends 
upon her actions: 
 
( ) )()(,,,
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If  ( ) ( ))(,,,0)(,,,1 ikiihiikiihi aPZuaPZu −− > μμ  then she will participate in assembly plant 
employment, as the payoff function for both husband and wives is greater when she 
participates than when she doesn’t.  Yet if: 
 
( ) ( ))(,,,1)(,,,0 ikiihiikiihi aPZuaPZu −− > μμ  
 
She will have to negotiate with her husband on this decision.  The outcome will depend 
on the bargaining power of each. Therefore, her expected perceived well-being 
resulting from her negotiating with her husband will be: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ))(,,,01)(,,,1)( ikiiiiikiiiiwi aPZuaPZuuE −− ⋅−+⋅= μλμλ  
 
Here λ  is the probability she attributes to winning the bargaining process, which can 
be interpreted as the relative bargaining power of women. This bargaining 
power ))(,,,( mSZZ ehiiii μλλ = , where iZ are the characteristics and achieved 
functionings of wives,  hiZ  are those of her husband,  are the social sanctioning 
related to negotiating mechanisms and 
em are the expected mechanisms she ascribes 
to her husband. 
It is assumed that if she bargains she will incur a fixed bargaining cost ))(( mb ee μ which 
depends on the mechanisms she believes her husband will use. For example if she 
                                                 
7 Generally, economic studies construct a model for the equilibrium in a society where each 
individual maximizes his utility subject to the actions of others. This is out of the scope of this 
research. 
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expects her husband to hit her, this can be considered an emotional cost she incurs in 
bargaining. 
The wife will bargain to engage in productive activities if her expected perceived well-
being resulting from doing so is greater than her well-being if she only dedicates herself 
to reproductive work. She will therefore bargain if: 
 
)0()( =≥+ aubuE iewi  
 
There are two important issues to be highlighted here. First, women will not always get 
involved in a negotiation process with their husbands, even though they may desire to, 
and expect to win the bargaining process, given that there are bargaining costs in 
doing so. In this case power in the second dimension will prevail. 
Second, without the existence of norms regulating women’s engagement in different 
activities, women’s desire to participate in each activity will depend only on their 
characteristics and the perceived well-being resulting from the functionings achieved by 
such participation. The same would be true regarding their husbands’ perceived 
preferences, as they are also subject to social sanctions and internalization regarding 
their wives’ engagement in paid work. Further, without norms, wives would also have 
more power to negotiate with their husbands. Norms then, by imposing costs on 
individuals, restrict women’s opportunities to achieve well-being.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the methods used to answer the research questions. 
First, the choice of the fieldwork location is justified and explained. Second, the 
techniques used to collect information are detailed. It is also explained why for the 
terms of this research it was optimal to gather qualitative and quantitative information. 
Finally, it outlines how the recollected materials were analyzed and interpreted. 
 
 
3.2 Characteristics of this case study 
 
The objective of the study was to investigate how social norms restrict wives’ 
opportunities of participating in salaried employment. To achieve this, the research site 
needed to be one where there was widespread demand for female labour.  Since 1994, 
textile assembly plants that largely hire female employees were established in the 
Tehuacan region of Mexico. Thus a source of salaried jobs for women was created 
where previously it was nonexistent. However, the recent creation of these types of 
jobs meant that social norms regarding female employment were still widespread.  
Specifically, fieldwork was conducted in two towns of the Tehuacan area: San Gabriel 
Chilac and Santiago Miahuatlan. These towns were ideal research sites given that both 
were rural locations before assembly plants were built, and thus employment for 
uneducated female labour8 was created. Additionally, these two towns were attractive 
because they share similar characteristics. The population size of both is similar; 
Miahuatlan has a population of 12,765 while Chilac’s population is 11,3339. Education 
levels and access to services such as drinking water, drainage and electricity are also 
comparable. Moreover, the two are very close and well connected to the city of 
Tehuacan where they can access services such as banks, hospitals, and markets. 
The focus of the research was narrowed to analyzing how social norms influence 
wives’ decisions to participate in assembly plant employment. Even though there exist 
other alternative salaried opportunities for women in these towns, such as being a 
sales clerk or working as a maid for a rich home, these do not compare to those 
created by textile plants. This lack of alternative sources of employment for wives led to 
                                                 
8 As will be seen later, the average years of education for a married woman are 5.63 years, only 
a little less that primary level. It can be concluded therefore that overall, education levels of 
married women are low.  
9 Instituto Nacional de Geografía y Estadística. (INEGI). Conteo de Población y Vivienda. 2005. 
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our narrowing the analysis down to assembly plant jobs. Moreover, the functionings 
wives can obtain by participating in salaried employment differ for each occupation. For 
example, the timetable of a maid differs greatly from that of a worker in an assembly 
plant. While the latter has a fixed and full timetable, the former depends more on her 
boss’ current needs. The social norms and moral arguments regulating the participation 
of wives in each activity are also dissimilar. For instance, it might be regarded as 
improper for women to work in an assembly plant because they interact with men 
there. Maids, on the other hand, do not interact with men other than their bosses.  
Therefore analyzing the effects of social norms on one specific activity, the prevalent 
one, will allow us to better investigate the mechanisms in question.  
Participation rates of married women in the assembly plants of San Gabriel Chilac are 
starkly different from those of Santiago Miahuatlan. Wives’ employment rate in 
assembly plants in Santiago Miahuatlan is 18.6% while that of Chilac is 6.9%. It is 
pertinent to ask, then, whether social norms have a role to play in this outcome. This is 
yet another reason why these were the optimal research sites. Thus, the location 
allows us to see the different mechanisms through which social norms are enforced 
and affect both individual and household decisions. 
 
3.3 Fieldwork techniques 
 
Given the restrictions in both time and resources, the research used a cross-sectional 
design where information was collected at one specific point in time. Additionally, both 
qualitative and quantitative information was collected. As a first step, qualitative 
information was gathered through in-depth interviews. This was crucial, first to 
appreciate the insights and motivations of both wives and husbands regarding moral 
arguments against wives’ participation in assembly plant employment; the social 
sanctions upheld by each reference group, and the negotiation mechanisms within the 
household. It also permitted us to discern spouses’ perceptions regarding the welfare 
impacts of wives’ employment in assembly plants. Second, qualitative information also 
allowed us to identify factors that influenced the phenomena being researched. For 
instance, it aided in determining the factors that influence internalization of moral 
arguments. Third, given that economics still does not completely understand the 
mechanisms by which social norms are enforced, it helped to refine our research 
questions. Finally, in-depth knowledge of the contexts of both towns informed the 
construction of a survey and thus the collection of quantitative data.  
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Quantitative data, on the other hand, allowed for a representative survey at the town 
level. Therefore results can be generalized for the area where the study was 
conducted. The magnitude to which the phenomena studied occurred in these 
localities,  can thus be understood. For example, we observed the prevalence of each 
moral argument in each town. Also and very importantly, it allowed us to correlate the 
mechanisms by which social norms are enforced with wives’ propensity to work in 
assembly plant jobs.  
It must be noted that even though in-depth interviews and the survey were the main 
techniques used to obtain information, observation and secondary data, where 
pertinent, were also used.  Secondary data was primarily obtained through Mexican 
official datasets of the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI). Table 3-1 
shows the types of data and information by chapter obtained by each technique.  
Although asking for permission to enter and observe assembly plants and interviewing 
their managers would have provided fruitful information for the research, this was not 
done. During the period in which fieldwork was carried out, there was uncertainty in the 
Tehuacan area. Human rights organizations were promoting better quality jobs for 
textile plant workers and this made their managers fearful of providing information 
about their operations. Martin Barrios, the President of the Mexican Human and Labour 
Rights Commission of the Tehuacan Valley, had even been arrested by state police 
and accused of blackmailing a maquila owner.10 Following his release some months 
later, which was granted after pressure from national and international organizations, 
he received several death threats (Amnesty International 2007). Therefore, to avoid 
jeopardising the research, we only sought information from households. 
Written consent from the local authorities (Presidente Municipal) was obtained before 
gathering information from households. This aided in gaining individuals’ trust, as the 
letter confirmed I was a research student. Below, there follows a description on how the 
in-depth interviews and surveys were carried out.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 An assembly plant owner of San Gabriel Chilac also made the municipal police arrest me by 
claiming I was mugging people. However, I had the full support of the municipal authorities and 
therefore was released immediately.  
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Table 3-1: Types of data obtained by each technique 
  Obser
va 
tion 
In-Depth 
Interviews 
Household 
Survey 
Secondary 
Data 
Ch 
4. 
Textile Plants in Tehuacan 
Mexico 
    
 ? Figures on maquilas in 
Mexico and Tehuacan 
   ● 
 ? Figures on population and 
household characteristics of 
Chilac and Miahuatlan 
  ● ● 
Ch 
5. 
Moral arguments and 
decision-making within the 
household 
 
 
 
 
  
 ? Description of moral 
arguments 
● ●   
 ? Figures on extent of 
internalisation and social 
sanctions  
  ●  
 ? Description of decision-
making mechanisms within 
household 
● ●   
 ? Descriptive data and figures 
on extent of decision-making 
mechanisms within 
household 
  ●  
Ch 
6. 
Welfare effects of wives’ 
engagement in assembly plant 
employment vs. traditional 
activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ? Qualitative information on 
possible functionings 
achieved in each activity. 
● ●   
 ? Descriptive data on possible 
functionings achieved in each 
activity. 
  ●  
Ch 
7. 
The effect of beliefs in moral 
arguments on wives’ 
propensity to work in 
assembly plants 
   
 
 
 ? Descriptive data on belief in 
moral arguments by spouses. 
  ●  
 ? Regressions on the effect of 
beliefs in moral arguments on 
wives’ propensity to work in 
assembly plants. 
  ●  
Ch8
. 
The effect of social sanctions 
on wives’ propensity to work 
in assembly plants 
   
 
 
 ? Descriptive data on social 
sanctions by reference group  
  ●  
 ? Regressions on the effect of 
social sanctions on wives’ 
propensity to work in 
  ●  
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assembly plants. 
 
3.3.1 In-depth interviews 
 
In-depth interviews were posed to both to married women and men in each town. To 
this end, several interview guides were prepared depending on:11 1) whether a wife 
currently worked in an assembly plant 2) whether she worked outside her home but in 
a different activity 3) whether she had previously worked outside their home but did not 
do so anymore, or 4) if she had never engaged in salaried work.  
Purposive sampling was used to obtain a sufficient number of interviews in each of the 
previous categories. As women participating in assembly plant employment were 
scarce and were difficult to enumerate and locate, especially in Chilac, these were 
sampled using a snowball approach. Table 3-2 shows the total amount of interviews 
obtained by category and town. Because men also had full-time jobs, locating them 
was also complicated, and for this reason a smaller number of husbands than wives 
were interviewed.  
At the beginning of the interviews we explained to individuals how we would use the 
information provided by them. They were also assured that they would remain 
anonymous, that they could stop the interview at any point and could refuse to answer 
any question they didn’t feel like answering. Additionally, we asked permission to tape 
the interviews, and notes were taken whether permission was granted or not.  
 
 
Table 3-2 : Number of in-depth interviews by town 
 Wives Husbands Total 
 Miah Chil Miah Chil Miah Chil Total 
Currently working in maquila 26 23 19 16 35 39 74 
  -Previously worked in maquila 14 13 11 8 25 21 46 
  -Has never worked 10 10 6 7 16 17 33 
  -Works in another activity 2 2 2 1 4 3 7 
Total wives without salaried work  26 25 10 9 80 80 160 
 
 
                                                 
11 If the interviewee was a married woman then the guide used depended on her current and 
previous occupation. If it was a married man who was being interviewed the guide depended on 
his wife’s current and previous occupation. 
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3.3.2 Household survey 
 
In the second step, a survey was applied to married women with the purpose of 
obtaining representative data from both towns. Information obtained from the in-depth 
surveys helped in the construction of the questionnaire. Before implementing the 
survey, a pilot test was conducted in both towns to refine the questions.  
A random sample of dwellings was obtained from each town to obtain representative 
data at the town level. A map with the location of each dwelling was obtained from the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI). Thus, the sampling frame was 
the number of dwellings in each town.  The sample size for each town was calculated 
by estimating the following formula for proportions under simple random sampling  
(Lohr 1999,  Raj 1972) : 
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z =Z value in table for a normal distribution for a 95% confidence interval 
r = maximum acceptable error 
p =0.5 (unknown of proportion of interest) 
ε = response rate 
AHD= average households per dwellings 
AWD= average women 12 years or older living with a couple per household. 
 
Thus, correcting for population size: 
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For both towns, a confidence interval of 95%, an estimated error of 7%12 and a 
response rate of 85% were assumed.  In San Gabriel Chilac, the population of married 
women is 2,045. On average there are 1.03 households per dwelling and there are on 
                                                 
12 Using a smaller estimated error would have meant a much larger simple size for which 
resources were not available. 
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average 0.89 women of 12 years and older residing as a partner per household.  This 
resulted in a representative sample size for this town of 231 dwellings. In Miahualtlan, 
the population of women living with a partner is approximately 2,061. On average there 
are 1.04 households per dwelling and there are 0.91 women of 12 years or older with a 
resident partner. For Santiago Miuahuatlan, the sample size was of 225 dwellings.13 
Two interviewers were hired to apply the questionnaires. Including me, this totalled 
three interviewers. Given the lack of a list of households and household members for 
each town (information from INEGI exists but is not available because of confidential 
reasons), blocks were chosen randomly and every third house was selected. This was 
done because several families lived next to each other, so that a sample of 20 blocks 
would have provided information on around 40-50 families. 
3.4 Data analysis and interpretation 
 
Information resulting from in-depth interviews was divided up by its relevance to each 
research question. Next, basic coding was done. On the other hand, data obtained 
from surveys was entered into SPSS software, but was then transferred into STATA to 
be analyzed.  
Where needed, t-tests were performed to test whether the means of a variable in two 
groups were statistically different from each other. This type of test was also used to 
see whether the means of different variables were statistically significantly different 
from each other.  Binomial probability tests were performed to compare the proportions 
of two different variables or to test the difference in proportions for two groups on one 
variable.  
Next, we will look at how the Capabilities approach was operationalised to assess the 
welfare changes resulting from wives’ participation in different occupations (as 
analyzed in Chapter 6). Following, we will look at the regression model and techniques 
used to determine the effect of internalization of moral arguments and social sanctions 
from different reference groups on wives’ propensity to work in assembly plants, 
analyzed in in chapters 7 and 8.  
 
3.4.1 Operationalization of the Capability approach 
 
Theoretically, the capability approach is very attractive yet several challenges to its 
operationalization have been found. The first is the difficulty in specifying the list of 
functionings to be considered. As Robeyns (2000) explains, there are innumerable 
                                                 
13 Data obtained from INEGI, 2000 XII Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda. 
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functionings which can be taken into consideration to provide a picture of people’s well-
being, and the Capability approach does not prescribe a list. Nussbaum (2003) argues 
for a definite list of functionings and has drawn up a list that she defends as universally 
valid. However, Robeyns (2003) disagrees with this view and states that ‘Given the 
intrinsic underspecification of Sen’s Capability approach, there cannot be one catch-all 
list. Instead, each application of the Capability approach will require its own capability 
set.’ Indeed, given the particular objective of the proposed research, only those 
functionings that are related to people’s engagement in different economic activities are 
of interest here. Therefore, the functionings that will be taken into account will be those 
that have been considered relevant in the literature to the participation of individuals in 
different activities. These will be complemented with those observed to be important for 
a significant proportion of the people interviewed in the qualitative study.  
Assessing the capability space is conceptually attractive, given that the well-being of a 
person does not depend on the combination of achieved functionings, but also on the 
freedom they have to choose their well-being. In practice, however, this is not easy. As 
Comin (2001) explains, ‘Perhaps the most important (and intriguing) characteristic in 
influencing the difficulty of operationalizing the Capability Approach (through the use of 
empirical measures) is its counterfactual nature. Capability could be high but for any 
reason individuals may choose not to actualise it; or they may choose to have more of 
one sort of freedom than another. Because the informational basis of welfare 
incorporates counterfactual choices and scenarios, it does not correspond to the 
empirical observation of facts.’ This poses a problem because it implies that the 
measurement of a hypothesis which has never occurred and might never occur must 
be taken into account. ‘In most cases, statistical surveys collect data on facts that 
actually occurred rather than on facts that could happen or could have happened. 
Statisticians involved in questionnaire design say that ‘If you ask a hypothetical 
question you will get a hypothetical answer.’ This difficulty has mainly to do with the 
vagueness of the hypothetical alternatives. In asking a person whether she has a job, 
one only needs to describe what is meant by ‘having a job’, with little or no reference 
other external circumstances, on the contrary, in asking whether she can have a job, 
one must qualify the them by fixing the boundaries of the hypothetical world she has to 
consider.’ (Brandolini and Giovanni 1998) 
Then again this counterfactual challenge is not peculiar to capability measures. The 
same problem arises in the neoclassical framework. For example Manski (2004) 
argues that a given choice by an agent may be consistent with many alternative 
specifications of preferences and expectations. Consequently the identification of 
decision processes from choice data must rest on strong assumptions. The possibilities 
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for inference, and thus the implications for decision making, depend fundamentally on 
the assumptions maintained about these counterfactual outcomes. For example, it is 
customary to assume that decision-makers have specific expectations that are 
objectively correct or rational. This practice reduces the task of empirical inference to 
the revelation of preferences alone, but has contributed to a crisis of credibility. As a 
result, Manski (2004) defends the idea that economists have to contend with the logical 
unobservability or counterfactual outcomes. 
This research focuses on women’s engagement in different economic activities. Their 
freedom to engage in each, as well as the possibility of achieving functionings in each, 
will depend on a variety of factors. This study focuses on how social norms restrict this 
freedom.  Therefore the counterfactual arguments are restricted to the expected social 
sanctions wives and husbands expect to receive. For this purpose, Manski (2004) 
argues in favour of the collection of data in the form of subjective probabilities. This 
type of data has two major appealing features. Perhaps the most basic attraction is that 
probability provides a well-defined absolute numerical scale for responses, which is a 
reason to think that they may be interpersonally comparable. Another attraction is that 
empirical assessment of the internal consistency of respondents’ expectations is 
possible. A researcher can use the algebra of probability (Bayes’ Theorem, the Law of 
Probability, etc.) to examine the internal consistency of a respondent’s expectations 
about different events. Initially, the use of subjective probabilities was planned here. In 
the pilot of the survey, however, it was discovered that this was not an appropriate 
instrument given the context in which the survey would be applied. Because women 
had no formal education, it would be hard for them to answer in the form of probabilities 
or on a numerical scale from 1 to 10. For this reason, the Likert scale was used 
instead, involving five options (and in some cases four)..   
The use of the Likert scale is a second choice for several reasons. The first regards 
interpersonal comparisons of responses, that is, whether different people interpret the 
answers in the same way, and the resulting degree of comparability. Secondly, there 
are doubts as to whether responses are intra-personally comparable, i.e. whether a 
given person may interpret the same phrase in different ways in different contexts 
(Manski 2004).  However, even if there are many theoretical arguments against using 
the Likert scale instead of subjective probabilities, the scale was adopted based on the 
idea that it is better to have good answers from a non-optimal method than almost no 
response using the best one possible.  
Once the relevant achieved functionings are specified a third difficulty arises: how one 
is to rank the different functionings? ‘One first has to decide whether to aggregate the 
elementary indicators to obtain an overall evaluation for each single dimension 
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(functioning/capability) of well-being. The main advantage of the aggregation process 
refers to the criteria on which aggregation is based. However, whatever the criteria in 
which aggregation is based we will inevitably lose some important pieces of 
information’ (Chiappero Mertinetti 2000). For this study, not losing these pieces of 
information is fundamental. Understanding how the activity’s features and gendered 
characteristics influence individuals’ potential to achieve different functionings is 
central. This is especially true if one wants to compare how individuals’ perceptions of 
well-being resulting from their participation in different activities differ from the actual 
facts. Also, it was not our objective to measure gendered well-being resulting from 
these activities, but to gain an understanding of how social norms influence, both 
directly and through their effect on the power household members have to bargain, 
individuals’ opportunities to achieve functionings by participating in these activities. 
 
3.4.2 Regression specification 
 
3.4.2.1 Econometric specification of woman’s labour participation 
 
In chapter 2 a model for wives' desire to participate in assembly plant employment was 
specified.  In it, each wife faced a binary choice of action { }1,1−∈a , where  1=a  if she 
participates in assembly plant employment, and 1−=a  if she does not. A social norm 
indicating that wives should not work in an assembly plant is supported by a certain 
social group. Therefore, if a wife works in an assembly plant she will experience guilt 
and shame because of her internalization of these moral arguments, and will also be 
socially sanctioned by the reference groups enforcing them. Thus, her perceived 
preference function of participating in assembly plant employment is specified as: 
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Where Z  includes both her characteristics and her achieved functionings in each state 
, kip  are the social sanctions she expects to receive from each reference group and 
)1(iε  and )1(−ε  are wives’ unobservable characteristics.  
A wife will desire to participate in assembly plant employment if: 
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Yet, the fact that she desires to work in the assembly plant is not a sufficient condition 
for her to actually do so. This will depend upon her husband’s perceived preference 
function, her bargaining power and the costs of bargaining.  Her bargaining power will 
be jointly determined with her work in the plant, and thus is not considered a 
determining variable in the following regression models. Additionally, for simplicity of 
exposition, her husband’s perceived preference function is not explicitly considered in 
the following regression specification. Further, without a loss of generality, the 
perceived preference function will be considered to take the following form: 
 
),,( piii Zau ε 14 
 
Given that ),,( piii Zau ε  is a random variable, we don’t know if a woman with certain 
values of Z  will experience greater utility if she works than if she does not.  It can be 
assumed, though, that ),,( piii Zau ε has a probability distribution governing the 
probability that woman i  with specific values of  will desire to work.  
 
Then: 
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Two commonly used distributions for the previous expression are widely used. The 
Probit model makes use of the normal distribution, where: 
                                                 
14 The costs related to social norms are therefore not explicitly considered, but can be regarded 
as to be included in Z . 
 
  
 
65 
 
 
)'()()|1(Pr
' βφβ zdttzYob z Φ=== ∫ ∞−  
The Logit model makes use of the logistic cumulative distribution function and is 
commonly used because of its mathematical convenience:  
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Because the logistic and the normal distributions are very much alike, except for the 
tails, which are heavier in the logistic distribution, the Probit and Logit models generally 
provide very similar results within intermediate values of β'z . Consequently, the two 
give different predictions if the sample contains very few responses (y’s equal to 1) or 
very few non-responses (y’s equal to zero) and very wide variation in an independent 
variable.  Because of these similarities, it is very difficult to assess on theoretical 
grounds which model is best to use, since this would necessitate the knowledge of the 
true β .  
It is important to note, that whatever distribution is chosen, the parameters of β  do not 
represent the marginal effects as they do in the linear regression models because: 
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From the previous expression it can be observed that the marginal effects will vary with 
the values of z . For this reason, it is common to evaluate the marginal effects for every 
observation and to use the sample average of the individual effects.  
In both the Probit and Logit models, the parameters of interest β  are estimated via the 
Maximum Likelihood method. This method the aims to estimate the vector β  that 
implies the highest probability or likelihood of having obtained the sample Y. To attain 
this, each observation is treated as a draw from a Bernoulli random variable. The 
likelihood function is expressed as follows: 
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The parameters β  can be estimated by maximizing this likelihood function or its 
logarithm with respect to β .These Maximum likelihood estimators will have asymptotic 
properties of unbiasedness, efficiency and normality. However, the estimates are 
obtained by assuming that the functional form is known, which is seldom true. If the 
functional form is misspecified, then the estimates of the coefficients and the inferences 
based on them can be highly misleading.  
In Chapter 7, the effect of beliefs in moral arguments by both spouses on wives’ 
probability of participating in assembly plant employment is estimated.  Given that 
beliefs in moral arguments and wives’ employment in an assembly plant might be 
jointly determined, a model that accounts for this is estimated; the Biprobit regression 
model. This model is fully explained in Chapter 7.  
In Chapter 8 the impact of each type of social sanction on wives’ propensity to work in 
an assembly plant, according to each moral argument and each reference group, is 
estimated. Probit estimates are used in this analysis.  
 
3.4.2.2 Wage estimation issues 
 
In the previous section it was established that a linear function for the probability of a 
wife participating in an assembly plant can be calculated if it is assumed that her utility 
function has a distribution function. Yet, an estimation complication arises given that 
this probability function depends upon the wage a wife would obtain when participating 
in a textile plant.  Information on this variable can only be available for wives who 
actually do work and receive a wage. Therefore the probability that a wife decides to 
participate in waged work is also the probability of having data on her wage. Yet, 
because data regarding working individuals also contains information on those 
variables that determine wage, it is possible to calculate an imputed wage for the whole 
population (including non-working individuals). To this end, we assume that the wage 
iw  that individual i  can obtain is given by a wage function: 
 
iwii xw ε+= α  
 
Where ix is a vector of variables explaining wage, such as education, age, etc, which 
can be observed for all the individuals in the sample and wiε  is a mean zero random 
error representing unobserved factors.  
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This function can be estimated in principle via a least squares regression, but doing so 
would not be adequate because the calculated wage would be based on data for 
workers only and this would give rise to sample selection or selectivity bias. This 
means that the wage data is not selected from a random sample of the population but 
from an endogenous subgroup, working wives. When this happens, the error term does 
not have a mean zero random variable, which is a basic assumption of the least 
squares regression estimation.  
 
Assuming that pε and wε are normally distributed, then:  
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Hence, unless piε  and wiε are uncorrelated, the least square estimates of α  will suffer 
from sample selection bias and will be inconsistent. Additionally, if piε  is correlated 
with wiε , then it is also necessarily correlated with w , meaning that endogeneity will be 
present. Therefore, neither imputed nor actual wage data would be appropriate for 
estimating the probability of desired participation.  
A solution proposed by Heckman (1974) will be employed to derive an expression for 
wives’ participation in assembly plant employment. Thus we note that a wife will work 
for an assembly plant if the wage she would obtain by doing so exceeds her 
reservation wage, which is the minimum wage at which she would choose to work. 
Then the probability a wife will work in an assembly plant can be expressed as: 
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Where 
iwii Xw ε+= α   is the equation for the market wage and 
iyii Yw εϑ += '*  where { }scvAYi ,,,= , is the equation for the reservation wage,  
 
It is assumed that both iyε  and iwε  are normally distributed. It must also be clarified 
that both Y and X can contain common exogenous variables. However for this system 
of endogenous equations to be identified (i.e. for the parameters in both equations to 
be estimable) there must be at least one variable in X not included in Y and at least 
one variable in Y not included in X .  
 
It then follows that: 
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Given that ipε and iyε  are mean zero normally distributed functions, then riε  is also a 
mean zero normally distributed random variable with pyyprriVar σσσσε 2)( 22 −+==  , 
where pyσ  is the covariance between the errors.   
There are two ways in which the parameters α and θ can be consistently estimated. 
On one hand, a two step estimation procedure can be employed. As a first step, from 
the previous probability expression the following likelihood function is specified.  
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where: ii YZ βα −=Δ , and iyipri εεε −=  
 
This function depends only on exogenous variables for which data for the whole 
sample, workers and non-workers, is available. Probit estimates of this function will 
provide estimates of rjj σαθ /)( −  for common variables in Y and Z , rj σα /  for 
variables in Z not in Y , and rj σθ /  for variables in Y  not in Z  . 
As a second step, the parameters of the wage equation α  are estimated. To achieve 
this, first observe that: 
 
)1|( =aE iwε  
)|(
rr
ri
iwE σσ
εε Δ> =
r
pww
σ
σσ −2
)(1
)(
ΔΦ−
Δφ
 
 
Thus the wage equation can be written as: 
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Where V  is the new residual, and 0)( =VE  
 
Given that estimates of Δˆ  were obtained from the first step Probit estimation, estimates 
of 
)ˆ(1
)ˆ(
ΔΦ−
Δφ
 can also be obtained. These can be replaced in the wage equation, which 
can then be estimated using ordinary least squares to obtain consistent estimates of θ . 
Because there is at least one variable in Y  not included in X , we can get an estimate 
of rj σθ /1  from the Probit estimation and an estimate of j1β  from the wage equation, 
and obtain an estimate of rσ . Following, all estimates of α  can also be obtained.  
Alternatively, a second way to estimate α  and θ  is by expressing a joint normal 
distribution function for the reservation wage and wage functions. The likelihood 
function for participation on waged employment can be expressed in the following 
manner: 
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Thus the following likelihood function can be specified: 
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This model can be estimated by the Full Information Maximum Likelihood method. 
Following the specification of the variables to be included in wives’ participation in 
assembly plant employment, equations and the wage estimates resulting for the 
Heckman wage regressions are described.  
 
3.4.3 Specification of variables  
 
Above, we developed an econometric specification for wives’ participation in assembly 
plant employment.  Next, Table 3-3 denotes and describes the variables to be included 
both in the desire for participation and wage equations. The variables which will proxy 
for internalization of social norms, which will be used for the estimations in chapter 7, 
and those of social sanctions used in chapter 8 are also included.  
 
Table 3-3: Variables included in regression equations. 
Explanatory 
variables 
Proxy for Variable 
 
Measurement of Variable 
Labour Participation  Dummy variable for current 
participation in an assembly plant 
Age  Wife’s age Wife’s age 
Household Income Household Income that 
does not depend on 
women’s engagement 
in salaried employment 
Includes income earned by husband, 
transfers, income earned from farming 
plots. 
Young children Children younger than 
6 
Dummy variable indicating whether the 
wife has children less than 6 years old. 
Older children Children older than 6 
and younger than 16 
Dummy variable indicating whether the 
wife has children between 6 and 16 
years old 
Internalization Woman’s beliefs Dummy on disagreement on each 
moral argument 
 Husband’s beliefs Dummy on disagreement on each 
moral argument 
Characteristics that 
potentially shape 
Wife lived in a city for 
more than a year 
Dummy variable indicating whether 
wife has ever lived in a city for more 
  
 
71 
 
internalization of a 
norm15 
than a year 
 Husband lived in a city 
for more than a year 
Dummy variable indicating whether 
husband has ever lived in a city for 
more than a year 
 Husband Farmer Dummy variable indicating whether 
husband is a farmer. 
 Husband Assembly 
Worker 
Dummy variable indicating whether 
husband is an assembly plant worker 
Social Sanctions Gossip by each of four 
reference groups 
Dummy variables representing woman 
believes each reference group to 
gossip about her using each moral 
argument if she works for an assembly 
plant 
 Criticism to wife by 
each of four reference 
groups 
Dummy variables representing woman 
believes each reference group to 
criticize her using each moral 
argument if she works for an assembly 
plant 
 Criticism to wife by 
each of four reference 
groups 
Dummy variables representing woman 
believes each reference group to 
criticize her husband using each moral 
argument if she works for an assembly 
plant. 
Wage (Mincer 
equation) 
  
Years of Education Years of completed 
formal education 
Number of years woman completed 
formal education 
Wife’s age Woman’s age Woman’s age 
Wife’s age squared Woman’s age squared Woman’s age squared 
 
 
3.4.4 The use of Likert scale questions 
 
The use of Likert Scale questions was proposed to measure both the beliefs which 
proxy for internalization, and gossip and criticism by the different reference groups, to 
proxy for social norms. The use of these qualitative measures, however, has its 
setbacks. As Dominitz and Manski, (1997) describe, these types of responses are of 
concern because they are not interpersonally and intrapersonally comparable. The 
former refers to different people interpreting each scale in a different manner, while the 
latter concerns the same person interpreting the results in a different manner in 
different settings.  
Because of these concerns, Manski (1993), and Dominitz and Manski (1997) argue in 
favour of the collection of data in the form of subjective probabilities. This type of data 
has two major appealing features. Perhaps the most basic is that probability provides a 
                                                 
15 Justification as to why these variables are considered as characteristics that potentially shape 
internalisation of norms is expanded on in chapter 7.  
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well-defined absolute numerical scale for responses, which is a reason to think that 
they may be interpersonally comparable. Another attraction is that an empirical 
assessment of the internal consistency of respondents’ expectations is possible. A 
researcher can use the algebra of probability (Bayes Theorem, the Law of Probability, 
etc.) to examine the internal consistency of a respondent’s expectations about different 
events. 
Because of these advantages, the use of these subjective probabilities was intended 
and proposed before field work started. However, this was found not to be feasible in 
the research area. During the pilot of the questionnaire, married women were posed 
questions in the form of subjective probabilities (a 0 to 100 chance of an event 
occurring), but most of them found this type of questions confusing. This made the 
implementation of subjective probabilities not viable. A high proportion of women in the 
research area have not received basic formal education where the use of percentages 
is taught. Even though they are very smart, they are not familiar with this type of 
ranking. As Dominitz and Manski (1997) point out, even people with formal education 
may have trouble thinking probabilistically about certain events. 
Given the difficulties with getting responses in the form of subjective probabilities that 
we encountered during the pilot of the questionnaire, Likert Scale-type questions were 
posed. These are entered into the regression in the form of dummy variables. For 
example, in the case of beliefs in moral arguments, a dummy variable with the values 0 
if a person does not totally agree and 1 if she totally agrees with the moral argument, is 
employed. Four other dummy variables are constructed for each of the other possible 
answers. One is taken as the baseline for the regression (e.g. ‘totally disagree’) and the 
others are compared to it. The results of these regressions, however, must be taken 
with caution, given that they cannot be assigned any quantitative or numerical value. 
Furthermore, probability distributions cannot be obtained as Dominitz and Manski 
(1997) do in the case of income expectations. These responses do, however, provide 
important information on whether beliefs and expectations of future events are at play.  
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_______________________________ 
4 Economic, population and household 
characteristics of Tehuacan 
_______________________________ 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the process by which assembly plants, and consequently 
employment opportunities for women, arose in Tehuacan, Mexico. It focuses 
specifically on the two towns where the research took place; San Gabriel Chilac and 
Santiago Miahuatlan. First, the main population and household characteristics of these 
towns will be explored. This will be done initially by using secondary data. Then the 
results obtained from the survey applied specifically for the purpose of this research will 
be discussed. Special attention will be given to exploring the traditional and non-
traditional activities that wives participate in and have access to.  
 
4.2 Mexico’s maquila industry 
 
During the 1960s a new pattern of production emerged in which multinational 
companies from labour intensive industries outsourced part of their productive 
processes to developing countries in search of cheaper labour. The falling of 
transportation and communication costs served as incentives to this new global 
production process, while the promotion of Export Processing Zones (EPZ) in 
developing countries in South East Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and parts of 
Sub Saharan Africa was a catalyst for its expansion. Via these zones inputs such as 
machinery, equipment and materials could enter these developing countries free of 
import tariffs  (Barrientos et al. 2004; Tiano, 1994). 
Mexico was one of the countries which promoted an export processing program. It was 
put in place in 1965 as a response to the unilateral suspension by the United States of 
America of a treaty it had signed with Mexico in 1942. In this treaty, the US had 
temporarily admitted migrants from Mexico because it was short of agricultural workers 
due to the Second World War. This agreement led to high in-migration to the border 
cities by Mexicans in search of these agricultural jobs.  When the US suspended the 
treaty, there was a sharp and critical increase in the unemployment rates in these 
border cities. Thus the free zones were established in these areas with the objective 
that the newly created assembly plants, or Maquilas as they are called in Mexico, 
would absorb the surplus of labour. (de la O. Martinez, 2006; Mendiola, 1999) 
During the 80’s the Mexican government extended the free zones to other areas of the 
country and passed several decrees and laws to foster the establishment of assembly 
plants. When Mexico signed the North Free Trade Agreement with the US and Canada 
in 1994 there was a rapid increase of assembly plants there (De la O. Martinez, 2006; 
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Mendiola, 1999). This can be verified by growth rates of employment in the maquila for 
export sector, presented in Table 4-1. After 1994 and previous to the economic crisis in 
2001, annual growth rates rose to above 10%. After the economic crisis in 2001, 
however employment growth rates were negative for three consecutive years, but then 
started to catch up again.  
 
Table 4-1: Employment levels and rates for the maquila for export in Mexico  
National Employment 
level 
% Change 
Employment 
Level 
1975 67,214 - 
1980 119,546 - 
1985 211,968 - 
1990 451,169 - 
1991 434,109 -3.78 
1992 503,689 16.03 
1993 526,351 4.50 
1994 562,334 6.84 
1995 621,930 10.60 
1996 748,262 20.31 
1997 903,736 20.78 
1998 1,014,023 12.20 
1999 1,143,499 12.77 
2000 1,291,232 12.92 
2001 1,198,942 -7.15 
2002 1,071,467 -10.63 
2003 1,062,105 -0.87 
2004 1,115,230 5.00 
2005 1,166,250 4.57 
2006 1,202,134 3.08 
Source: INEGI. Industria de la Maquiladora de Exportacion, 2007.  
INEGI. Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México. La producción, salarios, empleo y 
productividad de la industria maquiladora de exportación.1997, 2002 . 
 
 
However, the noteworthy characteristic of assembly plant employment for this study is 
that it is significantly female. This is true especially within the textile and electronics 
sectors (De la O. Martinez, 2006). One of the main reasons why women are 
predominantly hired is their lower educational levels and therefore the lower salaries 
assembly plants can pay them. Another explanation is that female employees are 
considered to have better manual dexterity (nimble fingers) and to be more docile and 
prone to accept tough and repetitive work (Elson & Pearson, 1981). Thus in many 
areas where assembly plants were established, the fact that women were being hired 
meant they had the possibility to participate in salaried jobs for the first time.  
  
 
76 
 
However, while historically a larger proportion of women than men have been hired in 
assembly plants, this tendency has declined over time. In Mexico, De la O. Martinez 
(2006) identifies three stages of feminization of employment in maquilas for export.  
First, during the 80’s and 90’s mainly women were hired by the assembly plants on the 
Mexico/US border. During the 90’s, the maquila workforce started to be de-feminized. 
In the third stage, during the 2000’s both men and women have been hired almost 
equally. This pattern can be confirmed by the figures in Table 4-2 where it can be 
observed that while a male hiring rate of 30% prevailed in the mid 70’s to 80’s, this rose 
to 85% by 2005. Yet, even if a lower percentage of women have been hired over time 
in the assembly plants, these still offer employment opportunities for women in areas 
where these were previously nonexistent. This is the case of the arrival of assembly 
plants to the Tehuacan area, specifically in the two towns which are the focus of the 
study; San Gabriel Chilac and Santiago Miahuatlan. The relatively recent arrival of 
assembly plants in these sites makes them ideal for investigating how social norms 
influence wives’ participation in a specific type of salaried employment compared to 
their involvement in traditionally female activities.  
 
Table 4-2: Male hiring rates of maquilas for export in Mexico 
 National Level 
 Total Obreros Techni 
cians 
Admini 
strative 
1975 - 0.28 - - 
1980 - 0.29 - - 
1985 - 0.45 - - 
1990 - 0.64 - - 
1995 - 0.69 - - 
1997 0.89 0.74 2.53 1.47 
1998 0.92 0.77 2.48 1.51 
1999 0.95 0.79 2.58 1.54 
2000 0.97 0.81 2.62 1.58 
2001 1.00 0.82 2.69 1.61 
2002 1.02 0.84 2.78 1.67 
2003 1.04 0.85 2.74 1.77 
2004 1.04 0.86 2.79 1.78 
2005 1.05 0.85 2.82 1.82 
2006 P 1.04 0.84 2.83 1.85 
Source: INEGI. Industria de la Maquiladora de Exportacion, 2007.  
INEGI: Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de Mexico. La producción, salarios, empleo y 
productividad de la industria maquiladora de Exportacion. 1997, 2002. 
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4.3 The Tehuacan region in Mexico  
 
Tehuacan is a region of Puebla, a state in the southern region of Mexico.  It consists of 
18 municipalities (provinces) and contains a city of the same name: Tehuacan. This 
city is the second largest of the state of Puebla, and in 2005 had a population of 
238,22916.  Most of the towns within this region are predominantly indigenous, from 
Nahuatl, Mixteco, and Popoloca groups.  
This area used to be mainly an agricultural one, where maize, beans, gourds, wheat, 
oats, alfalfa and tomato were grown. Although most of the crops are still cultivated in 
the area, with time agriculture has declined in importance. The main causes of this 
decline are identified by Barrios Hernandez (2003) as the industrialization of the region, 
the lack of capitalization and the privatization of access to water and land. Tehuacan is 
also known for its mineral water industry, with a very important soft drink producer, 
Peñafiel, established there. There is also production of livestock, pigs, sheep, and 
cattle. Apiculture too has become quite a significant activity in the zone (Ayuntamiento 
de Tehuacan, 2008). 
During the 80’s textile factories arrived in the Tehuacan area, set up by local 
entrepreneurs. Initially, these produced shirts, trousers, school and industrial uniforms 
and underwear, mainly for domestic consumption. During those years textile production 
coexisted with agricultural production (Diaz Nuñez 2002; Martinez De Ita 2002; Barrios 
Hernandez 2004). 
However in 1994 the North Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada 
and Mexico prompted transnational companies to make arrangements with local 
entrepreneurs. Thus there was an explosion in the establishment of textile maquilas in 
the region. The greatest growth rate occurred between 1995 and 2000. The region’s 
maquilas assemble mainly jeans for transnational companies from the US such as 
Guess Incorporated, Levi Strauss, Calvin Klein, Gap, Polo Ralph Lauren, Tommy 
Hilfiger, The Limited, Sarah Lee, VF Corporation and others (Barrios Hernandez 2004). 
It is very difficult to calculate how many maquilas exist in Tehuacan as many do not 
register with the government. Barrios Hernandez (2003) calculated that in 2002 there 
were close to 700 maquiladoras in the region. According to estimates made this year, 
80% of the textiles produced in the area were exported. In 2001 the proceeds of this 
industry were the most important for the region.  
Thus from 1995 to 2000 many textile assembly plants were established in the zone, 
providing plenty of employment. According to a survey carried out by Diaz Nuñez 
                                                 
16 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI). Conteo de Población y Vivienda, 2005. 
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(2002), 52.8% of the maquila’s workforce in the area of Tehuacan was female. 
Estimates of gendered hiring trends over time in the maquilas of the Tehuacan area 
specifically are not available, so that data on this trend from the state of Puebla are 
instead reported in Table 3-1.  These figures confirm the results obtained by Diaz 
Nuñez (2002) which assert that men represent almost half the workforce. They also 
show that over time they comprise a greater proportion of the workforce. However, 
though employment created during the textile maquila boom was shared almost equally 
between the sexes, during this period a specific type of salaried employment for 
women was generated.   
 
Table 4-3: Masculinity rates of maquila for export employment in Puebla17.  
 Puebla 
 Total Obreros Technicians Administrative 
1997 0.91 0.83 2.07 1.27 
1998 0.98 0.91 1.89 1.27 
1999 1.01 0.93 1.85 1.31 
2000 1.00 0.95 1.73 1.19 
2001 0.99 0.92 1.80 1.12 
2002 1.00 0.93 1.80 1.10 
2003 1.11 1.03 1.93 1.35 
2004 1.07 0.98 2.16 1.15 
2005 1.05 0.97 2.06 1.04 
2006 P 1.02 0.94 1.89 1.06 
INEGI. Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México. La producción, salarios, empleo y 
productividad de la industria maquiladora de exportación.1997, 2002 . 
 
Field work was conducted in two towns of the Tehuacan area where textile 
maquiladoras had been set up and where, as a consequence, demand for female 
employment was created. Previous to the arrival of assembly plants, there were no 
other significant salaried employment opportunities for women in the region. This 
characteristic makes these towns optimal sites for the study, as previously women only 
dedicated themselves to traditional self-employment activities. Thus customary social 
norms still prevail in the towns alongside an abundant source of homogeneous 
employment for women. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Masculinity rates are calculated by dividing the number of males over the number of females. 
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4.4 Population and household characteristics of San Gabriel Chilac and 
Santiago Miahuatlan 
 
The two towns which are compared in the study are San Gabriel Chilac and Santiago 
Miahuatlan. These sites have not only experienced a surge in textile maquilas, but also 
share similar population and topographical characteristics. Both are in municipalities 
that are adjacent to the city of Tehuacan where all the services like banks and hospitals 
are available.Both have easy access and transportation to this city. However, wives’ 
participation levels in assembly plant employment are lower in San Gabriel Chilac than 
in Miahuatlan. San Gabriel Chilac is also a very traditional and indigenous town. 
Therefore it is plausible to explore whether social norms play any role in influencing 
wives’ lower participation levels here than in Miahuatlan.   
Table 4-4 shows figures of the population and number of homes in each town for 2005. 
As can be observed they have very similar size, with only a 1,000-person difference in 
their populations. They also have very similar proportions of men and women. The 
number of homes in each are also similar. Further, homes in the two towns have 
largely male heads of households.  
 
Table 4-4: Percentage of female and male population 
 Total  
Popu- 
lation 
Total 
Homes 
% 
Female 
Popu-
lation 
% 
Female 
headed 
house 
holds 
% Popu-
lation of 5 
years or 
older that 
speaks an 
indigenous 
language 
% Popu 
lation of 5 
years or older 
that speaks 
an indigenous 
language and 
no Spanish 
Chilac 11333 2664 52.46 26.46 52.85 0.54 
Miahuatlan 12765 2617 52.30 27.74 1.21 0.00 
INEGI. Conteo de Poblacion y Vivienda. 2005. 
 
 
Nevertheless, as Table 4-4 also shows, there is a great divergence in the proportion of 
indigenous people in each town. INEGI classifies an individual as indigenous if he 
speaks an indigenous language. While almost half of the population in San Gabriel 
Chilac speak an indigenous language, almost none in Santiago Miahuatlan does. This 
is so, even though the population of the two have the same ethnic background. 
Originally, Nahuatl was spoken in both towns, but has now been lost almost completely 
in Santiago Miahuatlan. As such, it could well may be that norms have evolved 
differently in each town. 
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It can also be said that San Gabriel Chilac has higher levels of marginalization than 
Santiago Miahuatlan. The National Council of Population (Consejo Nacional de 
Poblacion, CONAPO), in Mexico constructs a marginalization index for each locality in 
the country. This index is based on illiteracy rates of the population; the population 
without basic levels (primary) of education; the proportion of dwellings without services 
such as electricity, drainage or running water; overcrowding of dwellings; and the 
proportion of dwellings with refrigerator. Out of this index, this institution ranks localities 
into five levels of marginalization: very high, high, medium, low and very low. San 
Gabriel Chilac has a high level of marginalization (index of -0.46) while Santiago 
Miahuatlan has a medium one (index of -0.72)18.  Although each town has a different 
level of marginalisation the difference in the index between each is not very high.  
However, when each of the elements which compose this marginalisation index are 
analysed separately, there is much more of a mixed story. Some components are 
better in San Gabriel Chilac and others in Santiago Miahuatlan. For instance, it can be 
observed in Table 4-5 that education levels are better in the latter than in the former, 
though they are quite low in both towns. The primary or basic level of education takes 
six years to complete. In Chilac, the average years of education of the population does 
not even reach this level. In Miahuatlan on the other hand, it is slightly above it. The 
situation is much worse for women, as in each of the towns their average years of 
education is lower than that of men.  
The same pattern is observed when analysing the illiteracy rates from Table 4-6. 
Almost a fifth of the population is illiterate in San Gabriel Chilac, while this proportion is 
close to a tenth in Santiago Miahuatlan. This rate is also much higher for women in 
both towns. 
 
Table 4-5:  Average years of education of the population 
 Average years 
of education of 
the population 
Average years of 
education of the 
male population 
Average years of 
education of the 
female population 
Chilac 5.09 5.48 4.78 
Miahuatlan 6.49 6.8 6.23 
INEGI. Conteo de Poblacion y Vivienda. 2005. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18  A very low level of marginalisation ranges from -2.00 to -1.35, a low one from -1.35 to -1.02, 
a medium from -1.02 to -0.70, a high from -.70 to 0.61, a very high from 0.61 to 3.23.  
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Table 4-6: Percentage of population 15 years or more, that is illiterate. 
 % population 
15 years or 
more illiterate 
% male 
population 15 
years or more 
illiterate 
% female 
population 15 
years or more 
illiterate 
Chilac 19.88 15.00 24.00 
Miahuatlan 12.74 9.30 15.62 
INEGI. Conteo de Poblacion y Vivienda. 2005. 
 
In both towns, the majority of houses have access to basic services (Table 4-9). 
However, surprisingly a greater proportion have all the services in Chilac than in 
Miahuatlan. The difference between the two towns in the number of houses that have 
running water and those which have dirt floors is even more surprising. Usually, the 
infrastructure to access to these services (except for non-dirt floors) is provided by the 
government. So while these services have a large impact on the community’s welfare, 
it is still possible for households to have lower income levels in San Gabriel Chilac than 
in Miahuatlan.  
 
Table 4-7: Percentage of dwellings with basic services 
 % 
Dwellings 
with toilet 
% 
Dwellings 
with 
running 
water 
% 
Dwellings 
with 
drainage 
% 
Dwellings 
with 
electricity 
% 
Dwellings 
with dirt 
floor  
Chilac 95.64 96.37 87.57 97.68 50.18
Miahuatlan 91.04 85.58 82.80 97.39 27.24
INEGI. Conteo de Poblacion y Vivienda. 2005. 
 
Except for televisions, the percentage of dwellings with domestic appliances is 
generally quite low as shown in Table 4-7. Only around half the houses have a 
refrigerator and even less have a washing machine, while the share of households with 
a computer is almost negligible. A lower proportion of dwellings in San Gabriel Chilac 
have each of these appliances than in Santiago Miahuatlan. It must be noted, however, 
that only the percentage of households with a refrigerator form part of the 
marginalisation index. Nevertheless, the proportions of households with other types of 
domestic appliances are also good indicators of households’ wealth. 
Additionally, it must be noted that washing machines and refrigerators are appliances 
that would help perform domestic chores which are usually carried out by female 
household members. It can be deduced, then, that for a large proportion of women 
these chores will be quite strenuous.  
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Table 4-8: Percentage of households with appliances  
 % Dwellings 
with computer 
% Dwellings 
with washing 
machine 
% Dwellings 
with 
refrigerator 
% Dwellings 
with television 
Chilac 4.20 28.54 52.02 89.77 
Miahuatlan 6.03 40.70 56.29 90.48 
INEGI. Conteo de Poblacion y Vivienda. 2005. 
 
To sum up, Chilac has lower levels of education and a lower proportion of its dwellings 
have domestic appliances. Yet, in this town a there is a larger share of houses with 
basic services, which are usually provided by the government. Data on income levels 
of the population in each town are unfortunately not available. Evidence however 
seems to suggest that San Gabriel Chilac is slightly more marginalised than 
Miahuatlan.  
 
Table 4-9: Manufacturing industry in Miahuatlan and San Gabriel Chilac, 2004 
 Economic Units Total Production 
(thousands of 
pesos) 
Total persons 
employed 
 Miah Chilac Miah Chilac Miah Chilac 
Manufacturing Industries 81 112 424,555 60,877 1,232 692 
-Food industry 30 63 348,681 9,007 423 136
-Fabrication of textile inputs 6 0 36,833 0 169 0
-Garment Fabrication 16 33 27,611 50,056 524 529
-Fabrication of metallic 
products 
9 0 870 0 14 0
-Wholesale trading 0 8 5,204 1,533 22 20 
-Retail commerce  231 289 6,103 7,698 313 434 
-Food preparation services 42 29 2,360 2,160 64 65 
INEGI. Censos Economicos 2004. 
 
The economic activity of each town is also quite dissimilar. If we analyze data on the 
manufacturing industry, it can be seen that garment fabrication is very important for 
both towns in terms of total production and employment levels.19  It must be observed 
nevertheless that there are fewer economic units dedicated to the fabrication of textiles 
in Miahuatlan than in Chilac. This does not mean that there are more textile assembly 
plants in the latter, as in this town sewing and broidery is a tradition. As such there are 
workshops which dedicate themselves to the production of customary garments. From 
Table 4-9, it can also observed that there are economic units that fabricate textile 
                                                 
19 It must be clarified though, that official data on the manufacturing industry can be quite 
inaccurate as many assembly plants are not registered and operate clandestinely.  For the 
whole of Tehuacan, for example, Barrios (2003) notes that there are 248 maquilas registered, 
but it is calculated that there are actually around 700 of them. 
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inputs in Miahuatlan, while these do not exist in Chilac. This industry seems to be very 
important in terms of production and employment. However, while in Chilac the 
production of textiles is the most important manufacturing industry in terms of 
production, in Miahuatlan the food industry is much more significant. 
 
4.5 Characteristics of sample of wives and their husbands 
 
Next, the characteristics of the wives surveyed and their households will be described. 
First the personal characteristics of wives and husbands such as language, age, 
education will be explored. second, average information regarding household income; 
husbands’ main and secondary occupations; and household’ access to land will be 
displayed. Finally, the different activities of wives in both towns will be discussed. 
From Table 4-10 it can be seen that while in Miahuatlan very few speak the indigenous 
language Nahuatl, a large majority of them do in San Gabriel Chilac. Yet it can be 
observed that the result obtained for the proportion of wives speaking the indigenous 
language in Chilac, in the current sample, is much higher than that of the census 
shown in the previous section. This can be explained by the census’ inclusion of both 
males and females. The census also includes people older than five years old, while 
the survey includes married women only.  This might be an indication that indigenous 
language is being lost over time in San Gabriel Chilac, as a lower percentage of 
younger people speak Nahuatl. This could be due to a slow transformation of the town 
from an agricultural one to a more industrial and ’modern’ one.  
 
Table 4-10: Percentage of wives who speak an indigenous language 
 % 
Both 39.5 
Miahuatlan 1.86 
Chilac 76.5 
 
 
Table 4-11, shows the basic statistics for the age of wives and their husbands.  As 
expected, the average age of husbands is larger than that of wives. An interesting 
observation is the minimum age of wives and their husbands. In Chilac, the youngest 
wife is 15 years old while in Miahuatlan the youngest is 17. The youngest husband in 
Chilac is 16, and in Miahuatlan 19. Thus, individuals still get married fairly young in 
these towns, which is common in rural areas of Mexico.  
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Table 4-11: Age of wives and husbands  
 Wife Husband 
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Mean 37.18 36.61 37.75 39.46 38.61 40.29 
Median 35 35 36 38 37 40 
Std. Dev 11.18 10.72 11.62 11.96 11.36 12.40 
Min 15 17 15 16 16 19 
 
 
As for education levels, it can be seen in Tables 4-12 and 4-13, that these are quite 
similar to those of the Census. The majority have at most primary, which is a basic 
level of education. What is more, women have even lower levels of education than 
men. Towns’ educational levels on average are inferior in San Gabriel Chilac to those 
of Miahuatlan. An interesting exception is the relatively high proportion of wives in San 
Gabriel Chilac who have studied a ‘normal’ course, i.e. in preparation to teach children 
at public schools. As will be shown later, teachers, apart from a good salary, receive 
many other benefits. Thus for women in these towns, being a teacher is the best 
professional option.  
 
Table 4-12:  Education levels of wives and husbands 
 Wives Husbands 
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
None 10.19 5.12 15.21 12.35 7.98 16.67 
Pre-school 0.69 1.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Primary 60.88 61.4 60.37 52.68 48.83 56.48 
Secondary 20.37 24.19 16.59 23.08 30.05 16.2 
Bachillerato 3.01 4.19 1.84 6.53 7.51 5.56 
Normal 1.39 0.47 2.3 0.93 0.47 1.39 
Technical  2.31 2.79 1.84 1.63 2.82 0.46 
Professional 1.16 0.47 1.84 2.8 2.35 3.24 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Table 4-13: Years of education of wives and husbands 
 Wives Husbands 
 Both  Chilac Miah Both  Chilac Miah 
Mean 5.63 5.79 5.46 5.94 6.50 5.39 
Median 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Std Dev 3.73 3.41 4.03 4.08 3.89 4.20 
 
Total household income per week, reported by wives is displayed in Table 4-14. It can 
be seen that on average, household income is lower in Chilac than in Miahuatlan. It 
can also be observed that in both towns, the variance in income between households is 
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large. Yet, this figure is much larger for Miahuatlan. Nevertheless, the median in 
household income for this town is also larger than that of Chilac.  
 
Table 4-14: Household income per week20 
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Mean $1,664.02 $1,937.39 $1,395.76 
Median $1,087.11 $1,200.00 $958.46 
St. Dev $3,709.17 $5,028.58 $1,537.67 
 
 
The average number of household members in each dwelling is displayed in Table 4-
15. The mean number of household members was 5. This suggests that on average 
they were not very large compared to what is common in rural areas of Mexico. 
Traditionally, spouses in rural areas have many children. This result might then reflect 
the process of urbanization and modernization in both towns, as well as the increase in 
use of contraception. It also has to be considered that income has to be distributed 
between them.   
Table 4-15: Number of household members 
  Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Mean 4.96 5.24 4.68 
Median 5 5 4 
St. Dev 1.79 1.86 1.67 
 
Table 4-16: Husbands’ main occupation 
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Assembly worker 28.31 40 16.67 
Merchant 4.87 5.58 4.17 
Driver 7.42 10.7 4.17 
Farmer 31.79 13.95 49.54 
Electrician 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Migrant USA 3.02 3.72 2.31 
Building worker 6.03 5.12 6.94 
Own business 1.16 1.4 0.93 
Professional 1.86 1.86 1.85 
Teacher 0.93 0.47 1.39 
Animals 0.23 0.47 0.00 
Retired 1.39 1.4 1.39 
Sick 1.16 0.93 1.39 
Other 10.9 13.49 8.33 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
                                                 
20 The average exchange rate according to the Mexican Central Bank (BANXICO) was of $11.09 
Mexican pesos per 1 US Dollar, on May 2006. 
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Exploring husbands’ occupations, it can be verified in Table 4-16 that working in an 
assembly plant and being a farmer are the most common activities. Yet, while the 
former is more common in the town of Santiago Miahuatlan, the later is much more 
prevalent in San Gabriel Chilac. It can also be seen that in the two towns there are 
relatively few self-employed husbands, or husbands who are not in the workforce. 
We also asked whether husbands had a secondary activity. As Table 4-17 shows, only 
a modest proportion from both towns had a secondary income-generating activity. 
These secondary activities are displayed in Table 4-18. Almost half the husbands with 
a secondary activity from the two towns worked as farmers. Thus overall, around 
39.58% of husbands are farmers as a first or second activity. In Chilac this percentage 
is 21.40%, while in Miahuatlan it is 57.60%. 
 
Table 4-17:  Percentage of husbands with a secondary activity 
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Secondary activity 15.51 16.28 14.75
 
 
Table 4-18: Husbands secondary occupations. 
 Both  Miahuatlan Chilac 
Driver 2.99 5.71 0.00
Farmer 50.75 45.71 56.25
Blacksmith 1.49 2.86 0.00
Electrician 4.48 8.57 0.00
Building worker 5.97 2.86 9.38
Own business 7.46 5.71 9.38
Animals 5.97 11.43 0.00
Other 20.90 17.14 25.00
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
 
 
Besides having a main occupation, if households have access to land, be it rented, lent 
or owned, husbands also allocate time to farming. Nonetheless, only a small proportion 
of households in the two towns of Tehuacan had a plot to cultivate. As observed in 
Table 4-19, around a sixth of households had access to land. A slightly higher 
proportion of households in San Gabriel Chilac have access to a plot of land than those 
of Miahuatlan. 
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Table 4-19: Percentage of households with access to land 
 % of 
households 
with land 
Both 15.97 
Miahuatlan 14.88 
Chilac 17.05 
 
As can be seen in Table 4-20, the decisions regarding the cultivation of land were 
mostly taken by husbands. Only around 9% of decisions on how and what to grow are 
taken by wives. Fathers and fathers-in-law also take part in the farming decisions, 
much more than mothers and mothers-in-law. Thus, it can be said that the cultivation of 
land is mainly a male decision. 
 
Table 4-20: Family member who takes the main decisions regarding cultivating 
land 
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Wife  8.96 9.38 8.57 
Husband 73.13 65.63 80.00 
Mother-in-Law 1.49 3.13 0.00 
Father-in-Law 5.97 6.25 5.71 
Father  2.99 6.25 0.00 
Mother 1.49 3.13 0.00 
Children 1.49 3.13 0.00 
Brother/sister 1.49 3.13 0.00 
Other 2.99 0.00 5.71 
 
 
Table 4-21: Type of crop grown in households’ available land 
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Maize 53.62 62.50 45.95 
Garlic 20.29 0.00 37.84 
Alfalfa 8.70 15.63 2.70 
Courgette 10.14 0.00 18.92 
Tomato 4.35 3.13 5.41 
Beans 8.70 18.75 0.00 
Chilli 1.45 3.13 0.00 
Nopal 1.45 3.13 0.00 
 
 
In Table 4-21, the crops which households cultivated previous to the year of reference 
are displayed. The main crop grown in both towns was maize. However, this is the only 
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crop that was grown in the two localities. In Chilac, growing garlic was quite common, 
followed by courgettes, whereas alfalfa and beans were the main crops in Miahuatlan. 
Now we will address the economic activities wives carry out in the two towns of the 
Tehuacan area. These are much more diverse than the husbands’. Wives are 
commonly responsible for housework, but also have to perform other economic 
activities, including taking care of animals destined for household consumption or for 
selling in case of need; helping without pay in a family business; farming in the 
household’s plot; self-employed income-generating activities and in some cases 
salaried jobs. Wives do not restrict themselves to one activity only, but usually engage 
in several. Next, the participation rates in each of these occupations will be explored.  
As can be verified in Table 4-22, the participation rates for married women in salaried 
employment are very low. Overall, only a fifth of wives had worked for a salary in the 
previous year of reference and even fewer had done so previous to the week of 
reference. The gap in the rates between towns is surprising, as almost double the 
share of women worked for a salary in Miahuatlan to that in Chilac.  
 
Table 4-22: Percentage of wives with a salaried activity 
 Ever 
salaried 
Salaried 
last year 
Currently 
Salaried 
Both 77.78 21.53 16.90 
Miahuatlan 85.58 28.37 22.79 
Chilac 70.05 14.75 11.06 
 
 
Table 4-23 shows that textile assembly plant employment is by large one of the main 
waged occupations for wives, especially for those of San Gabriel Chilac.  The next, but 
by far most popular salaried activity is that of a school teacher, again particularly in San 
Gabriel Chilac. However, it must be emphasised that in order to be a school teacher, 
women need 4 years of training once they have completed high school. As is shown in 
Tables 4-14 and 4-15, very few have the opportunity to obtain these higher levels of 
education. The other viable alternative occupations for women without formal education 
are being hired in a store or working as a maid. As can be seen, only a very small 
proportion of wives participating in salaried employment undertake these activities. It 
can be concluded then, that for wives without formal educational levels, maquila 
employment is the essential activity.  
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Table 4-23: Wives salaried occupations 
 Last Year Week of Reference 
 Both Miah Chilac Both Miah Chilac 
Assembly 75.00 80.70 64.52 75.34 81.63 62.50
Maid 4.55 7.02 0.00 4.11 6.12 0.00
Teacher 10.23 3.51 22.58 12.33 4.08 0.00
In store or small business 4.55 5.26 3.23 2.74 4.08 29.17
Nurse 1.14 1.75 0.00 1.37 2.04 0.00
Farmer 1.14 0.00 3.23 1.37 0.00 4.17
Other professional non manual 2.27 1.75 3.23 2.74 2.04 4.17
Other non professional manual 1.14 0.00 3.23 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
 
 
Another income-generating activity available for wives in the area is that of self-
employment. As can be seen in Table 4-24, a much larger proportion of wives, almost 
half, engaged in this form of activity. Further, when comparing the share of wives who 
are self-employed in each town, it is found that in Chilac almost double the proportion 
of wives engage in this activity to that in Miahuatlan. This is opposite to the results 
obtained when the percentage of salaried wives was compared by town. 
 
Table 4-24: Percentage of self employed wives 
 Self 
employed 
last year 
Self 
employed 
week of 
reference 
Both 53.7 45.14 
Miahuatlan 40 29.77 
Chilac 67.28 60.37 
 
 
It must be noted, however, that even if for some wives self-employment can be a 
substitute for salaried employment as an income-generating activity, for some it can 
also be a complementary strategy. Table 4-25 shows the percentage of salaried wives 
who engaged in self-employment. It can be seen that, especially for those wives who 
are currently working compared to those who did so in the previous year, this 
proportion is very low, especially for salaried wives in Miahuatlan. It can be concluded 
therefore that for the great majority of wives self-employment is an alternative income-
generating strategy instead of a complementary one.  
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Table 4-25: Percentage of salaried wives who are also self-employed 
 Salaried wife also 
self-employed last 
Year 
Salaried wife also 
self-employed last 
week 
Both 18.18 9.59 
Miahuatlan 14.04 6.12 
Chilac 25.81 16.64 
 
 
It can be observed that wives are diversified into a number of self-employment 
activities. In San Gabriel Chilac, there is a strong tradition of sewing and weaving. This 
activity is passed on from generation to generation as mothers teach their daughters 
how to embroider and sew. Many women embroider clothes for ‘baby Jesus’ effigies 
which are sold once a year for ceremonies in Catholic churches. Another group of 
women embroider napkins or dresses which are bought by intermediaries once a week. 
Some even have workshops and sell the clothes themselves in city markets (Puebla or 
Mexico City). A large proportion of self-employed wives in Chilac undertake this work.  
 
Table 4-26: Wives’ self-employment activities 
 Last Year Week of Reference 
 Both Miah Chilac Both  Miah Chilac 
Sew 39.66 10.47 56.85 42.05 14.06 44.27 
Sell Garlic 6.03 0.00 9.59 5.64 0.00 8.4 
Store 16.81 20.93 14.38 19.49 26.56 16.03 
De-threading 5.17 6.98 4.11 4.1 4.69 3.82 
Make Tortillas 7.76 16.28 2.74 7.18 15.63 3.05 
Prepare Food 8.62 15.12 4.79 8.72 15.63 5.34 
Hawking 6.03 6.98 5.48 5.13 6.25 4.58 
Sell items in 
stall 
7.76 11.63 5.48 7.18 12.5 4.58 
 
Selling garlic in the market of Tehuacan, mainly on weekends, is also a frequent 
activity that is exclusive to San Gabriel Chilac. Garlic is cultivated in the town, so wives 
sell their families’ or others’ produce in the markets. In Miahuatlan a large share of 
wives prepare tortillas, a corn-based type of bread commonly used in Mexico in almost 
every meal.   
Convenience stores are a common enterprise for wives in both towns. These grocery 
shops range from the most simple, where only candy and non-perishable food is sold, 
to those which are fully equipped and have refrigerators and a much more varied stock. 
Usually, women keep an eye on them all day long while their husbands or sons work. 
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These types of business are more common in Miahuatlan but are still widespread in 
Chilac. 
A less common activity linked to assembly plants is removing threads from jeans.  
Maquilas distribute jeans to women’s houses and pay them per piece de-threaded.  
Finally, wives also sell products such as Avon from door to door, prepare food and sell 
it in stalls on the street, or sell items such as cosmetics or CD’s in market or street 
stalls.  However, these are the least common activities.  
It is important to note that wives’ self-employment activities in both towns are socially 
considered to be female ones. Sewing, cooking and making tortillas are activities 
women carry out within the house. Thus except for selling, the other self-employment 
activities are an extension of their reproductive activities.  
Apart from self-employment and salaried activities, another kind of economic activity by 
which wives in the area help support their families is by taking care of animals in their 
back yard. These are usually consumed or can be sold when cash is needed. As can 
be seen from Table 4-27, this activity is equally popular in both towns. 
 
Table 4-27: Percentage of wives taking care of animals 
 Have Animals 
Both 43.75 
Miahuatlan 42.79 
Chilac 44.7 
 
A smaller percentage of wives working in salaried employment had animals compared 
to those who were self-employed, especially if they had worked previous to the week of 
reference. However, a significant proportion still did. Self-employed wives on the other 
hand have an equal proportion of animals to the general population of wives. This 
could be due to working wives having less time, or that they have higher income levels 
and thus depend less on animal husbandry than self-employed wives.   
 
Table 4-28: Percentage of salaried and self-employed wives keeping animals 
 Salaried wife 
last year 
keeping 
animals  
Salaried last 
week also 
keeping 
animals 
Self employed 
wife last year 
keeping 
animals 
Self employed 
last week also 
keeping 
animals 
Both 39.78 34.55 43.53 44.62 
Miahuatlan 39.34 37.50 41.86 46.88 
Chilac 40.63 26.67 44.52 43.51 
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As can be verified in Table 4-29, by far the most common animals wives keep in the 
two towns are turkeys and chickens. A smaller proportion of wives have large animals 
like pigs, cows, lambs, donkeys and bulls, which are much more common in 
Miahuatlan than in Chilac. This is surprising as Chilac is much more of a rural and 
agricultural town. This finding, nevertheless, could be due to people in Miahuatlan 
having higher household income levels and therefore greater ability to buy these kinds 
of animals.  
 
Table 4-29: Types of animals wives keep 
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Turkey 65.61 51.09 79.38 
Chicken 42.86 46.74 39.18 
Hen 21.16 32.61 10.31 
Goat 7.41 9.78 5.15 
Pig 7.94 14.13 2.06 
Cow 3.70 7.61 0.00 
Lamb 10.05 14.13 6.19 
Duck 1.59 1.09 2.06 
Donkey 3.70 6.52 1.03 
Bull 2.12 4.35 0.00 
 
 
Women also help out in family or friend´s businesses without pay. For example, they 
can help attend on their mother in law´s corner shop regularly, as a favour to 
herwithout expecting any cash reward for their time. Therefore, they are providing 
labour to their family members (which can also be members of  their households) or 
friends freely. Table 4-30 shows the proportion of wives in each town who helped in a 
business without pay. Some (around 10%) dedicated time to help a business previous 
to the week of reference. A larger proportion of them did so in San Gabriel Chilac than 
in Miahuatlan.  
 
Table 4-30:  Percentage of wives that helped in a business without pay 
 Helped 
business last 
year 
Helped 
business last 
week 
Both 9.74 7.40 
Miahuatlan 7.01 5.12 
Chilac 12.44 9.68 
 
The relationships wives have with the individuals they help are varied, as shown in 
Table 4-31. In both towns, the relation they helped most often was a husband. A lower 
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but also meaningful share of wives assist their mothers, particularly in San Gabriel 
Chilac. Surprisingly, only in Miahuatlan were wives found to help their friends. 
Furthermore, they helped them almost as often as their husbands. Women in this town 
reported having more friends than those from Chilac, where due to cultural norms 
wives have more mobility restrictions and participate less in salaried employment 
(where they meet friends) than in Miahuatlan. 
 
Table 4-31:  Relation whose business wives’ helped with  
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Spouse 30.95 33.33 29.63
Mother 19.05 13.33 22.22
Mother-in-law 7.14 13.33 3.70
Daughter 9.52 0.00 14.81
Sibling 11.90 6.67 14.81
Other family members 11.90 6.67 3.70
Friends 9.52 26.67 0.00
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
 
 
Table 4-32 displays the kinds of businesses wives helped to run. In the two towns, a 
majority of wives who aided in a business did so in a corner shop. Fewer wives helped 
their relatives preparing food in stalls and making tortillas to sell there. As with wives’ 
own self-employed occupations, they commonly helped in activities commonly were 
considered female.  
 
Table 4-32: Type of business wives helped with  
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Corner shops 55.00 53.85 55.56
Sell food 15.00 15.38 14.81
Sewing 7.50 7.69 7.41
Medical center 2.50 7.69 0.00
Repair shop 2.50 0.00 3.70
Tortilla 12.50 15.38 11.11
Craft 2.50 0.00 3.70
Professional 2.50 0.00 3.70
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
 
Finally, wives also contributed economically by working the household’s land. Overall 
few wives helped in this way, as is shown in Table 4-35 since few households had 
access to a plot. If households with land are taken into account, it can be seen that a 
majority of wives there helped cultivating it.  
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Table 4-33: Percentage of wives that helped cultivate land  
 Help with 
land 
Help with land, of 
those who have it 
Both 8.8 55.07 
Miahuatlan 6.98 46.88 
Chilac 10.6 62.16 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Wives thus can engage in a wide range of possible activities to provide economically 
for their households, with or without pay. Among these, salaried employment and 
particularly assembly plant employment are untraditional activities for married women.  
Social norms regulate and sanction wives’ participation in them. In the following 
section, the main moral arguments and mechanisms by which norms in both San 
Gabriel Chilac and Santiago Miahuatlan prevent wives from participating in assembly 
plant employment will be explored. 
Although not the main focus of this study, it must be remembered that husbands are 
generally the ones who take the decisions as to what to cultivate. Finally, a notable 
proportion of wives helped without pay in their husbands’ businesses.  
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_______________________________ 
5 Moral arguments and decision-making 
within the household 
_______________________________ 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
 
In Mexico ‘the stereotype was that a manly man had to be a good provider for his family (as 
well as a heavy drinker, socializing mainly with his mates when not engaged with vigorous 
promiscuity). A womanly woman, on the other hand, was chaste and pure, the bearer of her 
husband’s honour; she stayed in the home, cared well for him and their children, and had an 
enduring capacity for suffering’ (Townsend 1999).   
 
 
The previous paragraph depicts the main roles of husbands and wives in Mexico. As 
such, it describes the ideal behaviour that is expected of women and men once they 
are married. Consistent with these roles are the main moral arguments that sustain the 
social norm that women ought not to participate in assembly plant employment in the 
two towns of the Tehuacán area. The first moral argument which will be explored is that 
of wives’ having the duty of fulfilling and being responsible for reproductive activities. 
Thus they should stay at home fulfilling these. The second one refers to women’s 
sexual integrity and states that women working for assembly plants are promiscuous. 
They should therefore avoid being dishonoured by taking jobs there. The last moral 
discourse refers to men’s obligation as breadwinners. If their wives are working for a 
salary in assembly plants, it implies that they are failing to fulfil their role or duty to their 
families. This is, as a result, another reason for wives to stay out of assembly plant 
employment.  
This chapter then, first makes an in-depth description of each one of these arguments. 
Second, it gives an overview of the extent to which these moral arguments permeate 
both towns. And finally, it described how couples negotiate wives’ participation or not in 
assembly plant employment. It also focuses on the roles that moral arguments play in 
the bargaining process between spouses.  
 
5.2 Women as homemakers 
 
Many of the women interviewed from both towns perceived staying at home as their 
obligation as wives. Thus, they did not consider it appropriate to work in an assembly 
plant.  Some women had been raised to fulfil this role throughout their lives and had 
stayed at home since they stopped studying, usually at a very young age. Therefore 
they had never taken part in any sort of paid job.  
This was the case, for example, of Sonia, a wife from San Gabriel Chilac who has three 
sons aged 14, 12, and 10, and an 8-year-old daughter. As she states, she had never 
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taken part in a salaried activity as ‘since a girl, I have always been in my home.’ 
Consistent with her upbringing, she viewed her place in the home when married, as her 
obligation of ‘ama de casa’21. However, when asked if she would like to work for the 
maquila independently of having to fulfil this role, she said that she would. This is an 
illustration of how girls are raised to fulfil their role as homemakers and thus, when they 
get married, continue to perceive it as their duty. 
Other wives have had the experience of participating in some form of salaried 
employment when they were single. Nevertheless, they had ceased doing so when 
they got married so that they could fulfil their role as housewives. The most common 
jobs for single women in both towns were assembly plant employment and working as 
a maid. Generally, those women who had been maids while single had migrated 
temporarily to another city such as Mexico City or Tehuacan. Thus they had also had 
the experience of living in another city but had returned to their towns and now fulfilled 
their socially ascribed roles.  
Pilar is a case of a wife from Chilac who had had a salaried job when unmarried. She 
had gone to the state of Veracruz, Mexico to work in an assembly plant when single, 
but had stopped doing so when she got married. She was 48 years old and had had 5 
children, now aged 18 to 25. In accordance with wives’ social role, she believed that a 
woman should cease working after she got married.  She stated: 
 
 ‘Once one has a husband, once one has, as one says, a husband, one doesn’t work somewhere 
else.’ 
 
Women’s responsibility of being a homemaker once they got married was also an 
argument reference groups would use to sanction them when they broke the social 
norm of not working in assembly plants.  For example, Clara was a 16-year-old and 
mother of a one-year-old baby.  She had recently quit working for the maquila but had 
continued for some time during her marriage. She recalled how throughout this period, 
her mother and father would criticize her by telling her that as she had gotten married, 
therefore she now had the obligation to stay at home.  
Ana, a 23-year-old from Chilac working for the maquila, believed that there would be 
gossip in the community upholding this moral argument, although she wasn’t able to 
exactly identify by whom.  As she said, when married women worked in the maquila 
people would say: 
 
                                                 
21 Term in Spanish meaning ‘Mistress of the house.’ 
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‘For what did she get married, if she was going to continue working…’ 
 
This statement not only supports wives’ role as homemakers, but even stronger, 
implies that the only purpose of women is marriage.  
Marriage alone is enough reason for some individuals to believe wives should stay at 
home. However, for many wives and husbands, the defining responsibility of married 
women in their role as homemakers is that of childbearing.  For example, Susana, a 
wife from Miahuatlan used to work previously in the maquila. Yet now she stayed at 
home taking care of her three children aged 6, 3 and 1. She described: 
 
‘Its one’s turn to look after the kids at home, but then one does not worry (about them). But, if it 
were for me I go to work. To be honest, I like to work.’ 
 
Consistent with her argument, she believed that it was her duty to take care of her 
children all day instead of working. Nevertheless, she preferred to do the later. Another 
illustrative case is that of Raul, a 37-year-old husband from Miahuatlan with four 
children aged 16 to 11 and who had a wife who had never engaged in salaried 
employment in her life.  Even though his wife did want to work for the maquila, he did 
not agree this was desirable.  
 
‘No, because my child is small and she has never worked. Since they are small, she has never 
worked. Her obligation is towards them, not the maquila. At home she has more time for my 
children. Further, she has the dinner table ready. You arrive and you know she can wait for her 
family.  Now my children go to school, they will arrive here and they will ask, -and the food? 
Who will feed them?’ 
 
So, this is another example of how it can be considered by some as wives’ obligation to 
stay at home. What is more, as depicted in this case, the wife stayed at home with the 
purpose of being available to serve her family, especially her children, even if they 
were not at a very young age.  
A crucial fear individuals had about wives not staying at home taking care of children, 
especially if the children were boys, was that they could become ‘street’ children and 
join gangs.  As Mariana, a 33-year-old housewife explained: 
 
‘I say that while they do not have children one can go to work, but once with children, well then 
one neglects them, especially if they are boys. It is when they need their mother most. Because 
the mother guards that they do not go to the street that they do not become slackers, because you 
know that in these times…’ 
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It could be presumed that families in the region did not have an alternative childcare 
option and that therefore wives with children had no other alternative but to stay at 
home taking care of them. In both towns, day care centres were scarce. A few 
assembly plants had their own nurseries, but the great majority of them did not. 
Nevertheless, several wives that did not participate in assembly plant jobs did have the 
option of leaving their children with their relatives, particularly their mothers. In the 
survey, questions were included which asked wives whether there was a female 
relative who could take care of their children if they had to work for the maquila. Table 
5-1 shows that the majority, 60%, of wives reported having at least one person with 
whom to leave their children. Also, a large proportion of wives considered their own 
female family members more able to carry out this task than their husbands’ family 
members.  
 
 
Table 5-1: Percentage of wives who stated there was at least one relative who 
could take care of their children if they had to work for the maquila22 
 At least 
one 
person  
Mother Mother 
in law 
Sister Sister 
in law 
Neigh 
bours 
Other 
person 
Both 61.13 39.21 24.78 22.87 17.27 6.51 11.11 
Mihuatlan 59.20 34.91 28.70 27.88 20.39 7.14 13.59 
Chilac 62.86 42.98 21.31 18.49 14.53 5.98 9.02 
 
 
Despite this, there was a consistent argument in the towns which stated grandmothers 
could not take care of children the same way as their mothers did. Lilia, for example, 
had two girls aged 6 and 3.  Although her mother was willing and able to look after her 
daughters, her husband would disagree with her working for a maquila. As she 
describes: 
 
‘I have already told him (her husband) I want to work, but I tell you he says no because of the 
girls, that we already have kids and I have to take care of them, because it is not the same thing 
to stay with a grandmother or another family member, it is not the same…even once I even told 
my mum and she told me that if it was for the sake of my children I should go to work and she 
would help me take care of them.’ 
 
                                                 
22 Figures are calculated for wives who have children less than or equal to 16 years old 
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Karina, a 40–year-old from San Gabriel Chilac with 2 children, one 13 and another 9, 
would also prefer to look after them herself instead of having her mother taking care of 
them for this reason. She explained: 
 
‘As I have my children, I could not dedicate myself for example, to the maquila, because I 
couldn’t take care of them, even though I have my mum. But it is very different one as a mother 
than a grandmother, besides my mother is old. Then, one thinks of something where I can not 
neglect my children, that is why I dedicate myself to my animals, embroidering, a little of 
everything. This way I can look after my children.’ 
 
Therefore, while some families did not have alternative childcare options, the majority 
of them did. Nevertheless, couples would prefer not to use them as they believed 
childcare from other relatives was not a substitute for their mothers’ attention. As a 
consequence, it was wives’ duty to stay at home to take care of them.  
The argument that wives neglected their children if they went to work for an assembly 
plant was also commonly used by reference groups to sanction both spouses. This, for 
example, happened to Clara, a 50-year-old wife from Miahuatlan who had had 7 
children, all adults now. The oldest was 40 while the youngest was 17 years old. While 
her children were younger she used to work for the maquila. She recalls that during this 
period, her friends would criticize her by asking: 
 
 ‘Why do you work? Because they would say that maybe I was neglecting my children.’ 
 
In the end, Clara stopped working because her children started growing up and they 
demanded that she attend to them.  
Mariana the 33-year-old housewife (whose situation was also described previously in 
the chapter) is another case of a wife who would get criticised for working in the 
maquila. In this instance, she was criticised by her mother in law.  
 
‘She says I shouldn’t work. Up to this date I tell her-well I am going to work, she says -no, well 
you are not going to work. She doesn’t want me to go to work because of my youngest boy’ 
 
However, it is not only wives who are socially sanctioned when they participate in 
assembly plant employment, but their husbands as well. Marco is a 33-year-old 
husband whose wife goes to the maquila. He and his wife have three children aged 13, 
12 and 10.  His father criticises him because in his opinion their children are being 
neglected.  
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Therefore each spouse gets criticised and gossiped about if the wife leaves her duty as 
homemaker and instead works for an assembly plant. This is especially true if they 
have children.  
It could be argued that taking care of children and even doing housework is a valid 
argument for wives to stay at home and work. This statement is not denied in this 
research. How can it be asserted, then, that wives’ freedom is curtailed by a social 
norm that accords with this reasoning? While childcare is considered an 
unquestionable reason for wives to stay at home, the fact that it is generally considered 
their obligation and duty can be regarded as limiting their freedom to decide. 
Furthermore, it is believed that men should also have the same opportunity to fulfil this 
role. As Nussbaum (2000) argues:  ‘If love and imagination are important both as social 
goals and as moral abilities for each and every person, this already suggests some 
form of family structure: for we see that not only that women need to acquire the so 
called male abilities of choice and independent planning, but also that males need to 
acquire at least some skills traditionally associated with women’s work and the female 
sphere.’ 
Dolores is a 40-year-old wife from Miahuatlan with 5 children. The oldest is 20 years 
old while the youngest is 9. When asked whether she would like to work in an 
assembly plant, she replied she would not because: 
 
‘For me the most important thing is to enjoy my children now that they are still with me, 
young.’ 
 
Nevertheless, she would also believe the following: 
 
 ‘We all have our way of living, of expression, and also for the work. Because even if we are 
women, we now count with all these liberties and if we sometimes do not do it, it is because we 
solve it in another way.’ Women who work in the maquila ‘try to become better, and that is why 
they work as a couple, the wife together with the man, to live better that is what I believe. 
Because that idea that a woman has to stay at her home…, no! I think that it is the decision of 
each family.’ 
 
Therefore, even though Dolores had the preference of staying at home to look after 
their children, she did not think it was wives’ duty to do so. It therefore can be implied 
that she has not internalized this moral argument. However, it must also be recognized 
that she does imply the idea that wives work only to obtain an additional income.  
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5.3 Male breadwinners 
 
In the two towns studied the husbands as well as the wives had a role to fulfil within 
their marriage. While wives had the obligation to stay at home to carry out reproductive 
activities, husbands’ duty was to be the breadwinners. Wives’ engagement in assembly 
plants earned them a considerable and visible salary. Therefore, it was considered that 
if wives went to work for the maquila, husbands were not fulfilling this role.  
This responsibility is embodied in what Fernando a 57-year-old husband from 
Miahuatlan said about wives working for the maquila: 
 
 ‘It is wrong… because that is what we are here for, to work and provide with what is 
necessary.’ 
 
In accord with this statement Fernando did not want his wife to work for the maquila 
even though she wanted to, had previously done so for 6 years and although their 6 
children were already adults. 
Raul a 37-year-old husband from Miahuatlan with four children aged 16, 14, 13 and 11, 
is another example of someone holding these views. Like Fernando, he would not 
agree to his wife working for an assembly plant, even though she desired to.  He 
stated: 
 
‘Since we got married she never worked, lets say, that one is doing ok with the expenses, there 
are times when one is up to date and there are some times when… what is one to do.’ 
 
It was not only husbands who assumed it was their obligation to provide economically 
for their family: wives expected them to do so as well. Sonia, for example, a wife from 
Chilac who had never worked for the maquila, implicitly believed this. This is illustrated 
by her answer when inquired whether she would like to work there: 
 
 ‘now, while he lives, I do not have the apprehension of having to work in the maquila.’ 
 
From the previous statements, it is important to notice that these arguments suggest 
that the only reason why wives would go to work for an assembly plant is to obtain 
income. Thus, if it is the men’s duty to provide economically for their family’s expenses, 
there is no reason for wives to work there. However, even though income can be an 
important driving force behind women’s desire to participate in assembly plant 
employment, there are other important features of maquila jobs besides the salary that 
are attractive for wives. These will be explored in the next chapter. 
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Just as wives suffered social sanctions if they did not comply with the obligation to be 
homemakers, husbands were also criticised and gossiped about by others if they did 
not fulfil their role as breadwinners.  Further, a series of negative adjectives were 
attached to these criticisms.  
Paola, for instance, a 30-year-old wife from Miahuatlan with three children aged 12, 4 
and 3, would claim that husbands would be criticised by people saying: 
 
‘that ‘huevon’23 is in the street and his wife working. There is lots of criticism for everything.’ 
 
Another wife from Miahuatlan, Claudia, 23 years of age and with two children, a 5 and 
4-year-old, also illustrated how husbands were named: 
 
‘If she (his wife) went to work, they would say that the husband is a ‘mandilon’24.  
 
Clara, for instance, a 50-year-old wife from Miahuatlan with 7 children aged 35 to 17 
also describes how husbands would be denoted if their wives worked for an assembly 
plant:  
 
‘They would say he is the one who sends her to work because he is very irresponsible, because 
sometimes they do have to go to work because they are irresponsible.’ 
 
An interesting feature of Clara’s statement is that it implies that husbands are the ones 
who send their wives to work in the maquila. This was not an uncommon belief. For 
example, Marco, the husband of a wife working for the maquila, also suspected there 
was gossip about him that suggested he was the one making his wife work: 
 
‘They haven’t said it to me, but I imagine that, it is almost the normal, that he sends her to work 
because there is not enough for the expenses, that is what they first believe.’ 
 
 
Marco would claim nevertheless that his wife’s participation in the assembly plant was 
a mutual agreement and was due to their having debts at the moment.  
Both the previous quotes imply not only that husbands are the ones who want their 
wives to work in assembly plants, but that they have the authority to make them do so if 
they wish. Further, by sending their wives to work, husbands are being lazy and 
irresponsible in their role as breadwinners. 
In some instances the irresponsibility imputed to husbands was further heightened by 
stating that wives’ participation in assembly plant employment was related to husbands 
                                                 
23 Is a pejorative expression that stands for ‘lazy’, but its literal meaning is ‘without balls’.   
24 This is also a derogatory word, which is best translated as ‘apron wearer.’ 
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drinking too much and therefore not having enough money to provide for their family. 
For instance, Raul, the 37-year-old husband from Miahuatlan believed: 
 
  ‘If wives go to work the first thing they (society) say when a wife goes to work is ‘huevon’, 
this and that, that he is ‘echado25’ or he is in the ‘cantina’26.’ 
 
Carlos, a 32-year-old from Miahuatlan, had a wife who had never worked in her life and 
three children aged 9 to 15. He believed some husbands made their wives work 
because they drank and therefore didn’t give their wives enough money: 
 
‘There are husbands that drink, they don’t give (money) to their wives, they don’t give them 
enough, then they have to go to work, now in the situations we live in.’  
 
Occasionally, the same working wives will be socially sanctioned for allowing and 
promoting their husbands to be irresponsible, lazy and in cases even drunk.  As Juana, 
a 33-year-old wife who sold tortillas part of the year and worked for an assembly plant 
the rest, illustrated: 
 
‘Sometimes they say that we make our husbands to be badly accustomed, because we give them 
a hand.’ 
 
Luisa, a 26-year-old from Miahuatlan, with three children aged 9, 5 and 3, who worked 
in the maquila, also received criticism: 
 
‘Members of my husband’s family do not really agree. His father says that only he has to work, 
that I am getting him into a bad habit.’ 
 
However, wives working in the maquila and their husbands used an alternative 
explanation of husbands’ duty. This way they would offset the arguments given by 
some members of the society implying that husbands were irresponsible for not 
complying with their role as breadwinners when their wives engaged in salaried 
employment.  According to them, as long as the husbands of the working wives were 
also participating in an income generating activity, then they were fulfilling their 
responsibility within the marriage. As Marco, a 33-year-old husband from Miahuatlan 
with three children aged 13, 12 and 10 explained: 
 
 ‘There are different cases, for example, the ones who are married and live with their husbands 
and children, they do it to bring up properly their children. If the husband does not work and she 
has to work to sustain the husband and the children … who knows why they do it’ 
                                                 
25 Word which means lying down, but is used for animals, so pejorative when used  
26 A bar where  only men are allowed. 
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Tonia is a 28-year-old from Miahuatlan with three children of 12, 9 and 6 years, who 
works for the maquiladora. She defended her husband, stating: 
 
 ‘If he were only in the house, they would say he does not go to work and she is outside the 
house to go to work. They would say, why does he stay at home? But if both of us go, I do not 
think they will think badly.’ 
 
Husbands of wives working for the maquila would get criticised and gossiped about for 
being irresponsible. Yet the idea of a wife working in an assembly plant was plausible. 
Nevertheless, the idea of husbands taking over the role of wives and staying at home 
engaging in reproductive activities while their wives economically provided for their 
families was unconceivable. For instance, Claudia a 29-year-old homemaker with two 
children, one 5 and the other 6, would argue: 
 
‘if she goes to work  and the husband stays (at home), then what would the husband do? The 
food? She will want him to stay preparing the food and her working he he he (laughs) One has 
to wake up early, leave the food done, it is also lots of work, it is lots of work.. but if one wants 
to prosper, she prepares the food, the husband comes, arrives from work, he eats. But if she goes 
to work and the husband stays being a ‘mandilon’ there, taking care of the children… that is not 
ok, then he gets used to it, then the woman works and he does not want to work any more, isn’t 
that true?’ 
 
Even Gabriela, a 20-year-old wife from Miahuatlan with a one-year-old son who would 
work for periods in the maquila, believed that:  
 
‘The work is for the man, but the home work is of the women. If a man has time to do his work 
during the day and the household chores during the night, well, then it is ok. But if he is only 
doing house work like a woman, then I believe it is not ok.’ 
 
Thus the role of each spouse within the marriage was clearly specified. Yet, while there 
was room for wives to challenge their duty of being at home by going to work to an 
assembly plant, they still had to be responsible for housework and their husbands had 
to continue being economic providers. Thus, husbands did not have any opportunity to 
take on wives’ socially ascribed role. 
 
5.4 Promiscuous wives 
 
The maquila is a place where women relate and interact with men on a daily basis.  
Previous to the arrival of assembly plants, married women would mainly stay at home.  
Therefore, there was no space where women constantly associated with men.  As this 
space was created, the opportunity and fear that wives might meet other men and get 
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romantically involved with them also emerged. The third moral argument relates to this 
concern, implying that women who work for assembly plants are promiscuous.  
Luisa a 26-year-old from Miahuatlan with three children aged 9, 5 and 3, for example, 
expressed what was thought of wives working for the maquila in these terms: 
 
 ‘that they are crazy27, that is what they say.’ 
 
Raul a 37-year-old husband from Miahuatlan had a wife who desired to work in the 
maquila, yet he was opposed to the idea. He would also refer to married women 
working for an assembly plant and would do so even in a harsher way:  
 
‘Here it is not said, it is known that they are bitches there (in the maquila)’ 
 
Some people would even go further and affirm that the whole motivation for married 
women to participate in assembly plants was to be unfaithful to their husbands. As 
Martha, a 26-year-old from Chilac who works in the maquila and has two sons, one 6 
and another 2 years old, puts it: 
 
‘they say that you are in bad steps there, that that is why you it is in your interest to go to the 
maquila.’ 
 
Adela a 47-year-old housewife with 5 children aged 25 to14, articulated couples’ 
refusal to see wives working for the maquilas in similar terms. 
 
‘Sometimes, not everybody, sometimes, they see young women and they say that they are 
searching for a lover, that the woman searches for another man, that she has an affair with some 
guy. It is what is said sometimes.’ 
 
Mariana, the 33-year-old housewife from Miahuatlan with four children also stated: 
 
‘The people, who know them (women in the assembly plant) say that they (wives) go because 
they are searching for another man.’ 
 
It is interesting to observe that because cheating on a husband is a negative trait, 
individuals always make reference to third parties making these types of statements. 
Raul is an exception, but also a case of a person who has a strong view on the topic.  It 
                                                 
27 In this context, ‘crazy’ woman means loose woman. 
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can de deduced accordingly that it is more usual for individuals to refer to gossip and 
criticism of others on the subject, than to their beliefs about it. 
On another note, a good explanation of how gossip and criticism is disseminated is 
given by Adela (previously quoted).  
 
 ‘They comment about it (infidelity) in the maquila. They then comment it to the neighbour and 
the neighbour already came to tell. Mainly they would they would tell to my husbands family. It 
is what they would come to say, or to my father, or to some neighbour or a relative, and then the 
gossip is constructed, and then, even if I would want to amend things I could not, because there 
are times that they do believe them, as it happens to some women. There are sometimes that 
men believe they are very independent, they feel they are self sufficient and they do not listen to 
the women.’ 
 
On the other hand, some wives would defend maquila wives by claiming that the 
promiscuity of female employees could not be applied to all the workers in the maquila.  
Mariana, for example, the 33-year-old housewife who stated that others believed wives 
worked in the maquila in order to be unfaithful to their husbands, contended: 
 
‘For one person that gets spoiled inside the maquila, they do not say her, they say, them.’ 
 
Camila, a 20-year-old from Miahuatlan with a one-year-old child who was employed in 
the maquila, also asserted that these comments could not apply to all the wives 
working for an assembly plant, as it depended on their conduct. 
 
‘It depends on the behaviour. If a woman that is already married goes to the maquila, goes to 
work and she goes to what she is there for, there is no problem. But if instead of working she 
talks or starts flirting then people judge badly.’ 
 
Further, not only were there contentions stating that women’s infidelity could not be 
generalized to all female employees, but also that these were exaggerated. Juana, for 
instance, a housewife from Chilac, when asked whether she believed there would be 
rumours about her if she worked in the maquila stated there would be because: 
 
 ‘Well for example, I say that, there is every type of person there, if for example, you have a 
friendship with someone, they do not say it is friendship… that is why.’ 
 
For this reason, Juana believed that even if she was not unfaithful to her husband, 
there would be gossip about her anyway. There would be rumours about women for 
having a friendship with a man.  
Camila from Miahuatlan also implied that people would misunderstand.  She 
commented: 
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‘Many times we like to beautify ourselves, but they (community) think we make it to attract 
someone else.’  
 
 
These last quotes reflect how it is uncustomary in both towns for married women to 
have regular interaction with males. Additionally, there was concern about any type of 
female conduct that would give rise to wives potentially flirting with other men. 
To avoid suspicions both from husbands and from wider society, some couples would 
even use the strategy of working for the same maquila. This way husbands would 
ensure their wives were not having an affair. Additionally, there would not be any scope 
for gossip on the matter. This was the case, for example, of Mariana, who worked in a 
maquila in Miahuatlan. Even if she believed rumours were likely to arise when wives 
worked for the maquila, when asked whether she believed there was gossip about her, 
she replied: 
 
‘No, because both of us work there (in the same maquila).’ 
 
Another arrangement partners would use to avoid gossip would be for husbands to go 
and pick up their wives at the assembly plants.  This was the strategy that Susana, now 
a housewife in Miahuatlan with three children aged 6, 3 and 1, adopted previously 
when she worked for an assembly plant.  This way, her husband would not have any 
problem with her working. 
It must be observed, that contrary to the previous moral arguments, this one does not 
specify any direct duty that needs to be followed by women. However, it implicitly it 
draws on the stereotype that women have to be chaste, pure and faithful to their 
husbands. This is contrary to what is expected from husbands. While wives and society 
in general do not regard husbands’ infidelity as a desirable behaviour, it is viewed as 
natural and even sometimes as part of their essence and therefore not as scandalous. 
As Mariana, the wife from Miahuatlan with four children, stated: 
 
 ‘It is not gossip (that husbands cheat on wives), it is the truth. In these times there is not one 
man that is not with women. This already happens worldwide, you can now see it anywhere.’  
 
Further, as it is the husband’s obligation to be the breadwinners, their infidelity has no 
effects on their labour participation.  
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5.5 Internalization of moral arguments 
 
Up to now the three main moral reasons according to which individuals in both San 
Gabriel Chilac and Santiago Miahuatlan maintain that married women should not 
participate in assembly plant employment were described in detail. We will now explore 
the extent to which these moral arguments have been internalized by society at large.  
To proxy for the internalization of each moral argument, Likert scale questions were 
included in the survey posed to wives. These asked whether wives on one hand, and 
husbands on the other, believed in each of the moral arguments. Five possible 
answers were included: whether individuals ‘completely agreed’, ‘somewhat agreed’, 
‘were indifferent’, ‘somewhat disagreed’ or ‘completely disagreed’ with each of the 
moral arguments. From these, dummy variables which indicated whether each spouse 
‘somewhat disagreed’ or ‘completely disagreed’ with each moral argument were 
constructed. Thus a total of eight dichotomous variables were created; for each spouse 
there are three which indicate whether they disagreed with each of the moral 
arguments and an additional one which showed if they disagreed with all the moral 
arguments.  
From Tables 5-2 and 5-3 it can be inferred that a lower percentage of wives and 
husbands disagreed with the moral argument that wives had to be the homemakers. 
On the other hand, a much larger share of couples disagreed with the argument that 
wives working in an assembly plant were promiscuous. Further, the proportions of 
wives who disagreed with all of the moral arguments are significantly different from 
each other at a 95% confidence and a 5% significance level.  This is also true for 
husbands’ disagreement with all the moral arguments.  
 
Table 5-2: Wives’ disagreement on moral arguments 
 Women’s 
place home 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Men 
Breadwinners 
All Moral 
arguments
%  Not Disagree 52.55 25.52 41.63 68.75
%  Disagree 47.45 74.48 58.37 31.25 
Total 100 100 100 100
 
 
 
Table 5-3: Husbands’ disagreement on moral arguments 
 Women’s 
place home 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Men 
Breadwinners 
All Moral 
arguments
%  Not Disagree 57.94 37.3 43.63 73.38
%  Disagree 42.06 62.7 56.37 26.62 
Total 100 100 100 100
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From the same tables, it can also be inferred that a larger share of wives would 
disagree with all the moral arguments than their husbands. The difference between the 
proportion of wives’ and husbands’ disagreement is the greatest, for the moral 
argument stating that wives working in the maquilas were loose. This gap is even 
significant at a 5 percent level. On the other hand, the divergence between spouses’ 
disagreements on women’s obligation to be the homemakers is significant but only at a 
10 percent level. Further, the gap between wives’ and husbands’ disagreement is 
smallest regarding men having to be the breadwinners. What is more, this difference is 
not significant at all. Therefore, husbands seem to have internalized norms regarding 
their wives’ behaviour to a much larger extent than wives. Yet this is not the case for 
the moral argument regarding their role within marriage. In chapter 7 we investigate the 
extent to which both wives and husbands’ beliefs in each moral argument have an 
effect on the probability that wives will work in assembly plant jobs. It is also 
investigated whether wives’ or husbands’ internalization of these rules has the greatest 
impact on this probability.  
Furthermore, beliefs in moral arguments by individuals are not assumed to be given but 
to depend on a series of variables. Firstly, it is presumed that the degree to which 
moral arguments are internalized diverge in each town. It should be noted that wives’ 
participation rates in the maquila were much larger in Miahuatlan than in Chilac. A 
fundamental premise in this research is that differences in participation rates between 
towns are due to the divergence in beliefs in moral arguments28.  
Secondly, individuals’ internalization of moral arguments is assumed to depend on 
characteristics such as age, education and household income. Younger generations 
are bound to believe less in each of these moral arguments. Therefore age is 
presumed to be negatively correlated to the belief in the moral arguments on the part of 
both spouses. Additionally, it is presumed that the higher the level of education an 
individual has, the more he or she will disagree with all the moral arguments. Finally, 
the level of income of a household is also expected to have a positive effect on 
spouses’ disagreement with moral arguments.  
Thirdly, one of the aims of the present research is to discover unconventional variables 
that influence wives’ and husbands’ internalization of the moral arguments.  Two 
different characteristics were identified during in-depth interviews which possibly have 
an influence on people’s beliefs in moral arguments.  On one hand, whether a husband 
participates in a traditional activity like farming or works in the newly created assembly 
plants is bound to have an effect on his perceptions. Previous to the arrival of maquilas 
                                                 
28 Tables on the share of wives and husbands believing in each moral argument are included in 
chapter (), where analysis on internalization of norms are extensively analyzed. 
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to the region, agriculture used to be the predominant activity. Therefore, husbands who 
still engage in this traditional activity might have less access to alternative views and 
ways of thinking. Conversely, husbands working for an assembly plant will have first 
hand information as to what goes on inside them. They will also interact with wives who 
work in assembly plants and probably with their husbands as well. Therefore to some 
extent they might have laxer beliefs.  Thus, it is expected that husbands in farming will 
believe more strongly in each moral argument whereas husbands working in assembly 
plants will believe less in each moral argument.  
A second set of determinants of individual beliefs considered in this investigation 
involves whether the person has lived in a city for an extended period of time, or was 
born in one.  As Bourdieu (1997) explained, people might adopt a social norm because 
it has been naturalized in society. People perceive there to be a natural order of things 
and therefore do not question it. When individuals live in a place where the order of 
things is different from those in their towns, they may begin to doubt whether norms 
and the arguments that sustain them are natural. They can therefore start questioning 
them. For example, a wife might believe that her role within her marriage is to be the 
homemaker because this is what is done in the town where she grew up. If she 
migrates to a city where these norms are not prevalent and therefore not widely 
followed, she can start challenging and changing her original beliefs. With even greater 
reason a person growing up in a city will have come to internalize diverging arguments 
and norms. Thus, in chapter () we will test whether couples’ temporary migration to 
another city has an effect on their belief in each of the moral arguments.  
Finally, individual’s beliefs are shaped by interacting with others in the society. In 
Tehuacán, women had strong ties with their family members. Therefore it is proposed 
that having participating in assembly plant employment, has an important effect on 
spouses’ beliefs in the moral arguments.  Specifically, it is examined whether having a 
sister or sister in law has any influence in these beliefs.  
 
5.6 Social sanctions 
 
People not only have feelings of guilt and shame when they violate a social norm but 
also face social sanctions by different reference groups when they do. Four different 
reference groups believed to gossip and criticise couples if wives worked for an 
assembly plant were mentioned consistently in the previous descriptions of moral 
arguments.  These were the wife’s family, the husband’s family, neighbours and 
friends.  
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Therefore, questions were included in the survey to account for the effect of social 
sanctions on wives’ participation in the maquila. These took the form of Likert scale 
questions which asked wives how likely they thought it was that they and their 
husbands would be gossiped about and criticised by each of the reference groups 
using each of the moral arguments if they participated in an assembly plant. These 
questions contained four possible answers: whether a wife believed it was sure, likely, 
unlikely, or impossible for the reference group in question to socially sanction them. For 
each question a dummy variable was constructed which had a value of one if wives 
were ‘sure’ or thought it was ‘very likely’ that they would be socially sanctioned. Thus, a 
total of 36 dummy variables were created. These first indicated whether wives felt that 
there would be gossip about them, second whether they would be criticized, and third 
whether their husbands would be criticized by each of the four reference groups using 
each of the three moral arguments.  
Tables 5-4, 5-5 and 5-6 show the proportion of wives who expected to be socially 
sanctioned by each reference group using each of the moral arguments. Consistent 
with the prevalence of the moral argument of wives being homemakers, a larger share 
of wives expected to be socially sanctioned by all reference groups for this reason than 
for the two others.  Furthermore, this difference is significant at a 1% level, for every 
type of sanction and every reference group. Conversely, even though the belief in 
husbands’ obligation to be breadwinners is also quite widespread in both towns, a 
relatively low proportion of wives believed they and their husbands would be 
sanctioned by almost all reference groups on the counts of this moral argument.  Thus, 
while a greater portion of wives anticipated that they and their husbands would be 
sanctioned due to their socially constructed role, they believed the contrary was true for 
that of their husbands, even though this might be quite extensively accepted in society.  
Further, a similar proportion of wives believed they would be sanctioned with the moral 
argument that wives working in a maquila were loose, to that stating that husbands 
were not fulfilling their duty as breadwinners. They believed this with reference to the 
groups. An exception, however, was that wives expected their husband’s family to 
gossip and criticize them and their husbands less with the argument of men not being 
good breadwinners than with one stating that wives working in an assembly plant were 
promiscuous. This difference is significant at a 1% level.  
From the same tables it can be observed that the degree to which wives thought 
different reference groups would sanction them and their husbands largely depends on 
the moral argument at hand. For the argument of wives’ place being the home, the 
reference group which a largest share of wives thought would gossip and criticize them 
and their husbands were their own family, followed by their husbands’ family, their 
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neighbours and finally their friends. Thus for this moral argument, the closer the 
reference group is to the wife the more likely she is to think she will be be sanctioned if 
she violates the norm. 
 
Table 5-4: Percentage of wives29 who expected to be socially sanctioned with the 
argument of women’s place being the home, by reference group and social 
sanction. 
 Wife’s 
Family 
Husband’s 
Family 
Neighbours Friends 
% Gossip 58.92 55.03 53.01 44.24 
% Criticism Wife  56.86 49.49 41.80 41.29 
% Criticism Husband 52.33 48.73 39.67 38.38 
 
 
On the other hand, a greater proportion of wives believed that their husband’s family 
would sanction them compared to the rest of their reference groups, using the moral 
argument that maquila women were promiscuous. It is noticeable that a large share of 
wives suspected their neighbours of gossipping using this moral argument. The 
percentage of wives who believed they would be gossiped about by this reference 
group was slightly larger than those who thought they would be sanctioned by their 
husband’s family. Nevertheless, this does not hold for the social sanctions of criticism 
from wives’ and husbands’ families. Thus a very large proportion of wives expected 
their neighbours to gossip saying they were promiscuous if they worked for an 
assembly plant, but did not expect them to say this directly to them or to their 
husbands.  
 
Table 5-5: Percentage of wives who expected to be socially sanctioned with the 
argument of being promiscuous, by reference group and social sanction 
 Wife’s 
Family 
Husband’s 
Family 
Neighbours Friends 
% Gossip 25.74 29.95 30.85 22.25 
% Criticism Wife  22.77 25.63 22.38 22.38 
% Criticism Husband 23.59 28.24 24.44 20.75 
 
                                                 
29 Per centage of wives form total wives interviewed who stated they thought it was likely of very 
likely to be sanctioned for moral argument, by reference group. 
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Wives believed their husband’s family would sanction them and their husbands the 
least on the counts of husbands not being the breadwinners. Interestingly, wives 
believed they would be sanctioned harshly by their own family if they did not comply 
with their role of being housewives. Yet on the other hand, they thought their husbands’ 
family would not criticise their husbands if they were the ones who did not comply with 
their role as breadwinners. A larger percentage of wives thought that their own family 
and neighbours would sanction them using this moral argument. 
 
Table 5-6: Percentage of wives who expected to be socially sanctioned with the 
argument of men not being good providers, by reference group and social 
sanction 
 Wife’s 
Family 
Husband’s 
Family 
Neighbours Friends 
% Gossip 27.45 21.01 27.40 23.45 
% Criticism Wife  25.06 17.47 22.59 19.95 
% Criticism Husband 22.6 17.81 21.33 20.00 
 
 
Finally, from the three previous tables it can be inferred that a larger proportion of 
wives considered that reference groups would rather sanction by gossiping than 
criticize them or their husbands. Thus, a larger share of wives expected people to 
circulate information regarding them than to directly mention it to them or their 
husbands.  
It is also the aim of this research to examine the extent to which social sanctions by 
each reference group impact wives’ probability of working in assembly plants. This will 
be explored in Chapter 8. We will also analyze whether lower participation rates in San 
Gabriel Chilac compared to those in Santiago Miahuatlán are due to differences by 
town in wives’ expected social sanctions. Contrary to the internalization of moral 
arguments by husbands and wives, social sanctions are considered to be exogenous 
variables.  Whether a wife expects her neighbour or a family member to gossip or 
criticize her will not depend on her personal characteristics.  
 
5.7 Decision making within the household 
 
Up to now, the three main moral arguments which sustain the social norm that wives 
should not work for an assembly plant have been described. The extent to which these 
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are internalized by both husbands and wives has also been examined. Yet because 
married women do not take labour participation decisions by themselves but generally 
negotiate them with their husbands, their bargaining process remains to be understood. 
This is the aim of this section. Further, how social norms influence these decisions is 
also explored. 
Most relationships are based, at least at the discursive level, on the commonly believed 
grounds that husbands have authority over their wives.30 This is especially true in the 
case of wives’ labour participation decisions. Thus, if wives want to work in an 
assembly plant, they have to ask their husbands’ permission to do so. As Claudia, a 
23-year-old wife from Miahuatlan, with two children, one 5 and the other 4, stated: 
 
‘If when you get married, the man does not let you, then everything is finished.’ 
 
 
Teresa is a wife from Chilac. She was asked whether she would like to work for an 
assembly plant, however, during the interview her husband arrived and answered for 
her:  
 
‘In particular… you see that when it is a marriage, you have to ask for permission… there are 
single mothers that have to, would not want to, but work here in the maquiladora.’ 
 
 
Angelica a 40-year-old wife from Miahuatlan with three sons aged 20, 16 and 14, 
wanted to work for the maquila, but her husband did not allow her to. She said: 
 
‘Oh no... if he has never let me, and we don’t have enough for the expenses…, no… he has 
never let me.’ ‘There are sometimes when I arrive and I tell him because there are several 
maquilas here.  Sometimes I tell him, there is one close by, but no…’ 
 
 
Teresa and Angelica’s statements are examples of how couples in general perceive 
that if wives desire to work for an assembly plant they have to convince their husbands 
and obtain the permission to do so. It is important to highlight that the fact that 
husbands have the authority to decide important aspects of their wives lives, means 
the latter are not generally considered adults in their own right. Their sense of agency 
is underestimated and undermined. It is very likely however, that wives use other 
                                                 
30 There are exceptions to this rule, as there are some decisions which are extended to the 
female role of housework such as what is cooked for the day, which are of the wives’ domain.  
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informal negotiating mechanisms than those that persist at the discursive level. These, 
however are not within the scope of this investigation31.  
So how is it that wives try to convince their husbands to allow them to work? As can be 
observed in Table 5-7, the great majority negotiate with their husbands by telling them 
that available income for household expenses is not sufficient. In Chilac, a significantly 
higher proportion of wives argued that money was needed for current expenses. In 
Miahuatlan, on the other hand, a much higher percentage of wives stated money was 
needed to buy a house. A significant proportion of wives used the strategy of offering to 
do more housework, but it was not as common as stating that additional income was 
needed for the household. 
 
Table 5-7: Percentage of wives using following arguments to convince their 
husbands to agree to their working for the maquila. 
 Money was 
needed for 
children 
Money was 
needed for 
current 
expenses 
Money was 
needed to buy 
a house 
Offered to do 
more 
housework 
Both  71.07 84.3 42.98 44.63 
Miahuatlan  69.64 76.79 60.71 46.43 
Chilac 72.31 90.77 27.69 43.08 
 
 
Given that it was husbands’ social role to be economic providers for their family, a 
wife’s claim that the income was not enough to cover household expenses meant that 
they were not fulfilling their duty. Thus, many husbands met their wives’ claims with 
resistance and would even offer to work double shifts to sustain their families’ needs.  
This is the case of Manolo, a 29-year-old husband from Chilac. He has two children 
aged 6 and 5. His wife had told him she wanted to work in a maquila, as she had done 
so before getting married. However, he was not of the same opinion: 
 
‘She has expressed that she wants to work because of the economic pressure she experiences. 
The truth is I do not want that, I prefer to work a double turn, but I prefer to work double so that 
she takes care of the children.’ 
 
Thus Manolo’s wife would stay at home and sell beauty articles from door to door to 
earn some money.   
                                                 
31 To understand these, further qualitative methods are needed.  
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Valeria, a 47-year-old wife from Chilac whose 5 children are already adults, also 
explained how her husband responded to her desire to work in an assembly plant by 
stating he would provide more money for expenses: 
 
‘I wanted to work in the maquila, when he arrived, my husband, I told him: 
-you know what I cannot manage with expenses, you know what, I am going to cook for the 
maquila.  
-no.  why? I will not let you work. I will give you more money. 
-It is not that I tell him, I want to win my own money, to help my children.’ 
 
Nevertheless, sometimes wives’ approach of demonstrating to their husbands that 
extra income would be available for the household was successful.  This was the case 
of Gabriela, a 20-year-old wife and maquila worker from Miahuatlan with a one-year-old 
boy.  As she explained: 
 
‘I did find it difficult to convince my husband, because my child is ill, but at the end I convinced 
him.’ 
‘I tell him that we need the money. I make him a budget of everything that needs to be paid, 
plus everything that we owe, plus the doctor appointments and medicines and all that, and we 
make the balance and we see that it is necessary for both of us to work to get through with all 
the expenses. Imagine if we do not pay this, we might even end up in jail and the kid is left 
alone and no... It is best to pay so that there are no more problems. This is how I convince him.’ 
 
This is a very extreme case of economic need and maybe because of this, Gabriela 
ended up persuading her husband. But even so, Gabriela found it difficult to convince 
her husband that it was best for her to work for the maquila. 
Another wife, Luisa, a 26-year-old from Miahuatlan with three children aged 9, 5 and 3, 
also worked for an assembly plant. Her case was not an emergency situation like 
Gabriela’s but she had also managed to convince her husband with the argument that 
the family needed more income. 
 
‘We talked. I didn’t find it difficult to convince him because he saw we needed more things. We 
didn’t have a house and as he worked there for a while, he trusted me. We talked to his mother 
to see if she could take care of our children and I went to work.’ 
 
In Luisa’s case she did not even have a hard time persuading her husband of her 
participation in maquila employment. 
Elena, a 28-year-old wife from Miahuatlan had also managed to convince her husband 
to let her work for an assembly plant. In her case, she used the argument of the family 
needing more income to cover educational expenses for their children aged 12, 9 and 
6.  
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‘When I got married there was a time when I didn’t work or anything, but now that the children 
have grown up, my son is in secondary school and that is why. Now as they need more, I told 
him, if you give me permission we both work together. That is why we decided to work, but if 
not I would only be a homemaker.’ 
 
Another way in which husbands responded to wives’ request to work was by pointing 
out their wives’ socially ascribed roles as homemakers. This was already illustrated in 
Manolo’s refusal of his wife working. Yet another example is the response given to Pilar 
by her husband. Pilar is a 48-year-old wife from Chilac with five children who are now 
adults, the youngest being 18 and the oldest 25. Her husbands’ refusal to let her work 
was given in terms of her obligation to attend on him: 
 
‘He doesn’t want because I have already told him. Firstly, because they must think that that is 
why they searched for us, no? So that one attends on them and one does for them what one has 
to. See there are men who just don’t understand us, sometimes they think that one is here for 
them.’ 
 
On the other hand, Pedro, a 27-year-old husband from Chilac, used the argument of 
his wife having the duty to take care of their four children. Because of this he would not 
agree on his wife working for the maquila. As he explained: 
 
‘She has commented that she wants to help me, but now the three of them are studying, and the 
girl is young, she needs her care. If she neglects her, she might learn the lesson the bad way.  
 
He stated that he would feel this even if there was an alternative childcare option 
available to them. As a matter of fact, during one of their children’s illnesses his wife 
had worked in the maquila during a period of time.  During that time they had left their 
son with Pedro’s mother.  
Miriam’s husband used the same argument. A 25-year-old wife living in Miahuatlan with 
two daughters of 7 and 3 years, she desired to work for an assembly plant. She 
explained: 
 
‘As a matter of fact my husband does not let me work because of the girls, because those who 
work leave them alone for long. I have told him that I want to work, but I tell you he tells me 
no, because of the girls. We have children now and we have to take care of them, because it is 
not the same if they stay with the grandmother or another family member. It is not the same.’ 
 
It is possible that husbands using this argument truly believed their wives’ reproductive 
role had to be fulfilled by them. Thus this would be the genuine reason for not allowing 
them to work. However, the fact that it was socially accepted that wives had the moral 
obligation to complete these tasks also gave validity to their claims. Further, if wives 
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had internalized this moral argument, then husbands could also call upon wives’ sense 
of guilt and shame for not complying with the norm.   
Another important reason behind husbands’ refusal to agree on their wives’ inclusion in 
the assembly plants was the fear of their being unfaithful if they did so. Thus in some 
cases, though not often, husbands would use as arguments the moral argument that 
wives in assembly plants were promiscuous. Cristina, a wife from Chilac, for instance, 
had wanted at some point to work for the maquila because her small business was not 
giving her enough profits. Therefore, she had told her husband she wanted to work. 
Nevertheless, he didn’t want her to because he believed maquila women were 
promiscuous.  
 
‘He only told me not to go to work, I would tell him –There is not enough (money), I am going 
to work. -I don’t want you to work because there… you see.. there are many things there.. as a  
matter of fact I had the experience of a woman that worked there and she became.. I mean she 
went on the wrong side instead of working.. and it has happened… that women have worked in 
the maquila and this has happened, I mean infidelities.’ 
 
In other instances, husbands would fear that wives were being unfaithful to them, but 
would not explicitly express it. Instead they would use an alternative reason. This was 
the case of Clara’s husband. Clara is a 16-year-old wife from Miahuatlan with a one-
year-old boy. She had still worked for a while during her marriage but her husband 
used the argument that she had to take care of children when in fact he was fearful that 
his wife was unfaithful to him.   
 
‘My husband didn’t want me to continue working. Who knows why he didn’t want to any more. 
He would get upset many things of me working for the maquila. Of the gossip saying I was 
going out with another. My husband many times told me to stop working. He said that because 
of the boy, I couldn’t.’ 
 
It also must be reminded that when spouses worked together, doubts regarding wives’ 
fidelity would be dissipated. Thus husbands’ fears in this regard would cease to exist. 
Therefore, husbands would be keener to allow their wives to participate in assembly 
plant jobs if they worked for the same factory as they did. This option, however, was 
only available to wives whose husbands worked for a factory.  
Lastly, an interesting observation is that none of the wives interviewed alluded to 
negotiating their employment by making reference to their own well-being. Only Valeria 
from Chilac, whose situation was described previously, claimed she wanted her own 
money after her husband offered to find more money to cover household expenses. 
This can be a sign of its being socially acceptable for a wife to work in a maquila 
because her family is in economic need. Thus it is reasonable for her to work if she 
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sacrifices herself for her family’s well being. Her working in an assembly plant for 
pleasure might be seen as selfish and contrary to her role as a care provider.  
Up to now the different motives husbands use to disallow wives’ employment in the 
maquila have been described. However, the extent to which husbands use each 
remains to be examined. In Table 5-8 it can be observed that the argument used by a 
larger proportion of husbands is that wives would neglect their children, followed by 
wives neglecting household chores. It is interesting to note that these reasons were 
much more widely used in Chilac than in Miahuatlan. In this last town, however, a 
higher percentage of husbands answered that they would find a way to provide 
economically for their family. Almost the same share of husbands in this town used this 
argument compared to another that wives neglected household chores if they worked 
in an assembly plant. This is unexpected and intriguing, given that couples disagreed 
equally on the former moral argument in both towns. It is also surprising to find that 
very few husbands stated that they did not want their wives to work because then they 
did they would be unfaithful to them. However, this could be because being unfaithful is 
a negative trait. Therefore, as in Clara’s case, husbands would conceal their real fears 
and use an alternative argument during their negotiating process with their wives. 
Further, although not the most popular arguments, those related to wives’ health and 
tiredness were also used by a share of husbands.  
 
 
Table 5-8: Percentage of husbands using following arguments as response to 
wives wanting to work in the maquila. 
 Would 
neglect 
children 
Would 
neglect 
household 
chores 
Too much 
work 
load 
 
Said he 
could 
sustain 
her 
Said it 
was bad 
for her 
health 
Said she 
would 
leave 
him 
Both 68.03 36.89 15.57 18.03 8.2 1.64
Miahuatlan 58.18 30.91 18.18 27.27 7.27 0
Chilac 76.12 41.79 13.43 10.45 8.96 2.99
 
 
It must be stressed that although it was widely accepted that husbands had the 
authority to give or deny their wives the permission to work for an assembly plant, in 
some instances this mechanism was also reinforced with the threat of physical 
violence.  
For instance, Valeria, the 47-year-old wife from Chilac, remembered: 
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‘He never let me work. It is best not to look for problems so that on one day God would not 
want it, he will hurt me and then who will see for my children. So this is why I said, I will have 
patience until God gives me strength.’ 
 
 
This was also the case of Claudia, the 23-year-old wife from Miahuatlan, who had two 
children, a five-year-old and a four-year-old. She wanted to work and would quarrel 
strongly about this with his husband. She believed her husband would use physical 
violence against her if she went without his permission. In other cases, wives believed 
that if they disobeyed their husbands and went to work in a factory without their 
consent they would divorce them. In other instances, however, they only expected to 
quarrel badly with them. Thus the expected consequences of wives disobeying their 
husbands by working without their consent were varied, from facing quarrels to 
physical violence and in some instances divorce. These outcomes can be regarded as 
what economists call the threat point, this is, what gives members of a household 
bargaining or negotiation power. 
Summing up, if wives wanted to work for assembly plants they had to come to an 
agreement with their husbands first. It was generally accepted in both towns that 
husbands had authority over their wives’ labour participation decisions. Thus wives had 
to convince their husbands to give them permission to work for an assembly plant. The 
majority of wives would approach their husbands with the argument that extra income 
was needed, for current expenses, their children’s education or to buy a house. If 
husbands were not convinced by their wives’ arguments, a large percentage of them 
would respond by pointing out their socially ascribed role as homemakers.  Some 
would offer to work more to obtain the necessary income.  However, few husbands 
would use their concern about their wives being unfaithful to them if their wives went to 
work as arguments with their wives. Instead they would state alternative motives.  
Wives expected a diverse range of reactions from their husbands if they went to work 
in an assembly plant without their consent. These would range from physical violence 
to having regular quarrels with them. 
Depending on wives’ expectations of the results of the negotiation process and the 
intensity of their desire to work in an assembly plant, a series of outcomes arise. 
Consistent with Luke’s three-dimensional views of power (2005), four different 
outcomes are distinguished. In the first dimension, decisions regarding wives labour 
participation involve direct actual and observable conflict. Thus in this case, husband 
and wife have explicitly bargained over her participation in an assembly plant. It is said 
that the wife has power in the first dimension if she desires to work, expresses it to her 
husband, her husband does not want her to do so (at least not initially), and she ends 
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up doing so. However, information on husbands´ preferences regarding their wives 
participation in assembly plants was not collected. Only data on whether a wife actually 
works was available. Yet, if a wife articulates her desire to work to her husband and the 
result is her non-participation in assembly plant employment, then it is inferred that 
husbands have power in the first dimension. In the second dimension of power, 
barriers are created that prevent bargaining from being real and interests being 
manifested. Therefore, it is considered that the husband has power in the second 
dimension if the wife desires to work for the maquila but does not express her desire to 
do so. Thus there is never an explicit bargaining process on the matter. Finally, there is 
considered to be power in the third dimension if wives do not desire to work, due to 
their socially constructed role.  
 
Table 5-9: Percentage of wives in each labour bargaining outcome. 
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Wife works 16.11 22.17 10.33 
Wife desires work, husband won’t let her 27.64 27.09 28.17 
Wife desires work, has not told husband 7.93 6.90 8.92 
Wife doesn’t want to work 48.32 43.84 52.58 
 
 
Table 5-9, shows the proportion of wives in each of the possible outcomes by town. A 
large share of those wives who agreed they wanted to work for an assembly plant 
would not obtain permission from their husbands. In both towns, this proportion 
represented almost half of the wives who admitted they desired to work. What is more, 
this percentage was larger than that of wives currently in a salaried job. On the other 
hand, the proportion of wives who desired to work in a maquila but had not manifested 
this interest to their husbands is moderate. Yet almost half the wives stated they did not 
desire to work in the maquila.   
When comparing outcomes by towns, it is observed that Chilac greatly differs from 
Miahuatlan on two counts. On one hand, the percentage of wives who actually do work 
in an assembly plant is much lower in the latter than in the former. On the other, the 
proportion of wives who do not want to work in the maquila is much larger in Chilac 
than in Miahuatlan. Also, to a much smaller extent, this same pattern is observed for 
those wives who desired to work but could not convince their husbands and for those 
who did not even discuss the issue with them. Therefore it can be inferred that wives in 
Chilac have less power in the first and second degree. Nevertheless, the main reason 
wives worked less in a maquila in this town was because they did not desire to do so. 
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Table 5-10: Reasons for which wives preferred not to work in an assembly plant. 
 Household 
chores 
Household 
child 
Workload Likes home 
Both  43.43 46.29 49.71 36.57 
Miahuatlan 50.00 50.00 62.20 34.15 
Chilac 37.63 43.01 38.71 38.71 
 
 
However, to know whether wives preferred not work due to their socially constructed 
role their reasons for this must be examined. As can be corroborated in 5-10, a large 
share of wives preferred not to participate in the maquila due to motives regarding their 
roles as wives.  Yet in Miahuatlan, a much larger proportion of wives preferred not to 
work because it represented a heavy workload. 
It must be recalled however, that preferring to stay at home and taking care of the 
children is considered as a valid argument for wives to stay at home instead of working. 
However, wives’ freedom is considered to be restricted when they consider it is their 
obligation or duty to stay at home.   
 
Table 5-11: Percentage of wives who did not disagree on moral arguments, by 
reason why they preferred not to work in an assembly plant. 
 Both  Miahuatlan Chilac 
Household chores 50.00 43.90 57.14 
Childcare 56.79 48.78 65.00 
 
 
Table 5-11 shows the percentage of those wives who preferred not to participate in 
assembly plants in order to focus on household chores and taking care of their 
children, according to their agreement with the moral argument of wives having to stay 
at home. It can be seen that of those wives who stated they did not want to work for the 
maquila to take care of their children, around half stated they did not disagree with their 
ascribed role.  
A greater proportion of wives in Chilac believed it was a wife’s obligation to stay at 
home to take care of their children than those in Miahuatlan. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that in this town, wives had less power in all the three dimensions than 
those in Miahuatlan.  
Up to now, the three moral arguments sustaining the social norm that wives should not 
work for an assembly plant have been described. The mechanism by which spouses 
bargain over wives’ engagement in the maquila has also been explored. Special 
attention has been paid to the way in which social norms shape this decision-making 
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process. Next, the welfare benefit wives and their families achieve when they work in 
an assembly plant, compared to when they dedicate themselves to the traditional 
activities in their towns, will be examined, and  the impact internalization of each moral 
argument by each partner has on the probability of wives’ working for the maquila will 
be analyzed. Then the effect that the social sanctions suffered by each spouse have on 
this probability will be calculated. 
 
 
 
  
 
125 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
6 Welfare effects of wives’ engagement 
in assembly plant employment vs. 
traditional activities 
_______________________________ 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will infer the possible welfare states wives can obtain by participating in 
the different activities available to them; these are the recently created textile assembly 
plant jobs and the traditional self-employment activities women carry out in the area. In 
line with the Capabilities framework, wives’ potential to achieve the appropriate 
functionings when participating in different occupations will be explored. Because it is 
of interest to infer the different functionings which wives can attain, each of these will 
be explored separately. This will additionally allow for an examination of the factors 
which influence wives’ welfare outcomes when engaging in these types of occupations.  
There are several studies which have already examined the effects of textile assembly 
plant jobs on their female employees’ well-being in Mexico and around the world 
(Barrientos et. al. 2004, Barrios Hernandez 2004, Elson and Pearson 1981, Kabeer 
and Mahmud 2004, Kabeer 2000, Tiano, 1994). This one differs from them on several 
counts. Firstly, it focuses on married women’s welfare. Because married women are 
expected to fulfil their socially ascribed roles within the household, the effect their 
participation in an assembly plant has on their well-being can differ greatly from that of 
single or divorced women.  Secondly, it links the welfare effects resulting from wives 
working in an assembly plant with the Capabilities framework. The achievement of 
different functionings can be enhanced or worsened with wives’ engagement in the 
maquila.  Therefore, these are explicitly outlined at the end of the chapter.  Given that it 
is the focus of the research, special attention will be paid to the role of social norms as 
factors which influence the achievement of the different functionings.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Although not a functioning, but a means 
to obtaining some, the hourly income wives obtain by participating in each of the 
income generating activities will be examined. Further, other benefits provided by 
assembly plants apart from income will also be explored. Next, the number of hours 
dedicated to assembly plant and self-employment will be investigated. This will be 
followed by an examination of the number of hours wives and their husbands dedicate 
to housework. Working conditions in assembly plants will also be taken into account, as 
well as other non pecuniary benefits of participating in the maquila. Next, we will look at 
the health implications of wives’ participation in the different occupations. Finally, the 
effect on decision-making processes within the household depending on wives’ 
engagement in the multiple types of occupation will be examined. Finally, a synopsis 
will be offered of all the different functionings which can be achieved by taking part in 
assembly employment.  Special attention will be paid to the conditions that influence 
wives’ attainment of these diverse functionings while engaging in these occupations.  
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6.2 Income available to married women in different types of activities 
 
This section will compare the income that wives obtain through assembly plant 
employment to that acquired by alternative activities available to them in the two towns 
of the Tehuacan area. Income is one of the main arguments used by spouses to 
defend wives’ participation in an assembly plant employment. As such, an analysis of 
the implications of wives’ engagement in the maquila cannot avoid considering this 
aspect. It must be reiterated, nevertheless, that under the adopted framework, income 
is not an indicator of well-being but the means to attain certain aspects of it. An 
assessment of the specific functionings obtained with income go beyond the scope of 
this research. Additional methods from the ones obtained during fieldwork would be 
needed to achieve this.  Thus, the income obtained in each activity available to wives is 
explored as a proxy for the functionings that can be achieved with it. Additionally, 
spouse’s perceptions of the use and significance of this income will be explored to see 
which relevant functionings are obtained with it.    
Evidence suggests that manufacturing assembly plants worldwide offer higher wages 
than alternative jobs in the areas where they are established. Kabeer and Mahmud 
(2004) find this pattern in Bangladesh, while Glick and Roubaud (2006) find the same 
in Madagascar. What is more, studies based in Mexico, which have compared income 
obtained in textile manufacturing plants to that which is offered in alternative activities 
available to women without formal education, have also found that wages are higher in 
the former than in the latter (Tiano 1994; Fussel 2000). Thus, we will verify whether this 
pattern also holds for Miahuatlan and San Gabriel Chilac. 
To calculate this, both weekly and hourly income will be used as units of analysis.  
Assembly plant employees are paid weekly. Therefore individuals from both towns 
specify their income over this period of time. However this variable depends on the 
number of hours wives worked during the week. Thus, values can vary greatly between 
and within each activity. As a consequence we will also examine the hourly income 
wives obtained by participating in a certain occupation. For this unit of analysis, the 
amount of time they invested in each activity will be irrelevant.  
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Table 6-1: Wage obtained by wives who participated in salaried employment 
activities in both towns32 
 Salary Assembly Maid Shop Asst Professional 
Weekly Income      
Mean 723.15 672.11 330.00 613.20 1233.33 
Median 700 675 350 700 1275 
Std 346.94 204.50 135.09 153.53 484.92 
Obs 92 68 5 5 12 
Hourly Income      
Mean 17.42 13.72 8.52 12.07 44.74 
Median 13.64 13.33 8.33 10.29 48 
Std 13.32 4.22 1.20 4.15 19.70 
Obs 91 67 5 5 12 
 
 
As was previously described in Chapter 4 there are few salaried options for women in 
both towns of the Tehuacan region. Besides assembly plant employment, the two other 
feasible salaried jobs for women without formal education are being a maid and being 
employed in a shop. From Table 6-1, it can be confirmed that both weekly and hourly 
income obtained by wives in maquila jobs is higher than that acquired in these two 
types of employment. Thus in terms of income, assembly plant work is the best option 
for women without formal education.   
Women with higher levels of education have the possibility of engaging in professional 
activities. Because of this, they earn a much greater income than women working in the 
maquila. This difference is even larger when comparing hourly income. Both the mean 
and median the hourly salary obtained in professional activities is more than triple that 
offered by assembly plants. Yet few women are able to achieve the higher levels of 
education that permit professional activities. Therefore, for most married women in both 
towns the greatest income opportunity is obtained by working in assembly plants.   
Next, income obtained for working in the maquila is contrasted to the statutory 
minimum wage in the region. The legal minimum wage for an 8-hour working day in the 
area is $45.81 pesos, which implies a minimum hourly rate of $5.73 pesos. From the 
Table 6-1, it can be verified that no woman working in an assembly plant reported 
earning less than the minimum wage. What is more, the mean and median hourly wage 
of married women working in an assembly plant more than doubled the statutory 
minimum wage. A previous study done by Barrios Hernandez (2004), which covered 
the whole Tehuacan region, came to the same conclusion. Therefore, it can be 
                                                 
32 The numbers include the hourly wage that all women who had worked during the previous 
year had earned, even if they were not currently employed. This was done because wages are 
not expected to change significantly throughout the year and wives would not find it difficult to 
remember how much they earned if they were not currently employed. Thus more observations, 
and therefore more precision is obtained by using this sample of women.  
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concluded that assembly plant employment not only provides a higher wage than other 
salaried options, but also fares well compared to the legal minimum wage. 
It must be remembered from chapter 4 however, that salaried employment is not the 
only source of income for married women. They can also engage in self-employment.  
However, both women who have a salaried job and those who don’t have the option to 
take on this type of activity.  Yet, women in salaried employment will have a much more 
limited amount of time available for self-employment. As such, only 9.56% of the 
married women who had worked in an assembly plant in the week of the survey had 
also engaged in a self-employed activity in that same time frame.  It can be concluded 
then that self-employment acts more as a substitute form of income generating activity 
than as a complement. Thus, income obtained from both these types of activities will 
be compared33.  
Table 6-2 shows that weekly income acquired through maquila jobs is almost double 
that of self-employment, and that this is consistent across towns. Nevertheless, this 
gap might be due to the difference in the amount of hours wives dedicate to each 
activity. Therefore, hourly income is also explored. It can be observed that hourly 
income in assembly plant jobs is still greater than that of self-employment. The average 
difference is even significant at a 1% level. However, when disaggregating these 
results by town, it is found that while this pattern holds for Chilac, in Miahuatlan mean 
hourly income for self-employment is slightly higher than that of assembly plant 
employment. Yet in this town, the median hourly income of self-employed women is 
much lower than that of women working for assembly plants. This is explained by the 
extremely large standard deviation of self-employment hourly income observed not 
only for Miahuatlan, but also for Chilac 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Numbers include hourly income obtained by those wives who engaged in both self-
employment and assembly plant employment.  This is done to obtain a greater number of 
observations.   
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Table 6-2: Income obtained by wives in assembly plant employment vs. those 
who been self-employed in each town. 
 Assembly Plant Employment Self Employment 
 Both Miah Chilac Both Miah Chilac 
Weekly Income       
Mean 672.11 705.28 592.5 333.45 411.69 229.95 
Median 675 700 600 200 300 190 
Std 204.5 216.65 148.04 517.52 675.64 195.42 
Obs 68 48 20 222 83 139 
Hourly Income       
Mean 13.72 14.39 12.15 11.49 14.95 9.51 
Median 13.33 14.14 11.44 7.56 10 6.25 
Std 4.22 4.44 3.22 13.14 15.37 11.26 
Obs 67 47 20 217 79 138 
 
 
To further explore the reasons for the great divergence in income obtained by self-
employed women, the returns of the main self employment activities are explored in 
Table 6-3. Both average and median weekly income obtained by each of the self-
employment activities is much lower than that of assembly plant employment. More 
importantly, however, results show that sewing and selling garlic at the market, which 
are Chilac’s main female activities, on average provide women with a lower hourly 
income than assembly plant employment. The same is true for having a corner store, 
selling tortillas and selling door to door. In turn, selling goods from stalls and selling 
food provide women with a larger average hourly income than maquila employment.  
However, the standard deviation of hourly income obtained via these last two activities 
is quite large compared to that of the other self-employment activities. This is especially 
true for selling goods from stalls, which could be due to the variety of possible items 
which can be sold, and which can yield in turn a diverse range of profits. Further, only 
the median hourly income obtained by selling food is greater than that of working in an 
assembly plant. Therefore evidence suggests that only through a small number of self-
employment activities is a woman likely to earn a greater hourly income than she can 
obtain through assembly plant work. Greater amounts of capital may be needed to 
access these highly remunerative self-employment activities, which are thus available 
to few women.  
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Table 6-3: Income obtained by wives participating in various self-employment 
activities 
 Self-
empl
oyed 
Sew Sell 
Gar 
lic 
Grocer 
(cor 
ner) 
store 
De 
thread 
Sell 
Torti 
llas 
Sell 
Goods 
Stalls 
Sell 
door 
to 
door 
Sell 
Food 
Weekly 
Income 
         
Mean 333.4 157.3 172.7 542.4 183.5 216.5 462.0 244.4 406.9 
Median 200 100 100 350 200 200 300 200 200 
Std 517.5 152.3 143 800.6 110.6 120.8 677.8 137.8 592.1 
Obs 222 88 13 33 12 17 17 13 19 
Hourly 
Income 
         
Mean 11.49 7.75 9.08 8.88 7.12 8.74 25.72 12.16 19.38 
Median 7.56 5.52 8.59 6.67 6 8.33 10.56 11.03 14.5 
Std 13.14 6.89 5.30 9.58 5.05 3.85 30.16 5.91 14.26 
Obs 217 86 13 33 12 17 16 13 18 
 
 
In general then, it can be said that income obtained by engaging in assembly plant 
employment is greater than that offered by other forms of salaried activities that do not 
require formal levels of education. It is also greater than the income acquired through 
most self-employment activities. This is especially true in the case of conventional and 
traditional self-employment such embroidery and selling garlic in the market.  
Income has been recognized as one of the many endowments influencing wives’ 
bargaining power within the household (Carter & Katz 1997, Katz 1997, Fafchamps 
2001)34. Some decision-making and time arrangements within the household 
depending on wives’ occupation will be analysed further in the chapter. Yet in the 
meantime it is important to uncover the extent to which each of the income generating 
activities contributes to total household income. Table 6-4 shows the proportion that 
wives’ income contributes to this total. As can be seen, wives participating in assembly 
plant employment, on average, contribute half the household’s income. Alternatively, 
the income wives obtain from self-employment represents on average only a quarter of 
the total. What is more, the median of this share is much less than the average. From 
these results it can be concluded that wives working for an assembly plant are equal 
economic providers to their husbands. This means that the income contributed by 
maquila working wives is much more visible than that of self-employed women. It is 
therefore possible that society perceives husbands as not complying with their role 
when their wives are working in an assembly plant but not when they are self-
employed.  
                                                 
34 It must be noted nevertheless that many scholars emphasize that income is not the unique 
factor influencing women’s power within the household (Sen, 1987, Agarwal 1997, Kabeer 
1994) 
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Table 6-4: Wives’ contribution to household income  
 Assembly Plant Employment Self- Employment 
 Both Miah Chilac Both Miah Chilac 
Mean  47.34 46.25 50.18 24.66 24.67 24.65 
Median 47.14 47.01 50.69 19.91 21.01 16.67 
 
 
Up to now data has revealed that the income earned in assembly plants is the greatest 
that wives without formal education and without large amounts of capital can obtain. 
Next, couples’ perceptions on the benefits and usefulness that this additional income 
provides for wives’ and their families’ welfare will be explored.  
In both towns, there view was prevalent that there was plenty of economic need, and 
that income earned only by husbands was not ‘enough’ to cover family expenses.  
Income was frequently stated to be one of the main motivations for women’s 
employment in garment factories. However this was not exclusive to this type of 
income-generating activity. Wives’ engagement in any type of in paid work was seen by 
some as a means to complement their husbands’ scarce income.  
For example Luisa is a 34-year-old from Miahuatlan who is working for the maquila. 
She has five children aged 9, 6, 5, 4 and 2. When asked her reasons for working in an 
assembly plant, she answered that she did it out of necessity because her husband did 
not earn enough.  
 
‘Sometimes we cannot manage with the earnings of one, in the maquila we can manage better.’ 
 
On the other hand Consuelo, who lives in Chilac, had the same reasons for engaging 
in an income-generating occupation. In her case, nevertheless, she decided to wash 
clothes for other people.  
 
‘The thing is that , sometimes, the money is not enough, because I have my children who ask 
me for their things, I have to force myself to wash, what my husband earns is not enough, and I 
have to force myself to wash ‘  
 
Furthermore, as by Consuelo, it was constantly emphasized by married couples that 
the main beneficiaries of this additional income were their own children. Specifically, 
they would argue that it would help toward their children’s educational expenses.  
Schools in both towns are public, and thus school fees are completely subsidized by 
the government. Yet, teachers asked for several school materials which households 
found it difficult to purchase. For this reason households sometimes could not cope 
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with educational expenses, and thus wives would seek additional income by working in 
assembly plants. 
For instance, Juana would intersperse selling tortillas in the market with maquila 
employment. She sold tortillas at a market stall, but because during the rainy season 
the market would flood, she worked in an assembly plant until the rains passed.  She 
was the wife of a builder and had a 13-year-old boy, and two girls a 7-year-old and a 5-
year-old. Both she and her husband agreed it was best for her to engage in some form 
of income generating activity, including the maquila, to be able to provide for their 
children’s education. 
 
‘We have our children in the school and they pay them (husbands) very little, it is to help each 
other in the maquila or in any activity.’ We do it ‘to provide our children with education, 
because we didn’t study we need to give them the best.’ 
 
 
Claudia, a 28-year-old mother of three children aged 12, 9 and 6, also worked to be 
able to pay for her children’s education. Both she and her husband worked in the fields 
together.   
 
‘you know they ask for many things in the school, the money is not enough, this is why both of 
us decided to work.’ 
 
 
Eventualities such as the illness of a family member are other important motives for 
wives’ participation in a maquila. Women could easily enter and exit assembly plant 
employment and many worked only at certain times of year. Maquilas offered a more 
regular and higher wage than other income generating activities. This meant that some 
wives could participate in assembly plant employment in case of contingencies, even if 
it was for a short period of time.  
For example, Pedro is a 37-year-old farmer in San Gabriel Chilac. He and his wife had 
three boys of 12, 10, 9 and a 3-year-old girl. His wife generally did not engage in any 
type of income-generating activity. However, she would work for an assembly plant in 
times of crisis. The last time she had worked in the ‘maquila’ for instance, it had been 
because one of his sons had gotten sick and they needed money for the medicines. As 
soon as Pedro’s son got better and was able to go back to school, his wife left the 
maquila and stopped working for income.  
 
‘Last time (she worked in the maquila) it was because my son had become ill, because it was 
necessary to cover the expenses and we had no money. Both of us worked, her in the maquila 
and me in the fields, because really I couldn’t manage by myself.’ 
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In Miahuatlan, Marco, a 37-year-old builder, and his wife followed the same strategy. 
They have three children who were at that time 13, 12 and 10 years old.  At the time of 
the interview his wife was working in the assembly plant because his mother-in-law had 
gotten sick. As a consequence they had had to ask for a loan, which they now needed 
to pay.  
 
 
‘We asked for a loan and this is why she works, only so that we can pay the bill and that’s it, she 
will not work for another period. As long as one does not owe anything, we can get by with my 
scarce salary.’ 
 
 
Marco and his wife had used this strategy previously on several occasions. Marco’s 
wife had always worked in the maquila to pay loans, which they had obtained for 
different purposes. This time it was his mother–in-law’s illness, while the previous one 
had been for his son’s first communion. 
Thus, wives’ work in the assembly plant was also used as a strategy for large 
expenditures for which households would otherwise have to get a loan or would simply 
not be able to afford.  Another illustration of this case is that of Marianna, a 33-year-old 
married housewife, with four children aged, 15, 14, 11 and 5. She had previously 
engaged in maquila work to start building her house. Without her work there she would 
have never been able to accomplish this. However, she had stopped working before 
she and her husband had completed paying for the construction of her house because 
her younger son, now 5, had been born.  
Self-sufficiency was identified as another advantage of earning a high income. 
Furthermore, this benefit related to wives’ welfare only, and not their families. Susana, 
for instance, a 25-year-old maquila worker with three children living in Miahuatlan, 
stated: 
 
‘one pulls through by oneself, the day that we become widows, we already have from where.‘ 
 
Susana makes reference to having an economic backup in case of becoming a widow. 
But this would also be true for wives in the case of a separation from their husbands.  
This is another positive aspect of wives’ having access to a sufficiently high income to 
subsist by themselves. Moreover, although not the focus of this investigation, 
Miahuatlan had a very high rate of separation and divorce, possibly facilitated by wives’ 
opportunity to work in an assembly plant. Therefore, while self-sufficiency was only 
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mentioned by one of the women interviewed, it is a crucial positive aspect for wives 
working in the maquila.  
A final important feature of income earned through assembly plant employment 
compared to that of self-employment, besides the amount earned, is the security and 
regularity of the work. Maquilas pay their workers weekly, so women knew they could 
count on a specific amount of regular income.  Women who were self-employed did not 
enjoy this privilege, as they earned different amounts each week. This is consistent 
with findings of a study carried out by Kabeer and Mahmud (2004) on assembly plant 
employment conditions in Bangladesh. In it, they find that this is the most valued 
aspect of assembly plant employment for the majority of workers in their sample.   
Thus, to sum up, the income earned in maquilas tends to be the highest that formally 
uneducated women can aspire to. Households in general had the perception that 
income obtained by husbands alone was scarce and that there was plenty of economic 
need. However, much of wives’ participation in maquila employment (and in other 
income-generating activities) was validated in terms of doing the best for their children. 
This was especially true in terms of their children obtaining a better quality education. 
This could be due to or related to women’s moral role of making their children’s well-
being their utmost concern. Therefore, social norms could also be playing a role in 
shaping these preferences. Nevertheless, if it is a discursive or authentic concern of 
wives and their partners, it cannot be discarded as unimportant. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, care and love for children is regarded as a valuable functioning. It is 
only as a social obligation that it restricts wives’ freedom to choose to participate or not 
in maquila employment. For this reason functionings achieved by children cannot be 
separated from an analysis of wives’ well-being.  
Wives’ assembly plant employment also benefited the household as an extra source of 
income in case of contingencies or their need to acquire a costly service or item. This is 
possible due to the low entry requirements and barriers of this type of employment.   
Furthermore, wives’ employment in the maquila also meant that the family had a 
regular and extra amount of income they could count on with certainty each week. This 
feature was especially significant for households given their limited ability to achieve 
basic needs such as health or shelter, due to their low income levels and their few 
channels to access formal credit. 
Finally, by working in assembly plants wives obtained a sufficiently high income to 
support themselves and their children, and thus became self-sufficient. Consequently, 
they and their children were protected in the case of their husband’s death. Further, 
wives could also separate themselves from their husbands much more easily. This 
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meant that wives were able to liberate themselves from marriage in the case that 
husbands physically or mentally abused them. 
 
6.3 Other benefits offered by salaried jobs 
 
 
Besides a regular income, some salaried jobs provide women with further benefits 
which self-employment do not offer. These benefits can take financial form or can 
supply wives with access to services such as health, credit or childcare.  Women in the 
study area rarely had an alternative opportunity to gain access to these services, hence 
their significance. This implies that wives can obtain different functionings by choosing 
to dedicate themselves to different activities: salaried vs. self-employment. This will be 
explored in this section.  
In Mexico, by law there are some benefits which all types of salaried jobs should offer. 
However some are provided voluntarily by some workplaces.  In Mexico, according to 
the Federal Law of Work, all employers should provide their workers access to the 
Social Security System, a year-end bonus, paid holidays and a share of the profits. The 
social security system (IMSS, Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social) is a state-run 
organization which provides employees with health services and retirement pensions.  
The employers subscribe their workers to this system by paying a monthly quota. The 
year-end bonus consists of firms paying their workers 15 days of additional salary each 
year, at the latest by the 20th of December. Furthermore, the employer also has to 
provide workers with at least 6 days of paid holidays after one year of completed work. 
Each subsequent year of work the employer needs to give 2 additional days of paid 
holidays until these reach 12 days. After that, 2 additional days of paid holidays are 
added with each 5 years of work completed.  Finally, firms also have to distribute a 
share of their profits amongst their workers. 
From the figures provided in Table 6-5 it can be seen that not all maquila employers 
provide workers with the benefits stipulated under the law. Only half the wives were 
granted social security by the assembly plant they worked for. This benefit implies 
access to health services for the wives and their families. For this reason, if their 
husbands do not already have access to this system, it can be quite important for wives 
to obtain. On the other hand, most wives working in assembly plants did receive the 
year-end bonus but less than half received paid holidays and profit sharing.  
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Table 6-5: Percentage of wives in assembly plant employment who received each 
type of benefit. 
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Social security 51.47 58.33 35.00 
Year end bonus 72.06 79.17 55.00 
Paid holidays 41.18 43.75 35.00 
Profit share 38.24 41.67 30.00 
Credit house 32.35 39.58 15.00 
Nursery 30.88 37.5 15.00 
 
 
Furthermore it can be verified that in Chilac a much lower proportion of maquilas 
offered their employees legal benefits, compared to those in Miahuatlan. This result is 
an important one, as it could explain wives’ lower participation rates in assembly plant 
employment in this town.  Unfortunately, this assumption cannot be tested statistically 
as benefits are only provided to those wives who do participate in assembly plants. 
Therefore it is impossible to deduce whether wives who do not participate in maquila 
jobs would obtain them if they did.  
The strategy by which some maquilas would get round the law and not provide the 
stipulated benefits varies. According to Hernandez Barrios (1993) some plants only 
supply their workers with a 28-day contract so that they never accumulate seniority or 
have the right to benefits. Other plants did not provide benefits because they relied on 
their workers never claiming them.  
Maria from Miahuatlan is 22 and has a six-month-old baby. She has a university 
degree but the best job she could find in terms of income was in the maquila. As a 
consequence, this is where she worked.  As she explained: 
 
‘The rest of the workers do not receive the (social) security. I do have it because I do not let 
myself. They think that because one is an ignorant person you have no clue. As a matter of fact 
almost the majority (of workers) do not have it. I demanded it, because if not, they don’t give 
it.’ 
 
Further, to avoid paying the year-end bonus, a number of assembly plants would stop 
production each year in December and lay off their workers.  Ana, for example is a 37-
year-old maquila worker in Miahuatlan who has three children aged, 21, 20 and 19. 
She has been working for almost 14 years in the maquila sector. She describes why 
she would work for a different assembly plant each year: 
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‘I enter to one (assembly plant), I go out. I go to another one.  At the end of the year they close 
them because of the year end bonus, so that they don’t have to pay it. That’s when I change 
jobs.’ 
On the other hand, while some assembly plants would avoid supplying the legal 
benefits to their employees, others would offer some voluntarily. Examples include 
providing a nursery and credit to buy or build a house. Around a third of married 
women working for assembly plants stated they received these types of benefits.  
Again, maquilas in Chilac were less likely to provide these types of benefits than those 
in Miahuatlan. This could also be an explanation for wives’ lower participation rates in 
maquilas in Chilac.  
Overall, there is evidence of the heterogeneity of assembly plants in terms of the 
compulsory and voluntary benefits they give to their workers. On one hand, some 
assembly plants give their workers non-compulsory and valuable benefits. On the 
other, some do not even comply with the law by providing their workers with obligatory 
ones.  In general it can be concluded that assembly plants in Miahuatlan are more 
likely to offer these benefits to their employees.  
But then, how do assembly plants fare in providing benefits compared to the other 
types of salaried jobs? From Table 6-6, it can be deduced that a larger share of wives 
in factories were awarded benefits compared to those in all other salaried occupations. 
Still, however, not even wives working for these types of activities received all the 
benefits stipulated by law. Judging assembly plant employment against the other two 
salaried activities that do not require formal education, the former fared much better. A 
wife without formal education, then, is more likely to receive benefits by working in an 
assembly plant than in the two other alternative occupations. 
 
Table 6-6: Percentage of wives who received each type of benefit, by type of 
employment. 
  Salaried Assembly Maids Sales 
Assistant 
Profess 
ional 
Social Security (IMSS)* 50.00 51.47 0.00 40.00 75.00 
Year end bonus* 69.57 72.06 20.00 40.00 100.00 
Paid holidays* 44.57 42.65 0.00 20.00 91.67 
Profit sharing* 34.83 39.71 0.00 0.00 44.44 
House credit 34.78 32.35 0.00 20.00 75.00 
Nursery  30.11 30.43 0.00 20.00 50.00 
Obs 91 67 5 5 12 
 
 
Thus, while working for an assembly plant could potentially provide women with 
benefits such as access to health services or a nursery, not all of them do. There is 
great heterogeneity of assembly plants in terms of the benefits they offer. While many 
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do not even give their workers those which are stipulated by the national law, some 
supply valuable ones voluntarily. Also, while it cannot be denied that not providing the 
benefits that are required by the law is quite serious, evidence does suggest that a 
greater share of maquilas offer these benefits compared to other employers of women 
without formal education.  
 
6.4 Wives’ working hours in each type of activity 
 
Another working condition through which wives’ occupation influences their and their 
families’ welfare, is the amount and flexibility of hours they need to dedicate to each.  
This limits the amount of time they can put into other pursuits such as leisure or 
reproductive activities. In economic terms, each hour spent in paid labour represents 
the opportunity cost of not dedicating this time to the next-best activity option. In this 
section, the amount of hours women invest in each activity is explored as well as its 
implications on wives and their family’s welfare and their opportunity costs. 
 
Table 6-7: Hours a week wives who participated in salaried employment worked 
 Both Chilac Miahuatlan 
Mean 49.69 49.88 49.25 
Median 50 50 50 
St. Dev 7.29 7.66 6.48 
Obs 68 48 20 
 
 
Employment in the maquila is, with very few exceptions, a full-time job where it is 
specified that employees should work 40 hours during the week and 5 hours on 
Saturdays. However, as can be seen in Table 6-7, wives working in an assembly plant 
on average worked 50 hours a week not 45 (a finding consistent across towns), 
because maquilas frequently make their employees work extra hours. Furthermore, 
workers were generally not paid for these extra hours. They received the same weekly 
salary regardless of whether they had worked extra time or not.  
Martha, a 26-year-old maquila worker with two children, one 6 and another 2, clearly 
illustrates how this operates within assembly plants.  
 
‘Well they make you work more, because the working hours of an employee are from 8 to 6 in 
the evening, and you stay until you finish your part, until 9 or 10 at night. On Saturdays they 
make you work all day when on Saturdays it is only four hours and a half… and they do not pay 
you, for instance they pay you the four hours and a half and they do not pay you for the work of 
all the day.’ 
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According to the Mexican Federal Law of Employment, employers can only make their 
employees work 3 extra days a week for a maximum of 3 hours. Further, these extra 
hours must be paid at the same rate as the standard working hours. Employers can 
ask their workers in extraordinary cases to work more than 9 extra hours a week. Yet in 
this case the employee has the right to refuse. Further, in this case each hour must be 
paid at double the standard rate.  Therefore, assembly plants in the area are in several 
cases breaking this law.  
However, while this was true for a large number of assembly plants, there were a few 
which offered better schedules for their workers. Luisa for example, is a 26-year-old 
worker in Miahuatlan with three children aged 9, 5 and 3. Contrary to most of the 
maquila workers, she would leave her job early. 
 
‘They give me a task to complete, I go in at 8 and I finish at 2:30, and they pay me the 
equivalent of a days worth of work.’ 
 
This however is an exception to the rule rather than the norm for most of the assembly 
plants in the area.  It is also yet another example of heterogeneity among maquilas in 
the area. 
The fact that various assembly plants do not respect the stipulated timetable would not 
only reduce wives’ available time for alternative interests. It would also affect wives in 
indirect ways. For instance some women would claim that working extra time would 
lead them to have serious arguments with their husbands. In some cases their 
husbands would even turn violent toward them. This was the case for example of 
Clara, a 50-year-old with 7 children from Miahuatlan. All of them where already adult, 
and because of their insistence Clara had already stopped working for an assembly 
plant. However, she remembers that when she worked for the maquila and she had to 
stay extra hours, her husband would frequently react violently when she returned 
home.   
 
‘He would say that the job was during the day, not the night.’  
 
 
In cases, wives who returned home late because they had to work extra time for an 
assembly plant would even encounter physical violence from their husbands. As Ana, 
the 37-year-old maquila worker from Miahuatlan with 3 grownup children aged, 21, 20 
and 19; stated: 
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‘Yes, they get angry because they arrive late, they hit them, they hit the, because they are not 
there, they do not take care of their children. There are some that have small children and also 
work for the maquila. There is where the problems come from.’ 
 
 
Ana admitted it had happened to her on several occasions. Her husband would get 
angry because she would arrive late when their children were younger and   her mother 
would take care of their children.  Therefore, by demanding that their employees work 
extra hours at night, assembly plants would indirectly affect wives with violent 
husbands by triggering discussions. 
 
Table 6-8: Hours worked by wives in each type of salaried employment 
 Salaried Assembly Maid Store Professional 
Mean 46.39 49.69 39.2 56.5 30 
Median 49.5 50 40 60 27.5 
St. Dev 11.62 7.29 15.85 18.74 7.07 
Obs 92 68 5 6 12 
 
 
Up to now the amount of hours wives worked in the maquila has been compared to 
those specified by their employers and stipulated in Mexican law.  But how many hours 
do assembly plant employees work compared to those in other salaried jobs? As can 
be observed from Table 6-8, the average number of hours wives in assembly plants 
work is much higher than that of wives in professional activities. However, women 
without formal education do not have access to these types of jobs. If we compare 
assembly plant employment to the other two accessible types of jobs for formally 
uneducated women, results differ for each. It can be observed that on average maids 
work fewer hours than maquila workers, while sales assistants work more. Therefore 
married women employed in assembly plants work longer, on average, than wives in 
one type of salaried employment, but not the other. It must be noted though that there 
are few observations of formally uneducated salaried wives who do not work in 
assembly plants. This fact, plus the great variance in the number of hours wives work 
in each occupation, makes it difficult to draw strong comparative conclusions.  
Also, while assembly plant workers and sales assistants have a fixed timetable,  maids’ 
schedules depend on their bosses’ needs Monica, a 25-year-old from Miahuatlan with 
three children aged 9, 7 and 4, explained this situation. She had experience working 
both as a maid and in the maquila and preferred the latter, as she explained: 
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‘Because in the maquila, they have a timetable, you have a time to go in and a time to go out. In 
a house (as a maid) you have to wait for the employers, and it is later. In the maquila, because of 
the timetable you go out quickly.’ 
 
Now, compared to maquila employment, women who are self-employed have greater 
flexibility to decide the number of hours they work. It must be recognized though that 
for some specific types of self-employment there are certain limits to this flexibility. For 
example, women who sew in their homes can decide to work as many hours as they 
wish. They have no type of constraint. On the other hand, however, women who have a 
home-based grocery store need to have regular opening hours, which are usually all 
day.  
Juana from Chilac has a food stand and explains how important the flexibility of being 
self-employed is for her. She highlights the fact that her business is something she 
owns, and therefore she has the autonomy and power to decide what and how to sell. 
 
‘I can stop working whenever I want to, it is my own business. For example if I say, today I am 
not going to go and sell, if I leave earlier or later, nobody tells me anything, nor will they 
discount money from my salary.’ 
 
But how much time do self-employed women decide to dedicate to their activities?  
Table 6-9 shows that on average, these women spend much less time on their 
activities than maquila workers on their jobs. Moreover, the median is significantly 
lower than the average. This finding is consistent across towns.   
 
Table 6-9: Hours worked by self-employed wives 
 Both Miah. Chilac 
Mean 32.45 31.56 32.94 
Median 24 21 25.5 
St. Dev 24.26 24.17 24.38 
Obs 225 81 144 
 
Yet, another interesting finding from Table 6-9 is the great variation in the hours worked 
by self-employed wives. For this reason, the average number of hours that women 
decide to work each week by each type of activity is analysed. As can be corroborated, 
in Table 6-10, with the exception of having a grocery store at home, the majority of self-
employed wives dedicated, on average, fewer hours to work women in assembly plants 
were required to35.  
                                                 
35 It must be noted that it is difficult to calculate the total amount of hours women dedicate to 
self-employment activities. Adding up the number of hours each woman dedicated to each of 
her self-employment activities is not very accurate as many women multitask and carry out 
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Table 6-10: Hours worked by wives in each type of self-employed activity. 
 Sew Sell 
Garlic 
Store Des 
hebrar 
Sell 
Tortill 
As 
Sell 
Goods 
Stalls 
Haw 
king 
Food 
Stand 
Mean 19.71 16.54 64.46 26.75  25.36 32.13 20.04 21.87  
Median 18 14 67.5   24 28 32.5 19 18 
St. Dev 13.01 7.74 24.49 14.65 13.53 24.68 11.60 17.36 
Obs 90 14 37   12 18 16 14 19   
 
 
Moreover, self-employed women are not only able to decide on the number of hours 
they put into this activity and have the flexibility to decide at which point of the day they 
engage in it, but can usually also multitask while they are working. 
This is what Rosa does. She is 56 years old and has 10 children, aged from 45 to 20. 
She sews in her house, and goes every weekend to Mexico City to sell what she has 
sewn during the week. She explains how she engages in both this activity and her 
house chores during the day. 
 
(The maquila)’ is very demanding because it is from 8 in the morning, and I am already used 
that I sit at my (sewing) machine, I work for a while, I cook my food, then I work some more, 
then I am there with my animals and there I am all day long.’ 
 
Most importantly, due to the possibility of multi-tasking while engaging in self-
employment and the lower and more flexible hours needed for this type of activity, 
women are able to fulfil their roles as homemakers. They can look after their children 
while earning an income at the same time. This was one of the most attractive features 
of self-employment and one of the main reasons women would argue against working 
for an assembly plant.  
This was the case for example of Consuelo, the wife from Miahuatlan who washed 
clothes to earn additional family income. She would not work for a maquila because if 
she did, she would not able to take care of her children. Instead, she washed clothes 
which enabled her to look after her children at the same time.  
 
‘I cannot (work for the maquila) because of my children, I cannot leave them alone and here 
washing, I am also watching them. And if I worked outside, then I would leave my children. 
Therefore I better dedicate myself to wash and not go out. My children as they are small, I have 
to take care of them as well.’ 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
several activities at the same time. For example, woman might sew while they wait for clients at 
their home based grocery store.  
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This is also the case of Juana, the 33-year-old wife who combined selling tortillas with 
working in a maquila but previously worked only in the former. However, because of 
the long hours she had to dedicate to her job in the assembly plant, she decided to sell 
tortillas instead. In her own words: 
 
‘Before I only worked in the maquila, but because sometimes we would stay later, we would 
stay to ‘velar36‘, then because of my children, to serve them, then, I decided to work for a while 
like this, selling tortillas.’ ‘It gives me more time to see my girls, to take care of them, I do not 
neglect them, like the maquila is all day long, and here it is only until two in the afternoon.’ 
 
Another interesting example is that of Pilar, a 34-year-old wife from Miahuatlan with 6 
children aged 9 to 20. She explains how she prefers to have her own income 
generating activity, sewing, than to work for the maquila. This way she has greater 
flexibility in managing her time. She as Juana highlights the fact that she is the owner 
of her own business and thus has the power to decide upon her working hours. As a 
result she can look after her children constantly: 
 
‘I acquired some places to sell at the market, it is just one day, but it is something of my own. I 
know what I sell, how I sell it. Maybe I earn little, but well, in the maquila I would have to be 
locked up. One has a starting hour and an hour to come out, and I would neglect my family. 
There would be help for my family but I would neglect my family, because I dedicate almost all 
morning to my girls who go to primary school. I take them their lunch and I am with them, and 
because I am at home I do not neglect my family, because that for me is what is most 
important.’ 
 
In accordance to the discourses of wives in both towns of the Tehuacan area, the 
opportunity cost of working in the maquila is the time available to look after their 
children. It must be noted that spouses’ arguments advocating in favour of income 
generating activities also revolved around children’s well-being. In this case the focus 
was on providing their children with better access to education. Therefore there was a 
trade off for wives between having additional income to better educate their children, 
and being able to spend time with them. 
Further, the reasoning supporting wives’ non-participation in assembly plant 
employment so that they could take care of their children goes hand in hand with their 
socially prescribed role.  As it is what society expects them to conform to, they might be 
upholding this discourse to appear to be conforming to their expected role. It is also 
likely that they have internalized this moral argument and they therefore believe it is 
their duty as wives. However, as was argued in Chapter 5, wives’ concern for their 
children’s care and welfare cannot be disregarded as unimportant. This is true as well 
                                                 
36  Word which means to ¨vigil¨. It implies that employers stay up late at night working.  
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for spouses’ concern for the quality of their children’s education. For this reason, both 
are considered as valuable functionings which are taken into account in the evaluation 
of welfare states achieved by wives’ participation in different activities.   
 
6.5 Wives’ and husbands’ engagement in housework 
 
 
Part of wives’ socially ascribed role as homemakers is also to be responsible for 
making sure that the household chores are completed. However, husbands’ 
involvement in this occupation is usually minimal. Even wives who engage in a full-time 
salaried job with their husbands have to carry out the bulk of the housework. This trend 
has been referred to as a ‘double burden of work’ by Hochschild (1989). She refers to 
the domestic chores working wives have to complete after their salaried jobs as a 
‘double shift’. These household chores which have to be completed after work imply 
both effort and time for wives. These usually wear them out and leave them with little 
time for leisure and plenty of stress. Meanwhile, husbands of salaried employed 
women usually have double the amount of leisure their wives do.  
Wives in the two towns of the Tehuacan area who worked in the maquila experienced 
this double burden of work. Jobs in assembly plants were generally full-time and wives 
were usually responsible for housework. For instance, Monica was a maquila worker in 
the town of Miahuatlan because her family sometimes needed extra money. Yet, her 
husband would not help her at all to accomplish the domestic chores.  
 
‘At midnight I am sometimes there washing clothes and ironing.’ 
 
 
Marco, a 35-year-old husband of a maquila employee in Miahuatlan, lamented that his 
wife got very tired working. He explained: 
 
 
‘She gets very tired. She has to arrive and do the housework and also work for the maquila. That 
is why she works for a while and then quits, she works one year and then rests for another.’ 
 
 
However when asked whether he would help doing the housework, he responded that 
he helped his wife to tidy the house, to clean the patio and once in a while to wash one 
or two pieces of clothes. Therefore, although he helped his wife to complete some 
tasks, she was still the one who carried out the bulk of work needed in a household 
with three children. Thus, even though Marco noticed and was concerned for his wife 
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tiredness due to her double burden of work, he would not participate equally in the 
house chores. 
Next, it is explored to what extent wives’ employment in assembly plants versus self-
employment influences the amount of time they dedicate to domestic chores. Further, it 
also examined to what degree this has an impact on their husbands’ involvement in 
these tasks. As a first step, wives from both towns in the Tehuacan area were asked 
which member of the household was responsible for making sure the domestic chores 
were completed. As can be seen in Table 6-11, almost 85% of the wives interviewed 
were solely responsible for the housework. Another 7% of wives were jointly 
responsible for these tasks with other women in the household (mother, mother-in-law, 
daughter, etc.). Almost 4% of wives shared this responsibility with their husbands, and 
only 1.4% of husbands had this responsibility by themselves. Thus, the total 
percentage of husbands who took on this responsibility is extremely low. This is yet 
more evidence that domestic chores are considered the domain of women. 
 
Table 6-11: Percentage of households in which each member is responsible for 
the house work 
 Both Miahuatlan Chilac 
Wife alone 84.95 82.79 87.10 
Husband alone 1.39 1.86 0.92 
Wife and husband only 3.47 3.72 3.23 
Wife and other 6.25 6.98 5.53 
Other only 3.24 3.72 2.76 
Wife, husband and other 0.69 0.93 0.46 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
From Table 6-11, it can also be deduced that this tendency is even greater in San 
Gabriel Chilac than in Santiago Miahuatlan. In Chilac the proportion of men who do the 
housework is almost half of that in Miahuatlan. Further, a larger percentage of women 
are fully responsible for this activity. This is consistent with Chilac being more 
conservative on several counts than Miahuatlan. 
It has been established that women bear the responsibility for the domestic chores 
within households. It still needs to be verified whether this continues to be true for 
women engaging in assembly plant employment, which is a full-time job. As is shown in 
Table 6-12, a much lower percentage of wives working for an assembly plants than 
those self-employed or without an income generating activity are solely responsible for 
housework. This is corroborated by a larger proportion of maquila wives sharing the 
house work responsibility with their husbands or with other members of her household. 
Moreover, a large share of wives stated that other family members were solely 
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responsible. This shows that wives seek support from other family members in order to 
be able to cope with their ‘double shifts’ – support that does not always come from their 
husbands but from other family members, usually female ones.  
 
Table 6-12: Percentage of households in which each member is responsible for 
the house work, by activity. 
 Assembly Self-
employed 
Only 
home 
Wife alone 60.00 88.72 86.10 
Husband alone 0.00 2.05 1.07 
Wife and husband only 10.91 3.59 2.14 
Wife and other 9.09 4.10 8.56 
Other only 18.18 1.54 1.07 
Wife, husband and other 1.82 0.00 1.07 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
However, even if a large percentage of wives do share the responsibility of housework 
with other family members, the majority of them (60%) still continue to be solely 
responsible. These wives have to cope with this duty after their long day shifts in the 
maquila. Therefore, the term ‘double shift’ applies to the majority of assembly plant 
wives. 
As for their husbands, it is puzzling to discover that none are solely responsible for the 
housework. A proportion of husbands do divide this responsibility with their wives, but 
the great majority of husbands are not involved. As noted previously, wives working for 
an assembly plant on average contribute half the household income. Thus, as women 
share the task of being the providers, one would expect husbands to also share in the 
housework. Yet in the majority of the cases, this does not happen. However, it can be 
observed that a much larger percentage of husbands of maquila workers compared to 
the rest do share the responsibility with their wives.  
One can also observe from Table 6-12, that a larger percentage of self-employed 
women compared to those without income-generating activities are solely responsible 
for the house chores. There is also a large percentage of husbands of self-employed 
women who are solely responsible for housework. Yet compared to the other two 
groups of wives, there is overall still a very low share of husbands sharing this 
responsibility with their wives. Further, a lower proportion of self-employed wives than 
the rest divide this responsibility with other family members.  It must be remembered, 
however, that in many instances self-employed women could undertake both activities 
at the same time, and that this was often the purpose of their engagement in this type 
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of activity. It makes sense then, that the majority of self-employed wives bear the sole 
responsibility of the domestic chores in their households.  
Up to now the focus has been on identifying the household member responsible for the 
domestic chores. Yet, this information does not tell us the amount of time or effort that 
wives and their husbands dedicate to the task. Thus, the average number of hours that 
wives in different activities and their husbands spend doing housework is compared. 
This will give us an idea of the magnitude of the ‘extra shift’ for salaried women. It will 
also inform us how much time wives who do not engage in any form of income-
generating activity, invest in doing house work.  
Table 6-13 shows the average number of hours that wives and husbands in each town 
dedicate to housework. It can be observed that both wives and husbands in Chilac on 
average dedicate less time to doing domestic chores than those in Miahuatlan. What is 
more, this difference is significant at a 1% level. This result could be explained by the 
lower number of children couples have in Chilac. It must be reminded that in Chilac on 
average spouses had 2.27 children while in Miahuatlan they had 2.74. 
 
Table 6-13: Hours wives and husbands dedicate to house work.  
 Wives Husbands 
 Both Miah Chilac Both Miah Chilac 
Mean 31.58 34.15 29.03 5.52 6.31 4.73 
Median 27 28 24 1.17 2 1 
Std Dev 19.52 20.29 18.42 8.64   9.84 7.18 
Obs 432 215 217 432 215 217 
 
 
 
Yet the interest is to analyse the difference in couples´ involvement in domestic chores 
depending on whether wives work in an assembly plant, are self-employed or neither. 
As can be seen in Table 6-14, wives who do not have an income-generating activity 
spend on average almost the same number of hours doing housework as if they had a 
full time job, i.e. eight hours a day during the week. This shows that engaging in 
household chores can be quite demanding.  The effort needed to complete these tasks 
will depend on the number of children the family has and the appliances the household 
owns (the equivalent to the amount of capital households have to achieve these 
chores).  It must be remembered that both towns of the Tehuacan region are quite poor 
and the majority of households did not have domestic devices to do housework. For 
example, wives still had to wash by hand and cook from scratch. It could be argued 
therefore that house work is quite an arduous task and an equivalent to a full-time job. 
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Table 6-14: Number of hours a week wives spend doing housework  
 All wives Current 
Assembly 
Current 
Self-
employed 
Current 
Housewife 
Mean 31.58 21.28 28.41 38.42 
Median 27 20 23 35 
St. Dev 19.51 11.76 18.83 20.48 
Obs  432 55 195 171 
 
 
Assembly plant workers, on the other hand, were the ones who on average spent fewer 
hours per week doing housework. As we have seen, this could be a reflection of the 
help they get from other family members. Still, on average they spend 20 hours a week 
on these chores plus the 50 hours they work in the maquila. An average wife would 
then be working a total of 70 hours a week (10 hours a day including weekends). This 
is bound to be tiring and stressful for them. Thus, the term ‘double shift’ for these 
women is quite accurate.  
Self-employed women do not dedicate much time to domestic chores as women who 
do not engage in income-generating activities. Yet they spend much more time on 
these tasks than assembly plant workers. It must be recalled that on average wives 
dedicate 20 hours a week to self-employed activity, which is much less than salaried 
wives spend at work. Yet this amount, plus the 30 hours a week self-employed wives 
dedicate on average to domestic chores is a significant figure (on average 50 hours a 
week). This is true especially if we take into account that some women have two self-
employment activities. However, it be remembered that self-employed wives frequently 
multi-task between these activities and the domestic chores. 
In contrast, husbands on average spend six times fewer hours doing housework than 
their wives. However, there is a large difference between the average time husbands of 
assembly plant workers dedicate doing house chores compared to the rest of the 
husbands (Table 6-15). On average, the latter complete three hours more a week of 
housework than the former. This represents almost a third more than the time 
husbands of self-employed women and wives without an income-generating activity 
dedicate to this task. However, even if husbands of maquila workers help their wives 
with the domestic chores, it is still less than half the time of their wives dedicate to 
them.  
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Table 6-15: Number of hours a week husbands spend doing housework  
 All 
wives 
Current 
Assembly 
Current 
Self-
employed 
Current 
Housewife 
Mean 5.52 8.81 4.71 5.48 
Median 1.17 5 1 1 
St. Dev 8.64 11.72   7.23 8.87 
Obs 432 55 195 187 
 
 
In contrast, husbands of self-employed wives are the ones spend less time on average 
doing housework. They also dedicate less time to these tasks than husbands of women 
who do not have an income-generating activity (although this last result is only 
significant at a 10% level). It should be noted that self-employed wives on average 
contribute a quarter of family income. Yet husbands do not engage in domestic chores 
correspondingly. This might have to do with self-employment not being as visible work 
as assembly plant employment. As Agarwal (1997) explains, self-employment can be 
seen as less valuable because it is physically37 and/or financially less visible. This can 
influence the perceived contribution of self-employed wives to the household. As Sen 
(1987) explains, household member’s perceived overall contribution may be different 
from his/her actual contribution. Where wives engage in domestic chores and a self-
employed income generating activity, their burden of work might not be as visible. This 
might be perceived by the household members including their husbands as a lesser 
contribution and effort than it actually is. Self-employed wives do not contribute half the 
household income like assembly plant workers, which is a much larger and visible 
share. Therefore, their husbands might not be as willing to help them with the house 
chores, even if their wives are helping them with their role of providers. 
Yet another plausible explanation for this outcome is that for a large number of self-
employed wives, the real purpose of engaging in this type of activity is to be able carry 
out reproductive activities. Thus, employment might be viewed as an overall strategy 
for wives to be able to do domestic work and still earn some extra money. Therefore, 
both spouses might not expect husbands to be involved in household chores. 
Summing up, wives working for assembly plants receive much more help with 
housework from other family members, including their husbands. They also spend 
fewer hours doing this task than self-employed wives or wives who do not have an 
income-generating activity. Further, their husbands spend more hours doing domestic 
                                                 
37 As a great proportion of self-employed women work from their homes, members of the 
society do not see them perform this activity. Thus, it is not physically visible.  
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chores than those of the rest. Nevertheless, most wives are still those mainly 
responsible for housework and they invest a large number of hours in the task. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that by large, wives working for assembly plants 
experience the double burden of a salaried job and domestic chores.  
Self-employed wives, however, have the same responsibility structure as those who do 
not engage in income-generating activities. In addition, they do not receive more help 
to achieve this task from their husbands than those from the former group. This could 
be due of the lack of visibility of their income and thus a lower perceived contribution to 
the household than there actually is.  Yet it could also be  because self-employment is 
an overall strategy for wives to be in charge of domestic activities while earning some 
income.  
 
6.6 Other welfare effects of assembly plant employment 
 
 
Working conditions at each assembly plant also have a strong influence on their 
employees’ welfare. These conditions include the rules governing the plant; how 
workers are treated by their superiors; and the safety provisions that protect 
employees.  These factors will shape wives experiences when participating in maquila 
employment and thus the welfare they can achieve by doing so.  
For instance, in several of the assembly plants, employees had to complete a quota of 
production in short time frame. This resulted in workers being under a huge amount of 
pressure and stress.  Alejandro, for example, a 42-year-old assembly plant worker, 
explained how this was the case for his wife: 
 
‘In the job there are several pressures, and sometimes they affect one’s health, and I would like 
there to be some type of business or something like that, so that she wouldn’t be so mentally 
pressured. She gets stressed and everything, I do not like that’ 
 
Therefore, even if he appreciates his wife helping him by bringing additional income 
into the household, he worries because she suffers from pressures related to the job. 
Therefore he would prefer her to work somewhere else.  
Further, besides the strict quotas, maquilas operate under an organizational structure 
where workers are under the strict vigilance of ‘encargados’ or supervisors. The main 
task of these supervisors is to certify that workers are doing their jobs accurately and at 
high speed. To achieve this, a large share of these supervisors resorted to scolding 
and yelling at the workers.  Of the wives surveyed 44% stated they were told off and 
scolded by their supervisors.  This is a quite significant share although it also reflects 
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the dissimilar conditions that different assembly plants provide to their workers.  
According to Barrios Hernandez et al. (2003) many employees felt abused and 
humiliated when being scolded by their supervisors. 
Pablo, a husband from Chilac with two children aged 6 and 10, had worked previously 
as a supervisor in a maquila.  He explained this situation when asked whether he 
would like his wife to work in the maquila: 
 
‘The supervisors abuse their authority position. They shout at them. Women cannot possibly 
work that fast.’ 
 
Employees who are scolded face additional pressure on top of having to complete a 
rigorous production quota fast. But more importantly, workers who are scolded and 
shouted at in a derogatory way are not being respected as human beings. 
Additionally, maquila workers have to perform a repetitive job in which they have to 
stay either sitting down or standing up for long hours, which also makes the job harder.  
As Laura, a 47-year-old maquila worker and mother of 4, explains: 
 
 
‘To go to a maquila you need to know how to sew and endure there all day, either standing up 
or sitting down…’ 
 
 
Thus, because maquila employees have to work very long hours; doing a repetitive job; 
having the stress and pressure of having to complete a production quota in a restricted 
amount of time; and even sometimes have a person scolding them, this type of 
employment is a very strenuous and tiring one. However, even though several women 
stated that working for the maquila was exhausting, for others staying at home was an 
even greater burden. For example, Maria is a 22-year-old with a six month baby, who 
was working for the maquila.  She had previously been a housewife for a while and for 
her this was much more tiring: 
 
‘It is more tiring to be at home than to be working, because (at home), one wakes up early, you 
prepare the lunch, clean all day, then make the food that the husband eats when he arrives, and 
then the next day the same thing.’ 
 
Therefore although maquila jobs are demanding, when comparing to the alternative 
options for wives, it was a matter of perception as to what was considered as more 
fatiguing. It must be noted however, that in general assembly plant employment was 
viewed as more demanding.  
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Another negative working condition found by Barrios Hernandez et al (2003) at some 
assembly plants was sexual harassment of female employees.  From the survey, 
4.35% of wives stated that they had been harassed by their supervisors. However, no 
person interviewed mentioned having experienced this or perceived this as being a 
problem within maquilas. While harassment of female employees represents a very 
grave situation which needs to be tackled, it does not, at least on the surface, seem to 
be a widespread problem. It must be acknowledged, nevertheless, that harassment is 
not an issue which is openly discussed. As a result, it is possible that, even if a large 
number of wives endured it, only a few wives declared to being victims of it.  
What does seem to be a prevalent but less serious condition is the docking of 
employees’ pay if they are late for work. From the survey, it was found that 74% of 
wives working in maquilas stated that they were charged if they arrived late to work. 
Employees were also charged for absence, regardless of the reason. In this case, 
91.3% of wives who had worked for an assembly plant stated that they were docked if 
they missed a day of work.  While docking workers’s pay is a mechanism by which 
employers’ disincentivize workers from arriving late and missing days of work, 
employees generally find this unjust and unbalanced as they usually have to work extra 
hours without being paid. Further, employees might have a justifiable reason such as 
sickness which prevents them from attending work.  
On another note, a positive condition provided by some assembly plants is that they 
offer their employees the opportunity of promotion.  For example, Elena had been 
working since she was 13 years old. She had stopped working because she had had a 
baby, but she explained how during the time she worked she climbed up the ladder 
within the assembly plant.  
 
‘I like working for the maquila. I started working as manual and ended up working for the last 
machine. I was very happy because I earned what I wanted.’ 
 
 
Of the wives surveyed, 62% stated they had the opportunity to progress at the 
assembly plant where they had worked during the last year. Thus, employees of many 
plants had the opportunity of promotion.  
There is yet another non-pecuniary benefit of working in the maquila independent of 
the conditions each plant offers but inherent to this activity. Because in an assembly 
plant various people gather together to work, it is also a place where socialization 
between co-workers occurs.  Thus a maquila is a place where wives can meet people 
and create friendships. This was highly valued by wives and was frequently mentioned 
in the interviews.   
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Ana, for example, the maquila worker from Miahuatlan, describes: 
 
‘There I forget about all my pressures that I have at home. I am fine and I feel well there. I meet 
my friends, my colleagues.’ 
 
 
Further, several wives without an income-generating activity who were self-employed 
and worked from home wished they could work in assembly plants for this reason. This 
is the case of Sonia, who works from home unthreading for a maquila plant and also 
does some embroidering.  She wanted to work for an assembly plant but didn’t 
because her husband would not let her. She explains:  
 
‘I would like to work for a maquila because, well, there you meet lots of people, you mingle 
with them, and you say… good morning, good afternoon, you get to know people.’ 
 
On the contrary, wives had very few alternative places and opportunities to meet and 
spend time with people.  As Carla, a wife with no income-generating activity said: 
 
Being a housewife, ‘one almost does not go out, one is always in the house.’ 
 
Thus, although she had never worked in an assembly plant she wanted to because it 
represented an opportunity for her to socialize.  This statement accords with the idea 
that wives’ place is the home. Because of this, they have restricted mobility and few 
spheres where they can interact with others. Mostly, wives only associated with 
members of their family.   
Further, because wives without an income-generating activity would spend most of 
their time at home without going out, they had their children as their only companions 
which would also tire them sometimes. As Patricia, a 34-year-old maquila worker with 5 
children aged 9 to 2 who had had a period of being a housewife, puts it:   
 
‘At home, one also gets bored with one’s children.’ 
 
It must be noted that 68% of self-employed wives carried out their activities from home.  
Even though some wives would perform these activities outside their home, they would 
do so only one or two days a week.  Therefore a large majority of wives performing 
these types of activities did not have the opportunity to associate with other people.  
This resulted in them having fewer or no friends and only their extended family to 
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socialize with. Thus, maquila employment provides wives with the opportunity to break 
with the isolation of their homes. 
Thus there are positive and negative aspects for wives’ welfare when working for a 
textile plant.  Some working conditions that maquilas provide for their workers can be 
harsh and tiring. This is the case, for example, where wives are mistreated by 
supervisors and are pressured to work fast. Yet on the other hand, assembly plants 
also allow for wives’ promotion and socialization with colleagues.  
 
6.7 Wives’ health conditions when participating in different activities. 
 
Some studies examining textile assembly plant employment conditions in Mexico have 
found that they are mostly suboptimal and that health protective measures are deficient 
(Barrios Hernandez 1993; Tiano 1994). As a consequence, maquila employees 
frequently suffer from poor health. Barrios Hernandez (1993) in his evaluation of 
maquilas in the area of Tehuacan, Mexico found that several workers suffered from 
respiratory problems due to the inhalation of fluff; kidney and back pains for sitting 
down all day; allergies due to the contact with chemicals in textiles; eye weakness and 
stress.  Also, Villegas, J. et al. (1997) argue that to perform the maquila tasks,    
employees have to focus the eyes intensly in the performed task. This leads to a high 
deterioration of the sight. 
A number of the wives surveyed and interviewed from both Chilac and Miahuatlan also 
experienced health problems. Some had even stopped working because of them. Of 
the wives who worked in a maquila in the year of reference and had stopped working 
for a period of time, 35% (7 out of 22) stated they had done so because they had fallen 
ill. One of them had already returned to her job and 5 planned to do so soon38.  
However, several wives with deteriorating health conditions continued to work for the 
maquila. Thus to further assess the extent to which wives working for an assembly 
plant faced detrimental health conditions, questions were included in the survey about 
whether wives had experienced a number of symptoms in the past month39.  These are 
compared with the ones experienced by self-employed wives and those not working for 
an income generating activity. 
Table 6-16 shows the percentage of wives in each town that experienced symptoms. 
There are several symptoms suffered by at least a third of the wives interviewed.  
                                                 
38 Unfortunately information regarding which illnesses these women suffered is not available. 
39 To this effect, the percentage of those who participated in each activity during the last year is 
considered. This is done so that those wives who left the maquila because they were ill are not 
excluded from the analysis. Further, some symptoms may be due to wives’ work in assembly 
plants in the last year even though they do not work there any more.  
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Thus, it can be deduced that in general, wives from both towns do not have good 
health conditions. Some of these were experienced to a higher degree in Miahuatlan 
than in Chilac, for example coughing, difficulty breathing, swollen joints with pain, body 
aches, stress, and eye weakness. Nevertheless, only the symptom of difficulty 
breathing is significantly different between towns.  
 
Table 6-16: Share of wives who have experienced health related symptom in the 
last month, by town 
 Both Miah Chilac 
Cough 26.51 28.37 24.42 
Difficulty Breathing 14.42 17.21 11.52 
Swollen Joints with Pain 24.19 26.51 21.66 
Irritated eyes, with pain 30 30.7 29.03 
Sore Throat 35.43 32.56 37.79 
Kidney Pain 28.84 25.58 31.8 
Back  Pain 27.44 22.79 31.8 
Swollen Irritated & Itchy Skin 13.95 12.56 15.21 
Allergy 9.53 6.51 12.44 
Blood Pressure 29.6 26.51 32.26 
Body Ache 31.63 37.21 25.81 
Stress 40.23 42.79 37.33 
Eye Weakness 33.02 35.81 29.95 
 
 
However, as can be observed in Table 6-17 a larger share of maquila workers suffered 
from a substantial number of symptoms than self-employed or non-income-generating 
wives. These symptoms include coughs, swollen joints, irritated eyes, sore throat, 
kidney pain, swollen, irritated and itchy skin, allergies, stress, and eye weakness.  
However, only the percentage of maquila workers experiencing irritated eyes, sore 
throat, difficulty breathing, kidney pain, irritated skin and eye weakness was 
significantly from between non-assembly-plant workers (both self-employed and those 
without an income-generating activity). 40 However, if we compare those who are 
currently working in the maquila, with those currently self-employed on one hand, and 
housewives on the other, it ceases to be true that a higher share of maquila workers, 
compared to each of the two other groups, experience the symptoms of stress and 
swollen, irritated and itchy skin. Further, if we take into account those wives who are 
currently working for a maquila, only the symptoms of irritated eyes, sore throat and 
                                                 
40 For all of these symptoms, (except for eye weakness) the same tendency is observed in each 
town.  
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eye weaknesses are significantly different from non-assembly-plant workers. These are 
exactly the same health problems Barrios Hernandez (1993) had found that employees 
of textile assembly plants suffered in the area of Tehuacan, Puebla and it is likely they 
are due to the working conditions also identified by him..  
 
Table 6-17: Share of wives who have experienced symptoms in the last month 
 All 
Wives 
Assembly 
last year 
Self-
employed 
last year 
Home last 
year 
Cough 26.51 31.88 23.28 28.87 
Difficulty Breathing 14.42 17.39 13.36 14.79 
Swollen Joints with Pain 24.19 18.84 25.43 24.65 
Irritated eyes, with pain. 30.00 42.27*** 30.17 27.46 
Sore Throat 35.43 44.93** 35.34 29.58** 
Kidney Pain 28.84 36.23* 31.47 21.13*** 
Back  Pain 27.44 30.48 33.19 16.90*** 
Swollen Irritated & Itchy Skin 13.95 18.84* 15.09 11.97 
Allergy 9.53 13.04 10.34 7.04 
Blood Pressure 29.60 26.09 29.31 30.99 
Body Ache 31.63 33.33 26.72 38.73** 
Stress 40.23 43.48 40.52 38.03 
Eye Weakness 33.02 42.03** 32.76 30.28 
* 1% significance 
** 5% significance 
*** 10% significance 
 
 
It can be concluded then, that in general wives from both towns have poor health. 
There are many factors which can influence this: nutrition, access to health centres and 
the intensity of in each activity. However, a significant and large percentage of wives 
working in assembly plants experience illnesses and deteriorating health, which can be 
traced back to suboptimal protective measures and working conditions. Maquilas could 
equip themselves and have protective measures for their workers. For example, 
women could be made to wear masks to protect themselves from inhaling fluff. They 
could also, for instance, be allowed to have more periods of rest and allowed to go to 
the toilet more often.   
 
6.8 Decisions within the household  
 
 
Many economists have suggested that salaried employment might increase wives’ 
bargaining power within the household (Katz 1997, Fafchamps 2001, Agarwal, 1997). 
We will therefore examine the effect maquila employment has on decision-making 
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within the household. Although analysing which household member takes decisions on 
certain issues is far from being a measure of bargaining power, investigating how these 
decisions are altered with wives’ employment in assembly plants can serve as an 
indicator of changes within the family power structure. Thus first we assess which 
household member takes decisions within the household regarding preparing food, 
children’s education, children’s permissions, large expenditures and contraception. 
Next, we see how this decision structure differs for households in which wives engage 
in different activities.  
 
Table 6-18: Percentage of household members who take decisions 
 Food 
prepa 
ration 
Child 
ren’s 
educati
on 
Child 
ren’s 
permissi
ons 
Strong 
expen 
ditures 
Contra 
ception 
Wife 63.43 26.18 20.62 9.05 29.18 
Spouses 20.83 68.08 70.88 63.10 58.62 
Husband 1.62 2.74 6.96 24.05 11.67 
Mother 1.16 0.00 0.77 0.71 0.53 
Children 0.00 1.75 0.26 0.24 0.00 
Husband’s mother 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 
Wife and other 12.04 0.52 0.52 2.62 0.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
From Table 6-18, it can be seen that decisions taken within the household are 
consistent with the socially ascribed roles for wives and husbands. The large majority 
of wives take the decisions within the household regarding food preparation, with a 
much lower percentage of husbands involved in this decision. Furthermore, of those 
husbands who are engaged in it, a greater share does so with their wives than by 
themselves. The rest of the decisions are generally taken jointly. Yet, while in a much 
larger percentage of households wives take decisions by themselves regarding 
children’s issues and contraception, a greater share of husbands take decisions alone 
regarding large household expenditures.  
Table 6-19, shows the proportion of household members who take decisions, by town. 
In Chilac a slightly smaller proportion of wives take the decisions regarding food 
preparation alone. A larger proportion of them share these decisions with other family 
members. However a larger proportion of wives in Chilac than in Miahuatlan take 
decisions alone regarding their children. On the other hand, a larger percentage of 
wives in Miahuatlan than in Chilac take decisions on large expenditures and 
contraception, both alone and with their husbands. Thus it can be concluded that wives 
in Miahuatlan are involved to a greater extent than those in Chilac in significant 
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decisions like large expenditures and contraception. On the other hand, in Chilac wives 
are more engaged in decisions regarding children’s education and permissions.  
 
Table 6-19: Percentage of household members who take decisions 
 Food 
Preparation 
Children’s 
Education  
Children’s 
Permissions 
Strong 
Expenditures 
Contra- 
ception 
 Miah Chil Miah Chil Miah Chil Miah Chil Miah Chil 
Wife 65.58 61.29 23.08 29.53 18.41 22.99 17.50 13.33 32.63 25.67
Spouses 19.53 22.12 70.19 65.8 72.64 68.98 70.00 60.00 59.47 57.75
Husband 2.33 0.92 3.85 1.55 7.96 5.88 7.50 13.33 0.00 0.00 
Mother 0.00 0.00 1.92 1.55 0.5 1.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Children 0.93 1.38 0.00 0.00 0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Husbands 
mother 
0.93 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.84 16.58
Wife & 
other 
10.7 13.36 0.96 1.55 0.00 1.07 5.00 13.33 1.05 0.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
It can be seen in Table 6-20 that decisions regarding food preparation are taken 
differently in households where wives work for assembly plants compared to those 
where wives are self-employed or do not have an income-generating activity. It is 
evident that a lower proportion of maquila-employed wives are in charge of this 
arrangement by themselves. This is in part due to a greater involvement of husbands in 
this decision, but mostly because wives share this responsibility with someone else in 
the household. This is consistent with the finding that maquila wives have less 
responsibility for the housework, share it with other female family members, and spend 
less time on it during the week, than wives in other occupations. Therefore decisions 
over food preparation continue to be mostly female, with the prescribed gender role 
regarding food preparation only challenged in a few households.  
 
Table 6-20: Household members who take decisions within the household 
regarding food preparation 
 All 
wives 
Current 
assembly 
Current 
self-
employed 
Current 
home 
Wife 63.43 38.18 68.72 64.17 
Spouses 20.83 29.09 19.49 20.32 
Husband 1.62 0.00 1.54 2.14 
Mother 1.16 3.64 0.51 1.60 
Husbands mother 0.93 1.82 0.00 1.60 
Wife and other 12.04 27.27 9.74 10.16 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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The structure of household decisions regarding children’s education and permissions 
are not very different in household where wives work in assembly plants compared to 
those where they are in self-employed (Tables 6-21 and 6-22). For a slightly higher 
percentage of households in which wives work for the maquila, decisions regarding 
children’s permissions are taken by their mothers. This could be explained by their 
taking care of the children while wives go to work. Nonetheless, it can be said that 
overall, there is no radical divergence on decisions regarding children’s affairs in 
households were wives work for the maquila.   
 
Table 6-21: Household members who take decisions within the household 
regarding children’s education 
 All 
wives 
Current 
assembly 
Current 
self-
employed 
Current 
home 
Wife 26.18 24.00 27.93 25.57 
Spouses 68.08 72.00 66.48 68.18 
Husband 2.74 0.00 2.79 3.41 
Children 1.75 0.00 1.68 2.27 
Wife and other 1.25 4.00 1.12 0.57 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Table 6-22: Household members who take decisions within the household 
regarding children’s permissions 
 All 
wives 
Current 
assembly 
Current 
self-
employed 
Current 
home 
Wife 20.62 21.28 19.32 21.89 
Spouses 70.88 74.47 73.30 67.46 
Husband 6.96 2.13 6.25 8.88 
Children 0.77 0.00 0.00 1.78 
Mother 0.26 2.13 0.00 0.00 
Wife and other 0.52 0.00 1.14 0.00 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
On the other hand, it can be observed from Table 6-23 that decisions over large 
expenditures are different depending on whether wives engage in each one of the 
activities; maquila employment, self-employment or only reproductive activities.  In 
those households where wives do not have an income-generating activity, they are less 
involved in these decisions. Additionally, in these households a very large share (more 
than a third) of husbands take these decisions by themselves. On the other end of the 
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spectrum, in households where wives participate in assembly plant employment, a 
larger percentage take these types of decisions alone, and thus a a lower percentage 
of their husbands do so. There is quite a large share of households in which wives are 
self-employed and where decisions of this type are taken jointly by both spouses. This 
proportion is even larger than for those households in which wives dedicate themselves 
to maquila employment or reproductive activities only. Yet in these households wives 
generally do not take these decisions by themselves. These results might be explained 
due to the fact that decisions over expenditure are related to income. Wives working in 
assembly plants contribute double the share of income to their households of self-
employed wives. It makes sense, then, that a larger proportion of wives working for an 
assembly plant are engaged in these types of decisions. Thus, what could generally be 
considered a male decision is transformed if wives engage in self-employment and 
even more if wives work for the maquila. 
 
Table 6-23: Household members who take decisions within the household 
regarding large expenditures 
 All 
wives 
Current 
assembly 
Current 
self-
employed 
Current 
home 
Wife 9.05 16.36 9.63 6.56 
Spouses 63.10 67.27 72.19 52.46 
Husband 24.05 9.09 14.97 37.16 
Children 0.71 0.00 0.00 1.64 
Mother 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.55 
Husbands mother 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.55 
Wife and other 2.62 7.27 3.21 1.09 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Finally, decisions concerning contraception are also different in household were wives 
work for an assembly plant (Table 6-24). In a large share of households, where there is 
a wife working for an assembly plant, she alone takes this decision. In the other 
households contraceptive issues are primarily resolved by both spouses. This could be 
an indicator that wives achieve greater empowerment within the household. Yet other 
factors could be influencing this result. Wives working in an assembly plant are 
younger, and thus might be taking these decisions by themselves. Yet on average 
assembly plant workers are 33 years old, while the self-employed and those without 
income-generating activities are each on average 37 years old. Thus, the average 
difference in age does not suggest that this variable is what influences the larger share 
of maquila wives deciding contraception matters by themselves.  
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Table 6-24: Household members who take decisions within the household 
regarding contraception 
 All 
wives 
Current 
assembly 
Current 
self-
employed 
Current 
home 
Wife 29.18 59.18 28.31 21.82 
Spouses 58.62 38.78 59.04 63.64 
Husband 11.67 2.04 12.65 13.33 
Husbands mother 0.53 0.00 0.00 1.21 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Thus compared to households where wives are self-employed or do not have an 
income-generating activity, those in which they work for a textile plant have a number 
of different decision-making arrangements. Food preparation is one of them. Yet the 
difference in this decision structure in households where wives participate in the 
maquila corresponds both to wives sharing these decisions with other female family 
members, and to husbands’ incorporation into them. Decisions regarding large 
expenditures are also dissimilar in households where wives participate in assembly 
plant employment. Not only there is a larger share of wives who are involved in this 
decision, but also a greater proportion of them who decide by themselves. To a lesser 
extent, self-employed wives also take part in these decisions in a larger proportion than 
those without an income-generating activity. This finding could be due to large 
expenditures being related to income. As maquila wives have a higher income, they 
have the ability to spend and to decide by themselves how much to spend. The third 
type of decision which is different in households where wives work in the maquila is 
that of contraception. Decisions related to children do not differ by wives’ occupation. 
Thus, it can be said that wives’ employment in maquilas has some influence on 
gender-related decisions.  
 
6.9 Achievable functionings in assembly plant employment 
 
From the evidence above, it is clear that a single assessment as to whether assembly 
plant employment is better or worse for wives (or their families) is suboptimal.   
Women’s participation in this activity has both positive and negative effects on them 
and their family. These in turn depend on a series of conditions within the workplace, 
the household and the society. Spouses’ determination of which are the most important 
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functionings, and therefore their resolution on whether wives should work or not in the 
maquila, will depend on their perceived preferences. However, to enhance women’s 
capacities to attain different functionings when engaging or not in the maquila, a 
separate analysis of each of the conditions influencing the achievement of these is 
needed. For example, employees who inhale fluff may develop asthma, thus 
preventing them from achieving the functioning of being free of sickness. 
By analyzing functionings separately, policies can be formulated regarding each of the 
negative conditions influencing working wives’ welfare. Thus, their opportunities to 
achieve better welfare states can be enhanced. For the previous example, employees’ 
functioning of being free of sickness can be improved if they are provided with masks 
and plants have better ventilation.  
Thus in this section, all the positive and negative conditions found to influence wives’ 
experiences in maquila employment are summarized. Additionally, they are mapped 
onto the different functionings whose achievement can be enhanced or worsened by 
wives’ working in maquilas. 
It must be remembered, however, that for both husbands and wives, children’s well-
being was of utmost importance, at least in the discourse. For many it even governed 
the decision regarding wives’ employment in assembly plants. In this sense, the main 
argument wives gave for not participating in maquila employment was that if they did, 
they would not be able to provide quality care for their children. On the other hand, the 
chief reason wives supplied for their inclusion into this activity was to obtain 
supplementary income to be able to provide for their children’s educational expenses. 
Because one of the traditional moral arguments states that wives are those responsible 
for childrearing, this last claim can be considered a moral counterargument. It implies 
that wives still name their children as their main concern. Instead of dedicating time to 
childbearing they decide to invest in their children’s education. However, as been 
discussed previously, whether both these reasons are internalized concerns, are only 
used as a discourse, or reflect an authentic interest, they cannot be discarded as non-
fundamental. Therefore, the functionings children achieve by wives’ participation in 
assembly plant employment will also be incorporated into the current analysis. Taking 
this into account, Table 6-25 summarizes all the positive and negative conditions within 
the maquila, the household, and society that influence wives and their children’s 
achievement of functionings when the former work as maquila employees.  
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Table 6-25: List of wives’ achievable functionings when employed in assembly 
plants 
 
 Women Children 
 
Category Functionings Negative Positive Positive Negative 
 
Physical 
health 
Being free of 
sickness 
- Unhealthy 
working 
conditions  
-Access social 
security 
-Additional 
income 
 -Social 
Security  
-Additional 
income 
 
  Being free of 
tiredness 
-Long working 
hours 
-Double burden 
work 
      
Mental well 
being 
Being free of 
pressure 
-Pressure from 
managers 
-No isolation     
  Being free of 
Stress 
-Quotas to be 
completed 
      
Education 
and 
knowledge 
Being able to 
have a 
Personal 
development 
  -Opportunity to 
get 
job promotion 
-Income to 
provide 
education 
  
Quality 
time 
with family 
Being able to 
have quality 
time with 
children 
and family 
-Long working 
hours limit time 
to spend with 
family 
- Double work 
burden  
    -Quality 
time 
With 
mother 
Social 
Relations 
Being able to 
see and have 
friends 
-Being 
accepted in 
society (norms) 
-Space to make 
friends 
    
Allocation 
of time 
Being able to 
engage in 
leisure  
activities 
-Double work 
burden  
-Long working 
hours 
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 Women Children 
 
Category Functionings Negative Positive Positive Negative 
 
Respect Being 
respected in 
the workplace 
  -Scolding by 
supervisors 
-Not being 
provided 
stipulated 
benefits 
 
    
 Being 
respected in 
the household 
 -Decisions 
within 
household 
-Financial 
independence 
  
  Being free of 
domestic 
violence 
-Social norms 
plus long 
working hours 
- Financial 
independence 
    
  Self worth   - Financial 
independence 
-Choice of 
activity 
   
 
 
As is shown in Table 6-25, many positive and negative welfare states depend on the 
working environment within assembly plants. However, a fundamental aspect to 
consider is that assembly plants are heterogeneous in terms of the conditions they 
offer to their employees. For example, some assembly plants do not offer benefits 
stipulated by law, while others offer not only those but also voluntary ones such as 
access to credit or childcare. Some make their employees work long extra hours, while 
a few allow their employees to complete their quota and then leave early. Generally, in 
both towns most assembly plants offer suboptimal working conditions. In his study of 
textile assembly plants in the area of Tehuacan, Barrios Hernandez (2004) affirms that 
the maquilas who generally do not provide their workers with social security are the 
medium, small, and clandestine ones. As Tiano (1994), explains, apparel maquilas 
have very low startup costs: often just renting a building and acquiring second-hand 
sewing machines is enough to start a business. This allows small and domestically 
owned shops to operate easily. Nevertheless, these plants are the ones which 
generally offer suboptimal working conditions.  
Another main finding is that social norms are crucial in the determination of wives’ 
possible functioning outcomes and that they operate through several channels. On one 
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hand, norms and managers beliefs regarding women’s skills and roles determine the 
fact that it is women who are mainly hired by assembly plants. Furthermore, they also 
affect the way in which women are treated within these maquilas. On this issue, Elson 
and Pearson (1981) have suggested that textile assembly women are perceived as 
being more passive and compliant workers.41 We do not know if this is true for the 
maquilas of both towns in the Tehuacan area, but we do know that employees are 
subject to scolding by their supervisors (who are mostly male), sometimes 
mistreatment by them, and in a small number of cases to sexual harassment.  
On another hand, it is difficult to make a straightforward assessment of the influence 
that wives participation in assembly plant employment has on their agency.  
Information suggests however, that the effect is positive. Wives who work for the 
maquila generally have more mobility outside their home and socialize more.  They 
also contribute with half the share of household income.  These could be regarded as 
determinants of wives agency. Further, it was also encountered that a larger share of 
wives also take decisions within the household related to strong expenditures and 
contraception. Yet, these decisions are only one small aspect of what can be 
considered a persons agency. What is more, these last results must be taken with 
caution as it is also very likely that wives with greater agency are also the ones who 
work in the maquila.  
Further, norms shape the demands that certain institutions like schools and 
government place on wives and thus restrict their ability to achieve certain functionings. 
This is the case, for instance, where schools ask mothers to take part in school events 
and meetings. This makes wives feel that they are failing to comply with their duties 
and provide quality childcare if they are unable to attend. 
Additionally, the acceptance of wives’ and husbands’ social roles within the household 
also determines wives’ welfare when employed or not in assembly plants. This is 
shown, for example, in the double burden of work that wives working for the maquila 
experience.  It is also manifest in spouses’ marital disputes due to their long hours of 
work.  As this role is additionally part of the moral argument which holds that women 
should not work for assembly plants, it also determines the outcome of their 
participation.   
Finally, social norms directly affect the welfare of wives who work in assembly plants 
via the guilt they feel in violating the social norm and by receiving social sanctions from 
their reference groups.  These, internalization and social sanctions, are the two 
                                                 
41 Information in this regards, for maquila employment in San Gabriel Chilac and Santiago 
Miahuatlan is not available though, given that it was not the focus of the analysis and additional 
information would have needed to be gathered.  
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mechanisms by which social norms are enforced, and are the focus of the next two 
chapters.  
The functionings wives can achieve by being self-employed also depend on the 
conditions and environment in which they perform their activities. However, these 
usually do not depend on superiors, will be less strenuous and will involve fewer 
hazards than those existing within assembly plants. Also, they conform to the 
traditional roles of wives and husbands, and therefore do not affect their sense of guilt. 
Further, by engaging in these activities, they will not receive social sanctions from their 
reference groups. Thus social norms will not influence their well-being directly. 
However, they implicitly do have an effect on self-employed wives’ well-being. The 
social rule of women’s place being the home restricts their mobility and makes for 
scarce spaces where they are able to socialize. This can contribute to wives’ isolation 
and thus influence their ability to achieve the functioning of being able to see and have 
friends.  
Hence, it is clear that working conditions and social norms influence wives’ 
opportunities to achieve certain functionings. It must be remembered, though, that the 
extent to which wives actually achieve certain functionings while participating in each of 
these activities will depend on individual characteristics. What is tiresome for some 
wives might be enjoyable for others. For instance, some wives might find maquila 
employment tiresome, but others might find staying at home doing housework even 
more wearing. This, each of the spouses preferences and their decision-making 
process will determine whether wives work in assembly plants.  
As a final note, it must be reminded that social norms also influence wives’ and 
husbands perceived preferences. For example, wives might be educated and 
socialized to prefer to stay at home due to the rule that women are responsible for 
housework and child care. Therefore she will prefer to engage in a self-employed 
income-generating activity, or none.  
It is important to remember that social norms are ubiquitous. They influence factory-
employed wives’ achievement of functionings through several channels. More 
importantly, they also shape spouses’ preferences regarding wives’ occupations, and 
the decision-making process within the household. The next two chapters analyse the 
effect that the internalization of moral arguments and the impact of social sanctions 
associated with them have on wives’ propensity to engage in maquila work.  
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_______________________________ 
7 The effect of internalization on 
women’s propensity to participate in 
salaried employment 
_______________________________ 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
It has been proposed that social norms are sustained by or validated by one or more 
moral arguments. These arguments are internalized to varying degrees by individuals 
and because they are value laden, violation of the norm can cause feelings of guilt and 
anxiety. It is the concern of this chapter to assess the effects that internalization of 
each of these moral arguments has on women’s participation in assembly plant 
employment. Furthermore it is of utmost importance to single out the individual and 
household characteristics that might lead to believing in these moral arguments. These 
characteristics would then also have an indirect influence on women’s participation in 
salaried employment through their relationship to moral arguments. 
In the case of San Gabriel Chilac and Santiago Miahuatlan, it is possible to identify 
three main moral arguments which sustain the norm that a woman should not work in 
assembly plants. First, women are perceived as responsible for taking care of children, 
serving their husbands and carrying out the household chores. Thus it is believed that 
a women’s place is the home. Second, women who work in assembly plants are 
regarded as promiscuous and thus engaging in this type of employment to be unfaithful 
to their husbands. Finally, husbands also have a traditional role to fulfil. This is to be 
the economic providers of a household, i.e. the breadwinners. If their wives work for a 
wage it is considered they are not fulfilling this role.   
Having identified these moral arguments, questions in a Likert scale form were 
included in the survey and posed to married women. These asked whether wives and 
their husbands believed in each one of these rules to proxy for internalization of moral 
arguments.  Answers to these questions were used to test whether and to what extent 
the internalization of moral arguments influences women’s participation in salaried 
employment, and in turn whether specific individual and household characteristics 
influence these beliefs. 
Specifically, from each of the Likert scale questions a dummy variable was constructed 
which had a value of 1 if the answer was they “somewhat disagreed” or “completely 
disagreed” with the moral arguments. An additional dummy variable was created which 
had a value of 1 if they disagreed with all of the moral arguments. This was done for 
two main reasons: first, because the aim was to identify the characteristics of those 
who deviated or disagreed with the social norm. Second, it was operationally much 
simpler to use dichotomous variables than those with five values such as Likert scale 
questions.  Therefore a total of eight dummy variables were created, three for each 
spouse indicating whether they disagreed with each of the moral arguments and an 
additional two showing whether they disagreed with all the moral arguments.  
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Table 7-1 shows the proportion of wives and husbands who stated disagreement with 
each of the moral arguments. Figures suggest that the most internalized argument is 
that of women’s place being the home. Conversely, a larger proportion of women 
disagree with the argument of women being promiscuous if they work in an assembly 
plant. From It can also be observed from Table 7-1 that men’s disagreements on moral 
arguments follow the same pattern.  Furthermore, disagreements on each one of moral 
argument are significantly different from each other at a 95% confidence and a 5% 
significance level for both spouses. Thus, each moral argument is internalized to a 
different degree both by women and by men. This demonstrates the importance of 
analyzing separately the beliefs on each one of the moral arguments which sustain the 
norm that women should not participate in assembly plant employment. 
 
Table 7-1: Disagreement on moral arguments 
 Women’s 
place home 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Men 
Breadwinners 
All Moral 
arguments 
% Wives  Disagree 52.55 25.52 41.63 68.75 
% Husbands Disagree 42.06 62.7 56.37 26.62 
 
 
It can also be discerned from Tables 7-1 that wives’ and husbands’ beliefs differ from 
each other. A lower proportion of men than women disagree on each one of the moral 
arguments. Yet only for the argument of women being promiscuous if they work at 
assembly plants is the proportion of women’s disagreement significantly different from 
men’s at a 5% significance level. For the argument of women’s place being the home, 
the proportion of women disagreeing is significantly different from men’s at a 10% level. 
Therefore the only argument which cannot be said to be significantly different between 
genders is that of men having to be the breadwinners.  Moral arguments then seem to 
be more installed in men’s consciousness than in women’s. As spouses in some form 
or another have to settle whether wives participate in assembly plant employment, it is 
of fundamental interest to analyze the differential impact that internalization of norms 
for each partner has. Due to both women’s and men’s discourses implying men’s 
authority over the allocation of wives’ time into waged activities, it is anticipated that 
husbands’ disagreements will have a greater effect than that of their wives.  
Furthermore, statistical figures suggest that these disagreements both by husbands 
and wives can be associated with participation in salaried employment. Table 7-2 
shows that a larger proportion of wives participating in assembly plant employment 
than those who do not, disagree with all the moral arguments. This result is also found 
for men: as a greater proportion of husbands of those who participated in assembly 
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plant employment disagreed with all of the moral arguments. It must be tested, 
however, whether these beliefs are correlated with assembly plant employment, once 
other variables are taken into account. Previous results might surface, for example, 
because a woman with a higher level of education might also disagree much more with 
each moral argument, but as she would earn a higher wage, she would also be bound 
to have a higher probability of participating in waged employment.  
 
 
Table 7-2: Disagreement on moral arguments by participation in assembly plant 
employment 
 Women’s  
place home 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Men  
Breadwinners 
 Works Not 
works  
Works  Not 
works  
Works  Not 
works  
% Wives disagree 44.63 62.32 72.65 84.06 55.12 75.36
% Husbands disagree 61.84 37.68 40.56 20.29 46.48 28.99
 
 
Furthermore, as was discussed previously in Chapter 4, a vastly greater proportion of 
women work in assembly plants in Santiago Miahuatlan than in San Gabriel Chilac. In 
the week of reference, 18.6% of wives worked in an assembly plant on Santiago 
Miahuatlan, as opposed to 6.91% in San Gabriel Chilac. This raises the question as to 
whether this can be attributed to social norms.  Tables 7-3 show women’s and men’s 
disagreement on moral argument by towns. It can be observed that a greater 
proportion of women and men in San Gabriel Chilac disagree with both the argument of 
women’s place being the home and women being promiscuous. However, only for this 
last argument is this difference significant at a 5% level and for a 95% confidence 
interval. Conversely, a very small (insignificant) but higher proportion of men and 
women in San Gabriel Chilac disagree with the argument of men having to be the 
breadwinners. This can be explained by the prevalent opinion in San Gabriel Chilac 
that women are hard workers (being self-employed in their home) and are proud to 
help their husbands to economically provide for the family.42 At the same time, 
husbands are also used to their wives earning some form of income. This is not so in 
Santiago Miahuatlan, where previous to assembly plants, women had no income 
generating activity. 
  
                                                 
42 It will be explained in another chapter that women in Chilac traditionally sew, even the founder 
of the town and therefore its name come after a woman called Maria la Chilaca who was a 
woman who worked (sewing). Therefore husbands see it as normal for women to help them 
economically. The amount earned by this activity however is very low. 
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Table 7-3: Disagreement on moral arguments, by town 
 Women’s place 
home 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Men 
 Breadwinners 
 Miah. Chilac Miah. Chilac Miah. Chilac 
% Wives Disagree 50.23 54.84 19.53 31.48 41.31 41.94
% Husbands Disagree 44.34 39.81 67.61 57.87 55.77 56.94
 
 
Overall, figures have shown that women and men internalize each of the moral 
arguments to a varying degree. Also beliefs in them by both spouses coincide with 
wives’ lower participation rates in assembly plant employment, and this is consistent 
across towns. However, it still remains to be verified whether there is indeed a 
correlation between these two variables when taking into account other variables such 
as years of education and age, and if so, the magnitude it has. This is not a simple task 
given that it is very likely that internalization of moral arguments and participation in 
assembly plant employment are jointly determined. Yet, in the next section, a 
regression model which accounts for this difficulty is specified.  Regression results and 
their analysis then follow. Subsequently, it is tested whether further household 
characteristics influence women’s participation in assembly plant employment through 
their effect of their impact in beliefs on moral arguments.  Specifically, these are 
husband’s main activity; whether either partner has lived in a city or was born in one 
and whether relatives also participate in assembly plants. 
 
7.2 Biprobit regression model 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to empirically assess to what extent disagreement on these 
moral arguments influence women’s participation in assembly plant employment. 
However, disagreement on norms and participation in assembly plant employment are 
presumably jointly determined. Due to this, a simultaneous equation model, a recursive 
Birpobit model, is employed. To this end, let disagreement on a moral argument be 
denoted as jD , where j is each moral argument plus disagreement on all moral 
arguments, therefore { }4,3,2,1∈j . It is assumed that jD is a latent random variable 
which is only observed as a dichotomous variable which takes values 0 or 1.  Then,  
 
i
j uxD −= 2* β  
1=jD  if 0*>jD  
0=jD  if 0* ≤jD  
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Variables that are considered to influence women’s and men’s disagreement on norms 
and which are included in 2x  are age, per capita household income, the town they 
belong to and years of education. Later in the chapter, we will test whether other 
variables such as husbands’ activity, having lived or been born in a city or having 
female relatives who work in assembly plants also have an influence on 
disagreements. 
The participation equation is specified in a similar manner: 
 
 
εγβ −+= ji DxY 11*  
1=Y  if  0* >Y  
0=Y  if  0* ≤Y  
 
 
Variables included in 1x  are age, predicted wage, predicted wage squared, number of 
sons or daughters less than 6, number of sons or daughters greater than 6, per capita 
household income, and the town they belong to.  
Following (Maddalla 1983, pg 123) we then have the following system of equations:  
 
 
 
i
j
i
i
j
i
DxY
uxD
εγβ
β
−+=
−=
11
*
22
*
 
0)( =iuE = 0)( =iE ε , 
1)( =iVar ε = 1)( =iuVar , [ ] ρε =iiuCov ,  
 
 
A condition for identification of the model is that 2x does not include all the variables of 
1x  if iε  and iu are not independent.43  For this model, each equation can be estimated 
separately by a Probit regression given that iε  and iu  are independent. However if this 
condition is not satisfied, the estimates obtained using this method would not be 
consistent.  Therefore an alternative estimation method is used in which a joint 
distribution function of iu  and iε , ),( iiuF ε , is specified. For notational simplicity, it is 
assumed that the errors have symmetric distributions.  
 
                                                 
43 Theoretically it could be assumed that participation in assembly plant employment influences 
disagreement of the moral arguments. However it would be empirically logically inconsistent to 
do so. Proof of this is in Maddalla (1983) pg 118. 
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Then, the joint probability distribution of ),( YD j is given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
The likelihood function to be maximized then is: 
 
 
)1)(1(
00
)1(
01
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,
1121 ),,(
YDYDYDYD jjjj PPPPL −−−−∏=γββ  
 
 
This Biprobit regression model is estimated for disagreement on each one of the moral 
arguments plus on disagreement on all moral arguments, first by wives and then by 
husbands.  Thus, a total of eight Biprobit regressions were estimated. The variables 
included in the participation equation are those which are commonly used in the 
standard female labour participation models (Greene, 2003; Killingsworth, 1983; Smith, 
1980). However, nostudies have previously econometrically assessed the determinants 
of the probability of an individual to disagree with a moral argument. Thus, those 
variables which are presupposed to  have an impact on the belief in social norms are 
included  in the disagreement in moral arguments equation. Social norms are very 
likely to evolve generation by generation. As such, age is assumed to have an 
important effect in an individual´s beliefs in moral arguments. It is also presumed that 
formal education shapes children´s perceptions regarding appropriate behavior. Thus, 
years of education is also included as a determinant of the beliefs in moral 
arguments.Further, household income is a proxy for class and status of its members. 
Individual´s beliefs regarding moral argument are also thought to change depending on 
his class and status in the society. Therefore, household income is also an 
independent variable of disagreement on moral arguments. Finally, an important 
premis of this thesis, is that the degree to which moral arguments are held by spuses 
differs greatly by town. Because of these differences in percentions by town,  wives 
participation in an assembly plant differs in each. The variables included in each, the 
participation and disagreement equations are listed in Table 7-4.  
 
 
 
[ ]ργββ );(,)1,1(Pr 112211 jj DxxFYDobP +====
[ ]ργββ );(,)0,1(Pr 112201 jj DxxFYDobP −−====
[ ]ργββ −+−==== );(,)1,0(Pr 112210 jj DxxFYDobP
[ ]ργββ −−−−==== );(,)0,0(Pr 112200 jj DxxFYDobP
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Table 7-4: Variable included in the participation and disagreement equations 
Explanatory 
variables 
Measurement of Variable Expected Sign 
Labour Participation Dummy variable for current participation in an 
assembly plant 
 
Age  Wife’s age + 
Wage Heckman predicted wages + 
Wage squared Heckman predicted wages squared - 
   
Young children Dummy variable indicating whether the wife 
has children less than 6 years old. 
- 
Older children Dummy variable indicating whether the wife 
has children between 6 and 16 years old 
- 
Chilac Dummy variable indicating whether wife is 
from Chilac. 
- 
Wive´s or husband´s 
disagreement on moral 
arguments 
Dummy on disagreement on each moral 
argument 
+ 
   
   
Dissagreement on 
Moral Argument 
Dummy variable for wives or husband´s 
disagreement on moral arguments. 
 
   
Age Wife´s or husband´s age + 
Household per capita 
income 
Household Income that does not depend on 
women’s engagement in salaried employment 
+ 
Years of education Number of completed years of formal 
education 
- 
Chilac Dummy variable indicating whether wife or 
husband is from Chilac 
- 
 
 
Unlike OLS, the resulting coefficients of the explanatory variables in the Biprobit 
regression models will not provide us with the marginal effects. This is because these 
will vary with the value of x. The mathematical formulation of the marginal effects in the 
Biprobit model are fairly involved and thus are nor reproduced here44. Yet it must be 
noted that this is a recursive model, this is, wives and husbands´disagreement in each 
moral argument is a determinant of the probability a wife has to work for maquila. Thus, 
if a variable influences either spouses´probability to disagree with a moral argument, it 
also indirectly affects the probability of a wife to participate in an assembly plant. As 
such, if one variable, such as age, is an explanatory variable for both the participation 
and disagreement equation, it will have two different effects on wives participation in an 
assembly plant, a direct influence on participation and an indirect one through spouses 
                                                 
44 For a mathematical formulation of marginal effects refer to Greene (2003), pg 821.  
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disagreement on a moral argument. Thus the expected effect of a variable on wife´s 
participation is:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further, to compute the effect of disagreement on moral arguments on the probability 
of a wife of working in a maquila, the following should be  
 
 
 
The results of the Biprobit regression models are portrayed and explained in the next 
section. 
 
7.3 Results for simple biprobit estimates 
 
 
Table 7-5 shows the Biprobit regression results for wives’ disagreements on each one 
and on joint disagreement on moral arguments. Figures indicate that wives’ 
disagreements on every one of the moral arguments are significantly correlated with 
women’s propensity to work in assembly plants. Interestingly, the moral argument of 
women’s place being the home, which is the most prevalent in both towns, was the 
argument with the weakest effect on this probability. This could well be a reflection of 
the norm being instilled so powerfully in some women’s consciousness that even those 
working in assembly plants believe in this moral argument. Disagreement as to 
husbands having to be the providers, on the contrary, has the highest coefficient, which 
is also very similar to that of women being promiscuous if they work in assembly plants. 
However, none of the disagreement coefficients are significantly different from each 
other.45 Surprisingly, disagreement on all moral arguments is not significant in the 
participation equation and its magnitude is lower to disagreement on any moral 
argument taken into account separately. Hence, each one of the moral arguments has 
a distinctive effect on women’s participation in assembly plant employment, though 
these effects cannot be said to be significantly different from each other.  
                                                 
45 Statistical tests are portrayed in the appendix so that the narrative flows better.  
( ) ( )ρββρβγβ −−Φ++Φ ,,, 221´12221´12 xxxdx
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]2,12121 ,0|0Pr,,1|1Pr,| xxdyEdobxxdyEdobxxyE ==+===
[ ] [ ]21212121 ,,0|1Pr,,1|1Pr xxyyobxxyyob ==−==
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Table 7-5: Biprobit results for wives’ disagreement on moral arguments 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree All 
Participation Equation     
Age -0.03277** -0.00729 -0.00019 -0.02720 
Wage 52.53271** 21.87066** 27.69230* 53.29875** 
Wage Squared -10.30257** -4.29624** -5.39323* -10.35588** 
Number children older 6 0.02657 -0.00087 0.02042 0.02357 
Number of Children less 6 -0.18107 -0.14658** -0.12775* -0.14603 
Household p.c. income 0.00005 0.00002 0.00004 0.00003 
Chilac -0.55980** -0.05288 -0.28992* -0.41185 
Disagreement on argument 1.19298** 1.81694*** 1.90134*** 1.04808 
Constant -67.11275** -29.58950** -37.18475* -68.72345** 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Dissagreement Equation     
Age  -0.00175 -0.01692*** -0.02436*** -0.01092 
Household p.c. income -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00002 0.00000 
Years of Educ. 0.09583*** 0.02807** 0.01802* 0.04917*** 
Chilac -0.09023 -0.40036*** 0.03465 -0.22289 
Constant -0.48620 1.37409*** 1.01289*** -0.26770 
     
     
Antrho -0.34288 -10.31003 -10.46490 -0.30349 
     
Rho 0.33004 -1.00000 -1.00000 -0.29450 
     
P(rho=0) 0.4296 0.0331 0.0041 0.6020 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
Another explanatory variable of interest is the dummy representing whether a person is 
originally from Chilac or not. It has been found that more women work in assembly 
plants in this town than in Miahuatlan. This coincides with the fact that more couples 
disagree with the moral arguments in the latter than the former. It is a main interest 
then to discern whether and to what extent these discrepancies in participation rates 
between towns are due to internalization differences in social norms. From Table 7-5 it 
can be observed that in the Biprobit regression for disagreement with women being 
promiscuous, the dummy variable for the town Chilac is significant in the disagreement 
equation but not in the participation one. From this, it can be deduced that all the 
influence of being from Chilac on wives’ work in assembly plants comes via the effect it 
has on the disagreement on this moral argument. Conversely, in the Biprobit 
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regressions for the two other moral arguments, the dummy variable Chilac is not 
significant in the disagreement equation, but is in the participation equation. Thus, it 
cannot be concluded that a lower probability of women participate in assembly plant 
employment in Chilac due to beliefs in these two moral arguments.  
Turning the attention now to other variables which influence the disagreement on moral 
arguments, it can be noted from Table 7-5 that only one variable is significant in this 
equation for all four Biprobits. This is years of education, which positively influences 
disagreement with moral arguments. By far, it has the strongest effect on wives’ beliefs 
that women’s place is the home. Another remarkable finding is that age significantly 
and positively influences disagreement on the moral arguments of women being 
promiscuous and on men being the breadwinners. Surprisingly however, it has no 
significant effect on women’s beliefs about their place being the home. Therefore, while 
the variable years of education has the greatest effect on this moral argument, age 
apparently has none.  
Finally, it can be observed that the significance of correlation between the errors of 
both equations, rho, also varies from one Biprobit to another. This coefficient measures 
the correlation between the outcomes after the influence of the independent variables 
is accounted for (Greene, 2007). In the previous calculations rho is significant in both 
the Biprobits on disagreements on women being promiscuous and men being the 
providers.  However this is not the case of the Biprobit regressions on women’s place 
being the home and disagreements on all the moral arguments equations, in which rho 
is insignificant.  
Up to now the effects of wives’ disagreements on their participation in salaried 
employment have been analyzed. However, wives usually do not take their labour 
decisions individually as they have to negotiate them with their husbands (Table 7-6). 
Therefore, let us now turn to the influence that men’s disagreements with moral 
arguments have on their wives’ participation in assembly plant employment. Contrary 
to expectation, there seems to be no significant correlation between the disbelief in 
every moral argument by husbands and their wives’ participation in assembly plant 
employment. This is perplexing given women’s discourses, which imply that husbands 
have authority over them when it comes to labour market decisions, as they state they 
ask their husbands for permission to enter into assembly plant work. However, Biprobit 
results show that these beliefs do not have much impact on women’s participation in 
assembly plant employment, while those of women do. Two likely explanations could 
be at work here. On one hand, women’s informal negotiation or power mechanisms in 
the household can be much stronger than they admit in open discourse. On the other, it 
must be reminded that a very low share of wives negotiated over this decision with their 
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husbands. Husbands had to use their authority only when wives desired to work for an 
assembly plant and expressed this to them. Therefore, the final impact of husbands´ 
disagreement on moral arguments on wives working in assembly plants is lower than 
that of wives. 
 
Table 7-6: Biprobit results for husbands’ disagreement on moral arguments 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
Age -0.02985* -0.02137 -0.02751 -0.02788 
Wage 57.85216** 52.03334* 52.16436** 55.3428** 
Wage squared -11.24816** -10.05201* -10.06065** -10.68153** 
Number children older 6 0.00097 -0.01664 -0.00765 0.01204 
Number of children less 6 -0.12368 -0.18986 -0.15497 -0.13225 
Household p.c. income 0.00004 0.00001 0.00004 0.00003 
Chilac -0.49457* -0.29219 -0.44072 -0.41730 
Disagreement argument 0.45623 1.33215 0.43816 0.67589 
Constant -74.28674** -68.10281* -67.61275** -71.67307* 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Dissagreement Equation     
Husband’s Age  -0.01102* -0.02647*** -0.01526*** -0.01677** 
Household p.c. income -0.00003 0.00004 -0.00005 0.00000 
Husband’s years of educ. 0.03919** -0.00919 0.02776 0.02078 
Chilac -0.03553 -0.22921* 0.143128 -0.14830 
Constant 0.00544 1.51553*** 0.51861* -0.05069 
     
     
Athrho 0.23402 -0.55794 0.07970 0.07918 
     
Rho 0.22984 -0.50645 0.07953 0.07918 
     
P(rho=0) 0.7801 0.5505 0.9233 0.9694 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
The determinants of husbands’ disagreements on moral arguments also differ from 
those of wives. While years of education appear to be an important determinant of 
moral arguments for women, for men, this variable is only significant in the 
disagreements on women’s place being the home. Age, however, does seem to be 
negatively correlated to all beliefs in moral arguments. The older the husband the less 
likely he is to believe on this norm.  
Finally, rho is not significant in any of the Biprobit estimates for men’s disagreements 
on moral arguments. Therefore, their wives’ participation in assembly plant work and 
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their beliefs in moral arguments seem to bear no relation whatsoever with to each 
other.  
Summing up, as expected, wives’ disagreements on moral arguments significantly 
influence their participation in assembly plant employment. Yet, there is no evidence of 
their husbands’ beliefs having any impact on their decisions regarding this activity.  
This comes as a surprise given that it was very common for women to state that they 
had to ask their husbands for permission to work. Also, years of education and age are 
crucial variables in the determination of the propensity to disagree with moral 
arguments.  Next, additional factors are tested to investigate whether they have an 
effect on beliefs on moral arguments and thus on married women’s probability to work 
in assembly plants.  
 
7.4 Husbands’ activity as a determinant of beliefs in moral arguments. 
 
Up to now, some of the evident individual and household characteristics which have an 
influence on both women and their husbands’ beliefs in moral arguments have been 
identified. This is the case, for example, of the years of education and the age a person 
has. However, it is also the aim to discover additional, less apparent characteristics 
which aid in improving the understanding of the channels by which internalization of 
norms can be strengthened or eroded. 
One of these possible characteristics is the husband’s activity. Throughout fieldwork 
two distinctive activities amongst husbands were singled out as possible determinants 
of norm internalization by both spouses. These were assembly plant employment and 
farming.  Farming was the predominant activity in both towns before assembly plants 
arrived in the area.  It is a traditional activity and as such husbands involved in it might 
have had less contact with competing discourses or ways of thinking. Conversely, 
assembly plant workers will not only have first-hand information on what is going on 
within the plants but will also interact with married women who work there, and with 
their husbands who might also have different views and beliefs on moral arguments. It 
is therefore hypothesised that husbands engaged in assembly plant employment will 
believe less in every moral argument than farmers and the rest of the population, 
holding other variables like education constant. On the other hand, it is suspected that 
farmers are the ones who most strongly subscribe to all moral arguments. Both these 
activities are also quantitatively important, given that they constitute husbands’ main 
activity in the two towns as can be seen in Table 7-7. For these reasons it is of great 
relevance to test the extent to which these two specific activities; farming or assembly 
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plant work, have an influence on husbands’ beliefs in moral arguments and thus on 
wives’ participation in assembly plant employment.  
Table 7-7: Percentage of husbands participating in each activity 
 All Miahuatlan Chilac 
Assembly 27.23 37.14 17.59 
Farmer 34.98 17.62 51.85 
Commerce 3.99 4.76 3.24 
Teacher 0.94 0.48 1.39 
Truck driver 7.28 10.48 4.17 
Builder 5.87 5.24 6.48 
Other 19.71 24.28 15.28 
Total  100 100 100 
 
 
Furthermore, not only will husbands have different beliefs depending on their activity, 
but through interaction, they can also influence their wives’ views as well.  Therefore, 
we also assess whether husbands’ activities influence their wives’ internalization of 
norms. Thus we focus on the extent to which farming and assembly plant employment 
influence both spouses’ disagreement with moral arguments and if, via this means, 
they have an indirect effect on wives participation in assembly plant employment.   
Data on the participation rates of women according to their husbands’ activity seem to 
agree with the previous line of reasoning. As Table 7-8 shows, a much higher 
percentage of wives of assembly plant workers than that of farmers work in a maquila. 
Furthermore, this finding is consistent in both San Gabriel Chilac and Santiago 
Miahuatlan.   
 
Table 7-8: Wives’ participation rates in assembly plant employment by their 
husbands’ activity. 
 All Miahuatlan Chilac 
Assembly Worker 22.41 23.08 21.05 
Farmer 4.03 10.81 1.79 
Others 12.72 16.16 8.11 
 
 
Figures in Table 7-9 show the plausibility of beliefs in moral arguments as an 
explanation for the higher participation rates of assembly plant workers’ wives than 
those of farmers. A higher proportion of men participating in assembly plant 
employment along with their wives disagrees with each of the moral arguments. 
Nevertheless, both assembly plant workers and farmers disagree much less with moral 
arguments than the rest of the husbands in the sample. This is also true for their wives. 
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This finding comes as a surprise given that it was initially expected that husbands 
working in assembly plants would believe less in every moral argument. This 
observation could be due to the higher educational levels needed to perform other 
types of activities, such as teaching, because years of education positively influence 
disagreements on moral arguments. However, it could be also be that the hypothesis of 
assembly plant workers’ wives participating in this type of activity is due to the 
internalization of moral arguments not holding.   
 
Table 7-9: Percentage of wives and husbands disagreeing with each moral 
argument by husband’s activity 
 Women’s 
place home 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Men 
Breadwinners 
Wives´ 
Dissagreement 
   
Assembly Worker 44.83 77.59 57.76 
Farmer 36.24 67.57 51.68 
Other 60.12 79.65 64.53 
Husbands´ 
dissagreement 
   
Assembly Worker 42.24 63.79 53.1 
Farmer 30.61 54.73 49.66 
Other 52.63 70.00 64.12 
 
 
 
To verify this two dummy variables, one which indicates whether husbands work in 
assembly plants and the other indicating husbands in farming, were added in the 
Biprobit regression for women’s participation in assembly plant employment and 
disagreement on moral arguments by both spouses. These were included in both the 
participation and the disagreement equation to verify whether they have an indirect 
influence on wives’ employment in assembly plants through their effect on beliefs in 
moral arguments or whether there are other direct effects at work. 
Table 7-10 shows the results obtained for the Biprobit regression on wives’ 
participation in assembly plant employment and their disagreements with moral 
arguments.46 Unexpectedly, the results indicate that having a husband in an assembly 
plant decreases the probability of disagreeing with every moral argument. On the other 
hand, having a husband in farming only significantly influences wives’ disagreements 
with women’s place being the home. Even so, the probability of disagreeing with this 
                                                 
46For simplicity,  only relavent variables (those representing husband´s activities and 
disagreement on moral arguments) are shown.  
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moral argument is reduced more by having a husband working in an assembly plant 
than in farming, although this difference, however, is not significant. This was 
unanticipated given that it was initially assumed that assembly plant employment would 
lead to husbands believing less on moral arguments than the rest of the population, 
especially farmers. Conversely, it was thought that farming was a much more 
conventional activity and that they would therefore have more conservative beliefs.  
This finding completely refutes the previous reasoning as regression results show that 
assembly plant workers believe more in every moral argument than husbands in any 
other activity, controlling for other variables such as years of education and age.  
 
Table 7-10: Biprobit results for wives’ disagreement on moral arguments 
depending on their husbands’ main activity. 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
     
Husband assembly plant 0.48432** 0.33779** 0.40181*** 0.38300 
Husband farmer -0.05653 -0.18364 0.04877 -0.23087 
Disagreement argument 1.27263* 1.63973*** 1.92594*** 0.86104 
     
Dissagreement Equation Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
     
Husband assembly plant -0.43668*** -0.31262* -0.35110** -0.38152** 
Husband farmer -0.38635** -0.15220 -0.13013 -0.23682 
Years of education 0.08223*** 0.00831 0.01397 0.03877 
     
     
Athrho -0.36068 -1.09250 -9.47136 -0.15443 
     
Rho  -0.345813 -0.79779 -1 -0.15443 
     
Likelihood-rat 0.4691 0.3107 0.0109 0.8113 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Another very interesting result obtained in the Biprobit regression is that while having a 
husband in an assembly plant negatively influences wives’ propensity to work in 
assembly plants indirectly through their beliefs in moral arguments, it also has a 
significantly positive direct effect.  This on a first view is startling; however it was very 
common for couples to work in the same assembly plant and to go there together.47 
This would both reassure husbands and show to the rest of the community that wives 
                                                 
47 I would explain this with much more detail on another chapter, this is why I only mention it 
here.  
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were not being unfaithful. This is the most likely explanation of these results and if true, 
it would be yet another interesting way in which belief in moral arguments, specifically 
on the argument on women being promiscuous, influences women opportunities to 
work in assembly plants. By restricting women’s employment to having a husband 
participating in the same activity and by having to work in the same assembly plant, 
women’s freedom to choose their activities is constrained.  
Also, when comparing closely this set of regressions with the simple Biprobits which 
did not include dummy variables for husbands’ activities, it is found that years of 
education had a significant effect on women’s disagreements in all four Biprobits in the 
later, while it remains significant only on women’s place being home in the former.  To 
investigate this further, wives’ years of education is compared for each husband’s 
activity group; farmers, assembly plant workers and the rest.  Interestingly it is found 
that farmer’s wives have a much lower level of education than the other groups of 
wives. The average years of education for a farmer’s wife is 3.7 while that of assembly 
plant workers is 6.16 and other wives 6.75.  It subsequently follows that being a 
farmer’s wife is strongly and negatively correlated to years of education. Hence the 
effect of years of education in these new set of regressions is diminished in 
significance and magnitude because of the influence of the new additional dummy 
variable. 
Table 7-11: Biprobit results for husbands’ disagreement on moral arguments 
depending on their main activity 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
all rules 
Particiation Equation     
     
Husband assembly plant 0.25010 0.37463* 0.27912 0.20613 
Husband farmer -0.30272 -0.23735 -0.31185 -0.34889 
Disagreement argument 0.26030 1.34716* 0.49728 0.01330 
     
Dissagreement 
Equation 
Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
     
Husband assembly plant -0.31113** -0.40597** -0.35580** -0.31996* 
Husband farmer -0.49133*** -0.21120 -0.27024 -0.35874** 
Husbands years of 
education. 
0.02513 -0.01753 0.02016 0.01144 
     
     
Athrho 0.35889 -0.55340 0.05421 0.50100 
     
Rho  0.35889 -0.50306 0.05416 0.50101 
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Likelihood-rat 0.6679 0.4377 0.9368 0.5725 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table 7-11 shows the results for Biprobit regressions on husbands’ disagreement with 
moral arguments and wives’ participation in assembly plant employment.  Results are 
similar to those of wives’ Biprobits.  Participating in assembly plant employment 
significantly diminishes husbands’ propensity to disagree with all moral arguments. 
Moreover, being a farmer diminishes the probability to disagree with the moral 
argument on wife’s place being the home only.  However, in this case being a farmer 
diminishes the probability of disagreeing with this moral argument more than being an 
assembly plant worker, although as for women’s disagreements, this difference is not 
significant. However, unlike wives’ Biprobits, having a husband working in an assembly 
plant does not have a significant direct effect on women’s participation equation, except 
on the Biprobit for the disagreement on wives’ being promiscuous.  
Another very interesting outcome from the Biprobit on women being promiscuous is 
that the disagreement dummy influences women’s propensity to participate in 
assembly plant employment positively and significantly (at a 10% level). Previously, in 
the simple Biprobit for this moral argument, this variable was not significant. 
Furthermore, this moral argument is the one on which working in an assembly plant 
affects the husband’s beliefs most strongly. These results suggest that the 
internalization of this moral argument by husbands has the most powerful effect on 
women’s participation in assembly plant employment.  
Also, as for women’s Biprobits, the magnitude of the coefficients for years of education 
is reduced in the disagreement equations compared to the simple Biprobit estimates, 
where dummy variables for husband’s activities were not included. The same 
explanation is applied here as in wives’ Biprobits results.  The mean years of education 
of farmers is 3.57 while this figure is 7.02 for assembly plant workers and 7.04 for 
husbands who work in other activities. Thus the dummy variable farmer is correlated 
with husbands’ years of education, and therefore the reduction of the effect of years of 
education is due to the influence of the inclusion of this new variable. 
From the Biprobit regressions in this section it can be concluded that husbands’ 
economic activities do influence women’s participation in assembly plant employment 
through their effect on women’s disagreement with moral arguments.  They do not do 
so in the anticipated way, however.  It was believed that being or having a husband 
working in an assembly plant would positively influence women’s beliefs in moral 
arguments. It was found, however, that the effect was contrary to expectation.  Having 
or being a husband working in an assembly plant does influence women’s participation 
in assembly plants, but not through beliefs in moral arguments.  Husbands’ farming 
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only significantly influences disagreement by both spouses on the moral argument on 
women’s place being the home.  
7.5 Living in a city or being born in a city as determinants of beliefs in moral 
arguments  
 
People in a town might subscribe to a norm because it has been naturalized by society, 
and is perceived as being part of ‘a natural order that goes without saying and 
therefore goes unquestioned’ (Bourdieu 1977). However, an individual who moves from 
his native town which has established norms and settles in an alternative location 
where different views and beliefs exist might come to realize that his norms and moral 
arguments are not so natural.  For example, a husband might originally believe that the 
women’s place is the home because he grew up in a town where this moral argument 
persists and is extensively followed. If he temporarily migrates to a city where it is 
widely perceived that women should work to help provide for the family, then he may 
come to realize that there are other moral values different from those in his home town.  
He may then begin to doubt and change his original beliefs. Thus, another plausible 
determinant of whether an individual disagrees or not with a moral argument can be 
whether he has lived in a place with different beliefs in social norms. Generally, in 
Mexico, cities have less traditional views than those of towns. We therefore test 
whether both wives and husbands who have lived in a city for more than one year have 
a higher probability of disagreeing with each of the three moral arguments and on all 
moral arguments jointly, which validate the norm that women should not work in an 
assembly plant.  
Also, following the previous line of reasoning, a person born in a city is even more likely 
to uphold the beliefs established there. If these values are less conventional and in 
dissonance with those pertaining to both towns of Tehuacán, then a person who is born 
in a city has a greater likelihood of disagreeing with each moral argument. Therefore, 
we also examine whether being born in a city influences either spouse’s disagreement 
with moral arguments and thus wives’ participation in assembly plant employment. 
To verify whether women’s participation rates in assembly plants are consistent with 
the preceding arguments, these percentages are shown in Table 7-12 depending on 
whether wives and husbands have lived in a city, were born in one or neither48.  
Results show that overall, participation rates of women who have lived in a city do not 
vary much from those of women who have not.  Yet, analyzing this pattern by town, it 
                                                 
48 The three groups, those who have lived in a city, those who were born in a city and those who have 
neither lived in a city nor were born in one are mutually exclusive groups. Therefore those who were born 
in a city and also claimed to live in a city, were included in the group of those born in a city.  
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can be observed that in San Gabriel Chilac women who have husbands who have lived 
in a city for more than a year have greater participation rates than the rest, and this 
difference is significant at a 10% level.49 Thus, the hypothesis that women’s 
participation in assembly plant employment is greater for women who have lived in a 
city or have a husband who has done so, does not generally seem to hold. However, 
this does not rule out the possibility of there being an indirect influence on having lived 
in a city or having a husband who lived in one through their effect on beliefs in moral 
arguments. 
 
Table 7-12: Wives’ participation rates in assembly plant employment depending 
on whether they and their husbands have lived or were born in a city. 
 None Chilac Miahuatlan 
Wives   
None  11.73 6.17 17.28
Lived in a city 10.61 6.98 17.39
Born in a city 23.81 16.67 26.67
Husbands  
None  12.19 4.64 18.93
Lived in a city 12.50 10.42 16.67
Born in a city 17.50 16.67 18.18
 
 
On the other hand, women who were born in a city or who have husbands born in one, 
are the ones who participate the most in assembly plant employment. This is consistent 
across towns as well. Yet, the effect is greater if women themselves were born in a city 
than if their husbands were born in one. The difference between the participation rates 
of those women born in a city compared to those who were not is significant at a 5% 
level, while this is not so for those who have husbands that have lived in a city. 
Therefore, overall, the suggestion that being or having a husband born in a place 
where conventional beliefs are more permissive, increases wives’ propensity to work in 
an assembly plant seems to hold. It still remains to be verified however, if this rise in 
participation rates is in fact correlated to being born in a city once other factors are 
taken into account like years of education and age and if so, whether these are due to 
differences in disagreements on moral arguments.  
Thus, to verify whether living in a city, being born in one and or having a husband who 
has done so can be potentially related to wives’ propensity to participate in assembly 
plants through their effect on beliefs, disagreements on each moral argument are 
                                                 
49 The significance regards the difference between those women who have lived in a city compared to 
those who were not born in a city nor lived in a city. 
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compared.  Figures in Table 7-13 suggest that living in a city does not have a strong 
effect on women’s disagreements with any of the three moral arguments. A much 
larger share of women who were born in a city, nevertheless, do believe less in every 
moral argument. On the other hand, differences in men’s beliefs depending on whether 
they have lived in a city, or were born in one varies with each moral argument.  The 
only moral argument with which men who have lived in a city tend to disagree less is 
women’s place being the home. Yet, the same proportion of men who were born in a 
city disagree with this moral argument.  Also, being born in a city has the strongest 
effect on men’s belief in women being promiscuous. Beliefs in the third moral 
argument, however, do not seem to vary depending on whether the respondents have 
lived in a city or were born in one.  
 
Table 7-13: Beliefs in moral arguments depending on whether wife and husband 
has lived of been born in a city. 
 Women’s 
place home 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Men 
Breadwinners 
Wives  
Not lived City 45.06 72.76 57.76 
Lived City 46.97 75.76 54.55 
Born City 66.67 85.71 69.05 
Husbands  
Not lived City 38.49 62.26 56.23 
Lived City  52.11 53.52 54.93 
Born City 52.5 82.5 60 
 
 
Simple statistical analysis, then, does not support the theoretical argument that 
individuals beliefs are challenged by living in a city. The only exceptions are that men 
who have lived in a city have different beliefs from those who haven’t, on the moral 
argument of women’s place being the home. Beliefs, however, do seem to differ 
depending on whether persons are born in a city. This is especially so in the case of 
men’s disagreement regarding women being promiscuous. These last findings 
corroborate the idea of cities having less conventional beliefs in all three moral 
arguments. Yet at first glance it appears that living in one for more than a year is not 
enough for transforming beliefs of those who come from more traditional societies. It 
seems then, that individuals have to grow up in a place for their perceptions to be 
shaped by it.50 Wives’ participation rates in assembly plant employment reflect this both 
                                                 
50 It was also checked whether living in a city for more than five years had an effect on both 
women’s and men’s beliefs. The results however are basically similar.  
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these findings. Living in a city or having a husband who lived in a city for more than one 
year has no effect on the percentage of women participating in assembly plant 
employment nor on either spouses’ beliefs.  Women born in a city or who have a 
husband born in a city do however have higher participation rates.  Although living in a 
city does not seem to have any influence either on participation rates or on beliefs, 
dummy indicators for both variables, living in a city and being born in a city, are 
included in Biprobit regressions. Specifically, they are incorporated into the 
disagreement on moral arguments equation.51 52 This is done in order to corroborate 
whether, once other variables are taken into account, living in a city is still not 
correlated with disagreements and if being born in a city is, and if so, the magnitude of 
the effect. 
Table 7-14 shows the Biprobit results for women’s participation in assembly plant 
employment and their disagreement with moral arguments. As expected from the 
previous statistical results, living in a city has no significant effect on any of the moral 
arguments. Also, as predicted, those women who were born in a city, with a 
significance of 10%, influence women’s propensity to disagree with the moral 
arguments of women’s place being the home, women being promiscuous and on all the 
moral arguments jointly. Also, disagreement with each of these moral arguments 
significantly influences women’s propensity to enter assembly plant employment. 
Therefore, being born in a city indirectly influences women’s propensity to participate in 
assembly plant employment via its influence on beliefs in these moral arguments. The 
notable exception is the moral argument of men having to be the economic providers, 
since it is not significantly influenced by either living in a city or being born in one. This 
might suggest that this moral argument is held in cities equally to the two towns of 
Tehuacán.   
An interesting observation, is that while in previous Biprobit results, disagreement on all 
moral arguments was not significant in the participation equation, it becomes so when 
being born in a city and having lived in one are incorporated as explanatory variables in 
the disagreement equations. The magnitude of this coefficient also becomes much 
larger. This suggests that having been born in a city has an important effect on wives’ 
                                                 
51 Biprobit regressions were run in which both Dummy variables were also included in the 
participation equation. These two variables however, were highly insignificant. Furthermore, 
there is no theoretical argument for which there two variables could have a direct effect on 
women’s participation in assembly plant employment.  Because including irrelevant variables 
reduces estimation efficiency, results where these variables are only included in the 
disagreement equation are analyzed.   
52 As on the other hand, exclusion of relevant variables will result in biased estimates. As in the 
last section, husbands participation in assembly plant employment was significant in most cases 
in the participation and disagreement equation, this variable is also included for the estimation 
of the following Biprobit regressions. 
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participation in assembly plant employment, through its influence on their disagreement 
with all moral arguments. To a lesser degree, the same happens with the moral 
argument of women’s place being the home.  This variable becomes more significant 
(at a 1% level instead of 5%) and its coefficient becomes larger when an indicator 
variable for a wife’s being born in a city is included.  
 
 
Table 7-14: Biprobit results for wives’ disagreement with moral arguments & 
lived in city.  
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men  
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
Disagreement argument 1.39789*** 1.82975*** 1.92627*** 1.37522** 
  
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Dissagreement Equation     
Lived city 0.07606 0.13257 -0.02331 0.00544 
Born city 0.35744* 0.34488* 0.22752 0.35399* 
     
     
Athrho  -0.46178 -11.47868 -14.79687 -0.51462 
     
Rho  -0.43153 -1 -1 -.47353 
     
Likelihood-rat 0.2614 0.0076 0.0029 0.3359 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
Having been born in a city or have lived in one for more than a year affects men’s 
beliefs in a different manner to women’s.  As Biprobit figures show in Table 7-15, living 
in a city significantly increases the probability of husbands disagreeing with the moral 
argument of women’s place being the home. However, this is the only moral argument 
for which living in a city has an influence on husbands’ beliefs. It should be noted that 
conversely, this dummy variable had no effect on any of women’s disagreements. 
Moreover, having been born in a city only influences significantly the probability that 
husbands will disagree with the moral argument of working women being promiscuous.  
The magnitude of the effect also appears to be quite large. However, beliefs in neither 
of these two moral arguments have a significant influence on women’s propensity to 
participate in assembly plant employment. Therefore even if living in a city or being 
born in one has a significant effect on husband’s beliefs, these are not significantly 
translated into higher participation rates for wives. Also, as for women, men’s Biprobit 
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results indicate that there is no effect from either living in a city or by being born in one, 
on the probability of husbands’ disagreeing with the moral argument of them having to 
be the economic providers.  
 
Table 7-15: Biprobit results for husbands’ disagreement on moral arguments, 
born in city. 
 Biprobit 
Women 
at Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
Disagreement variable  1.34203 1.20440 0.64476 0.83517 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Dissagreement Equation     
Husband lived city 0.34725** -0.07287 0.06070 -0.01595 
Husband born city 0.18135 0.64927** 0.00450 0.20992 
     
     
Athrho  -0.32739 -0.43077 -0.03247 -0.00158 
     
rho  -0.31617 -0.40597 -0.03246 -0.00158 
     
Likelihood-rat 0.6893 0.5463 0.9678 0.9969 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
An interesting observation is that for the Biprobit estimate of husbands’ beliefs in moral 
arguments, the coefficient for husbands’ assembly plant employment in the 
disagreement equation ceases to be significant when the dummy variables for having 
lived in a city and having been born in one are included.  This could be an indication 
that the later are correlated with the former.   
Overall then, both statistical and regression results suggest that having lived in a city 
does not challenge beliefs in moral arguments. The theoretical argument of individuals 
realizing that there are laxer beliefs in other areas and thus having an important impact 
on their own perception of norms seems not to hold.  The only exception is the belief of 
husbands in the moral argument that women’s place is the home. On the other hand, 
those wives who are born in a city do tend to disagree to a greater extent on moral 
arguments, and thus have a higher propensity to participate in assembly plant 
employment. This indicates that indeed cities have less traditional views on the moral 
arguments related to women’s participation in salaried employment. Husbands who 
were born in a city however only have only different views on working women being 
promiscuous. This moral argument again seems to have a very important effect on 
men’s consciousness. 
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7.6 Relatives working in assembly plants influence on beliefs in moral 
arguments. 
 
Individual’s beliefs, perceptions and values are constantly being shaped in the course 
of interactions with members of their social or reference groups. In both towns of the 
Tehuacán area people maintain especially significant and strong ties with members of 
their family. This is true particularly for women, who generally have more mobility 
restrictions and fewer activities outside their homes than men. Thus, being such a 
noteworthy reference group, actions and choices by family members are bound to have 
a considerable influence on individual’s beliefs in moral arguments. Having female 
relatives participating in assembly plant employment is expected then to affect both 
wives and husbands’ beliefs on moral arguments. As social norms and moral 
arguments condemn specifically married women’s participation in assembly plant 
employment, it is considered that the incorporation of married relatives in this activity 
will have an even larger impact. In this section, this line of reasoning is tested by 
assessing in particular whether having sisters or sisters-in-law working in assembly 
plants is related to women’s participation in assembly plant employment indirectly, via 
their connection with either partner’s beliefs in moral arguments. Furthermore, it is 
examined if the effect is greater if married sisters and sisters-in-law are considered. 
To this end, a dummy variable is created on one hand, for those who have at least one 
sister participating in assembly plant employment and another, on the other hand, for 
those with at least one sister-in-law working in this occupation. Further, this dummy 
variable is incorporated in both the participation and the disagreement on moral 
arguments equations. This will indicate whether there is a correlation between each 
dummy variable and wives’ participation in assembly plant employment by means of a 
correlation with disagreement on moral arguments, or if there are other direct 
correlations present.  
It must be noted however, that there exist difficulties in assessing the causality of the 
influence on participation in assembly plant employment by sisters and sisters-in-law 
has on the couple’s beliefs in each moral argument. This is because other contextual 
and correlated effects can be present which are not accounted for in the regression 
model. Contextual effects are those in which the propensity of an individual to act in a 
certain way depends upon exogenous characteristics of the group. Correlated effects, 
in contrast, can be present when individuals belonging to a certain group behave in a 
similar way given that they share similar individual characteristics or face similar 
institutional environments (Manski, 1993). In this case, for example, contextual effects 
  
 
193 
 
can be present because both the wife and her sisters are likely to live in the same 
village and face the same markets and institutions. Correlated effects might be present 
given that generally sisters are brought up in the same family and thus are raised with 
the same set of values and have the same level of education. These correlated and 
contextual effects can be at work both through the disagreement equation and/or the 
participation equation. While contextual effects are controlled for by including town 
dummy variables in the Biprobit regression models, correlated effects are not. 
Therefore, results must be taken with caution. 
 
Table 7-16: Wives with Female Relatives Participating in Assembly Plant 
Employment 
 Sister Sister-in-law 
All 18.52 16.44 
Married 9.26      9.03       
 
 
In Table 7-16 it can be observed that 18.52% of married women have sisters working in 
assembly plants while slightly less, 16.55%, have a sister-in-law working in this activity.  
Statistical data does not seem to contradict the premise that women’s participation in 
assembly plant employment is positively affected by having a sister and/or a sister-in-
law participating in this occupation. A larger (and significant at 5%) share of married 
women who have a sister working in an assembly plant, work in one, compared to 
those who do not have a sister working in this activity. The difference is not as great 
and only significant at 10% for those women who have sisters-in-law working in an 
assembly plant.   
 
Table 7-17: Wives participation rates in assembly plant employment of those 
having female relatives in assembly plants. 
 Sister Sister-in-law 
Single or married Relatives   
With Relatives 20.00     18.31       
Without Relatives 11.08     11.63       
Married relatives   
With Relatives 17.50     25.64       
Without Relatives 12.24     11.45       
 
 
Table 7-17 shows that almost half of the sisters and sisters-in-law participating in 
assembly plant employment are married. However, unexpected results are obtained 
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when comparing the participation rates of wives who have married sisters working in 
assembly plants with those who have not. While there still is a positive gap in wives’ 
participation rates between those who have married sisters and those who do not, this 
is lower than when those who have sisters in assembly plants, irrespective of whether 
they are married or not, are considered. Even more, this difference is not significant, 
even at a 10% level.  At first glance, this seems to be perplexing given that the effect 
on wives’ participation rates in assembly plants was anticipated to be greater if they 
were married than the outcome of having either a sister or sister-in-law already working 
in one. These divergent results however, can be due to the correlated effects on wives 
of their sisters, which are not related to beliefs in moral arguments. For example, 
sisters share very similar characteristics such as education levels and thus the ability to 
obtain similar wages in the labour market which might lead both of them to search for a 
waged job.  An alternative or additional explanation to these findings is the influence 
that single sisters working in assembly plants are likely to have on wives’ beliefs. Even 
though they are single, sisters working in this occupation might grasp alternative beliefs 
regarding moral arguments on married women’s participation in assembly plant 
employment. Through their interaction, they can transmit these beliefs to their sisters. 
On the other hand, the difference in participation rates between those who have 
married sisters-in-law working in assembly plants compared to those who haven’t, is 
greater than the gap in participation rates when sisters-in-law, irrespective of whether 
they are married or not, are taken into account. And in this case, the difference even 
becomes significant at a 1% level. This result is consistent with our hypotheses. 
Married women are bound to have less contextual and correlated effects with their 
sisters-in-law than with their sisters. Therefore having an unmarried sister-in-law who 
works in an assembly plant will have less of a correlation with a wife’s likelihood of 
working (since this is not related to beliefs) than having a sister who works in one. 
Up to now, results have indicated that wives are more likely to work in assembly plants 
when they have a sister or sister-in-law who works in one. However, it remains to be 
explored whether this increase in participation rates is related to beliefs in moral 
arguments, or is due to other direct influences. Thus, the share of wives, and 
subsequently of husbands, that disagree with each of the moral arguments depending 
on whether they have sisters and sisters-in-law who work in assembly plants will be 
analyzed.  
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Table 7-18: Percentage of wives disagreeing with each moral argument 
depending on whether they have sisters or sisters-in-law working in assembly 
plants.  
 Women’s place 
home 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Men  
Breadwinners 
 Sister Sister-in-
law 
Sister Sister-in-
law 
Sister Sister-in-
law 
Single or married       
With Relative 47.50    50.70      81.25    66.20      61.25    61.97      
Without Relative 47.44    46.81      72.73    75.90      57.39    57.34      
Married       
With Relative 42.50    48.72      80.00    61.54      67.50    56.41      
Without Relative 47.96    47.33      73.72    75.57      57.14    58.27      
 
 
It can be observed in Table 7-18, that a larger share of wives who have at least one 
sister working in an assembly plant disagree significantly (at 10%) more with the moral 
argument of women being promiscuous. The effect seems to be slightly reduced if 
disagreements of wives who have married sisters are taken into account. Yet, even 
given this, a greater percentage of wives disagree with this moral argument if they have 
a married sister than those who do not have married sisters working for assembly 
plants. However, the difference ceases to be significant.  
An unforeseen result, however, is encountered when the beliefs of wives with and 
without sisters-in-law participating in assembly plant employment are compared. A 
much lower and significant (at 5%) proportion of women who have a sister-in-law 
working for an assembly plant disagree with this moral argument. Moreover, there is a 
difference between the share of wives disagreeing with the moral argument regarding 
promiscuity, when we compare those who have a married, working sister-in-law with 
those who don’t. This difference is greater and more significant than where the sister-
in-law’s marital status is not taken into account. These are startling results; but they 
may be a reflection of wives state of affairs with their-in-laws compared to their own 
family. While they tolerate their own sisters’ participation in assembly plant 
employment, they censure their sister-in-laws’.  
Furthermore, woman being promiscuous is the only moral argument with which a 
significantly larger percentage of women disagree if they have a sister or sister-in-law 
who works.  Women seem to disagree more often with the moral argument of men not 
being good providers if they have a sister working in an assembly plant, especially if 
she is married. However this difference is not large enough to be significant. Having 
sisters-in-law working for assembly plants seems to influence the proportion of wives 
who disagree with this moral argument only if the former are married, though again this 
is not significant. The moral argument regarding women’s place being the home seems 
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to be even less affected by having sisters or sisters-in-law who work, especially if they 
are married. Again, this is the most rigid moral argument, with few variables associated 
with disagreeing with it.  
Men’s beliefs in moral arguments, on the other hand, do not seem to be much affected 
by having a sister or sister-in-law who works whether she is married or not, as can be 
verified in Table 7-19. Nevertheless, there are two significant and quite surprising 
results. On one hand, a lower and significant (at 10%) proportion of men disagree with 
the moral argument of women being promiscuous if they have at least one married 
sister working in an assembly plant. This is quite astounding, given that instead of their 
beliefs on moral arguments being challenged by having a female member of their own 
family defying them, they are strengthened. The second unforeseen result is that a 
higher and significant (at 10%) share of husbands disagree with the moral argument of 
men not being good providers if they have a married sister-in-law working in an 
assembly plant. This again is a perplexing outcome given that beliefs are being 
challenged more by someone belonging not to his own family, but to his wife’s. As with 
their wives’ beliefs, the moral argument which does not seem to be transformed at all 
by having a sister or sister-in-law, married or not, working in an assembly plant is that 
of women’s place being the home. Again, beliefs in this moral argument by both 
husbands and wives are the most rigid.  
 
Table 7-19: Percentage of husbands disagreeing with each moral argument 
depending on whether they have sisters or sisters-in-law working in assembly 
plants.  
 Women’s place 
home 
Women  
Promiscuous 
 Men  
Breadwinners 
 Sister-
in-law 
Sister Sister-
in-law 
Sister Sister-
in-law 
Sister 
Single or 
married 
      
With Relative 43.75      43.66      65.00      60.56      60.00     52.11      
Without Relative 41.19      41.27      61.65      62.60      54.26     55.96      
Married       
With Relative 37.50      41.03      60.00      51.28      65.00     51.28     
Without Relative 42.09      41.73      62.50      63.36      54.34     55.98      
 
 
 
Up to now, statistical results regarding wives’ participation in assembly plant 
employment and  beliefs by both spouses in moral arguments, suggest that there might 
indeed be a correlation between having a sister or sister-in-law who works in an 
assembly plant and wife who does so, via their correlation with disagreements with 
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certain moral arguments, especially regarding women being promiscuous. It still 
remains, though, to verify whether by holding constant some variables such as years of 
education, household income and age, this correlation still exists. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that the dummy variables for having a sister or sister-in-law who works 
are also included directly in the participation equation, to control for effects that might 
influence wives’ propensity to work but that are unrelated to disagreement with moral 
arguments.  
Table 7-20 shows the findings for the Biprobits on wives’ participation in assembly plant 
employment and wives’ disagreement with each moral argument. Results show that 
having a sister working in an assembly plant does not significantly affect wives’ 
propensity to disagree with any moral argument, or to work themselves. This, despite 
previous statistical results that point to a possible relation between wives’ having a 
sister who works, disagreeing with certain moral arguments, and working themselves. 
This is an example of how once other variables like age and household income are 
controlled for, the significant relationship between sister’s participation in assembly 
plant and disagreement on moral arguments disappears.  
 
Table 7-20: Biprobit results for wives’ disagreement on moral arguments, 
depending on having a sister or sister-in-law who works in an assembly plant. 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
     
Sister  0.15618 0.06644 0.09413 0.06660 
Sister-in-law 0.09961 0.44042*** 0.04947 0.16586 
Disagreement equation  1.26312** 1.86840*** 1.92575*** 1.07459 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
     
Sister  -0.06032 0.07328 0.03930 0.11182 
Sister-in-law -0.03659 -0.52620*** -0.02305 -0.23227 
     
     
Athrho -0.33831 -10.59434 -10.30585 -0.28076 
     
Rho -0.32597 -1 -1 -0.27361 
     
Likelihood-rat 0.4351 0.0276 0.0024 0.6559 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Having a sister-in-law who works in an assembly plant, on the other hand, has a 
significant and negative effect on the probability that wives will disagree with the moral 
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argument of women being promiscuous if they work in an assembly plant. Additionally, 
in this Biprobit it has a positive and significant direct effect on women’s propensity to 
work. Furthermore, it is the only Biprobit for which this variable is significant in this 
equation, which indicates a correlation between sisters-in-law working and 
disagreement with women being promiscuous. It could well be that having a sister-in-
law who works at a plant has the same effect as having a husband working at one. It 
reassures both the husband and society that the wife will not be unfaithful. Also, in this 
Biprobit, having a husband working for an assembly plant ceases to be significant in 
the disagreement equation. Therefore there is also evidence of a correlation between 
husbands and sisters-in-law working in assembly plants in the disagreement equation.  
 
Table 7-21: Biprobit results for wives’ disagreement on moral arguments, 
depending on having a married sister or sister-in-law working in an assembly 
plant. 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree  
All  
Participation Equation     
Married sister -0.01996 -0.12043 -0.23121 -0.11452 
Married sister-in-law 0.36741 0.66915*** 0.33454 0.45487* 
Disagreement dummy 1.25589** 1.70714*** 1.94927*** 1.00730 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Dissagreement Equation     
Married sister  -0.20943 -0.02988 0.23692 -0.05597 
Married sister-in-law -0.09533 -0.65445*** -0.16171 -0.31527 
     
     
Athrho -0.33138 -1.01320 -10.77600 -0.21910 
     
Rho -0.31976 -0.76708 -1 -0.21566 
     
Likelihood-rat 0.4548 0.3211 0.0042 0.7393 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Next, the outcomes of having a married sister or a married sister-in-law participating in 
an assembly plant are analyzed (Table 7-21). Just as with the results when sisters’ 
marital status is not taken into account, having a married sister working in an assembly 
plant influences neither the participation equation nor the beliefs in moral argument 
equations. Including the dummy variable denoting married sisters-in-law who work in 
assembly plants provides similar results to that denoting sisters-in-law irrespective of 
their marital status is used.  This variable is only significant in the Biprobit on women 
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being promiscuous, and is also significant in the participation and disagreement 
equations. Also, as expected, the effect of having a married sister-in-law who works in 
an assembly plant is greater in both the participation and disagreement equations than 
when the dummy variable for sisters-in-law that does not take into account their marital 
status is included. Another result that comes as a surprise is that rho ceases to be 
significant in the Biprobit for women being promiscuous. This implies that the errors 
from the disagreement and the participation equations cease to be correlated. 
Let us now turn to the Biprobits on husbands’ beliefs. Table 7-22 reveals that having a 
sister or a sister-in-law working in an assembly plant does not have any significant 
influence on the probability of husbands disagreeing with any moral argument. For 
these Biprobits, these dummy variables are not significant in the wives’ participation 
equation either.  
 
Table 7-22: Biprobit results for husbands’ disagreement with moral arguments, 
depending on having a sister or sister-in-law working in an assembly plant. 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
Husbands sister-in-law 0.11355 0.14467 0.08715 0.03827 
Husbands sister 0.07342 0.18242 0.12442 0.12238 
Disagreement dummy 0.36787 1.21714 0.41564 0.81700 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Dissagreement Equation     
Husbands sister-in-law 0.01669 -0.08323 0.13210 0.20212 
Husbands sister -0.01413 -0.24396 -0.16731 -0.11899 
     
     
Athrho 0.30410 -0.41915 0.11467 0.00813 
Rho 0.29506 -0.39622 0.11417 0.00813 
     
Likelihood-rat 0.6695 0.5601 0.8614 0.9615 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Therefore we test whether when only married sisters and married sisters-in-law are 
considered, an impact on men’s probability to disagree with any moral argument will 
exist (Table 7-23). Amazingly, it is found that having a sister who works for an 
assembly plant decreases the probability that husbands will disagree with the moral 
argument of women being promiscuous. In this Biprobit, similarly to the one on 
women’s beliefs regarding women being promiscuous if they work, for husbands, 
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having a sister (or sister-in-law for wives) also becomes significant in the participation 
equation. However, disagreement with this moral argument remains insignificant in the 
participation equation. Therefore it cannot be concluded that having a sister-in-law who 
works in an assembly plant influences a wife’s propensity to do the same, through the 
influence it has on the probability that they will disagree with this moral argument. 
 
Table 7-23: Biprobit results for husbands’ disagreement with moral arguments, 
depending on having a married sister or sister-in-law working in an assembly 
plant. 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree  
All  
Participation Equation     
Husbands sister-in-law -0.12630 -0.04899 -0.16388 -0.12822 
Husbands sister 0.32961 0.56343** 0.39890 0.31993 
Disagreement dummy 0.33571 1.26728 0.37793 0.03274 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Dissagreement Equation     
Husbands sister-in-law -0.21131 -0.18719 0.30630 0.02834 
Husbands sister -0.10856 -0.48626** -0.26537 -0.23653 
     
     
Athrho 0.32725 -0.42264 0.16264 0.51270 
     
Rho 0.31605 -0.39915 0.16122 0.47205 
     
Likelihood-rat 0.6307 0.5821 0.8094 0.5586 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
The aim of this section was to explore the effects of having a relative who breaks the 
social norm regarding women (especially married ones) working in assembly plants on 
the probability of disagreeing with each moral argument. Specifically, two types of 
relatives were considered, wives’ sisters and husbands’ sisters. Results were quite 
contrary to expectations. First of all, the participation of wives’ sisters in assembly plant 
employment did not influence the beliefs of either partner at all. Nor did it have any 
direct influence on wives’ participation in assembly plant employment. This came quite 
as a surprise given that on one hand wives’ perceptions and beliefs were initially 
believed to be highly dependent on the actions of their sisters, and on the other, 
strongly correlated effects between sisters were anticipated. Furthermore, it was found 
that violation of the norm by husbands’ sisters, in particular married ones, did have an 
influence on both partners’ beliefs in the moral argument of promiscuity. Nevertheless, 
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the effect was contrary to that anticipated. Instead of challenging beliefs, the inclusion 
of husbands’ wives in assembly plant employment reinforced them. This result also 
highlights the importance of this moral argument as more susceptible to change. 
 
7.7   Change in couple’s beliefs due to wives participation in a salaried activity. 
 
Wives beliefs regarding the moral rules indicating that they should not work for an 
assembly plant could be challenged when they do so. On one hand, this could be a 
result of wives interacting with other wives holding different beliefs than theirs, and who 
as a result also participate in assembly plant employment. On another hand, married 
women working for an assembly plant can experience what is called “cognitive 
dissonance”. This is, “if a person holds two cognitions (perceptions) that are 
psychologically inconsistent, he experiences dissonance: a negative drive state. 
Because the experience of dissonance is unpleasant, the person will strive to reduce it- 
usually by struggling to find a way to change one or both cognitions to make them more 
consonant with one another” (Aronson 1997).Thus, if a wife initially believes in one or 
all the moral arguments against wives participation in an assembly plant, and then for 
some reason she works for one, her initial perceptions regarding married women’s 
engagement in this type of job might be changed to be consistent with this choice. This 
might be true as well for husbands. If they have a wife who has worked in a waged job, 
he can adjust his beliefs to be consistent with his wives actions.  
If spouses´ beliefs regarding wives participation in an assembly plant change when she 
actually works for one, then there might be an issue of identifying the causality in the 
Biprobit regression. This is, a significant coefficient for disagreement on the moral 
arguments in the participation equation can be due to the probability of wives 
engagement in the maquila being influenced by their or their husbands´ beliefs and/or 
because the probability to disagree with a moral argument is influenced by wives 
participation in assembly plant employment. 
To investigate whether wives who work for a wage adjust their beliefs to justify this 
choice, a dummy variable was constructed which represents whether a woman had 
ever worked in a salaried job while married. Information on the specific salaried activity 
the wife engaged in while married is unavailable. Therefore, it was not possible to 
construct a dummy variable which specifically represented whether a wife had engaged 
in assembly plant.  
It must also be noted that by constructing this indicator variable, it is assumed that any 
woman who has worked in a salaried activity while married, not only those currently 
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work there, will have adjusted their beliefs if these are in disagreement with their views 
before participating in them. 53 
Also, this dummy variable includes salaried wives who have worked in professional 
activities for which higher levels of education are needed. Thus, there can be some 
correlation with this dummy variable and the educational level of wives. Therefore, an 
additional dummy variable was created which represented the interaction between 
professional activities and wives having worked while married. 
Table 7-24 shows the percentage of wives in each town that have engaged in a 
salaried activity while married and the percentage of wives who are currently working. It 
can be observed that almost half of the wives in the sample have worked in a salaried 
activity at some point during their marriage. Nevertheless, less than one fifth of wives 
currently participated in a waged job. Furthermore, less married women in Chilac than 
in Miahuatlán had engaged in a salaried activity while married.  
 
Table 7-24: Percentage of married wives who worked in a salaried activity at 
some point during their marriage.  
 All Miahuatlan Chilac 
Worked while married 49.07 58.14 40.09
Currently worked 16.90 22.79 11.06
 
Results of Biporbit regressions which include a dummy variable in the disagreement 
equation representing wives who have worked in salaried employment at some point 
during their marriage, are portrayed in Tables 7-25 and 7-26. These indicate that 
having participated in a salaried activity while being married strongly, significantly and 
positively influences wives´ beliefs in each one of the moral arguments. Also, having a 
wife who has worked for the maquila while she was married significantly influences the 
probability of a husband believing in each one of the moral rules. Furthermore, rho is 
significant for all the Biprobits on wives and husbands disagreements. This means that 
the errors of both equations are correlated.  
Furthermore, in this regression the variables representing disagreement on women 
being promiscuous and men being providers influence the probability of wives working 
                                                 
53 It might also be that those who have just started working hold stronger beliefs in each of the 
moral arguments. However, information regarding how long wives had worked in an assembly 
plant for is only available for those who currently engage in a salaried activity. Thus, this variable 
could not be included in the Biprobit equations. Simple Probits that included a variable for 
length of time working were estimated for the probability of wives disagreeing with each one of 
the moral arguments for the sub sample of currently working wives. Yet, this variable did not 
yield significant results.  
  
 
203 
 
in an assembly plant to a similar extent than in the simple Biprobit regressions (which 
do not include dummy variables for wives who have ever worked in a salaried activity). 
Yet, the coefficient for the variable indicating wives disagreement on the moral 
argument of wives place being the home becomes larger and even greater than those 
representing disagreement on the other two moral arguments. It must be reminded that 
in the simple Biprobit, this coefficient had the lowest value of all moral arguments in the 
participation equation. What is more, the variable indicating disagreement on all moral 
arguments by both husbands and wives is not significant in the simple Biprobits, but it 
is in the regressions which include the dummy variable representing wives who have 
worked while married in the disagreement equation. However, some variables that 
used to be significant in the participation equation cease to be so when including this 
dummy variable. Having a child less than six years old is no longer significant in the 
participation equation for the Bipribits including wives beliefs on being promiscuous or 
husbands being the breadwinners. This is true also for wives age in the participation 
equation of the Biprobit including husbands´ disagreement on wives being the 
homemakers. 
On the other hand, wives who have been engaged in professional salaried activities 
while married, have a significantly lower probability than those who have participated 
while married in non professional salaried jobs, of believing that women who work for 
an assembly plant are promiscuous. What is more the later coefficient is larger than 
that of the dummy variable representing wives who have worked while married in a 
salaried activity. This implies that overall, wives who have worked while married in 
professional activities have a negative and significant probability of disagreeing with 
these moral arguments. 54 
Additionally, compared to the simple Biprobit regressions coefficients for the other 
independent variables (in both the participation and disagreement equation) were 
generally reduced in magnitude. Furthermore, some variables that significantly 
influenced wives beliefs in moral rules in the simple Biprobit estimations, no longer did 
so. For instance, years of education ceased to be a significant variable for wives beliefs 
in wives being promiscuous and husbands not being good providers. The indicator 
variable for belonging to the town of Chilac also stops being a significant determinant 
for wives being promiscuous. In the case of husbands´ beliefs, age is no longer a 
significant determinant of their disagreement on wives place being the home. 
                                                 
54 Biprobit regressions that did not include the interaction dummy of wives who have ever 
worked and had professional activities were also run. The effect of variables included in the 
disagreements and participation equation were similar.  
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Additionally, being from Chilac does not influence significantly the probability of them 
disagreeing with wives being promiscuous.  
Overall then, there does seem to be some evidence that having worked in a salaried 
activity (or having a wife who has worked for a salaried activity) has an effect on 
spouses beliefs on each one of the moral arguments.  As previously explained, this 
could be due to the cognitive dissonance experienced by beliefs being in discord with 
the choice of wives participating in an assembly plant. It could be also a consequence 
of wives socialization with individuals holding different beliefs. 
 
Table 7-25: Biprobit results for wives´ disagreement on moral arguments 
depending on whether a wife has worked in a salaried activity while being 
married and if this salaried activity is a professional one.  
 
Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree all 
rules 
     
Participation Equation     
Age -0.01555* -0.00446 0.00139 -0.00866 
Wage 33.07110** 26.67697** 36.63454* 38.34115*** 
Wage Squared -6.47704** -5.13453** -7.06098** -7.42264*** 
Number children older 6 0.02584 0.00563 0.00237 0.04558 
Number of Children less 6 -0.10935 -0.10046 -0.10377 -0.08151 
Household p.c. income 0.00005 0.00002 0.00004 0.00003 
Chilac -0.34852* -0.01190 -0.26493 -0.16202 
Disagreement argument 1.98231*** 1.73582*** 1.80059*** 2.05115*** 
Constant -43.23751** -36.51211** -49.16633** -50.56832*** 
     
Disagreement Equation     
Age -0.00218 -0.01116* -0.01777*** -0.00711 
Household p.c. income -0.00002 -0.00004 -0.00003 0.00000 
Years of Educ. 0.04643*** 0.01835 0.01986 0.02750*** 
Worked Married 0.70455*** 0.59435*** 0.52720*** 0.65302*** 
Worked Married*Prof -0.26914 -1.10979** -0.77356 -0.98846** 
Chilac 0.05397 -0.17009 0.18654 -0.02277 
Constant -0.61790** 0.78717** 0.41025 -0.68981** 
     
     
Athrho -9.62601 -10.86191 -9.13059 -12.50429 
Rho -1 -1 -1 -1 
P(rho=0) 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
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Table 7-26 Biprobit results for wives´ disagreement on moral arguments 
depending on whether a wife has worked in a salaried activity while being 
married and if this salaried activity is a professional one.  
 
Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree all 
rules 
     
Participation Equation     
Age -0.01792 -0.00060 -0.00413 -0.01530 
Wage 25.84296** 30.07547** 35.63334*** 38.34905* 
Wage Squared -5.04748** -5.72849** -6.89027*** -7.46794** 
Number children older 6 0.02201 0.00522 -0.00220 0.01915 
Number of Children less 6 -0.07384 -0.10034*** -0.07763*** -0.11904 
Household p.c. income 0.00005 -0.00002 0.00006 0.00003 
Chilac -0.34767* -0.05457 -0.32367** -0.23709 
Disagreement argument 2.13411*** 1.84999*** 1.90497*** 2.24720*** 
Constant -34.04477** -41.24440** -47.51663*** -49.99875* 
     
Disagreement Equation     
Husband’s Age -0.00703 -0.01569*** -0.00852* -0.00978* 
Household p.c. income -0.00002 0.00006 -0.00005 -0.00001 
Years of Educ. 0.01921 0.00558 0.01961 0.01311 
Wife Worked Married 0.77508*** 0.66199*** 0.55771*** 0.77285*** 
Wife Worked Married*Prof 0.14405 -0.97673** -0.70714 -0.40809 
Chilac 0.08460 -0.05987 0.27401** 0.03922 
Constant -0.49576 0.59005** -0.05111 -0.76137*** 
     
     
Athrho -11.34661 -11.84082 -10.90294 -10.19633 
Rho -1 -1 -1 -1 
P(rho=0) 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
 
The results obtained in this chapter reveal the importance of using a Biprobit 
regression model in which joint determination of disagreements on moral arguments 
and wives participation in salaried employment is accounted for. Usually, empirical 
female labour participation studies do not consider the influence of social norms on 
variables which also affect women’s participation in salaried employment. Take the 
case, for example, of the variable ‘age’ which is generally associated with women’s 
propensity to participate in waged employment. In this study, this variable was found to 
significantly affect beliefs in moral arguments, which in turn also have an impact on 
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wives propensity to work at a plant.  If the age variable were only included in the 
participation equation, the resulting coefficient would encompass the effects of any 
direct influence this variable has on women’s labour participation, such as aging, plus 
the indirect effect age has through the beliefs in moral arguments.  In this case then, 
there would be a significant loss of information on the means by which women’s labour 
participation takes place. Furthermore, when studies empirically assess the propensity 
of wives to participate in salaried employment and exclude the influence of beliefs in 
moral arguments, they are omitting relevant variables, leading to biased results. 
Furthermore, findings in this chapter also highlight the usefulness of analyzing each 
moral argument’s internalization separately. Not only does each belief influence 
participation in salaried employment to a different extent, but also, each is affected to 
varying degrees by diverse individual and household characteristics. This shows that 
each has its own foundations and justifications, thus the importance of analyzing each 
one independently.  
It is also very important to consider the influence and determinants of both wives’ and 
husbands’ beliefs in moral arguments and the effects these have on wife’s participation 
in assembly plant employment. Usually the former are much more prone to change 
than the latter. It can be implied then that husbands’ beliefs are much more rigid than 
wife’s. Moreover, contrary to what was expected, husbands’ beliefs in moral arguments 
had no significant effect on wife’s propensity to participate in assembly plant 
employment. This is quite an unexpected result given that it was anticipated that 
husbands’ beliefs would have a greater influence on wife’s participation in assembly 
plants than wives’ beliefs. In their discourses, both husbands and wives implied that 
wives had to ask their husbands for permission to work in assembly plants and that it 
was they who had the last word when it came to making this decision. As previously 
explained, two possible reasons can account for this finding. On one hand, informal 
bargaining mechanisms different from those which are socially expected can be 
present within marriages. On the other hand, beliefs might not play an important role in 
husbands’ decisions as to whether their wives are to participate in assembly plant 
employment or not.  This is evidence of the importance of quantitatively testing social 
discourses, as individuals might not necessarily act upon them.55 
Moreover, it was not only that husbands’ beliefs in moral arguments did not have the 
hypothesised effect. In the qualitative exploration, various factors seemed to affect 
wives’ participation in assembly plant employment via disagreement on moral 
arguments. Nevertheless, they did not prove to do so in the expected way, for diverse 
                                                 
55 This does not imply that other more profound qualitative methods than the one used in this 
study would not aid in uncovering decision mechanisms within the household.  
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reasons. For example, statistical results supported the argument of wives’ beliefs being 
correlated with their sisters’ participation in assembly plant work. When included in the 
Biprobit, where other contextual factors were accounted for, the relation was 
insignificant. Disagreement with moral arguments by both spouses were also expected 
to be greater where the husband participated in assembly plant employment  However, 
a husband working in an assembly plant has a negative effect on disagreement with 
moral arguments by both partners, but a positive direct one on women’s participation in 
salaried employment. Furthermore, it was suggested that if living in a city where moral 
arguments were less traditional, individuals would internalize them.  In this case, no 
significant correlation between living in a city with beliefs in moral arguments was 
found. All these outcomes also highlight the importance of empirically testing, via the 
use of Biprobit regressions, hypotheses which arise through the use of in-depth 
interviews.  
Overall, results in this chapter show the difficulties in finding statistically representative 
variables which influence moral arguments. Beliefs in norms seem to be quite 
unchanging. This, however, does not allow for the importance of searching for the 
determinants of social norms which are not so apparent. This, and analyzing the 
influence each moral argument and each spouse’s belief in them has on women’s 
participation in waged employment, aids us in thoroughly understanding the 
mechanisms by which social norms restrict women’s freedom to choose their own 
activities. This can also prove to be useful in informing policy.  
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_______________________________ 
8 The effect of social sanctions on 
women’s propensity to participate in 
salaried employment 
_______________________________ 
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8.1 Introduction 
 
In the last chapter we analysed the extent to which wives and husbands believed in 
each of the moral arguments that justify the norm that married women should not work 
in an assembly plant. Further, we explored the effect these beliefs actually had on 
wives’ propensity to work. Statistical and regression results indicated that to a varying 
extent, believing in each of the moral arguments had a significant effect on married 
women’s propensity to work in assembly plant jobs. It was concluded therefore that 
internalization of moral arguments is an effective mechanism by which social norms 
influence wives’ labour allocation into assembly plant employment. However, it is also 
posited that social norms affect wives participation in this activity via a second 
mechanism; social sanctions. Given that social norms are value laden, those who 
believe in the moral arguments will not only feel guilt and anxiety when they disregard a 
norm, but might also take it upon themselves to punish those who violate it, by 
gossiping or criticising them. Therefore the expectation of being socially sanctioned 
might make some wives disregard the norm and work in assembly plant jobs. This 
chapter empirically tests the extent to which these social sanctions affect women’s 
probability to take factory jobs.  
Those individuals who gossip or criticize the person who breaks the norm will belong to 
different social or reference groups that will vary in their relationship with the violator. In 
both Miahuatlan and San Gabriel Chilac four reference groups were identified to be 
relevant during field work; wife’s family, husband’s family, neighbours and friends. 
Individuals will generally be affected to varying degrees by the sanctions of each type 
of reference group. The importance individuals place on the sanctions they receive 
from each of them is proposed to be related to their proximity. For example, a women 
working in an assembly plant will feel more concerned if her father or mother criticize 
her for not fulfilling her role as mother or wife, than if that criticism comes from a 
neighbour. This assumes that they have a much closer relationship with their mothers 
than with their neighbours.  
Also, individuals will be affected differently by gossip and criticism. A woman might feel 
uncomfortable if she suspects her neighbours are gossiping about her and calling her 
promiscuous because she works in an assembly plant. However, if they directly accuse 
her or criticise her of being unfaithful to her husband, she might feel even more 
embarrassed. Furthermore, the effects are even more extreme if neighbours go and tell 
this to her husband. For this reason, three different types of social sanctions were 
distinguished; gossip, criticism directed to the wives and criticism directed to their 
husbands. 
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Overall then, the analysis will focus on the extent to which married women’s 
expectations of being gossiped about, being criticised themselves or their husband 
being criticised, along the lines of each of the three moral arguments, and by each of 
the four reference groups, influences the probability that they will participate in salaried 
employment.  
To achieve this, Likert scale questions were posed to wives asking how likely they 
thought it that they and their husbands would undergo gossip and criticism from 
different reference groups drawing upon the three types of moral arguments, if they 
worked. Each of the questions contained four possible answers: whether a wife 
believed it was sure, likely, unlikely, or impossible for the reference group in question to 
socially sanction them. From each of the questions, a dummy variable was constructed 
which had a value of 1 if they were “sure” or they thought it was “likely” they would be 
socially sanctioned. Therefore, a total of 36 dummy variables were created that 
indicated how likely wives felt that 1) there would be gossip about them, 2) they would 
be criticised, or 3) their husbands would be criticised, by each of the four reference 
groups using each of the three moral arguments.  
Table 8-1 shows the percentage of married women who believed they would be 
socially sanctioned on the basis of each of the moral arguments validating the norm 
that women should not work in assembly plants i.e.; not fulfilling their role as mothers 
and wives; being promiscuous if they work in an assembly plant; and their husbands 
not fulfilling their role as breadwinners, respectively. Results show that a much larger 
proportion of married women believed they would be socially sanctioned according to 
the moral argument that women are not fulfilling their role as wives and mothers than 
the other two moral arguments. What is more, the difference in the percentage of 
women believing they would be sanctioned by this moral argument and by the other 
two is significant at a 1% level, for every type of sanction and every reference group. 
Furthermore, approximately a similar share of women believed they would be 
sanctioned by all reference groups owing to the moral argument of women being 
promiscuous than that stating that men are not fulfilling their role as providers when 
their wives work in an assembly plant. There is one exception to this similarity however: 
wives expected their in-laws to gossip and criticise them and their husbands 
significantly less (at 1%) with the argument of men not being good breadwinners, than 
with the rule of women being promiscuous.  
An interesting observation is that the moral arguments of women’s place being the 
home and women being promiscuous if they work in an assembly plant were believed 
by approximately a similar percentage of women and their husbands to the proportion 
of women who expected to be sanctioned because of these moral arguments. 
  
 
211 
 
Conversely, however, a much lower proportion of women expected that they or their 
husbands would be socially sanctioned when working in an assembly plant owing to 
the moral argument stating that men should be the breadwinners, than the percentage 
who agreed with this argument. Therefore, even though quite a large percentage of the 
population believed that it is the men’s role to be the breadwinners, there did not seem 
to be a great deal of social sanctioning because of its violation.  
 
Table 8-1: Percentage of wives who expected to be socially sanctioned with each 
moral argument when working in an assembly plant,  by reference group and 
social sanction. 
 Wife’s 
Family 
Husband’s 
Family 
Neighbours Friends 
Women´s place 
being the Home 
 
% Gossip 58.92 55.03 53.01 44.24 
% Criticism Wife  56.86 49.49 41.8 41.29 
% Criticism Husband 52.33 48.73 39.67 38.38 
Wives being 
promiscous 
 
% Gossip 25.74 29.95 30.85 22.25 
% Criticism Wife  22.77 25.63 22.38 22.38 
% Criticism Husband 23.59 28.24 24.44 20.75 
Men not being good 
providers 
 
% Gossip 27.45 21.01 27.4 23.45 
% Criticism Wife  25.06 17.47 22.59 19.95 
% Criticism Husband 22.6 17.81 21.33 20 
 
 
Wives generally believed that their own and their husbands’ families would be the ones 
to socially sanction them and their husbands. A family might feel the responsibility to 
prevent their family members from violating a moral argument. Women expected less 
disapproval from their friends. This could be either because they expect loyalty from 
their friends or because individuals usually seek out friends with similar beliefs.   
Nevertheless, the reference groups which wives most expected to be reprehended by 
vary depending on the moral argument. For instance, most women believed they would 
be sanctioned by their family rather than any of the other reference groups for not 
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being good mothers or wives when working for assembly plants56. Conversely, the 
largest proportion of women believed they and their husbands would be gossiped 
about and criticised by their husbands’ family with the moral argument of promiscuity57. 
However, wives believed their husbands’ families were the group that would least 
sanction both spouses on the count of husbands not being good providers if their wives 
worked for assembly plants. The largest proportion of wives believed they would be 
socially sanctioned by their own family on the basis of this moral argument, though 
almost the same share thought they would be gossiped about and criticised by their 
neighbours. Moreover, the difference between the share of women who expected to be 
reprehended on the basis of the moral argument of men not being good providers, by 
their husband’s family compared to their own family and their neighbours, is significant 
(at the 5% level)58 for all social sanctions. What is notable about these results is that 
women are sanctioned largely by their own family when they are not fulfilling what 
society perceives as their role; i.e. being housewives and mothers. On the other hand, 
men are least sanctioned by their own family when they do not comply with their 
socially ascribed role as breadwinners. It must be remarked however, that wives 
generally expect their families to take it upon themselves to sanction them according to 
only one of the two moral arguments they are supposed to ascribe to: being good 
mother and wives. They do not believe families will sanction them much based on the 
moral argument of their being promiscuous if they work in an assembly plant. 
Furthermore, when comparing social sanctions, the results show that a large proportion 
of wives expected to be sanctioned with gossip than with criticism, and that a high 
percentage of them believed criticism would be directed to them instead of their 
husbands. It is interesting to note that there is not a wide gap between the percentage 
of married women who believed they would be gossiped about compared to those who 
expected to be criticised, when these sanctions came from family and friends. In 
contrast, the gap between the proportion of wives who believed they would be 
gossiped about, compared to those who thought they would be criticised by the two 
other reference groups is much wider, especially for  their neighbours. Only for this last 
                                                 
56 The percentage of wives who expected to be reprehended by their families on the basis of 
this moral argument, however, is only significantly different at a 5% level from the proportion 
who thought they would be sanctioned by neighbours and friends.  The percentage of wives 
expecting to be sanctioned by families is only significantly different at 5% to the percentage of 
wives believing they would be reprehended by their in-laws using direct criticism.  
57 Yet the percentage of wives expecting to be sanctioned with this moral argument by their 
husband’s family is only significantly different at a 5% level to the percentage who believed they 
would be reprehended by their friends.  The percentage of wives who thought they would be 
sanctioned with this moral argument by neighbours is also only significantly different at 5% to 
this last reference group, but only in the case of gossip. 
58 There is an exception to this statement: the proportion of married women believing their 
husbands would be criticised because of this moral argument is not significant.  
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reference group is gossip significantly different (at least at 10%) from criticism of both 
wives and husbands, for each moral argument. This can be explained by the closeness 
and loyalty they expect from both friends and family compared to that of their 
neighbours, with whom they have a more distant relationship. Because of this 
closeness, these two former reference groups might have the trust to be 
straightforward and tell them what is on their minds, thus criticizing them for breaking 
the social norm. 
Up to now, the proportion of women who believe it is likely that they will be sanctioned 
by each reference group, using each type of sanction and upholding each moral 
argument has been analysed. The aim of the chapter, however, is to assess whether 
wives’ expectations of being socially sanctioned with each moral argument actually has 
an effect on the probability of their participating in salaried employment and if so, which 
sanctions and from which reference group have the strongest impact. Thus, as a first 
step in exploring whether social sanctions actually influence married women’s 
participation in assembly plant employment, the proportion of women who believe they 
will be reproved depending on whether they work in this activity or not by each social 
group on the count of each moral argument is shown in Table, 8-2. Results show that a 
much larger proportion of wives who did not engage in assembly plant employment 
stated it was likely they would be socially sanctioned, compared to those who did 
work.59 Results are consistent across reference groups and moral arguments. What is 
more, for the moral argument of women’s place being the home, the difference in the 
proportion of women who expect to be sanctioned, is significant at a 1% level, for wives 
who work compared to those who do not. For the moral argument of women being 
promiscuous this difference is significant at a 5% level. This shows, then, that there is 
an apparent correlation between women’s participation in salaried employment and the 
sanctions they expect to receive from their relations. This relationship appears to be 
stronger for the moral argument of women having to stay home to serve their husbands 
and having to take care of their children than for the other moral arguments. It must be 
confirmed, though, whether after controlling for other variables, the correlation still 
exists and if so, to what extent. It is also necessary to analyze which sanctions, and by 
whom, affect the probability of wives’ participating in assembly plant employment, and 
to what degree.  
 
                                                 
59 Except for gossip by family on the moral argument regarding men not being good providers if 
their wives work in an assembly plant, where the percentage of working wives who expected to 
be gossiped about was close to the percentage of nonworking wives.  
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Table 8-2: Percentage of women who expected to be socially sanctioned with the 
argument of women’s place being the home, by reference group and social 
sanction by town and whether they work or not in an assembly plant. 
 Wife’s  
Family 
Husband’s 
Family 
Neighbours Friends 
 Not 
work 
Work Not 
work 
Work Not 
work 
Work Not 
work 
Work
Wives place being 
the home 
  
% Gossip 62.75 32.69 57.93 35.29 56.29 31.25 47.2 25.49
% Criticism Wife  61.24 26.92 52.75 27.45 45.11 20.41 44.72 19.61
% Criticism Husband 55.77 28.85 51.45 30.00 42.54 20.83 41.07 21.57
Wives being 
promiscous 
  
% Gossip 26.70 19.23 30.9 23.53 32.38 20.83 24.22 9.80
% Criticism Wife  23.86 15.38 27.11 15.69 23.96 12.24 21.5 11.76
% Criticism Husband 25.35 11.54 29.74 18.00 26.28 12.50 23.13 5.88
Men not being good 
providers 
  
% Gossip 27.25 28.85 21.80 15.69 29.43 14.29 25.94 7.84
% Criticism Wife  25.92 19.23 18.60 9.80 24.28 12.00 21.88 7.84
% Criticism Husband 23.66 15.38 18.66 12.00 22.76 12.24 21.63 9.80
 
 
Before addressing this, it must be noted that a much larger share of married women 
participated in salaried employment in San Gabriel Chilac than in Santiago Miahuatlan. 
It is thus essential to verify whether differences in expected sanctions can explain this 
dissimilarity. As an illustration of how social sanctions operate differently in San Gabriel 
Chilac from in Santiago Miahuatlan, Table 8-3 displays the percentage of women who 
thought it was likely they would be socially sanctioned, by town. These figures show 
that in San Gabriel Chilac a much higher proportion of women believed they would be 
reproved by all reference groups with the argument that they were neglecting their 
duties as mothers and wives when participating in assembly plant employment. This 
difference is significant at least at a 10% level for all sanctions and reference groups, 
except for criticism to husbands by husband’s family and criticism to wives by 
neighbours. Conversely, a larger share (though not significant) of women in Miahuatlan 
expected to be sanctioned by their families with the moral argument of women being 
promiscuous if they worked for an assembly plant. For the other two reference groups, 
however, there was no difference in women’s expectations of being sanctioned with 
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this moral argument, by town.  Also in Miahuatlan, a larger percentage of wives 
believed they would be gossiped about and criticised with the argument of men not 
accomplishing their role as breadwinners when working in an assembly plant. Though 
this is true for all reference groups, only for wives and husband’s family is this gap 
significant, and at a 5% level for all types of sanctions. There is an especially stark 
difference between towns in the percentage of women who stated it was likely that their 
husbands would be criticised with this moral argument.  
 
Table 8-3: Percentage of women who expected to be socially sanctioned with the 
argument of women’s place being the home by reference group, social sanction 
and by town. 
 Wife’s 
 Family 
Husband’s 
Family 
Neighbours Friends 
 Miah Chilac Miah Chilac Miah Chilac Miah Chilac
Wives place being the 
home 
  
% Gossip 52.55 64.79 50.53 59.13 48.33 57.53 39.89 48.42
% Criticism Wife  50.26 62.91 45.74 52.88 38.89 44.62 37.70 44.74
% Criticism Husband 48.45 55.87 45.74 51.46 32.77 46.24 35.00 41.58
Wives being 
promiscous 
  
% Gossip 28.50 23.22 32.62 27.54 29.21 32.43 22.40 22.11
% Criticism Wife  22.80 22.75 27.27 24.15 23.73 21.08 19.78 20.53
% Criticism Husband 25.77 21.6 29.95 26.7 25.71 23.24 23.76 17.89
Men not being good 
providers 
  
% Gossip 34.36 21.13 27.13 15.46 27.93 26.88 25.97 21.05
% Criticism Wife  29.38 21.13 21.28 14.01 22.6 22.58 21.55 18.42
% Criticism Husband 22.99 13.11 22.29 20.43 24.44 15.79 34.36 21.13
 
Overall then, only expected sanctions regarding the moral argument of women’s place 
being the home are higher in San Gabriel Chilac than in Santiago Miahuatlan. 
Nevertheless, the importance wives place on sanctions regarding each of the moral 
arguments can still be higher in either town.  For example, a greater proportion of 
women in Miahuatlan can expect to be sanctioned with the moral argument of them 
being promiscuous. However, the impact these social sanctions actually have on 
women’s participation in assembly plant work could be greater in Chilac than in 
Miahuatlan. Therefore, it will be further explored via regression analysis whether 
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differences in expected social sanctions by town have an effect on women’s propensity 
to undertake factory work.  
Summing up, the evidence up to now strongly suggests that there is a relationship 
between wives’ participation in assembly plant employment and the social sanctions 
they expect to receive by each of the moral arguments, and from whom. Yet, it must be 
confirmed whether this correlation still exists when controlling for other variables. Also 
to be tested is whether the lower participation rates in San Gabriel Chilac compared to 
Santiago Miahuatln are due to differences by town in expected social sanctions. To 
achieve both these goals, we will next specify a regression model where the probability 
of married women’s participation in assembly plant employment is explained by their 
expectations of receiving social sanctions by each moral argument and reference 
group. 
 
8.2 Regression model specification 
 
To analyze the extent to which each social sanction, by each reference group, 
regarding each moral argument affects married women’s probability of participating in 
assembly plant employment, the following regression model is specified. Contrary to 
the variables used in the previous chapter, which represent disagreement in moral 
arguments by women and their husbands, it is assumed  that  the social sanctions 
wives expect to receive for breaking the social norm and  the participation of wives  in 
an assembly plant employment are not jointly determined..60 This is because wives 
expectations on them or their husbands receiving a social sanction is dependant upon 
other people´s beliefs regarding the moral arguments, not theirs. For this reason, 
simple Probit regression models are specified in which dummy variables accounting for 
the expected sanctions by each reference group using each moral argument are used 
to test whether they have a role in determining the dichotomous variable of women’s 
participation in assembly plant employment. 
In this case, assuming for simplicity´s sake that there is only one moral argument, 
working in assembly plant is modelled as a latent variable as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
60 The reference group which could be an exception is that of friends. The proportion of friends 
who will sanction them on each moral argument might depend on whether they participate or 
not in assembly plant employment.  
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Where y  represents wifes´ participation in assembly plant employment; ia  represents 
the choice of action of wives, where  1=ia  if she participates in assembly plant 
employment, and 1−=ia  if she does not; kip  are the social sanctions she expects to 
receive from each reference group; k  denotes each reference group, thus 
{ }4,3,2,1∈k ; and )( iaε  are wives’ unobservable characteristics. Finally,  the variables 
included in x  are: wives’ age, predicted wage, predicted squared wage, number of 
children less than 6, number of children older than 6 and per capita total exogenous 
household income. It is assumed, as in standard Probit models, that )|1(Pr xYob =  is 
normally distributed. 
The issue of which set of social sanction variables to incorporate in the regression 
model is a complex one. Given that the correct specification of *y  is unknown, it is not 
easy to discern the accurate variables to be included in the regression equation. While 
omission of relevant variables might lead to biased results, inclusion of irrelevant 
variables leads to the reduction of estimation efficiency (Hansen, 2008; Greene, 2007). 
Therefore, the issue of which set of social sanction variables are to be incorporated in 
the regressions has no straightforward answer. Even though there are tests that aid in 
selecting a model, in this case a variable selection decision was based upon another 
concern. Social sanction dummy variables show indications of being highly collinear. 
When several subsets of these variables were incorporated in the regression 
estimation, small changes in the data produced ample fluctuations in the parameter 
estimates. In addition, coefficients had very high standard errors and low significance 
levels even though they were jointly significant. Also, the coefficients had the wrong 
signs.  All these are indications of multicollinearity (Greene, 2007). In this case, 
because regressors are highly dependent on each other, it is difficult to disentangle the 
effect of one parameter against the other, reducing the precision of each one (Hansen, 
2008). It was due to this imprecision that each of the social sanction dummies was 
incorporated in a regression separately, so that the effect of each on the probability of 
women’s participation in assembly plants could be assessed. Also, each one of these 
regressions was run twice; once including an interaction dummy variable accounting for 
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sanctions in San Gabriel Chilac and again excluding it. Thus, a total of 72 Probit 
estimations were run, two for each expected sanction from each moral reference on 
each moral argument.  In the following section, these are compared and analyzed in 
detail. 
Additionally, given that social sanction dummy variables are strongly collinear and that 
resulting regression coefficients for each are sometimes very similar to each other, 
tests were performed to verify whether the coefficients obtained for different reference 
groups and those obtained for different moral arguments were statistically different 
from each other. To this effect, cross-model Wald tests using a simultaneous 
covariance matrix (variance covariance matrix for coefficients from two different 
models) of the sandwich robust type were carried out. The results for each one of these 
Wald tests will be included in the appendix. However, when relevant, the significance in 
the difference between two variables will be mentioned in the text.  
 
8.3 Probit estimation results  
 
Initially, Probits including expected sanctions which employ the moral argument of 
women’s place being the home were explored.  Table 8-4 shows the coefficient results 
for the effect of sanctions women anticipated to receive on their propensity to work, by 
each of the reference groups: family, husband’s family, neighbours and friends61.   
The results show that all the dummy variables representing the sanctions used by each 
reference group regarding the moral argument stating that women’s place is the home 
are significant at a 5% level. The magnitude of each one is also very similar.  What is 
more, for this moral argument, the difference in the effect on women’s participation in 
assembly plant employment by each reference group is not significant. However, even 
if the differences are very small and cannot be said to be significant, coefficients on 
expected sanctions coming from the wife’s family are slightly higher than those coming 
from other reference groups. This is especially true in the case of direct criticism of 
wives. It must also be noted that a larger percentage of married women expected to be 
sanctioned by this reference group and with this moral argument than by any of the 
others. This signals not only that families generally take it upon themselves to make 
sure that their female relatives follow their prescribed gender role, but also that wives 
themselves place great importance on the sanctions they receive from their relatives, 
as results suggest that they are effective in preventing them from seeking factory jobs. 
                                                 
61 Coefficient results for the rest of the explanatory variables are included in the Appendix. 
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Table 8-4: Probit coefficient results on the effect of sanctions by different 
reference groups on wives participation in assembly plant employmeny using 
the moral argument of wives’ place being the home. 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
Wife´s Family       
Sanction -0.5083** -0.6303*** -0.6780*** -0.7907*** -0.5053** -0.6287*** 
Sanction*Chilac -0.3582  -0.3331  -0.3766  
Husband´s 
Family       
Sanction -0.4186* -0.4532** -0.5290** -0.6021*** -0.4744** -0.4964*** 
Sanction*Chilac -0.0981  -0.2226  -0.0633  
Neighbours       
Sanction -0.5362** -0.5850*** -0.5528** -0.6892*** -0.5522** -0.5351* 
Sanction*Chilac -0.1458  -0.5323  0.0466  
Friends       
Sanction -0.3662 -0.5566*** -0.5470** -0.7300*** -0.5616** -0.5477*** 
Sanction*Chilac -0.6057  -0.6675  0.0394  
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
On the contrary, anticipated sanctions based on the moral argument that women’s 
place is the home, coming from the husband’s family have the least effect on wives’ 
propensity to work. This is surprising, given that a large proportion of married women 
expected to be criticised by their husband’s family with this moral argument. In fact, 
after their own families, a larger percentage of women expected to receive sanctions 
from this reference group than from the other two. It seems then that even if plenty of 
husbands’ families take it upon themselves to sanction wives, the wives might not be 
so affected by them as by other reference groups. It must be noted however, that these 
results are not significant.  
As regards the two reference groups, expected sanctions from neighbours and from 
friends have the same effect. However, a result worthy of note is the high value of the 
coefficient representing criticism from wives’ friends, which is almost as great as that 
denoting criticism from their family. A smaller percentage of wives believed they would 
be sanctioned by friends with this argument (and with the two others as well). Thus, 
while married women believed they would generally not be sanctioned by their friends, 
the expectation that they would be criticised by them on the basis that they were not 
good wives and mothers does seem to have a large impact on their propensity to work. 
Another unanticipated finding is the non-significance among wives in San Gabriel 
Chilac of the interaction dummy variables representing expected sanctions by each of 
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the reference groups, based on the moral argument of women’s place being the home.. 
As was shown previously in this chapter, a larger proportion of married women 
expected to be sanctioned with this rule by all reference groups in this town. This is 
also coincident with the finding that a much smaller share of wives in San Gabriel 
Chilac worked. Nevertheless, evidence shows that the impact of sanctions on wives’ 
decisions to work is not significantly different in Chilac than in Santiago Miahuatlan, 
even if they are much more widespread in the former.  
Moving on to social sanctions regarding another moral argument, attention is now 
turned to wives’ expectation of reproof based on the idea that married women working 
in assembly plants are promiscuous. Table 8-5, shows the Probit regression results for  
the dummy variables accounting for wives’ expectation of sanctions according to this 
moral argument by each reference group and by each sanction. 
Results indicate that sanctions based on this moral argument significantly influence 
wives’ propensity to work in the case of all moral arguments and all types of sanctions 
at least at a 10% level, except for two cases: criticism of wives by their own family and 
gossip by their husband’s family.  
However, sanctions based promiscuity in the form of criticism directed at husbands are 
significant at least at a 5% level for all reference groups. Furthermore, except for the 
Probit including criticism of husbands by their own family62, this sanction has the 
highest magnitude of coefficient. The difference between sanctions is extremely stark 
regarding the wives’ families, and even more so regarding friends. For both these 
reference groups the difference in magnitude between criticism of wives and that of 
husbands is significant at a 5% level, while the difference between gossip and criticism 
of husbands is significant at a 10% level only. 
On the other hand, the sanction regarding the moral argument of women being 
promiscuous has a very low impact on wives’ propensity to work, for all reference 
groups (except for friends) when it surfaces in the form of gossip. In the case of gossip 
coming from the husband’s family, the coefficient is not significant, and for the other 
two reference groups, wives’ family and friends, the coefficient is only significant at a 
10% level.  Therefore, it can be concluded that women do not really place much 
importance on gossip about their being promiscuous if they work, compared to where 
people tell their husbands that they are being unfaithful.63 
The great and very important exception is that of gossip coming from friends. The 
coefficient representing this sanction by this reference group and on this moral 
                                                 
62 In this case criticism to wife has almost the same magnitude. It is even slightly larger. 
63 It must be reminded though that gossip is only significantly different to the sanction, criticism 
directed to husbands and only if these come from friends and the wives family. 
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argument is significant at a 5% level. Moreover, after criticism to husbands from the 
same reference group, it is the sanction coefficient with the largest value. Interestingly 
though, criticism of wives by the same reference group is not as large and is only 
significant at a 10% level.   
An interesting contrast is offered by the different types of sanctions which ultimately 
have an impact on women’s participation in employment. Here we compare sanctions 
that call on the moral arguments of women being promiscuous, and of women’s place 
being the home. In the case of the former, the probability that women will work in 
assembly plants is not greatly affected by gossip about and criticism of wives by their 
own families, compared to sanctions in the form of criticism of husbands coming from 
the same reference group, and to all sanctions expected from all other reference 
groups. In the case of criticism of wives, the coefficient is not even significant and in the 
case of gossip it is significant but at a 10% level only. In contrast, the wife’s family is 
the reference group with the greatest influence on women’s propensity to work in 
assembly plants when it comes to the moral argument of women’s place being the 
home. Furthermore, criticism of wives had the greatest impact on married women’s 
assembly plant employment, followed by gossip. Therefore, even though both moral 
arguments are directed at influencing married women’s behaviour, the reference 
groups and type of sanctions associated with each differ in their influence on married 
women’s ultimate employment decisions. It seems that families are more effective in 
sanctioning women with the moral argument of women’s place being the home, and 
less so with that of women being promiscuous.  
Also significant is the evidence suggesting that the moral argument regarding wives 
being promiscuous if they work in a factory has a particularly strong hold on their 
husbands. Ultimately, husbands have a strong effect on wives’ participation in salaried 
employment. On one hand, this criticism when directed at husbands, especially by 
friends, is quite effective in influencing women’s participation in salaried employment. 
On the other, it must be noted that in the case of internalization of moral arguments by 
husbands, the dummy variable that proxied for husbands belief in the moral argument 
of women being promiscuous was the only moral argument internalized by husbands 
which showed a significant influence on married women’s employment. Therefore both 
criticism of husbands and their internalization of this moral argument are an effective 
operating mechanism for the social norm indicating that wives should not work in 
assembly plants.  
Finally, the interaction dummy variables for sanctions regarding this moral argument in 
Chilac are not significant either. However, it is useful to note that a larger proportion of 
women in Miahuatlan than in San Gabriel Chilac believed they would be sanctioned 
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with this moral argument. Interaction dummies, in all cases where they were available, 
indicated on the other hand that the impact on women’s propensity to work was lower 
in Chilac than in Miahuatlan. Therefore, though it must be remembered that these 
figures were not significant, it seems that even if expected sanctions are greater in 
Miahuatlan, it is in Chilac where they have a greater importance in influencing women’s 
participation in assembly plant employment. 
 
Table 8-5: Probit coefficient results on the effect of sanctions by different 
reference groups on wives participation in assembly plant employment, using 
the moral argument of wives being promiscuous 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
Wife´s Family       
Sanction -0.1785 -0.3483* -0.1327 -0.3605 -0.5395* -0.6356*** 
Sanction*Chilac -0.7015  -0.7884  -0.3545  
Husband´s 
Family        
Sanction -0.1499 -0.3298 -0.3232 -0.4842** -0.3168 -0.4688** 
Sanction*Chilac -0.7501  -0.6109  -0.5984  
Neighbours       
Sanction -0.1861 -0.3776* -0.3789 -0.5454** -0.4156 -0.5905** 
Sanction*Chilac -0.7014      
Friends       
Sanction -0.4479 -0.6560** -0.3377 -0.4574* -0.8680*** -0.9835*** 
Sanction*Chilac -  -0.4022  -  
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Finally, results for sanctions regarding the moral argument of men not being good 
providers for their family when their wives work for an assembly plant are explored 
(Table 8-6). When comparing the influence of sanctions from each reference group, 
friends are found to have the strongest effect on wives’ employment. They are the only 
reference group for which all types of sanctions based on this moral argument are 
significant at least at a 5% level. Coefficients representing sanctions from this 
reference group are also much higher than those associated with other reference 
groups. What is more, the magnitude of the coefficient representing gossip coming 
from friends is different (at a 5% significance level) from gossip coming from the 
husband’s family and significantly different (at 1%) from gossip coming from the wife’s 
family. Also, criticism of wives from this reference group is different (at 5%) from 
criticism by the wife’s family.  
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Furthermore, all types of sanctions by neighbours based on the moral argument of men 
not being good providers are significant, but in this case criticism of husbands is 
significant at a 10% level only. However, sanctions from this reference group are not 
much greater than those coming from other reference groups.  Gossip using this moral 
argument and coming from this reference group is only significantly different (and at a 
5% level) from gossip coming from the wife’s family. 
Sanctions based on this moral argument by the husband’s family are not generally 
significant. In this case it can be seen that only in the case of criticism of wives and 
husbands do sanctions significantly (although only at the 10% level) affect wives’ 
propensity to work. Finally, the least effective sanctions come from family. The 
coefficients for gossip about and criticism of wives by this reference group are the 
smallest for the argument that husbands are not good providers, and are not significant 
at all. However, there is an important exception. Criticism directed at husbands by this 
reference group and on this moral argument is significant at a 5% level, and has the 
same or similar magnitude as this type of sanction by the husband’s family and 
neighbours.  
From these results it can be seen that in the case of this moral argument the 
hypothesis does not seem to hold that the closer the reference groups are to wives, the 
greater their influence on their propensity to work. This is so because the family is 
considered to be much closer to wives than neighbours and friends, but also has the 
least effect on women’s employment.  
Next, the effects of the different types of sanctions using the moral argument of men 
not being good providers if their wives work are explored. It can be observed that the 
types of sanctions which have a much greater impact on women’s employment for the 
reference groups of neighbours and especially friends is gossip, followed by criticism of 
wives and finally criticism of husbands64. For the case of sanctions coming from the 
husband’s family, criticism of wives has a slightly higher effect on their propensity to 
work than criticism directed at husbands, while both have a much higher effect than 
gossip. Finally, as has already been described, criticism of husbands bears the largest 
(and the only significant) coefficient of all sanctions coming from wives’ families. It 
seems then that for those reference groups which are not close to wives, the 
expectation of gossip that husbands are not being good providers has a stronger effect 
on their employment than more direct sanctions such as criticism. However, for those 
                                                 
64 The only significant differences between the effects of sanctions however, are gossip 
compared to criticism coming from friends and gossip compared to criticism of husbands, 
coming from the wife’s family.  
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reference groups which are close to wives, such as their husbands’ and their own 
families, criticism is more important than gossip.  
Finally, it can also be observed that the coefficients for the interaction dummy variables 
representing sanctions for this moral argument in San Gabriel Chilac are not significant 
either. This coefficient is negative in the case of wives’ and husbands’ families. Yet, the 
coefficients for gossip and criticism from neighbours in this town are positive. For 
expected sanctions coming from friends in Chilac no coefficients are available. It 
should be noted that the proportion of women who believed they would be sanctioned 
with this moral argument was lower in Chilac, just as it was for the moral argument of 
women being promiscuous. However, results suggest that the influence of sanctions 
from either spouse’s family, based on this argument, on women’s employment are 
stronger in this town. They also seem to be weaker for neighbours. However, given that 
results are not significant, interpretations must be made with caution. 
 
Table 8-6: Probit coefficient results on the effect of sanctions by different 
reference groups, on wives participation in assembly plant employment using 
the moral argument of husbands not being good providers by different reference 
groups. 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
Wife´s Family       
Sanction -0.0018 -0.1180 -0.2440 -0.2958 -0.4061 -0.4601** 
Sanction*Chilac -0.4545  -0.1844  -0.2435  
Husband´s 
Family       
Sanction -0.3392 -0.3789 -0.3518 -0.4960* -0.4421 -0.4496* 
Sanction*Chilac -0.1906    -0.0337  
Neighbours       
Sanction -0.6001** -0.5655** -0.6027* -0.4907** -0.4357 -0.4692* 
Sanction*Chilac 0.1031  0.3193  -0.1167  
Friends       
Sanction -0.7594** -0.8807*** -0.6255** -0.7556*** -0.5693** -0.6624** 
Sanction*Chilac       
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
The moral argument with the greatest overall influence in all reference groups and all 
types of sanctions is that of women’s place being the home. It must be reminded that 
all sanction coefficients from this moral argument were also significant at a 5% level. 
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Comparing specific results from all the moral arguments, it can be inferred that the 
expected sanction with the greatest impact on women’s propensity to participate in 
salaried employment is criticism directed at husbands from their friends, stating that 
their working wives are promiscuous. The expected sanction with the second greatest 
impact on this probability is gossip among a wife’s friends that her husband is lazy and 
not good a provider because she undertakes factory work. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
These results show that social sanctions are an effective and important mechanism by 
which social normsrestrain women’s participation in assembly plant employment. 
Unfortunately, however, given that dummy variables representing wives’ expectations 
of being sanctioned according to a certain moral argument and by each reference 
group are highly correlated, each of these had to be included separately in a Probit 
regression equation. Because of this correlation, the resulting coefficients representing 
these sanctions were frequently similar to each other. 
Nevertheless, some patterns could be seen in the obtained results. For example, 
sanctions by all reference groups regarding the moral argument of the women’s place 
being the home, where they can be child carers and serve their husbands, are not only 
the most widespread, but consistently have a significant and high effect on women’s 
propensity to work. What is more, though not significant, sanctions which came from 
the wife’s family seem to have a particularly influential effect. Wives’ families effectively 
take it upon themselves to reprove wives when they do not comply with their ascribed 
role. Therefore, in this case, the premise that the sanctions coming from reference 
groups with a closer relationship with wives will have a greater effect on their 
participation in salaried employment, does hold.   
This closeness assumption, though, does not hold for the other two moral arguments.  
For expected sanctions according to the moral argument regarding men’s socially 
subscribed role of being the breadwinners of the family, the converse is true. In this 
case, sanctions of both wives and husbands, coming from friends, followed by those of 
neighbours, have the greatest effect on wives’ participation in assembly plant 
employment. The remarkable feature of expected sanctions regarding this moral 
argument is not only that the closer the reference group, the less the effect on wives’ 
employment, but also that the reference group with the lowest impact on this probability 
is the husband’s family. While the wife’s family can significantly influence wives to 
  
 
226 
 
follow their prescribed gender role, the contrary is true for the husband’s family when 
they sanction men regarding their being the family breadwinners. 
In the case of the moral argument implying that women who work in assembly plants 
are promiscuous, there is no overall reference group whose sanctions have the 
strongest effect on wives’ employment. Therefore there is also no support for the 
proposition suggesting that the closer the reference group, the greater the effect on 
wives’ employment. However, the striking peculiarity of this moral argument is the 
importance of the specific sanction of criticism of husbands. This result, and that of the 
effects of husband’s internalization of this moral argument on wives’ employment, 
evidences how meaningful this specific moral argument is to husbands.  
Overall then, these findings suggest that sanctions regarding each moral argument 
follow quite different courses of action. First, each differs in its influence on wives vs. 
husbands. Second, the reference groups which use each of them, and the effect they 
ultimately have on wives’ employment, also varies.  Lastly, they also diverge in the 
types and impacts of the sanctions with which reference groups decide to reprove 
spouses. This not only shows the great importance of analysing each of the different 
moral arguments associated with a norm separately, but also of singling out the effects 
of each type of sanction and each reference group. Many of these different patterns 
can be deduced, even if several coefficients are not significantly different from each 
other. 
Finally, another important question posed at the beginning of this chapter was whether 
social sanctions played any role in the higher factory employment rates of married 
women.  Though generally sanction coefficients did have the expected negative sign, 
these were not significant. Thus, it cannot be concluded from this analysis that 
sanctions have a higher effect on wives’ participation in factory jobs. It must be noted, 
however, that there were few observations accounting for women’s assembly plant 
employment in San Gabriel Chilac. In several Probit regression cases, these were 
dropped from the regression analysis. Therefore, this could have also been an 
important factor in the non-significance of the sanctions in this town.  
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9.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this research was to analyse how social norms influence wives’ 
opportunities to achieve well-being when working in textile assembly plants. To achieve 
this goal, four main research questions were initially posed. In this chapter I review the 
main findings and issues which surfaced in answering these questions. Next, the 
theoretical implications of these findings are considered. Finally, the main limitations of 
the research are described. Throughout the sections, findings are presented in relation 
to the research question to which they respond.  
 
9.2 Empirical Findings 
 
This section reviews the key findings of the research and expands on how these are 
pertinent to each of the research questions. Further, though not a research question, 
an important query of this dissertation was to discover whether differences in 
participation rates between towns are due to social norms. Econometrical results did 
not support this assertion. Thus, it is also elaborated on which other possible factors 
might explain the disfference in wives participation rates in the maquila between towns.  
 
1. What are the functionings wives can achieve by working in assembly plants 
compared to those they can attain by being involved in traditional female 
activities? 
 
The research assessed the functionings wives can achieve by working in assembly 
plants in the two towns of the Tehuacan area. We found that these types of jobs have 
both positive and negative characteristics. Equally, wives will have different 
personalities so that what is attractive to one might be a burden for another. Therefore 
a clear-cut assessment of whether assembly plant employment is better or worse for 
wives is impossible. Evaluating separately the way in which working in this job 
influences wives’ achievement of each of the relevant functionings, and of the factors 
influencing their attainment, is much more fruitful.  
Moreover, wives’ employment in assembly plants influenced not only their achievement 
of functionings but also those of their family members. At least at the discourse level, 
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they placed especial importance on their children’s welfare. Both arguments supporting 
wives’ employment in assembly plants, and those deploring it evolved around their 
children’s wellbeing. On one hand, it was widely perceived that an important benefit of 
wives’ staying at home was that they could then take care of their children. However, 
husbands who supported their wives’ engagement in assembly plant work argued that 
this provided them with additional income that would improve their children’s welfare. 
They particularly emphasised that this additional income was destined to economically 
support their children’s educational expenses. Thus, wives’ employment in assembly 
plants was commonly perceived as a trade-off between quality of childcare (which, it 
was sometimes emphasised, could only be provided by their mother) and the quality of 
their education.  
As husbands had the role of being the main economic providers of the household, 
wives’ temporary employment in an assembly plant in instances acted as a reserve for 
waged labour. In case of contingencies such as the sickness of a family member, 
households could obtain additional income if wives worked in the maquila for a period 
of time. Thus in cases, these types of jobs acted as safety nets. Yet this temporary 
reserve of labour could also be used as a household strategy to make larger 
expenditures, such as a house. This was feasible due to the availability and the low 
entry barriers of assembly plant jobs. Yet this feature is rarely considered in the 
literature. It is also quite a significant one, as there was an absence of financial 
institutions in both towns that could easily provide credit or saving plans to 
households.This is another example of how wives’ employment in assembly plants was 
used to enhance their family’s well-being.  
As for the effect of assembly plant employment on wives’ personal welfare, positive 
outcomes (apart from the greater income they obtained) had to do with the possibility of 
interacting socially and having friends; achieving personal development within the 
plant; and having greater decision-making power within the household in areas such as 
large expenditures (which were not usually considered to be female decisions) and 
contraception. Negative effects had to do mainly with the stress and pressure of 
performing their tasks for long hours, as well as juggling their jobs with their 
reproductive activities. Further, wives were sometimes scolded and insulted by their 
supervisors and thus were not respected as human beings. What is more, some 
developed health problems such as coughs, swollen joints, difficulty breathing, irritated 
skin, eye weakness and kidney pain from their assembly-plant work.  
Factors influencing wives’ welfare when they worked in an assembly plant are those 
inherent to salaried employment, the working conditions they offer, and social norms. 
As to the working conditions offered by maquilas, it is very important to highlight that 
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these were heterogeneous. On one end of the spectrum some offered benefits superior 
to those stipulated by the law, fewer working hours and better treatment of their 
workers by supervisors. On the other end were those factories which made employees 
work extra hours without pay; which did not provide benefits stipulated by the law; 
which had managers who scolded and pressured their employees; and those with 
insufficient health and safety provisions.  
As for social norms, these influence wives’ welfare when they work in diverse 
occupations through several channels. Foremost, as social norms prescribe that wives 
should not work in assembly plant jobs, they influence wives’ motivations to work for 
them. They do so through two mechanisms: internalisation and social sanctions. If a 
wife disregards the norm and works for an assembly plant, she and her husband will 
experience the guilt and social sanctions as direct costs that affect their well-being. 
Social norms also affect wives’ welfare when they work in assembly plant jobs through 
other means. As described previously, wives’ social role of responsibility? for 
household tasks affected their well-being by being a moral argument influencing their 
motivation to work in an assembly plant. Yet this role also influenced working wives’ 
welfare through other means. On one hand, it was generally perceived that wives had a 
duty to undertake household tasks regardless of whether or not they had a salaried job. 
Therefore when they did work in assembly plants they had to perform a substantial 
amount of housework, even when they obtained help, which came mainly from other 
female family members and to a lesser extent from their husbands. This added to the 
workload they had overall, was tiring for them and thus had a severe effect on their 
welfare. The social norm stipulating that wives were responsible for childcare also had 
an effect on their well-being. Given that assembly plants often made employees work 
extra and long hours, the quality of the childcare working wives could provide was 
strongly and negatively affected. It must be remembered that they and their husbands 
regarded their children’s care as a fundamental aspect of their well-being. In addition, 
the extra hours wives had to work and the effect this had on childcare also fed into the 
conflicts they had with their husbands, thus further affecting their welfare. 
Social norms are also imbedded in institutions. These institutions include the assembly 
plants themselves, governmental organisations, education, services, etc. Within 
assembly plants for example, managers can perceive women to be more passive and 
compliant and therefore might push them to work to obtain difficult production quotas 
and scold them. Similarly schools, presuming that wives have the role of child rearers, 
would sometimes demand their presence of in their daily activities, adding to the 
pressure for working wives. Thus the effect social norms have on wives who work in 
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assembly plants is ubiquitous, as these are imbedded in both individuals and 
institutions. 
 
 
2. How does the internalisation of different moral arguments by each spouse 
influence wives’ probability of employment in an assembly plant? 
 
Two of the three moral arguments validating the social norm that indicates that wives 
should not work for an assembly were related to spouses’ appropriate economic roles 
within the family. One of them specified that wives should stay at home to do the 
household chores, take care of children and attend on their husbands. The other stated 
that husbands had to be the breadwinners of their family. Both women and men 
believed it was their duty and responsibility within the marriage to fulfil these roles. But 
not only did each couple believe it was their duty to fulfil their ascribed social roles; they 
also expected and demanded that their partner fulfil theirs. What is more, they 
sometimes perceived it to be the sole purpose of their marriage.  
What is important to highlight is that these roles were viewed as an obligation instead 
of an option. This does not imply that individuals did not have the option to disregard 
the norm. Yet if they did so they would face feelings of guilt and remorse on one hand 
and sanctions from their reference groups on the other. In the absence of the norm, 
individuals would not have to face these costs, which could be prohibitive.  
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that while it was socially regarded as plausible for 
wives to work for an assembly plant, this did not imply that they ceased to have the 
responsibility for the household tasks. As such, it was inconceivable for husbands to 
take on these chores. While they did dedicate marginally more time to these activities 
when their wives worked in assembly plants, the idea of spouses exchanging their 
socially ascribed roles was implausible. 
In addition, there was the conception that if wives worked for an assembly plant, 
husbands ceased to fulfil with their socially ascribed roles as economic providers. This 
implicitly assumed that wives would take on a maquila job only to obtain an income, 
disregarding the possibility of their working to achieve other welfare outcomes. 
The third moral argument which stated that women who worked for an assembly plant 
were promiscuous also regulated wives’ behaviour. However, in this case, it had 
nothing to do with their appropriate economic duty but more to do with their sexual 
integrity. Probably because of the negative cast of this argument, individuals always 
referred to third persons upholding it, and rarely admitted to believing it.  
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Some argued that the sole reason wives sought jobs in assembly plant jobs was to find 
someone with whom to cheat on their husbands. Yet some debated these claims, 
stating that they were exaggerated. They would assert that people would invent stories 
just because a woman had a friendship or talked with a man. As importantly, while the 
idea of wives cheating on their husbands was strongly sanctioned, the idea of 
husbands cheating on their wives was viewed as more natural.   
The most widespread arguments for both husbands and wives were those related to 
spouses’ economic role within the household, especially that specifying that it was 
wives’ responsibility to be the homemakers. On the other end of the spectrum, a 
smaller proportion of spouses believed in the moral argument about wives being 
promiscuous. This could be due to the negative trait this moral argument implies. 
Furthermore, wives disagreed more widely with all moral arguments than husbands.  
As for wives’ beliefs in moral arguments, although they were most likely to disagree  
with their role as homemakers, this norm had the smallest effect on their propensity to 
work in assembly plants. It is presumed that this might have to do with this moral 
argument being so widespread that even wives that worked for an assembly plant 
upheld it. This line of reasoning is consistent with wives’ carrying out the main bulk of 
the household chores even when they work in the maquila. The moral argument which 
had the largest effect on wives’ probability to participate in assembly plant employment 
was that of men having to be the providers. Moreover, wives’ disagreement with the 
notion of women being promiscuous if they work for the maquila had marginally lower 
impact on this probability than the norm stating that men were the providers. Yet a 
lower proportion of wives believed in this last moral argument. While none of the 
disagreement variables for wives were significantly different from each other, it is still 
clear that each has a quality and impact of their own. It is therefore important to 
analyse separately the effect of each moral argument.  
In contrast, results indicated that husbands’ disagreement with each of the moral 
arguments had no significant effect on their wives engagement in maquila jobs. This 
was completely unexpected, not only because wives perceived that their husbands 
agreed more with each moral argument than they did, but also because of the 
widespread discourse implying husbands’ authority over wives’ freedom to work in the 
maquila. While this could be due to informal mechanisms wives use to negotiate with 
their husbands, it must be noted that this result could also be explained by the low 
proportion of wives (less than half) that negotiated with their husbands about working 
for an assembly plant. Further, while not significant (yet almost so), husbands’ beliefs 
regarding wives being promiscuous had the greatest impact on wives’ probability of 
employment in assembly plants. 
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One of the aims of this research was to discover whether differences between towns in 
wives’ participation rates in assembly plant employment was due to social norms. 
Participation rates in Chilac were much lower than those in Miahuatlan. This was 
consistent with the finding that fewer wives and husbands disagreed with all moral 
arguments in the latter than the former. Yet comparing the impact of each moral 
argument by town, it was found that being from Chilac rather than Miahuatlan only 
negatively influenced both spouses’ beliefs in the moral argument that wives were 
promiscuous. This was also the moral argument for which there was a much lower 
disagreement in Chilac than in Miahuatlan. Therefore the differences in the impact on 
participation between towns due to internalisation of norms were only driven by this 
moral argument. However, differences in wives’ rates of assembly plant employment 
between towns were so great that there must have been other direct influences, 
unrelated to beliefs in moral arguments, that drove these dissimilarities.   
Another goal of the research was to discover factors which influenced the 
disagreement with moral arguments by each spouse. It was found that years of 
education had a significant effect on wives’ beliefs in all moral arguments. It had the 
greatest effect on beliefs regarding their role as homemakers. On the other hand, 
education had a significant effect on husbands’ beliefs only for this last moral 
argument. This result is important, as higher education can be used as a policy aimed 
at improving women’s opportunities to achieve welfare. Not only does this variable 
improve women’s potential of obtaining a higher income, but it also erodes beliefs in 
moral arguments.  While this by itself improves wives’ welfare, it also increases their 
freedom to engage in salaried employment.  
Age is another important factor influencing disagreement with moral arguments by both 
spouses. The exception however, is that it does not significantly influence wives’ 
disagreement with the argument that they are the home-makers. This indicates how 
beliefs in moral arguments wane with each generation. Although the establishment of 
assembly plants offered wives the opportunity to achieve some positive functionings, 
norms restricting their participation, and thus their freedom to obtain them, are taking 
time to phase out.  
It was hypothesised in this research that spouses’ beliefs would depend on the 
occupation of the husband. Those who work in assembly plants interact with wives who 
also work there, and are thus violating the norm. Those who interact with wives who 
have disregarded the norm, might find their conventional notions challenged. On the 
other hand, husbands who are farmers participate in traditional activities and thus their 
views might not have been challenged. However, surprisingly, it was found that 
husbands’ employment in assembly plants had a negative influence on their 
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disagreement with every moral argument by each spouse. This was completely 
contrary to what was expected. However husbands employment in an assembly plant 
did have a direct effect on their wives’ propensity to work at one.. This might also be 
due to wives and husbands working for the same assembly plant to quieten suspicions 
regarding the wife’s infidelity to her husband. Therefore beliefs in the moral argument 
of wives being promiscuous might be indirectly influencing this outcome. 
Once a norm is naturalised in a society, individuals think of it as the natural order of 
things. It is when they experience life in another society they might come to challenge 
these norms. Thus, we tested whether living in a city or being born in one had an effect 
on spouses’ beliefs in moral arguments. It was found that overall living in a city has no 
effect on spouses’ beliefs in moral arguments. The exception, however, was living in a 
city for more than a year, which greatly influenced husbands’ beliefs in the moral 
argument of wives’ role as home-makers. Furthermore, wives who were born in a city 
tend to disagree to a greater extent with all moral arguments. Yet being born in a city 
only negatively influences husbands beliefs in moral arguments related to wives being 
promiscuous.   
Finally it was tested whether having a relative disregarding the norm had a positive 
influence on wives and husbands beliefs in moral arguments. To this effect, two kinds 
of relatives were considered: wives’ sisters and husbands’ sisters. Contrary to what 
was expected, the employment in an assembly plant of a wife’s sister had no effect on 
either spouse’s beliefs. However, where a husband’s sister worked in an assembly 
plant employment both spouses believed more in the moral argument that working 
wives were promiscuous. This effect was contrary to what was expected, as instead of 
confronting couples’ beliefs, the employment of husbands’ sisters in assembly plants 
actually reinforced them. These results, nevertheless, might be not be very strong due 
to correlated effects such as the sisters’ educational levels, which might be at play and 
are not controlled for in the estimations.  
Overall, there were not many factors that influenced the internalisation of norms. 
Results suggest that embedded moral arguments are difficult to change. With a few 
exceptions, neither having a close relation employed in an assembly plant nor living in 
a city for more than one year significantly changed spouses’ beliefs in moral 
arguments. Further, most of the factors which did have an impact on spouses’ beliefs 
had to do with their upbringing, such as being born in a city and their formal 
educational level.  
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3. How do social sanctions by each reference group, using each moral argument, 
influence wives’ probability of working in an assembly plant? 
The evidence from this study suggests that individuals do sanction spouses when 
wives disregard the social norm by working in the maquila, using several different 
moral arguments. Yet, while two of these arguments make reference to what is 
appropriate behaviour for wives, and one to husbands’ behaviour, each of these tends 
to be used regarding both spouses.  
Additionally, it was found that distinguishing between the two types of social sanctions, 
gossip and criticism, was pertinent. On occasions, when wives transgressed the social 
norm, information circulated between individuals making allusion to the event. These 
comments referred to how spouses were disregarding the moral arguments. In other 
instances, individuals directly confronted spouses by criticising them using each moral 
argument. In extreme cases, individuals close to the couple (for instance, one spouse’s 
mother) even tried to prevent wives from working in assembly plants, and thus breaking 
the norm. It is important to highlight, though, that spouses regarded that people 
gossiping about them was in itself a negative experience. It can therefore be 
considered a cost of breaking a social norm, which is separate from that of criticism. 
Furthermore, four reference groups that sanctioned spouses were identified: spouses, 
the wife’s family, the husband’s family, and friends and neighbours. Sometimes 
information on a spouse breaking a moral argument flowed from one group to another. 
For instance, gossip regarding a wife being promiscuous could start with friends but 
pass on to neighbours who would then tell her family members, who would finally 
criticise the couple directly. It was therefore presupposed that the closer the relation of 
the reference group to the couple, the likelier it was that they would sanction by 
criticising rather than gossiping. It was also assumed that the impact of sanctions on 
wives’ propensity to work in the maquila would be greater the closer the relation of the 
reference group to the couple.  
Gossip and criticism could include a series of derogatory epithets to condemn men who 
were not considered to be the breadwinners, and wives who were not complying with 
their roles as home-makers. In the case of the former, the epithets made reference to 
husbands being lazy and irresponsible. They also implied that these husbands were 
taking on the role of women and therefore not being manly enough. In instances they 
were even considered drunkards. In the latter case, they were considered crazy and in 
cases even called by the pejorative term ‘bitch’. Interestingly, while gossip and criticism 
were directed at wives on the counts of them not being good home-makers and 
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especially that they were neglecting their children, specific epithets to refer to their 
violation of the moral norm were not employed.  
Analysis of the extent to which each type of social sanction was employed in each town 
shows that gossip was more widely used than criticism. This makes sense as few 
individuals are willing to make an effort to directly confront those who break the norm. It 
was also found that wives perceived that they received more criticisms than their 
husbands. It must be noted, though, that these results are not significantly different 
from each other and thus need to be regarded with caution.  
Moreover, the extent of sanctions by each reference group using each moral argument 
differed greatly, as as did their effect on wives’ employment in assembly plants. It was 
found that wives largely believed they would be sanctioned on the counts of not 
complying with their role as home-makers. In particular, a large proportion believed 
they would be sanctioned by their families because of this argument.  Yet not only did 
their families largely make it their function to sanction wives, results suggest they were 
also very effective in doing so. The probability of a wife working in an assembly plant 
was significantly and largely affected by sanctions coming from her family.  
However, sanctions regarding husbands’ economic role followed a completely different 
pattern. Not only were they (and their wives) less likely to be sanctioned by their own 
family using this moral argument, but this sanction also had a smaller impact on wives’ 
probability of working in an assembly plant. Sanctions from friends and to a lesser 
extent neighbours were more widespread and had a greater effect on wives’ probability 
of working in the maquila.  
Comparing the reference groups whose sanctions had the greatest impact on wives’ 
probability of  assembly plant employment using the moral argument of wives being 
promiscuous, the results indicated that these followed the same pattern as those 
sanctions concerning men having to be the breadwinners. That is, sanctions from 
friends and neighbours had a larger effect on this probability than those from either 
spouse’s family. Therefore, the presumption that sanctions from reference groups that 
have a closer relationship to spouses will have a larger impact on wives’ probability of 
working in the maquila did not hold in the case of these two moral arguments.  
A very important finding is the strong influence that criticisms received by husbands 
from their friends (related to the previous moral argument regarding their wives being 
promiscuous) had on wives’ propensity to work in an assembly plant. Of all the 
sanctions upholding each moral argument and used by each reference group, this was 
the one which had the highest impact on this propensity. Furthermore, it must be noted 
that that husbands’ beliefs in this moral argument had a very strong effect on this same 
propensity. It therefore seems that this moral argument has a particular grip on 
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husbands, and thus a very influential effect on their resistance to their wives’ 
participation in assembly plant employment.  
Overall, these results indicate that valuable information would be overlooked by 
regarding social sanctions as if they homogeneously influenced wives’ propensity to 
work in assembly plants instead of disaggregating them by group, argument and 
destination. Furthermore, wives and husbands regarded different reference groups and 
moral arguments as significant for their preferences regarding this decision.  
Comparing the effects of sanctions between towns, it was found that a larger proportion 
of wives from Chilac expected to be sanctioned with the argument of wives being the 
home-makers, while a larger percentage of wives in Miahuatlan expected to be 
sanctioned with the arguments of husbands being the breadwinners and wives being 
promiscuous. Nevertheless, these findings do not suggest any significant difference in 
the impact of these sanctions by town on wives’ employment in assembly plants.  
  
 
4. How are decisions regarding women’s employment negotiated by couples, and 
how is this process influenced by social norms? 
 
At least at the discursive level, it was believed that if a wife wanted to work for an 
assembly plant she had to ask their husband’s permission to do so. Therefore, it was 
socially considered that husbands had authority over wives regarding this decision and 
wives had to convince their husbands to allow them to work in the maquila. Thus, 
socially, wives’ sense of agency was undermined and they were not regarded as 
humans in their own right. It must be acknowledged, however, that wives might be 
using some other informal mechanisms different from those used at the discursive 
level, which where not identified in this study, to negotiate their employment with their 
husbands. 
Husbands would also sometimes use other power mechanisms besides their authority 
over their wives. While apparently not widespread, the use of force in the form of 
physical violence was reported by some.  
The outcomes wives expected if they went to work for an assembly plant without their 
husbands’ permission ranged from divorce to bad quarrels with their husbands. Thus 
the threat points of neoclassical intra-household bargaining models take diverse forms.  
The most common strategy couples would use to negotiate about wives’ assembly 
plant employment was persuasion of the other partner. Yet because husbands had the 
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authority over this decision, it was wives who had to do the convincing.65 What is more, 
moral arguments were widely used as part of this strategy. In a first instance, it was 
common for wives to try to persuade their husbands to allow them work for an 
assembly plant by stating that his income was not enough to cover their household 
expenses. Given that it was husbands’ role to be the economic providers of the family, 
this would imply that they were not fulfilling this duty. As such, husbands would 
sometimes offer to work double shifts when faced with their wives’ indication that their 
income was insufficient. Conversely, husbands would also remind wives of their role as 
home-makers as a strategy to deny them permission to work for assembly plants. 
While this argument might represent their true motives, the fact that they were socially 
regarded as moral arguments upholding a norm would also give validation to their 
arguments.  
Interestingly, husbands would seldom make allusion to the possibility of their wives 
being unfaithful to them if they worked for the maquila. This result is interesting as 
there was evidence that both husbands’ belief in this moral argument and their 
expectations of being subject to social sanctions because of it had a very important 
effect on wives’ propensity to work in an assembly plant. This could be due either to 
husbands not explicitly expressing their fear of their wives being unfaithful to them, or 
to this fear not being widespread (it was the argument that fewer husbands agreed 
with), yet being quite powerful when they did.   
Thus social norms also had a fundamental influence on couples’ negotiation process 
regarding wives’ participation in assembly plant employment.  They did so firstly by 
specifying husbands’ authority over wives. Secondly, moral arguments validating the 
norm that wives should not work for assembly plants were used as reasons to 
persuade the other spouse. 
Finally, the extent to which each dimension of power was used in the negotiation 
process was analysed. While more information was needed to do this, some 
conclusions can be observed. Approximately half the wives wished to work in assembly 
plants. Further, a lower but still considerable proportion of wives did not negotiate the 
decision with their husbands. Therefore less than half actually engaged in this 
negotiation process with their husbands. This low share might be the reason why in 
general husbands’ beliefs in moral arguments did not have a significant effect on wives’ 
participation in assembly plants, while those of wives did.    
                                                 
65 Interestingly, the case in which a husband desires her wife to work while she didn’t was not 
encountered in the investigation. 
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Further, results indicate that a lower proportion of wives in Chilac than in Miahuatlan 
took on assembly plant jobs. This could be due to wives having less power in the first 
dimension in the later town than in the former. Yet this is also contrasted with their 
having less power in the third dimension. This means that a lower proportion of wives 
in Chilac than in Miahuatlan wished to go work due to their ascription to the social norm 
indicating that they should not do so.  
 
 
5. What Determines the Difference in Participation Rates between Chilac and 
Miahuatlán? 
 
A central query of this thesis was whether social norms could explain the lower 
participation rates in the maquila of wives in Chilac than in Miahuatlán. Throughout the 
thesis it was assessed whether the two mechanisms through which social norms 
operate; internalization of moral arguments and social sanctions from reference 
groups, were determinants of this dissimilarity of participation rates between towns.   
As for internalization of the moral arguments by spouses, it was encountered that a 
larger share of spouses disagreed with two of three of three of the moral arguments in 
Chilac than in Miahuatlán: wives having to be the homemakers and wives working for 
an assembly plant being promiscuous. As for the third moral argument, husbands 
having to be the homemakers, the percentage of spouses who disagreed with it was 
similar between towns. However, being from Chilac only had a significant influence on 
the probability of spouses disagreeing with the moral argument of wives being 
promiscuous.  Thus, pertaining to this town only had an impact on wives probability to 
participate in an assembly plant through the internalization of this moral argument. 
As for the different impact of social sanctions on wives engagement in the maquila by 
town; it was encountered that only a larger proportion of wives form Chilac expected to 
be the object of sanctions by all reference groups, for not complying with the moral 
argument of not being the homemakers if they work for an assembly plant. Yet, there 
was no evidence that gossip or criticism to them or their husbands with this, or the 
other two, moral arguments had a significant influence on wives probability to work for 
an assembly plant.  
Overall then, except for the internalization by spouses of the moral argument of wives 
who work for an assembly plant being promiscuous, there is not much evidence of 
social norms being the whole reason for wives lower participation rates in Chilac than 
in Miahuatlán. Therefore the question regarding which factors are the responsible for 
this outcome remains to be answered.  
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Another likely explanation for the lower participation rates of wives in the maquila in 
Chilac than in Miahuatlán, are the lower wages and benefits that assembly plants offer 
to wives in this town. As was observed in Table 6-2, assembly plants in Miahuatlán on 
average offer 100 pesos per week more to their employees than those in Chilac (700 
pesos versus 600 pesos). In terms of hourly income, they offered 2 pesos more to their 
employees (14 pesos versus 12). Thus, assembly plant workers in Chilac receive on 
average 15 per cent less in wages than workers from Miahuatlán. Furthermore, it must 
be reminded that imputed wages had a strong and significant effect on wives 
probability to participate in the maquila. Thus, there is sound evidence supporting the 
assertion that lower wages offered by maquilas in Chilac explain a great part of the 
lower participation rates in these jobs in this town.  
Moreover, a larger share of maquilas in Miahuatlán than in Chilac offer all types of 
benefits to their workers. For instance, 58% of maquilas gave social security to their 
workers in Miahuatlán compared to only 35% of those in Chilac. Also, 37.5% of 
assembly plants had nurseries in Miahuatlán, while only 15% of those in Chilac had 
one. It cannot be corroborated whether assembly plants offering benefits to their 
employees have a significant effect on wives probability to participate in assembly plant 
employment66. Yet, the importance families place in having access to the services and 
income these benefits provide, suggests that this is another plausible explanation of 
wives lower participation rates in maquilas in Chilac than in Miahuatlán. 
The reason as to why assembly plants offer lower wages and inferior benefits in one 
town than the other is not clear. A possible explanation could be the prevalence of 
larger maquilas in Miahuatlán than in Chilac. It must be reminded that there is a 
correlation between the size of the maquila and the wages and benefits they offer to 
their employees. Yet, another reason could be the prevalence of very small and poor 
towns surrounding Chilac, from which maquilas draw part of their workforce. The 
largest of these is San Juan Atzingo, a locality with a population of 2027 inhabitants. 
The Mexican institution Consejo Nacional de Poblacion y Vivienda (CONAPO), in 2005 
categorized this town as being very highly marginalized. Further, 72.8% of the 
population of this town has not even completed the primary formal level of education. 
As families seem to be much poorer in these small surrounding towns of Chilac, the 
                                                 
66 Information of which wives receive benefits can only be obtained for those who work in an 
assembly plant. Thus, this information is not available for wives who do not participate in the 
maquila. To include this variable in a regression, it must be known whether all wives, working 
and not working, would obtain a benefit . 
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reservation wages of individuals coming from them might be lower. Thus, this enables 
assembly plants to offer lower wages in Chilac. 
There is yet another possible alterative explanation for lower participation rates of 
wives in the maquila in Chilac. As was portrayed in Table 4-18, there are a much larger 
proportion of husbands who dedicate themselves to farming as their main activity in 
this town (49.5%) than in Miahuatlán (14%).  When a husband dedicates himself to 
farming, the duties and tasks of his wife are tied to this activity. For instance, it is 
common for farmer´s wives to help their husbands carry out some tasks in the field. 
Also, wives of farmers not only prepare the meals for members of the household, they 
also go to the fields to hand the food to their husbands. Francisco, a 70 year old man 
who used to be a farmer, explains how his wife used to accompany him while he 
performed his job when younger: 
 
“When we were young, she would recollect the wood, she would accompany me to the fields 
with the oxens, sometimes she would go and feed us. It was tiring in that she would have to 
wake up early, rinse the nixtamal67, go to the mill, come and turn on the fire, take care of the 
fire, it is a job that now no.. that is why now tortillas are done by machines.” “Sometimes I 
would think of going back to the oxens, but then the wife also goes back, one moves the home 
for the food, it is a hard job to have to follow to the fields.” 
 
Farmer´s wives will have less time available to participate in assembly plant 
employment. Thus, there is a strong basis to presume that being a farmer´s wife has a 
negative effect on her probability to work for the maquila, However, as regression 
results show, there is no significant evidence to support this claim. Having a husband 
whose main activity is farming, affects negatively wives probability to participate in 
assembly plant employment, but this effect is not statistically significant.  
Finally, one could wonder whether differences in household income could determine 
the lower participation rates of wives in Chilac than in Miahuatlán. Yet this is not a 
plausible argument as one would presume that a wife is more likely to participate in 
assembly plant employment the lower her household income and per capital household 
income is lower in Chilac than in Miahuatlán. The average household per capita 
income in Chilac is of 378 pesos while in Miahuatlán it is of 406 pesos. What is more, 
per capita household income was not a significant determinant of wives probability to 
work for an assembly plant. 
                                                 
67 “Nixtamalizar” is the process by which corn is boiled with lime. It is a process to prepare 
“tortillas” which is a flat bread made out of corn. 
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Thus, besides from the internalization of spouses of the moral argument of wives who 
work for an assembly plant being promiscuous, there is only evidence for the difference 
in wages offered by each town being a determinant of the different participation rates of 
wives in the maquila between Chilac and Miahuatlán. While the difference in benefits 
could also explain this divergence, there is no form to prove this econometrically. Being 
a farmer’s wife also seemed to be an important determinant of her probability to 
participate in the maquila, yet this variable was not significant in the regressions. 
9.3 Conceptual implications 
 
This section presents the main findings’ contributions to the conceptual and theoretical 
framework. The research employs the Capabilities approach to assess the welfare 
states of spouses. This approach is contrasted throughout with that of the normative 
neoclassical economics framework. However, several of the conceptualisations and 
methods of neoclassical economics are employed. Therefore,the main conceptual 
implications relate to both these frameworks and the concepts contained within them.  
 
1. What are the functionings wives can achieve by participating in assembly plant 
employment compared to those they can attain by being involved in traditional 
female activities? 
 
The results suggest that the Capabilities framework is an appropriate one to study the 
effects that assembly plant employment has on wives’ welfare. This type of 
employment has positive and negative effects on their opportunity to achieve 
functionings. An assessment of each individually as well as the factors which inhibit or 
enhance the achievement of them is necessary. This is true especially if the goal is to 
inform policies aimed at improving wives’ welfare.  
However, a drawback of the Capabilities framework which was elucidated in the 
conceptual framework and which was made evident in this study is that the 
achievement of functionings has an interdependent feature. This is so especially at the 
household level (Iversen 2003). Wives’ assembly plant employment will not only have 
an effect on their own welfare, but also on that of their husbands and especially their 
children. This is the case, for example, of husbands receiving criticism from their 
friends stating that their wives are loose because they work in an assembly plant. This 
might be a detriment to husbands’ self-worth and thus to his welfare. The question 
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arises then how to judge the state of wives’ welfare in comparison to their husbands.  
By focusing on the welfare of individuals, the Capabilities approach does not consider 
these interdependencies.   
Moreover, it should also be recognised that wives’ participation in assembly plant jobs 
also has positive and negative effects on their husbands’ welfare For example, 
husbands also enjoy the rewards that come from the greater income available to the 
household. Thus a clear-cut assessment of the effect of wives’ labour participation on 
husbands´ welfare is not clear either.  
Furthermore, individuals also place importance on other family members’ welfare. This 
was the case, for example, where husbands cared about how their wives were treated 
in an assembly plant. Yet, most importantly it was reflected in both spouses’ 
assignment of the utmost importance to their children’s welfare (at least in discourse). 
As such, the decision as to wives’ employment in assembly plants seemed a trade-off 
between providing quality childcare and obtaining additional income to purchase 
commodities, including education. Thus including children’s welfare in the analysis of 
wives’ well-being as a result of their engagement in the maquila was fundamental.  
The perception of having to choose between working in an assembly plant to be able to 
afford commodities (primarily education) for their children and staying at home to 
provide quality childcare shows that social norms and roles did indeed shape the 
perceived preferences of wives and husbands. Yet these preferences were not only 
shaped because they were the factors taken into consideration by spouses. Couples’ 
preferences were also influenced by social norms in their conception of what consists 
of quality childcare and education. Especially in the former, for example, some spouses 
insisted that no one, even grandmothers, could provide childcare as well as mothers. 
Furthermore, couples were highly suspicious of nurseries. Therefore, while leaving 
children in nurseries could be regarded as acceptable in some societies, in these towns 
many families believed that only mothers should care for their children. While care for 
children cannot be disregarded as a significant functioning, what is regarded as 
adequate childcare is complicated to determine.  
Another important element which is difficult to assess is the extent to which social 
norms affect wives’ agency and how it is influenced when they work for an assembly 
plant. Wives’ decisions within the household were limited to those regarding their 
reproductive roles. Additionally, their mobility was restricted and they therefore spent 
most of their time in the home. Thus their chances to meet friends were also curtailed. 
Although these are inexact indications of wives’ agency, they do suggest it is quite low. 
Wives who worked in an assembly plant had the chance to meet friends. There are 
also some indications that wives who participate in assembly plants have more power 
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in making decisions about large expenditures and contraception. Yet it could also be 
that wives who have a high level of agency are those who decide to go to work in an 
assembly plant. Thus the effect of wives’ employment in assembly plants on their 
agency is difficult to isolate.  
 
 
2. How does the internalisation of each moral argument by each spouse influence 
wives’ propensity to work in an assembly plant? 
 
Social norms have been defined in this research as informal rules, upheld by one or 
more moral arguments which explain why they are considered the appropriate 
behaviour to adopt. This definition differs from others used by some economists in that 
it considers the moral aspect of norms as fundamental to the analysis. Other definitions 
have disregarded this moral aspect with the aim of mathematical simplicity. The 
implications of this omission for neoclassical mathematical modelling will depend on 
whether feelings of guilt and remorse for disregarding a norm follow the axioms from 
which rational behaviour is constructed. Akerlof and Kranton (2000), for example, 
assume they do, and they just incorporate individuals’ internalisation of norms in the 
utility function as another independent variable. Yet even if this rationale is accurate 
and individuals’ internalisation of social norms does follow these axioms, it must be 
reminded that these will also shape the perceived preferences of individuals (i.e. the 
utility function itself). Thus while neoclassical mathematical formalisation is a useful tool 
in analysing and representing economic behaviour, it can be quite inaccurate when 
studying social norms.  
Further, this study also adds to previous empirical research on the influence of social 
norms on wives’ labour participation decisions. It does so by incorporating and 
distinguishing between the different moral arguments validating the social norm 
indicating that wives should not work in an assembly plant. Previous economic studies 
have not considered their effects. Moreover, it has been shown in this research that 
each influences wives’ in assembly plant employment in a dissimilar way. Therefore 
valuable information on the mechanisms through which social norms influence 
individuals has been disregarded in the past.  
These findings also support the premise that moral arguments are perceived as part of 
the natural order within which a society functions. Moreover, evidence suggests that 
once individuals have been naturalised into believing these arguments, their views on 
them do not easily change. This is so even when they confronted with societies where 
different and mutually incompatible beliefs exist. This is indicated by the small effect 
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that living in a city for more than a year had on couples’ disagreements with moral 
arguments. It is also suggested by the results indicating that even if husbands worked 
for an assembly plant and therefore had interacted with wives and husbands who had 
broken the norm, their beliefs in each moral argument were strengthened instead of 
weakened. Furthermore, besides formal education few factors were found to change 
beliefs in norms and the moral arguments that validated them.  
 
3. How do social sanctions by each reference group, using each moral argument, 
influence wives’ propensity to work in assembly plants? 
 
This research shows that individuals will sanction others seen violating a norm. Given 
that sanctioning is not a pleasurable activity, the question as to why an individual might 
sanction a person who breaks a social norm is raised. This is so especially if the 
neoclassical assumption of rationality is maintained.  Yet there was evidence in this 
research supporting the premise that individuals sanction due to the moral content of 
social norms. People feel displeasure by observing someone disregarding a moral 
argument. By criticising and gossiping about the event, they are judging the person 
who violates the norm and they are also condemning them. They might even take such 
an effort to try to stop the person from breaking the norm. The repercussions this other 
moral aspect has on the assumptions of rational choice also need to be further 
investigated.  
This research also supports the position that gossip and criticism need to be 
differentiated from each other. It must be recalled that Coleman (1990) stated that 
gossip in itself does not constitute a sanction given that it can spread without the 
person who is being gossiped about knowing. Yet the expectation of it spreading is 
enough for individuals to take it into consideration when deciding whether to disregard 
a social norm. This is sustained not only by the perceptions of spouses, which were 
recognised in the study, but also by the differential impact that gossip and criticism 
have on wives’ probability of working in assembly plants.  
 
4. How are decisions regarding women’s employment negotiated between 
spouses, and how are they influenced by social norms? 
 
In the conceptual framework, the neoclassical intra-household model was considered 
deficient on several counts. These mainly evolved around its implications for spouses’ 
well-being. First of all, being a neoclassical model, it assesses the utility each spouses 
obtains. It was posited in the conceptual framework, however, that utility is not an 
  
 
246 
 
optimal measure of well-being. Secondly, intra household models predict a Pareto 
efficient solution to couples’ bargaining problem. Nevertheless, a Pareto efficient 
solution might be one where one spouse has all the resources while the other is 
destitute. Alternatively, the Capabilities approach would consider each person’s 
capability and thus asses the well-being of each member of the household individually. 
However, evidence obtained in this research also supports the claim that there are 
interdependencies in the capabilities spouses can achieve. What might increase the 
achievement of functionings of one spouse might decrease that of another. However, 
this is a disadvantage of the Capability approach as it does not consider these 
interdependencies. Therefore, while the approach has a better criterion to asses an 
individual’s well-being, it also has drawbacks when taking the household as a unit of 
analysis.  
Another downside of the neoclassical intra-household models is that they do not fully 
describe the negotiating mechanisms that couples engage in. These results have 
shown that these mechanisms might themselves have welfare effects for spouses. This 
is so, for instance, in the case of couples quarrelling when negotiating this decision or 
when husbands use physical violence. Modelling the effect of the negotiating 
mechanisms on spouses’ utility functions in an intra-household model can be very 
intricate.  
Results show that social norms were also present in the negotiation process regarding 
wives’ assembly plant employment in several ways. Firstly, they indicated that 
husbands had authority over their wives regarding this decision. Secondly, arguments 
validating the norm stating that wives should not work in assembly plants were used as 
legitimate arguments in the negotiating process. Finally, they influenced the agency 
and willingness of wives to engage in this negotiating mechanism. Thus social norms 
also have an important effect on spouses’ bargaining processes, which go beyond 
being a determinant variable in a utility function. 
While this was the aspect that needed to be developed further in this research, 
distinguishing between the three dimensions of power of spouses in this decision-
making process also provided fruitful. First, by ignoring the second dimension of power 
in which a wife wishes to work for an assembly plant but does not negotiate with her 
husband, important information regarding her welfare and agency is neglected. 
Moreover, to distinguish the third dimension of power also helps isolate the effect of 
norms on wives’ agency and on how these norms affect their perceived preferences. 
Thus this three-dimensional view of power provides a much more complete picture of 
the negotiation process.  
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9.4 Main limitations  
 
 
Although most of the field work went smoothly and the majority of the relevant 
information to answer the research questions was gathered, some limitations were 
encountered by the study. Many of these were related to financial and time constraints. 
In spite of these, the thesis has raised a number of topics and issues for further 
exploration.   
This section reviews these limitations following the format of the previous sections. 
However, because the limitations in answering the second and third research questions 
were closely related to each other, these are presented together.  
 
 
1. What are the functionings wives can achieve by assembly plant employment 
compared to those they can attain by being involved in traditional female 
activities? 
 
Limitations in obtaining additional and more precise information on how wives’ 
employment in assembly plants had an impact on their achievement of functionings 
were due primarily to financial, time and scope restrictions. Obtaining information from 
the managers of assembly plants themselves would have been fruitful. Also, visiting in 
order to see how these plants operated would have also been useful. This would have 
allowed a comparison of spouses’ perceptions regarding wives’ welfare when working 
in a plant with what can be directly observed there. Yet, there was local uncertainty due 
to the presence of several workers’ rights campaigners, making managers fearful of 
providing information about their operations. For this reason, data-gathering was 
restricted to households only. 
Other methods for collecting data would have provided more precise information on 
wives’ welfare by occupation, for instance, using time diaries to obtain data on time 
allocation by wives and husbands. Further, more sophisticated methods for obtaining 
information regarding healthcare could have been used. However, in both cases this 
would have required more resources. 
 
2. How does the internalisation of each moral argument by each spouse influence 
wives’ propensity to work in assembly plants? 
3. How do social sanctions by each reference group, using each moral argument, 
influence wives’ propensity to work in assembly plants? 
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Following Manski (2004), initially the data on the extent to which each spouse believed 
in each moral argument, and the extent to which they believed they would be 
sanctioned, was going to be collected in the form of subjective probabilities. That is, 
individuals were going to be asked, on a scale from 1 to 100, how likely they believed 
this to be. According to Manski (2004), this type of data has two major advantages. The 
first is that probability provides a well-defined absolute numerical scale for responses, 
and thus provides a reason to think that these may be interpersonally comparable. 
Also, an empirical assessment of the internal consistency of respondents’ expectations 
is possible. A researcher can use the algebra of probability (Bayes’ Theorem, the Law 
of Probability, etc.) to examine the internal consistency of a respondent’s expectations 
about different events. Unfortunately, during the pilot survey, it was found that because 
of the lack of formal educational levels among wives, they were not able to answer in 
the form of subjective probabilities. For this reason the feasible next option, Likert scale 
questions, were posed. Yet, using these Likert scale responses in the empirical study 
would have had disadvantages, the main one being that they are not interpersonally 
comparable. Thus, instead answers were incorporated in the form of dummy variables. 
This also provided simplicity of interpretation and comparison when incorporated in the 
regression models.  
Furthermore, because of financial and time constraints the survey was applied to wives 
only. Therefore questions regarding husbands’ beliefs and expectations regarding 
social sanctions were not posed directly to them. Although it was assumed that wives 
knew their husbands well enough to have this information, it is also possible that data 
would have been more exact if these questions were asked of the husbands directly.  
The study examined whether having a relative, specifically a married sister or sisterin-
law, who worked in an assembly plant had an effect on spouses’ beliefs in moral 
arguments. However the results were not as expected. As explained previously in the 
research, this could be due to several correlated effects which were not controlled for in 
the estimations, since relevant information on sisters and sisters-in-law was not 
collected. Thus further research on the impact of the violation of a norm by members of 
a reference group on individuals’ beliefs in moral arguments could be useful.  
Finally, dummy variables representing beliefs in moral arguments were highly 
correlated with each other. While the omission of relevant variables in a regression 
model might lead to biased results, only one dummy variable was incorporated in each 
regression estimation due to this correlation. Dummy variables representing social 
sanctions also had this drawback.   
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4. How are decisions regarding women’s employment negotiated between 
spouses, and how are they influenced by social norms? 
 
The discourses regarding the negotiating mechanisms which spouses engaged in 
when wives wished to work for an assembly plant were identified. However, there could 
well be some informal negotiating mechanisms used by wives (and maybe husbands) 
that have not been identified in this study. Other qualitative methods could be useful to 
capture them, yet again because of financial and time restrictions, they were out of the 
scope of this research. 
Furthermore, the three-dimensional view of power was not expanded in the research, 
as initially intended, to study the effect of both internalisation and social sanctions on 
each dimension. This was not accomplished for several reasons. Partly, this was due 
to failure to recollect all the relevant information, but it also made it possible to narrow 
down the focus of the analysis with the aim of achieving empirical and estimation 
simplicity.  
 
9.5 Concluding remarks 
 
The aim of this research was to explore the mechanisms by which social norms 
restricted wives’ opportunities to achieve well-being by limiting their employment in 
assembly plants. In contrast to other studies on this subject, the Capabilities approach 
was employed both as a framework of thought and as a means to assess wives’ 
welfare.  The study also acknowledged the existence of moral arguments and 
distinguished the main channels through which they influenced wives’ employment in 
assembly plants. Although there is still a long way to go to fully understand the 
mechanisms by which social norms function and affect individuals’ economic 
behaviour, this thesis provides some useful insights toward this end.  
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Appendix 1: Interview Guides 
 
1. Interview Guide for Wives who Work for the Maquila. 
 
1) Where do you generally meet your friends? Do you get along with them?  
 
2) In general, what is the main occupation of your neighbours? Your married 
friends? Your married female family members? And those of your husband? 
 
3) Can you tell me, how was it that you decided to work for the maquila? When 
did you start working there? Where you already married? 
 
4) Have you ever worked in something else? If so, what did you like most, 
working there or in the maquila? Why? 
 
5)  Why did you decide to work in the maquila and not somewhere else? For 
example, as a saleswoman  
 
6) Do you like working in the maquila? Why? How do you think the working 
conditions compare to those of the maquila? 
 
7) How do you think that working in the maquila compares to working doing 
household tasks?  
 
8) Is there something that bothers your husband of you working in the maquila?  
 
9) If you worked somewhere else previously, was there something that bothered 
your husband of you working there? 
 
10) Have you known of any husbands that react violently when their wives work for 
the maquila? And when they work somewhere else? Has it ever happened to 
you that your husband reacted violently because you work? 
 
11) When you told your husband you wanted to work in the maquila, did he agree? 
 
12) If he didn’t, how did you convince him? 
 
13) In general, what do people in the community think of married women who work 
for the maquila? 
 
14) What do you think of women who work for the maquila? 
 
15)  Is there someone who does not agree on you working for the maquila? 
a. Do you believe they mention things behind your back? What do you 
think they say? How did you feel because of this? 
b. Do they mention something to you? What do they say? How did you 
feel because of this? 
c. Has somebody ever stop talking to you because you worked for the 
maquila? How did you feel because of this? 
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d. Did they ever stop helping you in some way? How did you feel because 
of this? 
 
16)  Has the gossip ever influenced your desires of working in the maquila? 
 
17)  What is it thought in the community of husbands of women who work for the 
maquila? 
 
18)  And about your husband,  
a. Do they say things behind his back? How does he feel about it? 
b. Would they mention something to him? How does he feel about it? 
c. Have they stop talking to him or helping him in some way?  
 
19) Do you think that gossip and criticism influence in any way your husband 
supporting you or not for working for the maquila? 
 
20) Does anybody support your decision to work for the maquila? 
 
21) Do you think 10 years ago it was normal for women to work for the maquila? 
Has there been any change in the way people in the community perceive 
women who work in the maquila? Why do you think this change occurred? 
 
2. Interview Guide for Wives who have never Worked 
 
1) Where do you generally meet your friends? Do you get along with them?  
 
2) In general, what is the main occupation of your neighbours? Your married 
friends? Your married female family members? And those of your husband? 
 
3) Currently, would you like to work for the maquila? why? What do you think you 
would and wouldn’t like? 
 
4) Would you like to work somewhere else? Where? How do you think that 
working there compares to working for the maquila? 
 
5) Do you like working at home only? How do you think it compares to working for 
the maquila?  
 
6) If you currently wanted to work for the maquila, what would your husband 
think? If he would not agree on you working, what do you think your husband 
would do to avoid you going to work? 
 
7) Have you known of any husbands that react violently when their wives work for 
the maquila? Do you think it could happen to you if you worked for the 
maquila? 
 
8) In general, what is it said in the community of married women that work for the 
maquila? 
 
9) What do you think of women who work for the maquila? 
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10)  If you worked for the maquila, would there be someone who would not agree 
with you working? Who? 
a. Do you believe they would mention things behind your back? What do 
you think they would say? How would you feel? 
b. Would they mention something to you? What would they say? How 
would you feel? 
c. Would somebody stop talking to you because you worked for the 
maquila? How would you feel? 
d. Would they ever stop helping you in some way? How did you feel 
because of this? 
 
11) What is it thought in the community of husbands of women who work for the 
maquila? 
 
12)  And about your husband,  
a. Would they say things behind his back? How would he feel about it? 
b. Would they mention something to him? How would he feel about it? 
c. Would they stop talking to him or helping him in some way?  
 
13) Do you think that gossip and criticism influence in any way your desire to work 
or not for the maquila? 
 
14) Do you think that gossip and criticism influence in any way your husband 
supporting you or not in working for the maquila? 
 
15) If you wanted to work in the maquila, would anybody support your decision? 
who 
 
16) Do you think 10 years ago it was normal for women to work for the maquila? 
Has there been any change in the way people in the community perceive 
women who work in the maquila? Why do you think this change occurred? 
 
3. Interview Guide for Wives who do not Work but have Done so in the Past 
 
 
1) Where do you generally meet your friends? Do you get along with them?  
 
2) In general, what is the main occupation of your neighbours? Your married 
friends? Your married female family members? And those of your husband? 
 
3) You have told me that you previously worked as an employee? How was it that 
you decided to work? Where you married already?  
  
4) Why did you stop working?  
 
5) Was there someone who did not agree on you working? 
a. Do you believe they mentioned things behind your back? What do you 
think they said? How did you feel because of this? 
b. Did they mention something to you? What did they say? How did you feel 
because of this? 
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c. Did somebody ever stop talking to you because you worked? How did you 
feel because of this? 
d. Did they ever stop helping you in some way? How did you feel because of 
this? 
 
6) Did this gossip and criticism influence you to stop working? 
 
7) Is there something that bothers your husband of you working in the maquila?  
Did your husband influence you in any way to stop working? how? 
  
8) Have you known of any husbands that react violently when their wives work? 
Did it ever happen to you when you worked? 
 
9) Would you currently like to work for the maquila? Why? What do you think you 
would and wouldn’t like? 
 
10) Would you like to work somewhere else? Where? How do you think that 
working there compares to working for the maquila? 
 
11) Do you like working at home only? How do you think it compares to working for 
the maquila?  
 
12) If you currently wanted to work for the maquila, what would your husband 
think? If he would not agree on you working, what do you think your husband 
would do to avoid you going to work (if he would not agree)? 
 
13) Have you known of any husbands that react violently when their wives work for 
the maquila? Do you think it could happen to you if you worked for the 
maquila? 
 
14) In general, what is it said in the community of married women that work for the 
maquila? 
 
15) What do you think of women who work for the maquila? 
 
16)  If you worked for the maquila, would there be someone who would not agree 
with you working? Who? 
a. Do you believe they would mention things behind your back? What do 
you think they would say? How would you feel? 
b. Would they mention something to you? What would they say? How 
would you feel? 
c. Would somebody stop talking to you because you worked for the 
maquila? How would you feel? 
d. Would they ever stop helping you in some way? How did you feel 
because of this? 
 
17) What is it thought in the community of husbands of women who work for the 
maquila? 
 
18)  And about your husband,  
a. Would they say things behind his back? How would he feel about it? 
b. Would they mention something to him? How would he feel about it? 
c. Would they stop talking to him or helping him in some way?  
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19) Do you think that gossip and criticism influence in any way your desire to work 
or not in working for the maquila? 
 
20) Do you think that gossip and criticism influence in any way that your husband 
would support you or not in working for the maquila? 
 
21) If you wanted to work in the maquila, would anybody support your decision? 
who 
 
22) Do you think 10 years ago it was normal for women to work for the maquila? 
Has there been any change in the way people in the community perceive 
women who work in the maquila? Why do you think this change occurred? 
 
4. Husbands of Wives who Work in the Maquila 
 
 
1) Where do you generally meet your friends? Do you get along with them?  
 
2) In general, what is the main occupation of your female married neighbours? 
The wives of your married friends? Your married female family members? And 
those of your wife? 
 
3) Can you tell me, how was it that your wife started working for the maquila? 
When did she start working there? Where you already married? 
 
4) Did your wife ever work in something else?  
 
5) Why does she work in the maquila and not somewhere else? For example, as 
a saleswoman  
 
6) What do you think are the advantages of your wife working in the maquila in 
comparison to other places 
 
7) Do you like your wife working for the maquila? Why? 
 
8) In which ways do you think that your wife working in the maquila compares to 
her working only on household tasks?  
 
9) Did you agree when your wife wanted to work in the maquila?  
 
10)  If you did not agree, how did she convince you? How was the negotiation 
process 
 
11) In general, what do people in the community think of women who work for the 
maquila? 
 
12) What do you think of women who work for the maquila? 
 
13)  Is there someone who does not agree on your wife working for the maquila? 
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a. Do you believe they mention things about your wife behind your back? 
What do you think they say? 
b. Do they mention something to her? What do they say? 
c. Has somebody ever stop talking to her because you worked for the 
maquila?  
d. Did they ever stop helping you her in some way?  
e. How did she feel because of this? 
 
14)  Has the gossip and criticism ever influenced your wives desires of working in 
the maquila? 
 
15)  What is it thought in the community of husbands of women who work for the 
maquila? 
 
16)   And of you,  
a. Do they say things about you behind your back? How do you feel about 
it? 
b. Would they mention something to you? How do you feel about it? 
c. Have they stop talking to him or helping him in some way?  
 
17) Do you think that gossip and criticism influence in any way that your desires of 
your wife working or not for the maquila? 
 
18) Does anybody support your wife’s decision to work for the maquila? 
 
19) Do you think 10 years ago it was normal for women to work for the maquila? 
Has there been any change in the way people in the community perceive 
women who work in the maquila? Why do you think this change occurred? 
 
5. Husbands of Wives who have Never Worked 
 
1) Where do you generally meet your friends? Do you get along with your 
friends?  
 
2) In general, what is the main occupation of your neighbours? Of the wives of 
your married friends? Your married female family members? And those of your 
wife? 
 
3) Do you think there would be any advantage of your wife working for the 
maquila? 
 
4)  How do you think your wife staying at home compares to her working for the 
maquila?  
 
5) Do you think your wife would like to work for the maquila? 
 
6) If your wife would currently want to work for the maquila, would you agree? 
How do you think she would convince you? What would you do to convince her 
otherwise (if he does nor agree)? 
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7) In general, what is it said in the community of married women that work for the 
maquila? 
 
8) What do you think of women who work for the maquila? 
 
9)  If your wife worked for the maquila, would there be someone who would not 
agree it? Who? 
a. Do you believe they would mention things about your wife behind her 
back? What do you think they would say? How would she feel? 
b. Would they mention something to her? What would they say? How 
would she feel? 
c. Would somebody stop talking to her is she worked for the maquila? 
How would she feel? 
d. Would they ever stop helping her in some way if she worked in the 
maquila? How did you feel because of this? 
 
10) Do you think criticism and gossip influences your wives desires to work for the 
maquila in any way? 
 
11) In general, what is it thought in the community of the husbands of women who 
work for the maquila? 
 
12)  And about you if your wife worked for the maquila,  
a. Would they say things behind your back? How would you feel about it? 
b. Would they mention something to you? How would you feel about it? 
c. Would they stop talking to you or helping you in some way?  
 
13) Do you think that gossip and criticism influence in any way your desires of your 
wife working or not for the maquila? 
 
14) If your wife wanted to work in the maquila, would anybody support her to do 
so? Who? 
 
15) Do you think 10 years ago it was normal for women to work for the maquila? 
Has there been any change in the way people in the community perceive 
women who work in the maquila? Why do you think this change occurred? 
 
6. Husbands of Wives who do not Work but have Done so in the Past 
 
1) Where do you generally meet your friends? Do you get along with them?  
 
2) In general, what is the main occupation of your neighbours? Of the wives of 
your married friends? Your married female family members? And those of your 
wife? 
 
3) You have told me that you previously worked as an employee? How was it that 
you decided to work? Where you married already?  
  
4) Why did your wife stop working?  
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5) Was she already married? If so, was there something that bothered you of her 
working? If so, did you try to convince her to stop working? How? 
 
6) Was there some other person that did not agree on your wife working? 
a. Do you believe they mentioned things behind your wife’s back? What do 
you think they said? 
b. Did they mention something to her? What did they say? 
c. Did somebody ever stop talking to her because she worked?  
d. Did they ever stop helping to her in some way?  
e. How did your wife feel because of this? 
 
7) Do you think there is an advantage of your wife working for the maquila? And 
of her working in any other activity? 
 
8) Do you think your wife would currently like to work for the maquila? 
 
9) If your wife would currently want to work for the maquila, would you agree? 
How would she try to convince you? How would you try to convince her of not 
working (if he does not agree)? 
 
10) In general, what is it said in the community of married women that work for the 
maquila? 
 
11) What do you think of married women who work for the maquila? 
 
12) If your wife worked for the maquila, would there be someone who would not 
agree it? Who? 
a. Do you believe they would mention things about your wife behind her 
back? What do you think they would say? How would you feel? 
b. Would they mention something to her? What would they say? How 
would she feel? 
c. Would somebody stop talking to her is she worked for the maquila? 
How would she feel? 
d. Would they ever stop helping her in some way if she worked in the 
maquila? How did you feel because of this? 
 
13) Do you think criticism and gossip influences your wives desires to work for the 
maquila in any way? 
 
14) In general, what is it thought in the community of the husbands of women who 
work for the maquila? 
 
15)  And about you if your wife worked for the maquila,  
a. Would they say things behind your back? How would you feel about it? 
b. Would they mention something to you? How would you feel about it? 
c. Would they stop talking to you or helping you in some way?  
 
16) Do you think that gossip and criticism influence in any way your desires of your 
wife working or not for the maquila? 
 
17) If your wife wanted to work in the maquila, would anybody support her to do 
so? Who? 
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18) Do you think 10 years ago it was normal for women to work for the maquila? 
Has there been any change in the way people in the community perceive 
women who work in the maquila? Why do you think this change occurred? 
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Appendix 2:  Survey  
 
Locality_____________ 
Street Name_____________ Number______ between Streets______________________________ 
 
Date  |__|__|__|__|                              Starting time  |__|__:__|__|               Ending time  |__|__:__|__| 
  
Interviewee’s characteristics 
  
1a. How old are you?                                                                             |__| 
 
1b. Up to what grade and school year did you study? 
a) Grade                          |___|                           b)Year                |___|             
 
0) None 
1) Preschool 
2) Primary  (first six years of schooling) 
3) Secondary  (following three years) 
4) High school  (three years before university) 
5) Degree to be a school teacher 
6) Technical career  
7) University degree 
8) Post grad 
99) Does not know, did not answer 
 
1c. What is your marital status? (read alternatives) 
1) Married 
2) Single 
3) Widow 
4) Live together 
5) Divorced or separated 
6) Other 
7) Does not know, did not answer 
 
1d. Do you speak an indigenous language? 
1) Yes                               1da) ¿Which one? ______________________ 
2) No        
 
1e. Which is your main activity? 
 
1f. Which is the main activity of your husband? 
 
1g. Does your husband have another activity? 
1) Yes                               1ga) ¿Which one? ______________________ 
2) No        
 
1h. Do all the people that live in this house share the same allowance?           |__| 
1) Yes       Pass to 2a.          
2) No        Continue 
 
1i. How many other households are there who share the allowance and prepare food separately?   |__| 
2. ¿Who are the household members, beginning with your husband?  
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*Código para 2a).   01) Spouse                        05) Mother father                  09) Grandson /daughter        13) Cousin 
                                          02) Son/daughter              06) Mother/father in law)      10) Grandfather/mother        14) Worker                                              
.                                         03) Step son/daughter       07) Brother/sister                  11) Uncle/aunt                      15) Other (Specify)  
                                          04) Son/daughter in law    08) Brother/sister in law        12) Niece   
 
Dwelling Characteristics     
 
3a. The house you live in is…   (Read all options)                         |___|                                      
 1)  your property but you are still paying for it 
 2)  your property and is paid for 
 3)   Lent 
 4)  Rented        Pass to 3c.     
 5)  Other: ___________________          
 6)  NK                                                
 2a.  
Relatio 
nship 
 
2b.  
Sex? 
 
1)Male 
2)Female 
 
 
2c. 
Age? 
 
 
2d.  
¿Study level? 
  
0)None 
1) Preschool 
2) Primary 
3) Secondary 
4 )High School 
5) Normal 
6)Technical 
Career 
7) Professional 
8) Post grad 
99)NK 
 
2e. 
¿Main 
acti 
vity? 
 
2f.  
During 
the last 
year did 
he/she 
contribut
e to 
househol
d 
income? 
 
1)Yes → 
2) No 
 
2g. ¿From April 
2005 to April 
2006, for how 
long did he/she 
work? 
 
 
1) Days   
2) Weeks  
3) Months 
4) Other specify  
5) NK   
 
 
2h. ¿From April 
2005 to April 
2006, how much 
did he/she 
receive for her 
job or activity? 
1) daily   
2) weekly    
3) monthly   
4) biweekly    
5) by piece 
6) other specify  
7) NK   
 
 
    Level 
 
Year 
 
  Quan 
tity 
Pe 
riod 
Quan 
tity 
Pe 
riod 
A) |___|    |___| 
    
|___|  |___| |___|         |___| |___|   |___|    |___|  |___|   
B) 
 
|___| 
 
   |___|      |___| |___|    |___|        |___|      |___|   |___|    |___|  |___|   
C) 
 
|___| 
 
  |___|      |___| |___|    |___|        |___|      |___|   |___|    |___|  |___|   
D) 
 
|___|   |___|      |___| |___|    |___|        |___|      
 
|___|   |___|    |___|  |___|   
E) 
 
|___| 
 
  |___|      |___| |___|    |___|        |___|      |___|   |___|    |___|  |___|   
F) 
 
|___| 
 
  |___|      |___| |___|    |___|        |___|      |___|   |___|    |___|  |___|   
G) 
 
|___|   |___|      |___| |___|    |___|        |___|      |___|   |___|    |___|  |___|   
H) 
  
|___| 
 
 |___|       |____| |___|    |___|        |___|       |___|   |___|    |___|  |___|   
I) 
 
|___| 
  
  |___|      |____| |___|    |___|        |___|       |___|   |___|    |___|  |___|   
J) 
 
|___| 
 
  |___|      |____| |___|    |___|        |___|       |___|   |___|    |___|  |___|   
K) 
 
|___| 
 
  |___|      |____| |___|    |___|        |___|       |___|   |___|    |___|  |___|   
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3b. Who owns the house?                          |___| 
1) Interviewee    
2) Spouse    
3) Father/mother    
4) Father/Mother in law  
5) Brother/Sister    
6) Brother/Sister in law       
7) Other (Specify)    
 
3c. What material is your house made of?          |___| 
 1)  Brick                     
 2) Wood                               
 3)  Sun dried brick                                 
 4)  Asbestos plate              
 5)  Carton plate              
 6)  Other (Specify)               
 7)  NK                                 
 
3d. How many rooms do you use for sleeping?      |___|   
 
3e. Your house has: 
 
1) Yes 
2) No   
3)Nk  
a) Electric Energy                   |___| 
b) Drinking Water                       |___| 
c) Sewage                                  |___| 
d) Telephone                                |___| 
 
Lived in Another Locality 
 
4a. How many years have you lived with your partner/husband?                 |____| 
  
4b. When you started living with your partner/husband, did you…    (Read all options)             |____| 
1. Live alone as a couple?                        
2. Live alone as a couple with your respective children?                      
3. Live with your parents?          
4. Live with your husband’s parents?           
5. Live with other family members of yours?                      
6. Lived with other family members of your husbands?     
7. Other? Specify                                           
        99.   Not reply                                     
  
4c. Where you born in this community?                                                 |___| 
1. Yes         pass to 4g.               
2. No          Continue          
       
4d. Where were you born?___________________       
 
4e. The place where you were born was?…    (Read all options)        |___|                   
1) Town                        
2) City                         
3) Ranch settlement                    
4) Communal land                           
5) Hacienda                     
6) Vila                            
7) Other, Specify       
8) Nk                      
  
4f. How many years have you lived in this community?                   |____| 
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4g. Since you were 12 years old, have you lived outside this community? (not counting the place were you 
where born)   |___|            
1) Yes                Continue                                  
2) No                 Pass a  4i 
 
4h. ¿Since you were 12, which are the places you have lived in outside this community for longer than a 
year?  
4ga.  
Place  
(name) 
 
4gb. The place was a:  
1) Town                      5) Hacienda 
2) City                        6)Vila 
3) Ranch                    7) Other specify 
4) Communal land     8)NS/NC 
4gc.How 
many years  
did you live 
in…? 
 
4gd. What was the motive you lived 
there? 
1) Her work                      4) She got  married 
2) Her husbands work      5)Her family moved there 
3) Study                            6)Other (Specify) 
A)                         |___|   |____|                            |___| 
B)                         |___|   |____|                            |___| 
C)                         |___|   |____|                            |___| 
 
4i. Was your husband born in the community?                                              |___| 
1) Yes            Pass to 4m          
2) No          Continue       
 
4j. Where was your husband from?____________________   
 
4k. The place your husband was from was a                                               |___| 
1) Town                        
2) City                        
3) Ranch                   
4) Communal land                          
5) Hacienda                     
6) Vila                           
7) Other, Specify        
8) Nk                       
 
4l. How many years has your husband lived in this community?               |____| 
 
4m .Since your husband was 12 years old, did he ever live outside this community for longer that a year?  
(not counting the place he was born)?                                                                              |___|                    
1) Yes                 Continue                                              
2) No                  Pass to  5a. 
 
 
4na. 
Place 
 
4nb. The place was:  
1) Town                     5) Hacienda 
2) City                       6)Vila 
3) Ranch                   7) Other, specify 
4) Comunal land      8)NS/NC 
4nc.¿How 
many years  
did he live 
in…? 
 
4nd. ¿Which was the motive he lived 
there? 
1) Her work                      4) She got  married 
2) Her husbands work      5)her family moved there 
3) Study                            6)Other (Specify) 
A)                         |___|          |___|                            |___| 
B)                         |___|          |___|                            |___| 
C)                         |___|          |___|                            |___| 
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5. Employment 
 
 
5a. Since you were 10 years old, did you ever work as an employee in exchange of a salary?               |___| 
1) Yes       Continue      
2) No       pass to  6a.    
 
5b. When you worked for the first time…     
 
 a) It was in?                                                   |___| 
   1)    Maquila  
   2)    In a house (as maid)  
                                                                3)    In a store 
                                                                4)    Other (Specify) _______________ 
  
 b)  How old were you?                                                                |_____| 
 
 
 c) What was your marital status?                                                    |___| 
1) Married            
2) Single             
3) Widow             
4) Living with a partner     
5) Divorced-Separated    
6) Other                 
7) Nk                
 
5c. Since you got married or lived with your partner, did you ever work in exchange of a salary, even if it 
was for a short period of time?                                                                                                                                                
|___| 
1) Yes                   Continue    
2) No                    Pass to  5f.   
 
5d. How difficult was it to convince your husband to agree on you working? (READ OPTIONS)                       
|___| 
1) A lot  
2) Some    
3) Little    
4) Nothing   
5) It was his idea               Pass to 5f 
 
5e. How did you convince your husband to agree on you working? (Read and tick all those that apply) 
1) Said money was needed for the education of their children                             |___| 
2) Said money was needed for household expenses                                              |___| 
3) Said money was needed to construct a house                                                   |___| 
4) Offered to do more household chores                                                               |___| 
5) Offered not to neglect her household chores                                                     |___| 
6) Told him he would leave him if he didn’t agree                                                 |___| 
7) It was an agreement they had before they got married                                      |___|                         
8) Other (Specify)  ____________________                                                          |___| 
 
5f. From April 2005 to April 2006 did you work as an employee in exchange of a salary even if it was for a 
short period of time?                                                                                                                                                         
|___|                                                                                                                                                                  
1) Yes           Continue   
2) No            Pass to 6a. 
 
5fa. ¿In how many places did you work, from April 2005 to April 2006?                         |___|                                             
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From April 2005 to April 2006, In which places did you work? (from the first until the last) 
 Job  A) B) C) 
5fb. Which was your responsibility?  
 
   
5fc. How often did you get paid?*             |___|               |___|               |___|   
5fd. How much income did you earn in each 
period?  
$  |___________|   
 
$  |___________|   
 
$  |__________|   
 
5fe. Currently, the minimum wage is of $ 
45.81 pesos, the quantity you obtain from 
your job is?: (Read options) 
1)   Less                                  6)   From 5 to 10  m.w.?  
2)   Equal to this quantity      7)   De 10  m.w. ?  
3)   From 1 to  2  m.w.?         8)   Did not answer 
4)   From 2 to 3  m.w..?         9)   N.k. 
5)  From 3 to  5  m.w.?   
 
 
            |___|   
 
 
            |___|   
 
 
           |___|   
5ff. ¿Which days and how many hours and 
minutes did you usually dedicate to your 
job? 
                      Monday              
                      Tuesday             
                      Wednesday        
                      Thursday                 
                      Friday            
                      Saturday             
                      Sunday         
 
 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
 
 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
 
 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
|___| hrs |___| min 
5fg. For how long did you work there? 
 
|___| years 
|___| months 
|___| weeks 
|___| days 
|___| years 
|___| months 
|___| weeks 
|___| days 
|___| years 
|___| months 
|___| weeks 
|___| days 
5fh. Approximately, ¿how many persons, 
including the owner, work in this place? 
1)  2 to 5 people             6)  101 to  250 people 
2)  6 to 15 people           7)  251 to 500 people 
3)  16 to 20 people         8)  501 and more people 
4)  21 to 50 people         9) NS 
5)  51 to 100 peoples 
 
 
            |___|   
 
 
           |___|   
 
 
           |___|   
5fi. How did you find out about this job?? 
5) Did you go directly to the place? 
6) Through a friend or family 
7) She got offered the job 
8) It was announced in a public place 
9) Other (Specify) _______________ 
             
 
            |___|   
 
 
           |___|   
 
 
            |___|   
5fj. In that job they provided: 1) Yes  2) No 
3)Nk 
(ask each one)  
 
 
  
   a) End year money, obligatory by law             |___|              |___|              |___|   
   b) Paid holidays              |___|              |___|              |___|   
   c) Utility repartition, obligatory by law             |___|              |___|              |___|   
   d) Credit to buy home             |___|              |___|              |___|   
   e) Nursery             |___|              |___|              |___|   
   f) Time for maternal care                                  |___|              |___|              |___|   
   g) Social Security             |___|              |___|              |___|   
   h) Permission for school meeting              |___|              |___|              |___|   
   i) Permission to be absent one day              |___|              |___|              |___|   
5fk. In this job,  (ask each one)              |___|               |___|               |___|   
   a) Did you have to work extra hours?             |___|               |___|               |___|   
   b) Did the managers scold you?              |___|               |___|               |___|   
   c) Did the manager sexually harass you?             |___|               |___|               |___|   
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   d) Did your work fellows sexually harass you?             |___|               |___|               |___|   
   e) Do you have the possibility of getting  
promoted? 
            |___|               |___|               |___|   
   f) Do you get money discounted if you are 
absent a day? 
              |___|               |___|   
   g) Would they discount money if you were 
late? 
            |___|               |___|               |___|   
*CODIGO PARA 5fc.    1)  Monthly                            4)     Daily                                   7) Did not want to answer                        
                                          2)  Every 2 weeks                  5)     Gets paid by piece 
                                         3)  Each week                        6)     Could not tell 
 
       5g   In the last year, for how many periods longer than a week have you stopped working for?           |___|   
if they are cero, pass to 5i 
 
5ha. Period 5hb. Reason for which she 
stopped working 
5hc. How many days did she stop 
working? 
1                    |___|                      |______|   
2                    |___|                                 |______|   
3                    |___|                      |______|   
4                    |___|                      |______|   
     * 5hb CODE               1) Holidays                                  5) Arrange personal matters                    9) Maquila closed             
                                          2) Own illness                             6) Husband did not want her to work      10) Changed jobs 
                                         3) Illness children                        7) Finished saving what she needed       11) Works temporarily                  
                                         4) Illness other family member    8) Maquila closed temporarily               12) Other (Specify)  
 
5i. Who decides how your salary is used?  (Read and tick all answers that apply)  
1)  Interviewee                   |___|              6) Her mother                       |___|   
2)  Her husband                |___|              7) Her children                      |___|   
3)  Her mother in law        |___|              8) Her siblings                      |___|   
4)  Her father in law          |___|              9) Other (specify)                 |___|   
5)  Her father                     |___|   
 
5j. Who helps you by taking care of your children when you work?  (Read and tick all answers that apply) 
1) Mother                                |___|             5)  Daughter                                 |___|   
2) Mother in law                     |___|             6)  Nursery                                    |___|   
3) Sister                                   |___|             7)  Does not have children           |___|   
4) Sister in law                        |___|             8)  Other, Specify _________      |___|   
 
5k. Last week, did you continue working as an employee in exchange of a salary?              |___| 
1) Yes                     pass to  5n 
2) No                      continue 
 
5l.For which reason did you stop working?                                                   |___| 
1) Holidays                                        5)   Arrange personal matters                       9)    Maquila closed                                   
2) Own illness                                   6)   Husband did not want her to work        10)    Changed jobs                                
3) Illness children                             7)   Finished saving what she needed           11)   Has not found a job                       
4) Illness other family member         8)   Maquila closed temporarily                   12)   Other, which one? 
__________      
                                       
5m. Do you plan to go back to work?                                                                                                     |___| 
1) Yes           a.  In how many days?         |_________|        Continue   
2) No                                                                                            Pass to 6a 
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5n.  If it were not economically necessary for you to work, would you like to work in a maquila anyway?          
 
1) Yes              5na. why?       (Read and tick all answers that apply)                                                                       
1. She likes to work                                        |___| 
2. To learn a new occupation                         |___| 
3. She likes the atmosphere                             |___| 
4. She gets bored at home                               |___| 
5. For personal development                          |___| 
6. To have her own money                              |___| 
7. Other (Specify)______________                |___| 
2) No           5nb. why?            (Read and tick all answers that apply)                                                              
1. Neglect her home                                        |___| 
2. Neglect her children                                   |___| 
3. It is very tiring                                            |___| 
4. Salary is very low                                       |___| 
5. Does not like the atmosphere                     |___| 
6. Risks to be changed for another woman    |___| 
7. Earns  more where she currently works    |___| 
8. She likes more staying at home                  |___| 
 
 
5o. Now imagine you could choose a working timetable earning the same as you do right now per hour… 
     5oa. From what to what time would you like to work on a weekday? From  |___:___| hrs  to   |___:___| 
     5ob. From what to what time would you like to work on Saturdays?  From  |___:___| hrs  to  |___:___|  
     5oc  From what to what time would you like to work on Sundays?    From  |___:___| hrs  to   |___:___|  
                                                                                        Pass to 6l. 
 
6a. Currently, would you like to work in the maquila?                                                                                      
|___| 
1) Yes             pass to 6c. 
2) No            continue 
 
6b. If your husband would agree on you working in the maquila, would you like to work there?                      
|___| 
1) Yes             continue. 
2) No              pass to 6d 
 
6c Why would you like to work in the maquila?  (Read and tick all answers that apply)                                           
1. She likes to work                                         |___| 
2. To learn a new occupation                          |___| 
3. She likes the atmosphere                             |___| 
4. She gets bored at home                               |___| 
5. For personal development                          |___| 
6. To have her own money                              |___| 
7. Other (Specify)______________                |___|                Pass to 6e                                                                                
 
6d. Why would you like to work in the maquila?  (Read and tick all answers that apply)                                                       
1. Neglect her home                                        |___| 
2. Neglect her children                                    |___| 
3. It is very tiring                                             |___| 
4. Salary is very low                                        |___| 
5. Does not like the atmosphere                      |___| 
6. Risks to be changed for another woman     |___| 
7. Earns more where she currently works     |___| 
8. She likes more staying at home                   |___|            Pass to  6i 
 
6e Have you ever told your husband you want to work for the maquila?                                         |___| 
1) Yes         Continue                       
2) No          Pass to 6i 
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6f  When you have told him, how have you tried to convince him to agree on you working?  
(Leer todas las opciones) 
1) Said money was needed for education children     |___|      5)   Offered not to neglect domestic chores   |___|           
2) Said money was needed for household expenses   |___|      6)    Told him she would leave him                |___|               
3) Said money was needed to construct a house        |___|      7)    Other (Specify)  ______________         |___|     
4) Offered to do domestic chores                              |___|              
 
 
6g. What did he answer?   
1) She would neglect children                             |___|          5)  It is very tiring                                                   |___| 
2) She would neglect household chores              |___|          6)   He can economically support her                     |___| 
3) He would leave her                                         |___|          7)   Other (Specify) _________________               |___| 
4) It would be bad for her health                        |___|  
 
6h Now imagine you could choose a working timetable earning the same as you do right now per hour… 
     6ha. Form what to what time would you like to work on a weekday? From |___:___| hrs  to   |___:___|  
     6hb. From what to what time would you like to work on Saturdays? From  |___:___| hrs  to  |___:___|  
     6hc  From what to what time would you like to work on Sundays?    From  |___:___| hrs  to  |___:___|  
 
 
 
6i. If for any reason you had to work in the maquila  
 
 6ia.  
 1) Yes 
 2) No      
 3) Nk   
6ib.Why couldn’t she? 
   1) Not live any more  
   2) Does not live in community 
   3) Takes care of other children 
   4) Does not want to  
   5) Other (Specify)  
Could your mother help you take care of children? |___| |___| 
Could your mother in law help you take care of children? |___| |___| 
Could your sisters help you take care of children? |___| |___| 
Could your sisters in law help you take care of children? |___| |___| 
Could your neighbours help you take care of your children? |___| |___| 
Could another person help you take care of children, who? |___| |___| 
 
6j. In the last year, ¿did any female member of your or your husband’s family work in a maquila?             
1) Yes         Continue 
2) No       pass to 6k 
6ja.Relationship 
 
6jb. Is she a member 
of your household? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
 
6jc. Which is your marital status? 
1)  Married          5) Divorced separated     
2)  Single              6) Other 
3)  Widow            7) Nk                               
4)  Live together          
6jd. How 
many 
children 
does she 
have? 
A) |___| |___| |____| 
B) |___| |___| |____| 
C) |___| |___| |____| 
D) |___| |___| |____| 
  
 
 
6k. Do you have any married friends who work in the maquila?                |___|                     
         1) Yes                                
         2) No 
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6l. For working in the maquila (if she works in the maquila) or  
       if you worked in the maquila (is she does not work in the maquila), do you 
think it is: 
1) Impossible 
2) Somewhat  possible      
3) Very possible   
4) Surely   
5) N.A.  
Do you 
believe 
they would 
mention 
that to you? 
 
 
1)Impossible 
2)Somewhat 
Possible      
3) Very 
possible   
4) Surely   
5) N.A. 
Do you 
believe they 
would 
mention that 
to your 
husband? 
 
1) Impossible 
2)Somewhat  
possible 
3) Very possible  
4) Surely   
5) N.A. 
Your family members will or  You neglect household chores and children  |__|            |___|             |___| 
would tell other people that:. You cheat on your husband                          |__|            |___|             |___| 
(even if it is not true) That your husband is lazy &does not work   |__|            |___|             |___| 
Your husband’s family members  You neglect household chores and children  |__|            |___|             |___| 
will or would tell other people  You cheat on your husband                          |__|            |___|             |___| 
that:. (even if it is not true) That your husband is lazy &does not work   |__|            |___|             |___| 
Neighbours will or would tell  You neglect household chores and children  |__|            |___|             |___| 
other people  You cheat on your husband                          |__|            |___|             |___| 
(even if it is not true) That your husband is lazy &does not work   |__|            |___|             |___| 
Friends (not family members)  You neglect household chores and children  |__|            |___|             |___| 
will or would tell other people  You cheat on your husband                          |__|            |___|             |___| 
that (even if it is not true) That your husband is lazy &does not work   |__|            |___|             |___| 
 
 
7. Self-employment Activities   
 
7a. In the last year did you engage in any income generating activity? (ex, broidering & selling tortillas)                        
|___|                                                                                                                                  
1) Yes     continue   
2) No      pass to 8a.   
 
 
7b. From April 2005 to April 2006, Which activities did you engage in?  
Activity A) B) C) 
7bb.Which days and how many hours and 
minutes did you usually dedicate to that 
activity? 
              Monday                               |___|   
               Tuesday                                 |___|   
               Wednesday                            |___|   
               Thursday                               |___|   
               Friday                                    |___|    
               Saturday                                |___|   
               Sunday                                 |___|   
 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
7bc. For how long have you worked 
there? 
 
|___| years         
|___| months      
|___| weeks  
|___| days           
|___| years         
|___| months      
|___| weeks  
|___| days           
||___| years         
|___| months      
|___| weeks  
|___| days           
7bd. How much did you earn last week?  
$   |____________| 
 
$   |____________| 
 
$   |____________| 
7be.Did you carry out this activity last 
week?   1)Yes, 2)No 
|___| |___| |___| 
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7bf Last week did you dedicate the same 
number of hours that you usually do? 
1) Yes    pass to  7bh 
2) No     continue 
 
|___| 
 
|___| 
 
|___| 
7bg. Which days and how many hours 
and minutes did you dedicate to that 
activity last week? 
              Monday                                |___|   
               Tuesday                                  |___|   
               Wednesday                             |___|   
               Thursday                                |___|   
               Friday                                     |___|    
               Saturday                                 |___|   
               Sunday                                  |___|    
 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
7bh. How much did you earn last week?  
$   |____________| 
 
$   |____________| 
 
$   |____________| 
7bi.With how many people did you carry 
out this activity? 
|____| |____| |____| 
7bj.Of these, how many where members 
of your family? 
|____| |____| |____| 
7bk. What relationship do they have with 
you? 
1) Husband                4)Father in law     
2) Mother                   5) Siblings 
3) Father                   6)Brother/sister in law 
4) Mother in law       7)Other, specify 
|___|   
|___|   
|___| 
|___|   
|___|   
|___|   
|___| 
|___|   
|___|   
|___|   
|___| 
|___|   
7bl. Who takes the decisions regarding 
this activity? 
1) Her              4)  Father               7) Brother/sister  
2) Husband     5) Mother in law     8) Brother/sister 
in law 
3)Mother        6) Father in law      9) Other (specify) 
 
 
|___| 
 
 
|___| 
 
 
 
|___| 
7bm.Did you receive the money directly? 
1) Yes       2) No    
|___| |___| |___| 
7bn.How did you learn to execute this 
activity? 
1) Her parents taught her                      4) Private 
courses 
2) Other family members taught her     5) Technical 
career 
3) Courses DIF 
|___| |___| |___| 
7bo. Where did you carry out these 
activities? 
       1) In the  fields 
       2) From house to house or in the street 
       3) Improvised stand 
       4) In your own home with special installations. 
       5) In your own home without special 
installations 
       6) Fixed stand 
       7) Other 
|___| |___| |___| 
 
 
7c. Who decides how the money you earn from your work is spent? (Read and tick all options that apply) 
1) Interviewee            |___|      4) Father in law       |___|       7) Your children                 |___| 
2) Husband                |___|      5) Father                  |___|       8) Your siblings                  |___| 
3) Mother in law        |___|      6) Mother                 |___|      9) Other (specify)                |___| 
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8. Help Business  
8a. From April 2005 to April 2006, did you help a friend or family member in their business?  
1) Yes             Continue                                                                                                                                     
|___| 
2) No              Pass to 9a.    
 
     8aa. How many people did you help?                     |___| 
8ab. Whose business was it? 
1) Husband  
2) Mother in law 
3) Brother/sister  
4) Brother/Sister in law 
5) Friends  
a) 
|___| 
 
b) 
|___| 
c) 
|___| 
8ac What type of business was it?     
8ad. Does this person belong to your 
home? (Does he/she share the same 
expenses) 
1) Yes 
2) No 
 
|___| 
 
|___| 
 
|___| 
8ae.Which days and how much time do 
you usually dedicate to this business? 
                      Monday                             |___| 
                      Tuesday                             |___| 
                      Wednesday                         |___| 
                      Thursday                            |___| 
                      Friday                                 |___| 
                      Saturday                              |___| 
                      Sunday                            |___| 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
8af.Last week, did you dedicate the same 
amount of hours than you usually do?  
1) Yes  pass to    8ah 
        2)    No  continue    
 
 
|___| 
 
 
 
|___| 
 
 
|___| 
8ag. Which days and how much time did 
you dedicate to this business last week? 
                      Monday                               |___| 
                      Tuesday                               |___| 
                      Wednesday                          |___| 
                      Thursday                              |___| 
                      Friday                                   |___| 
                      Saturday                               |___| 
                      Sunday                              |___| 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
 
 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
|___| hrs |___|  min 
8ah. For how long have you helped 
him/her? 
 
|___| years         
|___| months      
|___| weeks   
|___| days           
|___| years         
|___| months      
|___| weeks   
|___| days           
|___| years         
|___| months      
|___| weeks   
|___| days           
8ai.How many people including you work 
in this business? 
|____| 
 
|____| |____| 
8aj.Of these, how many are family 
members? 
 
|____| 
 
|____| 
 
|____| 
 
8ak.How much money did you receive for 
helping him/her? 
$   |____________| $   |____________| $   |____________| 
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9. Help work land     
9a. Last year, did your household have access to land?                              |___|                                                                
1) Yes                     Continue     
2) No                      pass to 10a.   
 
9b. Is this land  
  
1) Yes  
2) No 
This land is…  
1) private 
2) rented    
3) on loan  
4) taken  
5) partnership  
What is the 
extension of the 
land? 
(SPECIFY UNITS) 
Ejidales (type 
communal land) 
|___| |___| |_______| 
Private property |___| |___| |_______| 
Communal |___| |___| |_______| 
other:______ |___| |___| |_______| 
 
9c. Do you rent all or part of the land?                                                                                                                      
|___| 
1) Yes                                       9ca. How much did you charge for the land? $ |______________| 
2) No                                            
 
9d. In the last year, did you dedicate time to work this land?                                                          |___| 
1) Yes      Continue 
2) No       Pass to 9g 
 
9e. On average, which days and how much time did you usually dedicate to work the land? 
                      Monday                         |___| hrs |___|  min                                 
                      Tuesday                         |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
                      Wednesday                    |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
                      Thursday                        |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
                      Friday                             |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Saturday                         |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Sunday                            |___| hrs |___|  min                                 
 
9f. From April 2005 to April 2006, how much time did you dedicate to working the land? 
 |___| months      
 |___| weeks   
 |___| days          
 
9g.Who makes the main decisions about what to cultivate?                                                              |___| 
1) Interviewee          4) Father in law       7) Children    
2) Husband             5) Father                   8)  Brother/sister    
3) Mother in law     6) Mother                  9) Other specify    
9h. Last year… 
9ha What 
did you 
cultivate? 
9gb. How much 
did you obtain of 
the crop? 
(specify unit) 
9gc. What is the 
market price of 
the crop? 
9gd. How 
much did 
you sell? 
 
9ge. How 
much did you 
consume?  
9gf. How 
much went 
for the 
consumption 
of animals? 
 
 |_________| $  |_________| |_________| |_________| |_________| 
 |_________| $  |_________| |_________| |_________| |_________| 
 |_________| $  |_________| |_________| |_________| |_________| 
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9. Animals  
 
10a. How many animals do you have that are not dogs and cats?                                                           |___| 
 1) Yes                  Continue   
 2) No                   Pass to 11a    
 
 
10b. What type of animals are they?  
Type of animal 
 
How many do you 
have? 
What is their main use? 
1)  Consumption          4) Savings 
2)  Sell                         5) To work the fields 
3)  Sell by products    6) Other (Specify) 
What is the 
approximate 
price of the 
animal? 
 |___________| |____| $  |___________| 
 |___________| |____| $  |___________| 
 |___________| |____| $  |___________| 
 |___________| |____| $  |___________| 
 |___________| |____| $  |___________| 
 
 
10c. Last year, on average, which days and how many hours and minutes did you dedicate to take care of 
your animals? 
                      Monday                   |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Tuesday                   |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
                      Wednesday              |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
                      Thursday                  |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Friday                       |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Saturday                   |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Sunday                     |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
 
 
10d. From April 2005 to April 2006, how much did you earn by selling animals and their by products?    
$   |___________|   
 
11. Domestic chores               
 
11a. Who is responsible of making sure the domestic chores are carried out in your household?                           
|___| 
1. Interviewee             
2. Husband                      
3. Mother in law                      
4. Sister                  
5. Sister in law                    
6. Other   Specify __________                 
 
11b.Last year, on average, which days and how many hours and minutes did you usually dedicate to 
domestic chores? 
                      Monday                  |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
                      Tuesday                  |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
                      Wednesday             |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
                      Thursday                 |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Friday                      |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Saturday                  |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Sunday                    |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
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 11b. .Last year, on average, which days and how many hours and minutes did your husband usually 
dedicate to domestic chores? 
 
                      Monday                  |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
                      Tuesday                  |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
                      Wednesday             |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
                      Thursday                 |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Friday                      |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Saturday                  |___| hrs |___|  min                                   
                      Sunday                    |___| hrs |___|  min                                  
 
11c.Did the following people also help doing the domestic chores? 1) Yes, 2) No  
1) Daughters                         |___| 
2) Sons                                  |___| 
3) Pays for the service          |___| 
4) Other people, specify  … |___|     
 
 
12 Government Programmes and Transfers  
12.In the last year did you receive money from?: 1)Yes   
2)No   
How 
many 
times did 
you 
receive 
money 
last year? 
How much did you 
receive in each occasion? 
12a. Oportunidades (antes Progresa)? 
 
|___| |____| 1) |_______|  4) |_______| 
2) |_______|  5) |_______| 
3) |_______|  6) |_______| 
12j. Another government programme? |___| |____| 1) |_______|  4) |_______| 
2) |_______|  5) |_______| 
3) |_______|  6) |_______| 
12l.  Severance pay |___| |____| 1) |_______|  4) |_______| 
2) |_______|  5) |_______| 
3) |_______|  6) |_______| 
12m. Money or gifts received from family members or 
friends who live in Mexico or another country?  
|___| |____| 1) |_______|  4) |_______| 
2) |_______|  5) |_______| 
3) |_______|  6) |_______| 
12n. Pension or retirement?  |___| |____| 1) |_______|  4) |_______| 
2) |_______|  5) |_______| 
3) |_______|  6) |_______| 
 
13. Welfare   
In the last month… 
(Read all options) 
Never Few times 
 
Several times Always 
13a. Have your felt sad or upset?     
13b. Have you slept badly?     
13c. Did you feel physically week?     
13d. Did you wake up in low spirit?     
13e. Did you feel useful and needed?     
13f. Did you feel life was full?     
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13g. Currently, can you say your health is:…   (Read all options)                                                        |___| 
1. Very good    
2. Good              
3. Regular         
4. Bad              
5. Very bad        
 
13h. In the last month, have you suffered from 1)Yes, 2)No 
       13ha. Coughs |___| 
13hb. Difficulty breathing  |___| 
13hc. Pain in the joints |___| 
13hd. Red/irritated eyes  |___| 
13he. Headache   |___| 
13hf.  Throat ache  |___| 
13hg. Kidney pain  |___| 
13hh. Back pain |___| 
13hi. Itching, irritation or swelling in the skin |___| 
13hk. Allergy |___| 
13hl. Pressure   |___| 
13hm. Body ache  |___| 
13hn. Stress    |___| 
13ho. Eye weakness  |___| 
13hp. Other (Specify)  |___| 
 
 
14. Contraception   
 
14a.Have you ever used a contraceptive method (to prevent or postpone pregnancy)?                     |___| 
Yes            Continue   
No             Pass to 14d 
 
14b. Which of the following contraceptive methods have you used? (READ OPTIONS)  
 1) Si, 2) No  1)Si, 2) No  
14ba. Oral contraceptive pills |___| 5bg. Withdrawal  |___| 
14bb. Diaphragm, DIU |___| 5bh. Emergency contraception  |___| 
14bc. Contraceptive injections |___| 5bi. Herbs or teas  |___| 
14bd. Condom preservative  |___| 5bj. Tubal ligation |___| 
14be. Implants |___| 5bk. Vasectomy    |___| 
14bf. Periodic abstinence  |___| 5bl. Other   |___| 
 
14c. How many children did you have when you first used this contraceptive method?     
 Pass to 14e.                  |___| 
 
14d. Why haven’t you used them?                                                                                                    |___| 
Does not trust them   
Her husband does not want her to 
Does not know about them   
Does not know how to get them    
She wants the children God sends her   
 
14e. If you could have chosen, how many children would you have liked to have?              |___| 
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15. Relationship with husband and family violence 
15a. In all relationships it is common for situations that cause anger to arise, tell me if any of the following , 
does your husband get angry with you because… (Read all options) 
What happens when your husband gets angry with you?   
 
1)Yes 
2)No 
3)NA 
Stops 
talking 
to you 
You 
argu
e 
He 
yells 
& 
insults 
Hits or 
throws 
things 
Hits 
you 
Doe
s 
noth
ing 
You 
talk 
Other 
15aa. You work? |___|         
15ab. You arrive late because you 
work? 
|___|         
15ac. You earn more money than 
your husband?  
|___|         
15ad. Because you do not work? |___|         
15ae. Because you visit or family 
and friends visit you?  
|___|         
15af. Because you do not obey him?  |___|         
15ag. Because you use contraceptive 
methods?  
|___|         
15ah. Because he does not like the 
way you dress?  
|___|         
15ai. Because he thinks you do not 
fulfil your role as a wife? 
|___|         
15aj. Because he thinks you cheat 
on him?  
|___|         
15ak. Other (specify)  |___|         
 
 
 
 
15b. Now let’s see it the other way round, ¿You get angry at your husband because… … (Read all options) 
What happens when you get angry with him?  
 
1)Yes 
2)No 
3)NA 
You 
stop 
talking 
to him 
Arg
ue 
Yells 
& 
insults 
him 
Throw
s or 
hits 
things 
Hit 
him 
Doe
s 
not 
do 
anyt
hing 
Tal
ks 
Other 
15ba. He works too much? |___|         
15bb. He does not work?  |___|         
15bc. He gets jealous?  |___|         
15bd. He visits family or friends too 
much? 
|___|         
15be. You think he cheats on you? |___|         
15bf. He does not help with 
household chores?  
|___|         
15bg.Does not take care of money? |___|         
15bh.He brings friends home? |___|         
15bi. He drinks or takes drugs?  |___|         
15bj. He doesn’t obey you? |___|         
15bk.He does not give you enough 
money for expenses?  
|___|         
15bl. Other?  (Specify) |___|         
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16. Household Decisions  
16a. At home, who takes decisions regarding (…)  (Read and tick all options that apply ) 
 Inter 
Vie 
wee 
 
Part 
ner 
Chil
d 
ren 
Mo 
th 
er 
Fath
er 
Fath
er 
in 
law 
 
Mot
her 
in 
law 
Other 
specif
y 
16aa. Food eaten at home         
16ab. Your children’s clothes         
16ac. Your children’s education         
16ad. Your children’s permissions         
16ae. Health services and medicines for your 
children  
        
16af. Strong household expenditures (fridge, 
car, furniture, etc)  
        
16ag. Money your parents or family gives you          
16ah. Money your husbands parents and 
family gives you?  
        
16ai. If you work or not         
16aj. If you or your partner use contraception          
 
 
 
16b. How much do you and your 
partner contribute to household 
expenditures…   (Read all 
options) 
Nothing Everything  A larger 
share 
Only a 
share  
No sabe Not 
apply 
a) You       
b) Your husband       
 
 
 
16c. The income of your household      (Read all options)                                                                                                     
|___|                                                                                                                    
1)  Your husband manages it and gives you some for the expenses? 
2)  Is placed in a fund and your husband and you use what is needed? 
3)  Your husband gives you what he earns and you decide how it is used? 
4)  You and your husband independently decide how the income is used? 
5)  Other 
 
17. Beliefs   
17. Do you strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, indifferent, somewhat agree, very much agree with the 
following: 
 Completely 
disagrees 
Disagrees  Indifferent Agrees Completely 
agrees 
17a. If a woman is married she should 
take care of the household chores and 
children 
     
17b.If a wife works for an assembly 
plant she will cheat on her husband 
     
17c. Is a wife works it is because her 
husband is lazy 
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. Do you think your husband strongly disagrees, somewhat disagrees, is indifferent, somewhat agrees, very 
much agrees with the following: 
 Completely 
disagrees 
Disagrees  Indifferent Agrees Completely 
agrees 
17d. If a woman is married she should 
take care of the household chores and 
children 
     
17e.If a wife works for an assembly 
plant she will cheat on her husband 
     
17f. Is a wife works it is because her 
husband is lazy 
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Appendix 3: Wage regression results 
 
In this section the results for the estimated Heckman regression model are displayed. The 
obtained estimates were further used to obtain predicted wages for all the wives in the 
sample, those who worked in an assembly plant and those who didn’t. As the focus of the 
research is to analyze the influence of social norms on wives’ employment in assembly 
plants, the joint regression model was estimated for the sample of wives who worked in 
textile plants and not on those who had a salaried job (including assembly plants). Using 
data on the latter would have provided biased estimates, as it is the wage that wives 
expect to receive in an assembly plant that is taken into consideration when deciding 
whether to work there or not. Thus for example, wives with a university degree would 
participate less in assembly plant employment due to the lower salary they would obtain 
there, compared to what they actually do receive for teaching. If wage estimates included 
the wage teachers obtain, the participation estimates would suggest that women had a 
high probability of working for an assembly plant, when they do not.  Therefore, this must 
be accounted for in the regression estimates.  
 
Heckman regression model results 
 Coef Std. Err P>|z| 
Age    
Years education -0.0636* 0.0370 -1.72 
Years education squared 0.0051** 0.0025 2.03 
Age  0.0027 0.0056 0.48 
Constant 3.1508*** 0.2369 13.30 
Participation in assembly 
plant 
   
Number children less 6 -0.1717* 0.0951 -1.80 
Number children more 6 0.0181 0.0673 0.27 
Age -0.0459*** 0.0097 -4.73 
Per capita total income 0.00005 0.00005 0.88 
Chilac -0.6319*** 0.1432 -4.41 
Constant -0.9165*** 0.3813 2.40 
anthro -1.359 0.3677 -3.70 
lnsigma -0.8654 0.0766 -4.75 
Rho -0.8762 0.0853 -0.876 
Sigma 0.4209 0.0766  
Lambda -0.3688 0.1002  
      * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Chi2= 9.24 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0024 
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As can be observed, from the results in the previous table, the coefficient for years of 
education has a negative sign when it would be expected to have a positive influence on 
wage. It is also found that the quadratic expression of years of education is positive and 
significant. This means that education has a convex relationship with wage. Furthermore, 
the minimum is obtained at 6.18 years of education. It must be reminded that the primary 
grade in Mexico is obtained after 6 years of education, the average years of education of 
married women in the sample.68  
Textile factory employment is intended for formally uneducated women. Therefore, 
although these are not generally the expected results for wage estimates, it does seem 
plausible that for workers in an assembly plant, with low levels of education, an additional 
year of education has no return in terms of wages. Yet, past a certain threshold, like the 
achievement of technical education, an additional year of education does have positive 
returns69. It seems that the wage a wife obtains has more to do with her capacity to sew 
and use a sewing machine than her formal levels of education. According to Hernandez 
Barrios (2003) there are some complicated elements of dressmaking that are highly paid. 
Similarly some machine operators, especially in laundries, are the ones who earn the 
most70.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Years of education using general wages, also seem to have a convex relationship with wages. The 
minimum is obtained in 5.67 years of education. 
69 Regressions were also estimated using levels of education instead of years of education to learn more 
about the relationship between education and wage. Though not significant, all levels of education negatively 
influence wages, except for technical education which has a positive and significant at a 10% level. A 
regression including years of education and a dummy variable for technical education was also estimated. 
Model selection tests were performed to test whether technical education should be included as a dummy 
variable in the regression estimates. The Alkaike Information Criterion (AIC) was best for years of education 
with technical level dummy, while the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) was best for years of education 
without levels. The model selection criterion BIC is consistent while the BIC is not. Therefore final 
regressions were estimated were ran including years of education only. (Hansen 2009) 
70 A Heckman regression was estimated which included some activity dummies. Results suggested that 
‘manuals’ earn significantly less than sewers. It is not possible to predict what type of activity women who 
do not work in assembly plants would perform if they did engage in this type of employment. Thus they are 
not included as explanatory variables in the wage estimations.  
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Appendix 4: Chapter 6, Statistical Tests 
 
Statistical tests comparing health symptoms by wives working in assembly plants 
vs. those not working in Assembly plants. 
 
 
Test Cough 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .2534435   .0228307                      .2086962    .2981908 
           1 |   .3188406   .0561031                      .2088806    .4288006 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0653971   .0605706                     -.1841132    .0533191 
             |  under Ho:   .0578824    -1.13   0.259 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.130               z = -1.130               z = -1.130 
    P < z =  0.1293        P > |z| =  0.2585          P > z =  0.8707 
 
 
Test Difficulty Breathing 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |    .137741   .0180883                      .1022887    .1731934 
           1 |    .173913   .0456304                      .0844791     .263347 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   -.036172   .0490848                     -.1323765    .0600325 
             |  under Ho:   .0460444    -0.79   0.432 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.786               z = -0.786               z = -0.786 
    P < z =  0.2161        P > |z| =  0.4321          P > z =  0.7839 
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Test Inflammation of Joints 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .2506887   .0227481                      .2061032    .2952742 
           1 |   .1884058   .0470752                      .0961401    .2806715 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0622829   .0522834                     -.0401906    .1647564 
             |  under Ho:   .0561479     1.11   0.267 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.109               z =  1.109               z =  1.109 
    P < z =  0.8663        P > |z| =  0.2673          P > z =  0.1337 
 
 
 
Test Irritated Eyes. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .2754821   .0234487                      .2295236    .3214406 
           1 |   .4202899   .0594231                      .3038227     .536757 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.1448078   .0638823                     -.2700147   -.0196008 
             |  under Ho:    .060103    -2.41   0.016 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -2.409               z = -2.409               z = -2.409 
    P < z =  0.0080        P > |z| =  0.0160          P > z =  0.9920 
 
 
 
Test Head ache 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .4683196   .0261905                      .4169872    .5196519 
           1 |   .5507246   .0598824                      .4333573    .6680919 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0824051   .0653593                      -.210507    .0456968 
             |  under Ho:     .06562    -1.26   0.209 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.256               z = -1.256               z = -1.256 
    P < z =  0.1046        P > |z| =  0.2092          P > z =  0.8954 
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Test Throat Ache 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .3333333   .0247423                      .2848393    .3818274 
           1 |   .4492754   .0598824                      .3319081    .5666427 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   -.115942   .0647926                     -.2429332    .0110491 
             |  under Ho:   .0627164    -1.85   0.065 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.849               z = -1.849               z = -1.849 
    P < z =  0.0323        P > |z| =  0.0645          P > z =  0.9677 
 
 
 
Test Kidney Ache 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .2727273   .0233754                      .2269123    .3185423 
           1 |   .3623188   .0578659                      .2489038    .4757339 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0895916   .0624089                     -.2119108    .0327277 
             |  under Ho:   .0594109    -1.51   0.132 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.508               z = -1.508               z = -1.508 
    P < z =  0.0658        P > |z| =  0.1316          P > z =  0.9342 
 
 
 
Test Back Ache 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .2672176   .0232256                      .2216963     .312739 
           1 |   .3043478   .0553932                      .1957791    .4129165 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0371302   .0600653                      -.154856    .0805956 
             |  under Ho:   .0585175    -0.63   0.526 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.635               z = -0.635               z = -0.635 
    P < z =  0.2629        P > |z| =  0.5257          P > z =  0.7371 
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Test Irritated Skin 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .1294766   .0176211                      .0949399    .1640133 
           1 |   .1884058   .0470752                      .0961401    .2806715 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0589292   .0502651                     -.1574469    .0395885 
             |  under Ho:   .0454179    -1.30   0.194 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.297               z = -1.297               z = -1.297 
    P < z =  0.0972        P > |z| =  0.1945          P > z =  0.9028 
 
 
Test Allergy 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .0881543   .0148809                      .0589883    .1173203 
           1 |   .1304348   .0405437                      .0509706    .2098989 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0422805   .0431883                     -.1269281    .0423671 
             |  under Ho:   .0384911    -1.10   0.272 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.098               z = -1.098               z = -1.098 
    P < z =  0.1360        P > |z| =  0.2720          P > z =  0.8640 
 
 
 
Test Blood Pressure 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .3002755   .0240586                      .2531215    .3474295 
           1 |   .2608696   .0528625                       .157261    .3644782 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0394059   .0580798                     -.0744283    .1532402 
             |  under Ho:   .0598318     0.66   0.510 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.659               z =  0.659               z =  0.659 
    P < z =  0.7449        P > |z| =  0.5101          P > z =  0.2551 
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Test Body Ache 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .3112948   .0243024                      .2636629    .3589266 
           1 |   .3333333   .0567504                      .2221045    .4445621 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0220386   .0617351                     -.1430371    .0989599 
             |  under Ho:   .0609952    -0.36   0.718 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.361               z = -0.361               z = -0.361 
    P < z =  0.3589        P > |z| =  0.7179          P > z =  0.6411 
 
 
 
Test Stress 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .3939394    .025646                      .3436742    .4442046 
           1 |   .4347826   .0596787                      .3178145    .5517507 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0408432   .0649559                     -.1681543    .0864679 
             |  under Ho:   .0643507    -0.63   0.526 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.635               z = -0.635               z = -0.635 
    P < z =  0.2628        P > |z| =  0.5256          P > z =  0.7372 
 
 
Test Eye Weakness 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      363 
                                                   1: Number of obs =       69 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .3112948   .0243024                      .2636629    .3589266 
           1 |   .4202899   .0594231                      .3038227     .536757 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.1089951   .0642006                     -.2348259    .0168357 
             |  under Ho:   .0616912    -1.77   0.077 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.767               z = -1.767               z = -1.767 
    P < z =  0.0386        P > |z| =  0.0773          P > z =  0.9614 
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Statistical Tests Comparing Health Symptoms by Wives without Income Generating 
Activity vs, those with an Income Generating Activity 
 
 
Test Cough 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .2517241   .0254856                      .2017733    .3016749 
           1 |   .2887324   .0380295                       .214196    .3632688 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0370083   .0457794                     -.1267342    .0527177 
             |  under Ho:    .045142    -0.82   0.412 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.820               z = -0.820               z = -0.820 
    P < z =  0.2062        P > |z| =  0.4123          P > z =  0.7938 
 
 
Test Difficulty Breathing 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .1413793   .0204595                      .1012795    .1814792 
           1 |   .1478873     .02979                      .0895001    .2062746 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   -.006508   .0361391                     -.0773393    .0643232 
             |  under Ho:   .0359097    -0.18   0.856 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.181               z = -0.181               z = -0.181 
    P < z =  0.4281        P > |z| =  0.8562          P > z =  0.5719 
 
 
Test Inflammation of Joints 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |    .237931   .0250048                      .1889225    .2869396 
           1 |   .2464789   .0361654                       .175596    .3173618 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0085478   .0439679                     -.0947234    .0776277 
             |  under Ho:   .0437894    -0.20   0.845 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.195               z = -0.195               z = -0.195 
    P < z =  0.4226        P > |z| =  0.8452          P > z =  0.5774 
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Test Irritated Eyes.  
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .3103448   .0271668                      .2570988    .3635909 
           1 |   .2746479   .0374557                       .201236    .3480598 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0356969   .0462706                     -.0549918    .1263857 
             |  under Ho:   .0468739     0.76   0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.762               z =  0.762               z =  0.762 
    P < z =  0.7768        P > |z| =  0.4463          P > z =  0.2232 
 
 
Test Head ache 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .4965517   .0293603                      .4390066    .5540969 
           1 |   .4507042   .0417546                      .3688666    .5325418 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0458475   .0510439                     -.0541967    .1458917 
             |  under Ho:   .0511765     0.90   0.370 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.896               z =  0.896               z =  0.896 
    P < z =  0.8148        P > |z| =  0.3703          P > z =  0.1852 
 
 
Test Throat Ache 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .3793103   .0284928                      .3234654    .4351553 
           1 |   .2957746   .0382994                      .2207092    .3708401 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0835357   .0477356                     -.0100243    .1770957 
             |  under Ho:    .048912     1.71   0.088 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.708               z =  1.708               z =  1.708 
    P < z =  0.9562        P > |z| =  0.0877          P > z =  0.0438 
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Test Kidney Pain 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .3241379    .027485                      .2702684    .3780074 
           1 |   .2112676    .034256                       .144127    .2784082 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .1128703   .0439192                      .0267902    .1989504 
             |  under Ho:   .0463341     2.44   0.015 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.436               z =  2.436               z =  2.436 
    P < z =  0.9926        P > |z| =  0.0149          P > z =  0.0074 
 
 
 
Test Back Ache 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .3241379    .027485                      .2702684    .3780074 
           1 |   .1690141   .0314495                      .1073741     .230654 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .1551238   .0417672                      .0732617     .236986 
             |  under Ho:   .0456374     3.40   0.001 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  3.399               z =  3.399               z =  3.399 
    P < z =  0.9997        P > |z| =  0.0007          P > z =  0.0003 
 
 
Test Irritated Skin  
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .1482759   .0208682                      .1073749    .1891769 
           1 |   .1197183   .0272425                       .066324    .1731126 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0285576   .0343167                      -.038702    .0958171 
             |  under Ho:   .0354211     0.81   0.420 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.806               z =  0.806               z =  0.806 
    P < z =  0.7899        P > |z| =  0.4201          P > z =  0.2101 
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Test Allergy  
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .1068966    .018144                      .0713349    .1424582 
           1 |   .0704225   .0214711                      .0283399    .1125051 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |    .036474   .0281107                      -.018622    .0915701 
             |  under Ho:   .0300189     1.22   0.224 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.215               z =  1.215               z =  1.215 
    P < z =  0.8878        P > |z| =  0.2244          P > z =  0.1122 
 
 
Test Blood Pressure 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .2862069   .0265416                      .2341863    .3382275 
           1 |   .3098592   .0388067                      .2337994    .3859189 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0236523   .0470151                     -.1158001    .0684956 
             |  under Ho:   .0466624    -0.51   0.612 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.507               z = -0.507               z = -0.507 
    P < z =  0.3061        P > |z| =  0.6122          P > z =  0.6939 
 
 
Test Body Ache 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .2793103   .0263462                      .2276727     .330948 
           1 |   .3873239   .0408798                      .3072011    .4674468 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.1080136   .0486341                     -.2033348   -.0126924 
 
             |  under Ho:   .0475697    -2.27   0.023 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -2.271               z = -2.271               z = -2.271 
    P < z =  0.0116        P > |z| =  0.0232          P > z =  0.9884 
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Test Stress 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .4103448   .0288851                       .353731    .4669587 
           1 |   .3802817   .0407386                      .3004356    .4601278 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0300631   .0499398                      -.067817    .1279433 
             |  under Ho:   .0501866     0.60   0.549 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.599               z =  0.599               z =  0.599 
    P < z =  0.7254        P > |z| =  0.5492          P > z =  0.2746 
 
 
Test Eye Weakness 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                      0: Number of obs =      290 
                                                   1: Number of obs =      142 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           0 |   .3413793   .0278444                      .2868054    .3959533 
           1 |   .3028169   .0385584                      .2272438      .37839 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0385624   .0475611                     -.0546557    .1317805 
             |  under Ho:   .0481125     0.80   0.423 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.802               z =  0.802               z =  0.802 
    P < z =  0.7886        P > |z| =  0.4228          P > z =  0.2114 
 
 
Statistical Tests Comparing Health Symptoms by Self Employed vs. Non Self 
Employed Wives. 
 
Table (). Test Cough 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .2327586   .0277444                      .1783807    .2871366 
          no |         .3   .0324037                      .2364899    .3635101 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0672414   .0426585                     -.1508506    .0163678 
             |  under Ho:    .042527    -1.58   0.114 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.581               z = -1.581               z = -1.581 
    P < z =  0.0569        P > |z| =  0.1138          P > z =  0.9431 
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Test Difficulty Breathing 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .1336207   .0223381                      .0898388    .1774026 
          no |       .155   .0255905                      .1048435    .2051565 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0213793   .0339686                     -.0879566     .045198 
             |  under Ho:   .0338295    -0.63   0.527 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.632               z = -0.632               z = -0.632 
    P < z =  0.2637        P > |z| =  0.5274          P > z =  0.7363 
 
 
 
Test Inflammation of Joints 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .2543103   .0285902                      .1982746    .3103461 
          no |       .225   .0295275                      .1671271    .2828729 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0293103   .0411008                     -.0512457    .1098664 
             |  under Ho:   .0412527     0.71   0.477 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.711               z =  0.711               z =  0.711 
    P < z =  0.7613        P > |z| =  0.4774          P > z =  0.2387 
 
 
Test Irritated Eyes 
 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .3017241   .0301352                      .2426602    .3607881 
          no |       .295   .0322471                      .2317969    .3582031 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0067241   .0441362                     -.0797813    .0932296 
             |  under Ho:   .0441586     0.15   0.879 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.152               z =  0.152               z =  0.152 
    P < z =  0.5605        P > |z| =  0.8790          P > z =  0.4395 
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Test Head Ache 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .4913793   .0328217                      .4270499    .5557087 
          no |        .47   .0352916                      .4008297    .5391703 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0213793   .0481951                     -.0730813    .1158399 
             |  under Ho:    .048212     0.44   0.657 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.443               z =  0.443               z =  0.443 
    P < z =  0.6713        P > |z| =  0.6574          P > z =  0.3287 
 
 
Test Throat Ache 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .3534483   .0313849                       .291935    .4149615 
          no |        .35   .0337268                      .2838966    .4161034 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0034483   .0460707                     -.0868487    .0937452 
             |  under Ho:   .0460787     0.07   0.940 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.075               z =  0.075               z =  0.075 
 
    P < z =  0.5298        P > |z| =  0.9403          P > z =  0.4702 
 
 
 
Test Kidney Pain 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .3146552   .0304879                      .2548999    .3744104 
          no |       .255     .03082                      .1945938    .3154062 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0596552   .0433519                      -.025313    .1446234 
             |  under Ho:   .0436501     1.37   0.172 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.367               z =  1.367               z =  1.367 
    P < z =  0.9141        P > |z| =  0.1717          P > z =  0.0859 
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Test Back Ache 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .3318966   .0309157                      .2713029    .3924902 
          no |       .205    .028546                      .1490508    .2609492 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .1268966   .0420792                      .0444229    .2093702 
             |  under Ho:   .0429937     2.95   0.003 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.952               z =  2.952               z =  2.952 
    P < z =  0.9984        P > |z| =  0.0032          P > z =  0.0016 
 
 
Test Irritated Skin 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .1508621   .0234982                      .1048064    .1969178 
          no |       .125   .0233854                      .0791655    .1708345 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0258621   .0331518                     -.0391143    .0908384 
             |  under Ho:   .0333692     0.78   0.438 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.775               z =  0.775               z =  0.775 
    P < z =  0.7808        P > |z| =  0.4383          P > z =  0.2192 
 
 
Test Allergy 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .1034483   .0199943                      .0642602    .1426363 
          no |       .085   .0197199                      .0463497    .1236503 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |   .0184483   .0280828                     -.0365931    .0734896 
             |  under Ho:     .02828     0.65   0.514 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.652               z =  0.652               z =  0.652 
    P < z =  0.7429        P > |z| =  0.5142          P > z =  0.2571 
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Test Blood Pressure 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .2931034   .0298844                      .2345311    .3516758 
          no |       .295   .0322471                      .2317969    .3582031 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.0018966   .0439653                      -.088067    .0842739 
             |  under Ho:   .0439593    -0.04   0.966 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.043               z = -0.043               z = -0.043 
    P < z =  0.4828        P > |z| =  0.9656          P > z =  0.5172 
 
 
Test Body Ache 
 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                    yes: Number of obs =      232 
                                                  no: Number of obs =      200 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yes |   .2672414   .0290528                      .2102989    .3241839 
          no |        .37   .0341394                       .303088     .436912 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        diff |  -.1027586   .0448282                     -.1906203    -.014897 
             |  under Ho:   .0448141    -2.29   0.022 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
              Ho: proportion(yes) - proportion(no) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -2.293               z = -2.293               z = -2.293 
    P < z =  0.0109        P > |z| =  0.0218          P > z =  0.9891 
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Appendix 5:  Chapter 7 
Regression Results 
 
Biprobit results for wives’ disagreement on moral arguments 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
Age -0.03277** -0.00729 -0.00019 -0.0272 
Wage 52.53271** 21.87066** 27.6923* 53.29875** 
Wage Squared -10.3026** -4.29624** -5.39323* -10.3559** 
Number children older 6 0.02657 -0.00087 0.02042 0.02357 
Number of Children less 6 -0.18107 -0.14658** -0.12775* -0.14603 
Household p.c. income 5.24E-05 2.33E-05 4.84E-05 3.94E-05 
Chilac -0.5598** -0.05288 -0.28992* -0.41185 
Disagreement on argument 1.19298** 1.81694*** 1.90134*** 1.04808 
Constant -67.1127** -29.5895** -37.1847* -68.7234** 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Dissagreement Equation     
Age  -0.00175 -0.01692*** -0.02436*** -0.01092 
Household p.c. income -1.4E-05 -2.4E-05 -2.3E-05 1.13E-06 
Years of Educ. 0.09583*** 0.028065** 0.01802* 0.04917*** 
Chilac -0.09023 -0.40036*** 0.03465 -0.22289 
Constant -0.4862 1.37409*** 1.01289*** -0.2677 
     
     
Antrho -0.34288 -10.31 -10.4649 -0.30349 
Rho 0.33004 -1 -1 -0.29450 
P(rho=0) 0.4296 0.0331 0.0041 0.6020 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Biprobit results for husbands’ disagreement on moral arguments 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
Age -0.02985* -0.02137 -0.02751 -0.02788 
Wage 57.85216** 52.03334* 52.16436** 55.3428** 
Wage squared -11.2482** -10.0521* -10.0607** -10.6815** 
Number children older 6 0.000971 -0.01664 -0.00765 0.012038 
Number of children less 6 -0.12368 -0.18986 -0.15497 -0.13225 
Household p.c. income 4.06E-05 1.01E-05 3.89E-05 0.000034 
Chilac -0.49457* -0.29219 -0.44072 -0.4173 
Disagreement argument 0.45623 1.33215 0.43816 0.67589 
Constant -74.2867** -68.1028* -67.6127** -71.6731* 
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 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Dissagreement Equation     
Husband’s Age  -0.01102* -0.02647*** -0.01526*** -0.01677** 
Household p.c. income -3.3E-05 3.82E-05 -5.4E-05 2.24E-06 
Husband’s years of educ. 0.03919** -0.00919 0.02776 0.02078 
Chilac -0.03553 -0.22921* 0.143128 -0.1483 
Constant 0.005435 1.515526*** 0.518605* -0.05069 
     
     
Athrho 0.234023 -0.55794 0.079702 0.079176 
Rho 0.22984 -0.50645 0.07953 0.07918 
P(rho=0) 0.7801 0.5505 0.9233 0.9694 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Biprobit results for wives’ disagreement on moral arguments depending on their 
husbands’ main activity. 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
Age -0.02594 -0.01042 0.00417 -0.02128 
Chilac -0.45195 -0.02892 -0.22307 -0.29062 
Wage 51.16249** 48.50041*** 27.42500 52.48139** 
Wage squared -10.00762** -9.40132*** -5.34842 -10.16895** 
Number children older 6 0.02585 -0.00632 0.00829 0.02202 
Number of children less 6 -0.20645 -0.17154 -0.13560* -0.16736 
Household p.c. income 0.00006 0.00004 0.00006 0.00004 
Husband assembly plant 0.48432** 0.33779** 0.40181*** 0.38300 
Husband farmer -0.05653 -0.18364 0.04877 -0.23087 
Disagreement on argument 1.27263* 1.63973*** 1.92594*** 0.86104 
Constant -66.01969* -64.20166 -37.13134* -68.15204** 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Dissagreement Equation     
Age  -0.00440 -0.02315*** -0.02742*** -0.01387** 
Household p.c. income -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00001 
Husband assembly plant -0.43668*** -0.31262* -0.35110** -0.38152** 
Husband farmer -0.38635** -0.15220 -0.13013 -0.23682 
Years of educ. 0.08223*** 0.00831 0.01397 0.03877 
Chilac -0.06037 -0.38832*** 0.00316 -0.23132* 
Constant -0.07420 1.84890*** 1.31302*** 0.08743 
     
     
Athrho -0.36068 -1.09250 -9.47136 -0.15443 
Rho  -0.345813 -0.79779 -1 -0.15443 
Likelihood-rat 0.4691 0.3107 0.0109 0.8113 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Biprobit results for husbands’ disagreement on moral arguments depending on their main 
activity 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous 
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree all 
rules 
Participation Equation     
Age -0.02355 -0.01418 -0.02024 -0.02354 
Chilac -0.35228 -0.13765 -0.30409 -0.29254 
Wage 55.79266** 50.98094* 51.09294** 50.21113* 
Wage squared -10.82616** -9.82065* -9.84149** -9.67450* 
Number children older 6 0.00067 -0.01294 -0.00631 0.00787 
Number of children less 6 -0.14077 -0.20355 -0.16751 -0.14229 
Household p.c. income 0.00004 0.00001 0.00004 0.00003 
Husband assembly plant 0.25010 0.37463* 0.27912 0.20613 
Husband farmer -0.30272 -0.23735 -0.31185 -0.34889 
Disagreement argument 0.26030 1.34716* 0.49728 0.01330 
Constant -71.96777** -67.33338* -66.68269** -65.09002* 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Dissagreement Equation     
Age husband -0.01130* -0.02990*** -0.01737*** -0.01741** 
Household p.c. income -0.00004 0.00003 -0.00006 -0.00001 
Husband assembly plant -0.31113** -0.40597** -0.35580** -0.31996* 
Husband farmer -0.49133*** -0.21120 -0.27024 -0.35874** 
Husbands years of educ. 0.02513 -0.01753 0.02016 0.01144 
Chilac 0.04486 -0.25925* 0.15210 -0.11357 
Constant 0.30252 1.90924*** 0.83444** 0.21143 
     
     
Athrho 0.35889 -0.55340 0.05421 0.50100 
Rho  0.35889 -0.50306 0.05416 0.50101 
Likelihood-rat 0.6679 0.4377 0.9368 0.5725 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Biprobit results for wives’ disagreement with moral arguments & lived in city.  
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men  
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
Age -0.02591 -0.00536 0.00438 -0.01895 
Chilac -0.44208 0.00852 -0.17804 -0.26310 
Wage 51.08956** 18.83299 26.08599 50.83710** 
Wage squared -9.99895** -3.71611 -5.05006 -9.85833** 
Number children older 6 0.02781 0.00433 0.01223 0.02673 
Number of children less 6 -0.21255 -0.17986*** -0.15102* -0.17102 
Household p.c. income 0.00006 0.00003 0.00005 0.00005 
Husband assembly plant 0.49924*** 0.35269** 0.39419*** 0.47543*** 
Disagreement equation  1.39789*** 1.82975*** 1.92627*** 1.37522** 
Constant -65.95008** -25.84555 -35.66604 -66.26994**
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 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Disagreement Equation     
Age  -0.00629 -0.02239*** -0.02852*** -0.01508** 
Household p.c. income -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00001 
Husband assembly plant -0.31450** -0.26578* -0.31232** -0.31046** 
Lived city 0.07606 0.13257 -0.02331 0.00544 
Born city 0.35744* 0.34488* 0.22752 0.35399* 
Years of educ. 0.08764*** 0.01267 0.01240 0.04065** 
Chilac -0.13695 -0.43984*** -0.00848 -0.25773* 
Constant -0.20211 1.71426*** 1.30075*** 0.00494 
     
     
Athrho  -0.46178 -11.47868 -14.79687 -0.51462 
Rho  -0.43153 -1 -1 -.47353 
Likelihood-rat 0.2614 0.0076 0.0029 0.3359 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Biprobit results for husbands’ disagreement on moral arguments, born in city. 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
Age -0.01994 -0.01810 -0.02149 -0.02221 
Chilac -0.40386 -0.20251 -0.35992 -0.32485 
Wage 55.74473** 53.56097* 51.21343** 54.18071** 
Wage squared -10.83091** -10.30430* -9.85224** -10.43244** 
Number children older 6 0.00142 -0.02912 -0.01234 0.00571 
Number of children less 6 -0.14515 -0.21898* -0.17917 -0.16072 
Household p.c. income 0.00006 0.00002 0.00005 0.00004 
Husband assembly plant 0.39529** 0.42616** 0.37380* 0.38289** 
Disagreement equation  1.34203 1.20440 0.64476 0.83517 
Constant -72.52222** -70.58426** -67.02871** -70.73586** 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Disagreement Equation     
Age husband -0.01454** -0.03020*** -0.01851*** -0.01904*** 
Household p.c. income -0.00005 0.00001 -0.00006 -0.00001 
Husband assembly plant -0.15531 -0.32300** -0.27344* -0.20876 
Husband lived city 0.34725** -0.07287 0.06070 -0.01595 
Husband born city 0.18135 0.64927** 0.00450 0.20992 
Husband years of educ. 0.03191* -0.01613 0.02726 0.01855 
Chilac  -0.11793 -0.29848** 0.07658 -0.19197 
Constant  0.19568 1.80961*** 0.75303** 0.11849 
     
     
Athrho  -0.32739 -0.43077 -0.03247 -0.00158 
rho  -0.31617 -0.40597 -0.03246 -0.00158 
Likelihood-rat 0.6893 0.5463 0.9678 0.9969 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Biprobit results for wives’ disagreement on moral arguments, depending on having a sister 
or sister-in-law who works in an assembly plant. 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
Age -0.02550 0.00101 0.00706 -0.02040 
Chilac -0.44510 0.06361 -0.18056 -0.29586 
Wage 50.77625* 24.04574** 29.29499* 51.00214** 
Wage squared -9.93430** -4.70795** -5.66927* -9.88079** 
Number children older 6 0.02829 -0.00170 0.01240 0.02479 
Number of children less 6 -0.21557 -0.14405* -0.12337 -0.17581 
Household p.c. income 0.00007 0.00004 0.00006 0.00005 
Husband assembly plant 0.47470** 0.30495** 0.38196** 0.44605** 
Sister  0.15618 0.06644 0.09413 0.06660 
Sister-in-law 0.09961 0.44042*** 0.04947 0.16586 
Disagreement equation  1.26312** 1.86840*** 1.92575*** 1.07459 
Constant -65.59527* -33.05342** -39.95467* -66.46319** 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Disagreement Equation     
Age  -0.00604 -0.02299*** -0.02787*** -0.01492** 
Household p.c. income -0.00002 0.00001 -0.00003 -0.00001 
Husband assembly plant -0.30223** -0.24337 -0.30453** -0.30814** 
Years of educ. 0.09476*** 0.02857*** 0.01542 0.04943*** 
Chilac -0.16771 -0.50589*** -0.04029 -0.30010** 
Sister  -0.06032 0.07328 0.03930 0.11182 
Sister-in-law -0.03659 -0.52620*** -0.02305 -0.23227 
Constant -0.17519 1.79503*** 1.27797*** 0.01981 
     
     
Athrho -0.33831 -10.59434 -10.30585 -0.28076 
Rho -0.32597 -1 -1 -0.27361 
Likelihood-rat 0.4351 0.0276 0.0024 0.6559 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Biprobit results for wives’ disagreement on moral arguments, depending on having a 
married sister or sister-in-law working in an assembly plant. 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree  
All  
Participation Equation     
Age -0.02620 -0.01036 0.00531 -0.02135 
Chilac -0.43564 -0.00647 -0.18368 -0.29557 
Wage 50.38619* 53.46540*** 25.97227** 50.62714** 
Wage squared -9.85042** -10.33425*** -5.04241** -9.80041** 
Number children older 6 0.03227 -0.00288 0.01937 0.02641 
Number of children less 6 -0.21963 -0.18801 -0.14736** -0.18230 
Household p.c. income 0.00007 0.00005 0.00006 0.00005 
Husband assembly plant 0.49177*** 0.39087** 0.41251*** 0.46594** 
Married sister -0.01996 -0.12043 -0.23121 -0.11452 
Married sister-in-law 0.36741 0.66915*** 0.33454 0.45487* 
Disagreement dummy 1.25589** 1.70714*** 1.94927*** 1.00730 
Constant -65.11886* -70.99366 -35.50347** -65.98649 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Disagreement Equation     
Age  -0.00626 -0.02520*** -0.02847*** -0.01546** 
Household p.c. income -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00001 
Husband assembly plant -0.29063* -0.23291 -0.32629** -0.29704 
Years of educ. 0.09489*** 0.01762 0.01388 0.04829** 
Chilac -0.18044 -0.48623*** -0.01501 -0.31636** 
Married sister  -0.20943 -0.02988 0.23692 -0.05597 
Married sister-in-law -0.09533 -0.65445*** -0.16171 -0.31527 
Constant -0.15413 1.92518*** 1.30236*** 0.06991 
     
     
Athrho -0.33138 -1.01320 -10.77600 -0.21910 
Rho -0.31976 -0.76708 -1 -0.21566 
Likelihood-rat 0.4548 0.3211 0.0042 0.7393 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Biprobit results for husbands’ disagreement with moral arguments, depending on having a 
sister or sister-in-law working in an assembly plant. 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree 
All  
Participation Equation     
Age -0.02434 -0.01695 -0.02207 -0.02151 
Chilac -0.40662 -0.18972 -0.34459 -0.32230 
Wage 55.47540** 51.87970* 49.50023** 52.91663** 
Wage squared -10.76122** -9.99069* -9.52147** -10.18991** 
Number children older 6 -0.00023 -0.01694 -0.00679 0.01196 
Number of children less 6 -0.14853 -0.21948* -0.18183 -0.16173 
Household p.c. income 0.00005 0.00002 0.00005 0.00004 
Husband assembly plant 0.32750 0.39693** 0.33898 0.37470** 
Husbands sister-in-law 0.11355 0.14467 0.08715 0.03827 
Husbands sister 0.07342 0.18242 0.12442 0.12238 
Disagreement dummy 0.36787 1.21714 0.41564 0.81700 
Constant -71.72821** -68.46844* -64.70549* -69.15060** 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Disagreement Equation     
Age  -0.01278** -0.03210*** -0.01865*** -0.01907*** 
Household p.c. income -0.00004 0.00003 -0.00006 0.00000 
Husband assembly plant -0.16870 -0.31334** -0.27763* -0.23926 
Years of educ. 0.03988** -0.00947 0.02817* 0.02068 
Chilac -0.06942 -0.33047** 0.08726 -0.18405 
Husbands sister-in-law 0.01669 -0.08323 0.13210 0.20212 
Husbands sister -0.01413 -0.24396 -0.16731 -0.11899 
Constant 0.13612 1.94542*** 0.76404** 0.10515 
     
     
Athrho 0.30410 -0.41915 0.11467 0.00813 
Rho 0.29506 -0.39622 0.11417 0.00813 
Likelihood-rat 0.6695 0.5601 0.8614 0.9615 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Biprobit results for husbands’ disagreement with moral arguments, depending on having a 
married sister or sister-in-law working in an assembly plant. 
 Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree  
All  
Participation Equation     
Age -0.02470 -0.01710 -0.02302 -0.02563* 
Chilac -0.40382 -0.16983 -0.34257 -0.34931 
Wage 54.88234** 51.23973* 48.62761* 48.35308* 
Wage squared -10.63471** -9.85299* -9.34909* -9.29996* 
Number children older 6 0.00199 -0.01316 -0.00625 0.00929 
Number of children less 6 -0.15124 -0.22947* -0.19027 -0.15528 
Household p.c. income 0.00005 0.00002 0.00005 0.00004 
Husband assembly plant 0.34383* 0.42511** 0.36301 0.30965 
Husbands sister-in-law -0.12630 -0.04899 -0.16388 -0.12822 
Husbands sister 0.32961 0.56343** 0.39890 0.31993 
Disagreement dummy 0.33571 1.26728 0.37793 0.03274 
Constant -71.00178** -67.77372* -63.54178* -62.83989* 
     
 Chdissag Infdissag Mandissag Dissagint 
Disagreement Equation     
Age  -0.01329** -0.03202*** -0.01853*** -0.01947*** 
Household p.c. income -0.00004 0.00002 -0.00006 -0.00001 
Husband assembly plant -0.14531 -0.31232** -0.29523* -0.21893 
Years of educ. 0.04044** -0.00878 0.02813* 0.02129 
Chilac -0.09330 -0.35437*** 0.09365 -0.20393 
Husbands sister-in-law -0.21131 -0.18719 0.30630 0.02834 
Husbands sister -0.10856 -0.48626** -0.26537 -0.23653 
Constant 0.18918 1.96008*** 0.75599** 0.16035 
     
     
Athrho 0.32725 -0.42264 0.16264 0.51270 
Rho 0.31605 -0.39915 0.16122 0.47205 
Likelihood-rat 0.6307 0.5821 0.8094 0.5586 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Biprobit results for wives´ disagreement on moral arguments depending on whether a wife 
has worked in a salaried activity while being married and if this salaried activity is a 
professional one.  
 
Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree all 
rules 
     
Participation Equation     
Age -0.01555* -0.00446 0.00139 -0.00866 
Wage 33.07110** 26.67697** 36.63454* 38.34115*** 
Wage Squared -6.47704** -5.13453** -7.06098** -7.42264*** 
Number children older 6 0.02584 0.00563 0.00237 0.04558 
Number of Children less 6 -0.10935 -0.10046 -0.10377 -0.08151 
Household p.c. income 0.00005 0.00002 0.00004 0.00003 
Chilac -0.34852* -0.01190 -0.26493 -0.16202 
Disagreement argument 1.98231*** 1.73582*** 1.80059*** 2.05115*** 
Constant -43.23751** -36.51211** -49.16633** -50.56832*** 
     
Disagreement Equation     
Age -0.00218 -0.01116* -0.01777*** -0.00711 
Household p.c. income -0.00002 -0.00004 -0.00003 0.00000 
Years of Educ. 0.04643*** 0.01835 0.01986 0.02750*** 
Worked Married 0.70455*** 0.59435*** 0.52720*** 0.65302*** 
Worked Married*Prof -0.26914 -1.10979** -0.77356 -0.98846** 
Chilac 0.05397 -0.17009 0.18654 -0.02277 
Constant -0.61790** 0.78717** 0.41025 -0.68981** 
     
     
Athrho -9.62601 -10.86191 -9.13059 -12.50429 
Rho -1 -1 -1 -1 
P(rho=0) 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
315 
 
Biprobit results for wives´ disagreement on moral arguments depending on whether a wife 
has worked in a salaried activity while being married and if this salaried activity is a 
professional one.  
 
 
Biprobit 
Women at 
Home 
Biprobit 
Women 
Promiscuous
Biprobit 
Men 
Providers 
Biprobit  
Disagree all 
rules 
     
Participation Equation     
Age -0.01792 -0.00060 -0.00413 -0.01530 
Wage 25.84296** 30.07547** 35.63334*** 38.34905* 
Wage Squared -5.04748** -5.72849** -6.89027*** -7.46794** 
Number children older 6 0.02201 0.00522 -0.00220 0.01915 
Number of Children less 6 -0.07384 -0.10034*** -0.07763*** -0.11904 
Household p.c. income 0.00005 -0.00002 0.00006 0.00003 
Chilac -0.34767* -0.05457 -0.32367** -0.23709 
Disagreement argument 2.13411*** 1.84999*** 1.90497*** 2.24720*** 
Constant -34.04477** -41.24440** -47.51663*** -49.99875* 
     
Disagreement Equation     
Husband’s Age -0.00703 -0.01569*** -0.00852* -0.00978* 
Household p.c. income -0.00002 0.00006 -0.00005 -0.00001 
Years of Educ. 0.01921 0.00558 0.01961 0.01311 
Wife Worked Married 0.77508*** 0.66199*** 0.55771*** 0.77285*** 
Wife Worked Married*Prof 0.14405 -0.97673** -0.70714 -0.40809 
Chilac 0.08460 -0.05987 0.27401** 0.03922 
Constant -0.49576 0.59005** -0.05111 -0.76137*** 
     
     
Athrho -11.34661 -11.84082 -10.90294 -10.19633 
Rho -1 -1 -1 -1 
P(rho=0) 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
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Tests comparing proportion of individuals believing in each moral argument 
 
 
Test wives’ beliefs in women’s place being home (chdissag) vs. women promiscuous 
(infidssag). 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           chdissag: Number of obs =      432 
                                        infdissa: Number of obs =      432 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
chdissag |    .474537    .024025                      .4274488    .5216253 
infdissa |   .7430556   .0210227                      .7018518    .7842593 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.2685185   .0319242                     -.3310889   -.2059482 
         |  under Ho:   .0332055    -8.09   0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(chdissag) - proportion(infdissa) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -8.087               z = -8.087               z = -8.087 
    P < z =  0.0000        P > |z| =  0.0000          P > z =  1.0000 
 
 
 
Test wives’ beliefs in women’s place being home (chdissag) vs. men breadwinners 
(manddssag). 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           chdissag: Number of obs =      432 
                                        manddiss: Number of obs =      432 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
chdissag |    .474537    .024025                      .4274488    .5216253 
manddiss |   .5810185   .0237383                      .5344922    .6275448 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.1064815   .0337744                     -.1726781   -.0402848 
         |  under Ho:   .0339681    -3.13   0.002 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(chdissag) - proportion(manddiss) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -3.135               z = -3.135               z = -3.135 
    P < z =  0.0009        P > |z| =  0.0017          P > z =  0.9991 
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Test husband’s beliefs in women’s place being home (chdissag) vs. women 
promiscuous (infdissag). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           chdissag: Number of obs =      432 
                                        infdissa: Number of obs =      432 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
chdissag |   .4166667   .0237198                      .3701767    .4631566 
infdissa |   .6226852   .0233208                      .5769772    .6683932 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.2060185    .033264                     -.2712147   -.1408224 
         |  under Ho:   .0339943    -6.06   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(chdissag) - proportion(infdissa) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -6.060               z = -6.060               z = -6.060 
    P < z =  0.0000        P > |z| =  0.0000          P > z =  1.0000 
 
Test wives’ beliefs in women’s place being home (chdissag) vs. men breadwinners 
(manddssag). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           chdissag: Number of obs =      432 
                                        manddiss: Number of obs =      432 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
chdissag |   .4166667   .0237198                      .3701767    .4631566 
manddiss |   .5532407   .0239195                      .5063594    .6001221 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.1365741   .0336864                     -.2025981     -.07055 
         |  under Ho:   .0340053    -4.02   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(chdissag) - proportion(manddiss) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -4.016               z = -4.016               z = -4.016 
    P < z =  0.0000        P > |z| =  0.0001          P > z =  1.0000 
 
Test wives’ beliefs in women’s place being home (chdissag) vs. husband’s beliefs in 
women’s place being the home (chdissagh).  
 
Two-sample test of proportion           chdissag: Number of obs =      432 
                                        chdissag: Number of obs =      432 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
chdissag |    .474537    .024025                      .4274488    .5216253 
chdissag |   .4166667   .0237198                      .3701767    .4631566 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0578704   .0337614                     -.0083007    .1240415 
         |  under Ho:   .0338187     1.71   0.087 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(chdissag) - proportion(chdissag) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.711               z =  1.711               z =  1.711 
    P < z =  0.9565        P > |z| =  0.0870          P > z =  0.0435 
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Test wives’ beliefs in women being promiscuous (infdissag) vs. husband’s beliefs in 
women being promsicous (infdissagh).  
 
Two-sample test of proportion           infdissa: Number of obs =      432 
                                        infdissa: Number of obs =      432 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
infdissa |   .7430556   .0210227                      .7018518    .7842593 
infdissa |   .6226852   .0233208                      .5769772    .6683932 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1203704   .0313977                       .058832    .1819087 
         |  under Ho:   .0316636     3.80   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(infdissa) - proportion(infdissa) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  3.802               z =  3.802               z =  3.802 
    P < z =  0.9999        P > |z| =  0.0001          P > z =  0.0001 
 
 
Test wives’ beliefs in men being breadwinners (chdissag) vs. husband’s beliefs in men 
being breadwinners (chdissagh).  
 
Two-sample test of proportion           manddiss: Number of obs =      432 
                                        manddiss: Number of obs =      432 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
manddiss |   .5810185   .0237383                      .5344922    .6275448 
manddiss |   .5532407   .0239195                      .5063594    .6001221 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0277778   .0336994                     -.0382719    .0938274 
         |  under Ho:   .0337127     0.82   0.410 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(manddiss) - proportion(manddiss) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.824               z =  0.824               z =  0.824 
    P < z =  0.7950        P > |z| =  0.4100          P > z =  0.2050 
 
 
Test wives’ beliefs in women’s place being home, depending on whether she works in 
an assembly plant or not. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      377 
                                               1: Number of obs =       55 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Work |   .4350133   .0255329                      .3849697    .4850568 
   Works |   .7454545    .058737                      .6303321     .860577 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.3104413   .0640466                     -.4359703   -.1849123 
         |  under Ho:   .0720769    -4.31   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -4.307               z = -4.307               z = -4.307 
    P < z =  0.0000        P > |z| =  0.0000          P > z =  1.0000 
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Test wives’ beliefs in women being promiscuous, depending on whether she works in 
an assembly plant or not. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      377 
                                               1: Number of obs =       55 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not works|   .7214854    .023087                      .6762358    .7667351 
   Works |   .8909091   .0420368                      .8085185    .9732997 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.1694237   .0479594                     -.2634223    -.075425 
         |  under Ho:   .0630696    -2.69   0.007 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -2.686               z = -2.686               z = -2.686 
    P < z =  0.0036        P > |z| =  0.0072          P > z =  0.9964 
 
 
Test wives’ beliefs in men being the breadwinners, depending on whether she works 
in an assembly plant or not. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      377 
                                               1: Number of obs =       55 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Works|   .5517241   .0256132                      .5015233     .601925 
   Works |   .7818182   .0556905                      .6726669    .8909695 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   -.230094   .0612981                     -.3502362   -.1099519 
         |  under Ho:   .0712168    -3.23   0.001 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -3.231               z = -3.231               z = -3.231 
    P < z =  0.0006        P > |z| =  0.0012          P > z =  0.9994 
 
 
Test husbands’ beliefs in women’s place being home, depending on whether she 
works in an assembly plant or not. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      377 
                                               1: Number of obs =       55 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Works|   .3687003   .0248476                      .3199999    .4174006 
   Works |   .7454545    .058737                      .6303321     .860577 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.3767543   .0637765                     -.5017539   -.2517547 
         |  under Ho:   .0711611    -5.29   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -5.294               z = -5.294               z = -5.294 
    P < z =  0.0000        P > |z| =  0.0000          P > z =  1.0000 
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Test husbands’ beliefs in women being promiscuous, depending on whether his wife 
works in an assembly plant or not. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      377 
                                               1: Number of obs =       55 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Works|   .5915119   .0253163                      .5418928     .641131 
   Works |   .8363636   .0498834                      .7385939    .9341333 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.2448517   .0559399                     -.3544919   -.1352115 
         |  under Ho:   .0699642    -3.50   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -3.500               z = -3.500               z = -3.500 
    P < z =  0.0002        P > |z| =  0.0005          P > z =  0.9998 
 
 
Test husbands’ beliefs in men being breadwinners, depending on whether his wife 
works in an assembly plant or not. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      377 
                                               1: Number of obs =       55 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Works|   .5198939   .0257309                      .4694622    .5703256 
   Works |   .7818182   .0556905                      .6726669    .8909695 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.2619243   .0613474                      -.382163   -.1416855 
         |  under Ho:   .0717602    -3.65   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -3.650               z = -3.650               z = -3.650 
    P < z =  0.0001        P > |z| =  0.0003          P > z =  0.9999 
 
 
Test wives’ beliefs in women’s place being home, by town 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      215 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      217 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .4976744   .0340993                      .4308409    .5645079 
  chilac |   .4516129   .0337829                      .3853996    .5178262 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0460615   .0480005                     -.0480178    .1401408 
         |  under Ho:   .0480506     0.96   0.338 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.959               z =  0.959               z =  0.959 
    P < z =  0.8311        P > |z| =  0.3378          P > z =  0.1689 
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Test wives’ beliefs in women being promiscuous, by town 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      215 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      217 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .8046512    .027039                      .7516558    .8576466 
  chilac |   .6820276    .031613                      .6200673     .743988 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1226235   .0415991                      .0410907    .2041563 
         |  under Ho:   .0420458     2.92   0.004 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.916               z =  2.916               z =  2.916 
    P < z =  0.9982        P > |z| =  0.0035          P > z =  0.0018 
 
 
Test wives’ beliefs in men being the breadwinners, by town 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      215 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      217 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .5813953   .0336448                      .5154527     .647338 
  chilac |   .5806452   .0334978                      .5149907    .6462997 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0007502   .0474771                     -.0923033    .0938037 
         |  under Ho:   .0474772     0.02   0.987 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.016               z =  0.016               z =  0.016 
    P < z =  0.5063        P > |z| =  0.9874          P > z =  0.4937 
 
 
Test husbands’ beliefs in women’s place being home, by town 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      215 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      217 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .4372093   .0338298                      .3709042    .5035144 
  chilac |   .3963134   .0332044                       .331234    .4613927 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0408959   .0474024                      -.052011    .1338028 
         |  under Ho:   .0474401     0.86   0.389 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.862               z =  0.862               z =  0.862 
    P < z =  0.8057        P > |z| =  0.3887          P > z =  0.1943 
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Test husbands’ beliefs in women being promiscuous, by town 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      215 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      217 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .6697674    .032074                      .6069036    .7326313 
  chilac |   .5760369   .0335474                      .5102851    .6417886 
---------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff |   .0937306    .046413                      .0027627    .1846985 
         |  under Ho:   .0466422     2.01   0.044 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.010               z =  2.010               z =  2.010 
    P < z =  0.9778        P > |z| =  0.0445          P > z =  0.0222 
 
 
Test husbands’ beliefs in men being the breadwinners, by town 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      215 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      217 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .5395349    .033993                      .4729099    .6061598 
  chilac |   .5668203   .0336377                      .5008915     .632749 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0272854   .0478228                     -.1210163    .0664455 
         |  under Ho:   .0478395    -0.57   0.568 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.570               z = -0.570               z = -0.570 
    P < z =  0.2842        P > |z| =  0.5684          P > z =  0.7158 
 
 
 
Simple Biprobit Regression Coefficient Tests  
 
 
Test women’s beliefs on women’s place being home (chdissag) equal to beliefs of women being 
promiscuous (infdissag) in participation equation (currasemb) 
 
[A_currassemb]chdissag - [B_currassemb]infdissag = 0 
 
           chi2(  1) =    1.32 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.2511 
 
 
Test  women’s beliefs on women’s place being home (chdissag) equal to men being 
breadwinners (manddissag) in participation equation (currasemb) 
 
   [A_currassemb]chdissag - [C_currassemb]manddissag = 0 
 
           chi2(  1) =    1.67 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1960 
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Test women’s beliefs on women being promiscuous (infdissag) equal to men being 
breadwinners (manddissag) in participation equation (currasemb) 
 
 
[B_currassemb]infdissag - [C_currassemb]manddissag = 0 
 
           chi2(  1) =    0.23 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.6336 
 
 
Test women’s beliefs on women being promiscuous (infdissag) equal to men beliefs on women 
being promiscuous (chdissagh) in participation equation (currasemb) 
 
 
[B_currassemb]infdissag - [F_currassemb]infdissagh = 0 
 
           chi2(  1) =    0.41 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.5230 
 
 
Test women’s beliefs on all moral arguments jointly (dissagint) equal to men beliefs on all 
moral arguments jointly (dissaginth) in participation equation (currasemb) 
 
 
[H_currassemb]dissagint - [I_currassemb]dissaginth = 0 
 
           chi2(  1) =    0.01 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9354 
 
 
Biprobit Regression Coefficient Tests Comparing Effect of Having a Husband 
working in an Assembly Plant v.s. Farming. 
 
 
 
Test husband in assembly plant coefficient equal to farmer husband coefficient in wives’ 
disagreement on women being promiscuous equation (chdissag) 
 
 
 - [chdissag]husbass + [chdissag]farmer = 0 
 
           chi2(  1) =    0.07 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.7864 
 
 
 
Test husband in assembly plant coefficient equal to farmer husband coefficient in husbands’ 
disagreement on women being promiscuous equation (chdissag) 
 
 
 - [chdissagh]husbass + [chdissagh]farmer = 0 
 
           chi2(  1) =    0.90 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.3440 
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Tests comparing proportion of wives’ who work in assembly plant employment 
depending on whether they or their husbands have lived in a city or were born in a 
city. 
 
 
Test proportion of women working in assembly plants depending on whether they 
have a husband who lived in a city compared to those who have a husband who 
hasn’t lived in a city or was born in one.  
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      151 
                                               1: Number of obs =       48 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Works|   .0463576   .0171106                      .0128215    .0798937 
   Works |   .1041667   .0440918                      .0177484    .1905849 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0578091   .0472954                     -.1505063    .0348882 
         |  under Ho:   .0394435    -1.47   0.143 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.466               z = -1.466               z = -1.466 
    P < z =  0.0714        P > |z| =  0.1428          P > z =  0.9286 
 
 
 
Test proportion of wives working in assembly plants depending on whether they were 
born in a city compared to those who were born in a city or lived in one. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                 0: Number of obs =      390 
                                              1: Number of obs =       42 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not works|   .1153846   .0161778                      .0836768    .1470925 
   Works |   .2380952   .0657205                      .1092854    .3669051 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.1227106   .0676824                     -.2553657    .0099445 
         |  under Ho:   .0541319    -2.27   0.023 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -2.267               z = -2.267               z = -2.267 
    P < z =  0.0117        P > |z| =  0.0234          P > z =  0.9883 
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Test proportion of wives working in assembly plants in Santiago Miahuatlán 
depending on whether they were born in a city compared to those who were born in a 
city or lived in one. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      185 
                                               1: Number of obs =       30 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Works|    .172973   .0278076                      .1184711    .2274748 
   Works |   .2666667   .0807373                      .1084244     .424909 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0936937   .0853919                     -.2610588    .0736714 
         |  under Ho:    .076592    -1.22   0.221 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.223               z = -1.223               z = -1.223 
    P < z =  0.1106        P > |z| =  0.2212          P > z =  0.8894 
 
 
 
Test proportion of wives working in assembly plants in San Gabriel Chilac depending 
on whether they were born in a city compared to those who were born in a city or 
lived in one. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      205 
                                               1: Number of obs =       12 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Works|   .0634146   .0170213                      .0300536    .0967757 
   Works |   .1666667   .1075829                     -.0441919    .3775252 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   -.103252   .1089211                     -.3167334    .1102293 
         |  under Ho:   .0753397    -1.37   0.171 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.370               z = -1.370               z = -1.370 
    P < z =  0.0853        P > |z| =  0.1705          P > z =  0.9147 
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Test proportion of women working in assembly plants depending on whether they 
have a husband who was born in a city compared to those who have a husband who 
hasn’t lived in a city or was born in one.  
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      392 
                                               1: Number of obs =       40 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not works|    .122449   .0165566                      .0899987    .1548993 
   Works |       .175   .0600781                      .0572491    .2927509 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   -.052551   .0623177                     -.1746915    .0695894 
         |  under Ho:    .055327    -0.95   0.342 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.950               z = -0.950               z = -0.950 
    P < z =  0.1711        P > |z| =  0.3422          P > z =  0.8289 
 
Test proportion of women working in assembly plants in Santiago Miahuatlán 
depending on whether they have a husband who was born in a city compared to those 
who have a husband who hasn’t lived in a city or was born in one.  
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      193 
                                               1: Number of obs =       22 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Works|   .1865285   .0280392                      .1315727    .2414843 
   Works |   .1818182   .0822304                      .0206496    .3429867 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0047103   .0868794                     -.1655702    .1749908 
         |  under Ho:   .0875669     0.05   0.957 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.054               z =  0.054               z =  0.054 
    P < z =  0.5214        P > |z| =  0.9571          P > z =  0.4786 
 
 
Test proportion of women working in assembly plants in San Gabriel Chilac 
depending on whether they have a husband who was born in a city compared to those 
who have a husband who hasn’t lived in a city or was born in one.  
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      199 
                                               1: Number of obs =       18 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Works|   .0603015   .0168745                       .027228     .093375 
   Works |   .1666667    .087841                     -.0054986     .338832 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.1063652   .0894472                     -.2816784    .0689481 
         |  under Ho:   .0624351    -1.70   0.088 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.704               z = -1.704               z = -1.704 
    P < z =  0.0442        P > |z| =  0.0885          P > z =  0.9558 
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Tests comparing proportion of wives’ who work in assembly plant employment  
depending on whether they have sisters or sisters in law working in assembly 
plants. 
 
 
Test proportion of women working in assembly plant depending on whether they 
have a sister working in an assembly plant or not 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      352 
                                               1: Number of obs =       80 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Works|   .1107955   .0167298                      .0780057    .1435852 
   Works |         .2   .0447214                      .1123477    .2876523 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0892045   .0477482                     -.1827892    .0043801 
         |  under Ho:   .0412851    -2.16   0.031 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -2.161               z = -2.161               z = -2.161 
    P < z =  0.0154        P > |z| =  0.0307          P > z =  0.9846 
 
 
 
 
Test proportion of women working in assembly plant depending on whether they 
have a married sister working in an assembly plant or not 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      392 
                                               1: Number of obs =       40 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not works|    .122449   .0165566                      .0899987    .1548993 
   Works |       .175   .0600781                      .0572491    .2927509 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   -.052551   .0623177                     -.1746915    .0695894 
         |  under Ho:    .055327    -0.95   0.342 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.950               z = -0.950               z = -0.950 
    P < z =  0.1711        P > |z| =  0.3422          P > z =  0.8289 
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Test proportion of women working in assembly plant depending on whether they 
have a sister in law working in an assembly plant or not 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      361 
                                               1: Number of obs =       71 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not Works|   .1163435   .0168756                      .0832679    .1494191 
   Works |   .1830986   .0458985                      .0931393    .2730579 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0667551   .0489025                     -.1626022     .029092 
         |  under Ho:    .043274    -1.54   0.123 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.543               z = -1.543               z = -1.543 
    P < z =  0.0615        P > |z| =  0.1229          P > z =  0.9385 
 
 
 
 
Test proportion of women working in assembly plant depending on whether they 
have a married sister in law working in an assembly plant or not 
 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion                  0: Number of obs =      393 
                                               1: Number of obs =       39 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Not works|   .1145038   .0160623                      .0830223    .1459853 
   Works |   .2564103   .0699201                      .1193694    .3934511 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.1419064   .0717413                     -.2825169    -.001296 
         |  under Ho:   .0559605    -2.54   0.011 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
               Ho: proportion(0) - proportion(1) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -2.536               z = -2.536               z = -2.536 
    P < z =  0.0056        P > |z| =  0.0112          P > z =  0.9944 
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Appendix 6:  Chapter 8 
Regression Results 
 
Variable Names 
# ch less 6 Number of children less than 6 
# ch old 6 Number of children older than 6 
Pc. Hh inc Per capita household income 
Age Age 
Chilac Dummy variable representing whether individual is from Chilac 
Wage Inputed wage 
Wage sq Inputed wage squared 
S.  sanc Dummy variable representing whether wife believes will be recipient 
of social sanctions 
S. san Ch Interaction variable whether wife believs recipient of social sanction 
and is from Chilac Chilac 
Constant Constant term 
 
 
 
Probit regression results including sanctions by wife’s family using the moral argument of 
wives’ place being the home. 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6 -0.25517* -0.24729* -0.22876 -0.21342 -0.26031* -0.25641* 
# ch old 6 -0.02849 -0.02712 -0.00071 0.006496 -0.02652 -0.01737 
Pc. Hh inc 3.03E-05 2.51E-05 1.74E-05 1.42E-05 3.11E-05 2.94E-05 
Age -0.03378** -0.03362** -0.03615** -0.036** -0.03638** -0.0366** 
Chilac -0.3176 -0.46639 -0.35928 -0.47398* -0.38621 -0.51892* 
Wage 50.35961** 50.89365** 49.31024* 49.42217* 49.31011** 49.02389* 
Wage sq -9.83327** -9.93168** -9.60774** -9.61783** -9.63408** -9.5788** 
S.  sanc -0.50831** -0.63034*** -0.67798*** -0.79072*** -0.50525** -0.62872*** 
S. san Ch -0.35824  -0.33308  -0.37659  
Constant -63.6564* -64.3346* -62.3394* -62.5359* -62.2013* -61.7849* 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Probit regression results including sanctions by husband’s family using the moral 
argument of wives’ place being the home. 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6 -0.23858* -0.23888* -0.23607 -0.23587 -0.21039 -0.21042 
# ch old 6 -0.04796 -0.04724 -0.02927 -0.02476 -0.01997 -0.01869 
Pc. hh Inc 0.000027 2.58E-05 1.76E-05 1.68E-05 2.06E-05 2E-05 
Age -0.02938* -0.02939* -0.0328** -0.03295** -0.02713* -0.02707* 
Chilac -0.39082 -0.431 -0.41116 -0.48181 -0.3693 -0.38971 
Wage 53.26415** 53.57643** 53.60087** 54.00019** 57.39634** 57.53329**
Wage sq -10.3391** -10.3981** -10.4154** -10.4901** -11.1006** -11.1245** 
S.  sanc -0.4186* -0.45315** -0.52902** -0.60211*** -0.47439** -0.4964*** 
S. san Ch -0.09813  -0.22262  -0.06335  
Constant -67.9702** -68.3678** -68.1871** -68.6909** -73.6789** -73.8675** 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Probit regression results including sanctions by neighbours using the moral argument of 
wives’ place being the home 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6 -0.30601** -0.3050** -0.30493** -0.29939** -0.29653* -0.29641* 
# ch old 6 -0.01384 -0.01315 0.00890 0.01697 0.01586 0.01514 
PC. hh Inc 0.00003 -0.00003 0.00002 0.00002 0.00004 0.00004 
Age -0.04141** -0.04191** -0.04583** -0.04586** -0.04318** -0.04317* 
Chilac -0.52458 -0.59336* -0.59359* -0.69748** -0.63405* -.62215* 
Wage 42.90753 42.01973 38.39492 39.14839 38.87277 38.71933 
Wage sq -8.44871* -8.28361 -7.60603 -7.74047 -7.70007 -7.67186 
S.  sanc -0.53620** -0.58502*** -0.55282** -0.68919*** -0.55224** -.53508* 
S. san Ch -0.14579  -0.53228  0.04658  
Constant -53.35043 -52.12318 -47.21156 -48.22862 -47.96744 -47.76368 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Probit regression results including sanctions by friends using the moral argument of wives’ 
place being the home 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6 -0.26722* -0.25612* -0.25481* -0.25590* -0.26809* -0.26749* 
# ch old 6 -0.00297 0.00277 0.01660 0.02681 0.01457 0.01432 
Pc. hh Inc 0.00004 0.00004 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 
Age -0.03047* -0.03180* -0.03399** -0.03573** -0.03289** -0.03283** 
Chilac -0.21473 -0.41377 -0.29744 -0.46349 -0.44178 -0.43095 
Wage 55.39666** 56.11219** 56.00322** 56.02832** 52.84844** 52.79240** 
Wage sq -10.7082** -10.8702** -10.8543** -10.8803** -10.2343** -10.2240** 
S.  sanc -0.36615 -0.55656*** -0.54697** -0.72994*** -0.56162** -0.54771*** 
S. san Ch -0.60573  -0.66747  0.03938  
Constant -71.0237** -71.6921** -71.4564** -71.2407** -67.4838** -67.4137** 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Probit regression results including sanctions by wives’ family using the moral argument of 
wives being promiscuous 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6 -0.26406* -0.25463* -0.27307* -0.25258* -0.25495* -0.24881* 
# ch old 6 -0.03377 -0.02923 -0.03084 -0.02357 -0.02552 -0.02064 
PC. hh Inc 2.79E-05 2.59E-05 2.88E-05 2.67E-05 2.67E-05 2.58E-05 
Age -0.03279** -0.03328** -0.03328** -0.03363** -0.03436** -0.03429** 
Chilac -0.35814 -0.49179* -0.32393 -0.46518* -0.42627 -0.47808* 
Wage 54.00334** 53.0322** 54.3822** 51.9372** 55.56469** 54.7833** 
Wage sq -10.4631** -10.2986** -10.5314** -10.0824** -10.777** -10.6322** 
S.  sanc -0.17847 -0.34829* -0.1327 -0.3605 -0.53946* -0.63555*** 
S. san Ch -0.7015  -0.78843  -0.35445  
Constant -69.0724** -67.608** -69.5976** -66.2419** -70.9062** -69.8472** 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Probit regression results including sanctions by husband’s family using the moral 
argument of wives being promiscuous. 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6 -0.22187 -0.21944 -0.23642 -0.23366 -0.20392 -0.20253 
# ch old 6 -0.03166 -0.02936 -0.0233 -0.0221 -0.01961 -0.01935 
PC. hh Inc 2.36E-05 2.22E-05 2.38E-05 2.11E-05 2.46E-05 2.14E-05 
Age -0.02846* -0.02952* -0.02956* -0.02987* -0.02687* -0.02726* 
Chilac -0.29031 -0.43658 -0.31146 -0.42189 -0.29369 -0.39629 
Wage 57.6876** 57.71053** 60.27082** 58.25569** 60.46975** 59.62786**
Wage sq -11.1315** -11.1465** -11.6253** -11.2527** -11.6691** -11.5084** 
S.  sanc -0.14989 -0.32983 -0.32316 -0.48424** -0.31678 -0.46881** 
S. san Ch -0.75008  -0.61094  -0.5984  
Constant -74.2923** -74.1624** -77.5984** -74.8369** -77.9434** -76.7909** 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
Probit regression results including sanctions by neighbours using the moral argument of 
wives being promiscuous 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6 -0.28260* -0.29433** -0.31699** -0.31933** -0.30399** -0.30487* 
# ch old 6 0.01147 0.01804 0.03100 0.03452 0.03365 0.03511 
PC. hh Inc 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 
Age -0.03966** -0.04149** -0.04229** -0.04399** -0.04250** -0.04409* 
Chilac -0.47861 -0.64816** -0.61259* -0.71704** -0.61612* -0.72721* 
Wage 41.36917 39.88060 38.91473 37.64819 34.47933 32.77385 
Wage sq -8.14808 -7.88702 -7.68716 -7.45867 -6.84171 -6.52108 
S.  sanc -0.18611 -0.37761* -0.37893 -0.54543** -0.41557 -0.59047** 
S. san Ch -0.70139      
Constant -51.65538 -49.43647 -48.25203 -46.41742 -42.44142 -40.08751 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Probit regression results including sanctions by friends using the moral argument of wives 
being promiscuous. 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6 -0.25035* -0.24325 -0.24788* -0.24487* -0.26442* -0.26010* 
# ch old 6 0.01511 0.01707 0.00154 0.00785 0.02730 0.02949 
PC. hh Inc 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00001 0.00001 
Age -0.02692 -0.02826* -0.03016* -0.03093* -0.03153* -0.03185* 
Chilac -0.28812 -0.40937 -0.34740 -0.41611 -0.44505 -0.49106* 
Wage 57.07771** 55.87258** 53.81786** 52.99603** 54.50355** 53.74507** 
Wage sq -10.9759** -10.7724** -10.3675** -10.2279** -10.5313** -10.3895** 
S.  sanc -0.44792 -0.65597** -0.33774 -0.45735* -0.8680*** -0.98346*** 
S. san Ch -  -0.40215  -  
Constant -73.7742** -71.9436** -69.3145** -68.0853** -69.8618** -68.8286** 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Probit regression results including sanctions by wife’s family using the moral argument of 
husbands not being good providers. 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6  -0.25501* -0.25315* -0.25447* -0.25242* -0.26266* -0.26266* 
# ch old 6 -0.02891 -0.03197 -0.02147 -0.01921 -0.01778 -0.01577 
PC. hh Inc 2.8E-05 2.64E-05 2.28E-05 2.22E-05 2.27E-05 2.23E-05 
Age -0.03102** -0.03258** -0.03116** -0.03174** -0.03271** -0.03348** 
Chilac -0.34055 -0.4643* -0.41479 -0.45833* -0.45714 -0.49806* 
Wage 53.92664** 51.26926** 52.02999** 50.82901** 52.47508** 51.614** 
Wage sq -10.4256** -9.93329** -10.0546** -9.83072** -10.1543** -9.99625** 
S.  sanc -0.00181 -0.11804 -0.24403 -0.2958 -0.40613 -0.46014** 
S. san Ch -0.45452  -0.18438  -0.24346  
Constant -69.2546** -65.5814** -66.7682** -65.1312** -67.159** -65.9524** 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Probit regression results including sanctions by husband’s family using the moral 
argument of husbands not being good providers. 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6 -0.22056 -0.21867 -0.21347 -0.21366 -0.20391 -0.20371 
# ch old 6 -0.02016 -0.02005 -0.01866 -0.02053 -0.02149 -0.02151 
PC. hh Inc 2.54E-05 0.000026 2.49E-05 2.47E-05 2.33E-05 2.32E-05 
Age -0.03002 -0.03043* -0.02768 -0.02918** -0.02733 -0.0274* 
Chilac -0.44756 -0.47682* -0.38696 -0.46819 -0.4193 -0.42375 
Wage 56.68051** 56.54175** 56.65913** 55.95172** 58.28978** 58.22084** 
Wage sq -10.9721** -10.953** -10.9523** -10.8367** -11.2613** -11.2489** 
S.  sanc -0.33923 -0.37891 -0.3518 -0.49603* -0.44214 -0.44956* 
S. san Ch -0.19062    -0.03373  
Constant -72.6793** -72.4257** -72.8632** -71.7287** -75.0179** -74.9188** 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Probit regression results including sanctions by neighbours using the moral argument of 
husbands not being good providers. 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6 -0.25482* -0.25432* -0.27559* -0.27351* -0.24930* -0.25169* 
# ch old 6 -0.01028 -0.01121 -0.00731 -0.00964 0.00567 0.00719 
PC. hh Inc 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
Age -0.03130* -0.03073* -0.03373** -0.03191** -0.02864* -0.02941* 
Chilac -0.44273 -0.41607 -0.52976* -0.45892 -0.41737 -0.44076 
Wage 47.42347* 48.09386* 42.62796* 44.33600* 47.84131* 47.24444*
Wage sq -9.15885* -9.28209* -8.24957* -8.56332* -9.23247* -9.12332* 
S.  sanc -0.60009** -0.56548** -0.60274* -0.49067** -0.43566 -0.46918* 
S. san Ch 0.10312  0.31929  -0.11671  
Constant -60.75666* -61.69151* -54.35079 -56.74787* -61.49443* -60.6491* 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Probit regression results including sanctions by friends using the moral argument of 
husbands not being good providers 
 
 
Gossip 
 
Criticism of Wife 
 
Criticism of Husband 
 
 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
With 
interaction 
dummy 
Without 
dummy 
# ch less 6 -0.25025 -0.24854 -0.23760 -0.23521 -0.24632 -0.24916* 
# ch old 6 0.03113 0.03605 0.02315 0.02881 0.02386 0.03023 
PC. hh Inc 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00001 0.00001 
Age -0.03150* -0.03294** -0.03214* -0.03381** -0.03124* -.03361** 
Chilac -0.44411 -0.51236* -0.44699 -0.51599* -0.41769 -0.51194* 
Wage 53.41171** 52.78544** 51.29289* 50.70244* 49.89919* 48.61773*
Wage sq -10.3184** -10.2150** -9.9240* -9.8296* -9.6322* -9.4085 
S.  sanc -0.75940** -0.88074*** -0.62548** -0.75558*** -0.56929** -0.6624** 
S. san Ch       
Constant -68.47055* -67.47929* -65.65282* -64.68665* -64.02575* -62.1144* 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Tests comparing social sanctions from different reference groups  
 
Test comparing gossip regarding women’s place being home, by wives family 
(dgfamch) vs. husbands’ family (dgfhusch). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamch: Number of obs =      409 
                                        dgfhusch: Number of obs =      398 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamch |   .5892421   .0243264                      .5415631     .636921 
dgfhusch |   .5502513   .0249358                      .5013779    .5991246 
---- ----+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0389908   .0348363                     -.0292872    .1072688 
         |  under Ho:   .0348581     1.12   0.263 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamch) - proportion(dgfhusch) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.119               z =  1.119               z =  1.119 
    P < z =  0.8683        P > |z| =  0.2633          P > z =  0.1317 
 
 
Test comparing gossip regarding women’s place being home, by wives family 
(dgfamch) vs. neighbours (dgneigch). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamch: Number of obs =      409 
                                        dgneigch: Number of obs =      366 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------ --+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamch |   .5892421   .0243264                      .5415631     .636921 
dgneigch |   .5300546   .0260882                      .4789228    .5811865 
--- -----+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0591874   .0356703                      -.010725    .1290998 
         |  under Ho:   .0357052     1.66   0.097 
----- -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamch) - proportion(dgneigch) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.658               z =  1.658               z =  1.658 
    P < z =  0.9513        P > |z| =  0.0974          P > z =  0.0487 
 
 
Test comparing gossip regarding women’s place being home, by wives family 
(dgfamch) vs. friends (dgfriench). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamch: Number of obs =      409 
                                        dgfrienc: Number of obs =      373 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamch |   .5892421   .0243264                      .5415631     .636921 
dgfrienc |   .4423592   .0257164                       .391956    .4927625 
-- ------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1468828   .0353993                      .0775015    .2162641 
         |  under Ho:   .0357715     4.11   0.000 
---------------------------------------------------- --------------------- 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamch) - proportion(dgfrienc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  4.106               z =  4.106               z =  4.106 
    P < z =  1.0000        P > |z| =  0.0000          P > z =  0.0000 
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Test comparing gossip regarding women’s place being home, by husbands family 
(dgfhusch) vs. neighbours (dgneigch). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfhusch: Number of obs =      398 
                                        dgneigch: Number of obs =      366 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhusch |   .5502513   .0249358                      .5013779    .5991246 
dgneigch |   .5300546   .0260882                      .4789228    .5811865 
------- -+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0201966   .0360886                     -.0505358     .090929 
         |  under Ho:   .0360911     0.56   0.576 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhusch) - proportion(dgneigch) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.560               z =  0.560               z =  0.560 
    P < z =  0.7121        P > |z| =  0.5758          P > z =  0.2879 
 
 
Test comparing gossip regarding women’s place being home, by husbands family 
(dgfhusch) vs. friends (dgfriench). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion          dgfhusch: Number of obs =      398 
                                       dgfrienc: Number of obs =      373 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhusch |   .5502513   .0249358                      .5013779    .5991246 
dgfrienc |   .4423592   .0257164                       .391956    .4927625 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |    .107892   .0358208                      .0376845    .1780995 
         |  under Ho:   .0360328     2.99   0.003 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhusch) - proportion(dgfrienc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.994               z =  2.994               z =  2.994 
    P < z =  0.9986        P > |z| =  0.0028          P > z =  0.0014 
 
 
 
Test comparing gossip regarding women’s place being home, by neighbours 
(dgneigch) vs. friends (dgfriench). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgneigch: Number of obs =      366 
                                        dgfrienc: Number of obs =      373 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgneigch |   .5300546   .0260882                      .4789228    .5811865 
dgfrienc |   .4423592   .0257164                       .391956    .4927625 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0876954   .0366323                      .0158974    .1594934 
         |  under Ho:   .0367724     2.38   0.017 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgneigch) - proportion(dgfrienc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.385               z =  2.385               z =  2.385 
    P < z =  0.9915        P > |z| =  0.0171          P > z =  0.0085 
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Test comparing criticism to women on women’s place being home, by wives family 
(dcfamch) vs. husbands family (dgfhusch). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamch: Number of obs =      408 
                                        dcfhusch: Number of obs =      396 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamch |   .5686275   .0245194                      .5205703    .6166846 
dcfhusch |   .4949495   .0251247                      .4457061    .5441929 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |    .073678   .0351063                      .0048709     .142485 
         |  under Ho:   .0351974     2.09   0.036 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dcfamch) - proportion(dcfhusch) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.093               z =  2.093               z =  2.093 
    P < z =  0.9818        P > |z| =  0.0363          P > z =  0.0182 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to women on women’s place being home, by wives family 
(dcfamch) vs. neighbours (dcneigch). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamch: Number of obs =      408 
                                        dcneigch: Number of obs =      366 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamch |   .5686275   .0245194                      .5205703    .6166846 
dcneigch |   .4180328   .0257818                      .3675013    .4685643 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1505947   .0355796                        .08086    .2203293 
         |  under Ho:   .0359968     4.18   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dcfamch) - proportion(dcneigch) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  4.184               z =  4.184               z =  4.184 
    P < z =  1.0000        P > |z| =  0.0000          P > z =  0.0000 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to women on women’s place being home, by wives’ family 
(dcfamch) vs. friends (dcfriench) 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamch: Number of obs =      408 
                                        dcfrienc: Number of obs =      373 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamch |   .5686275   .0245194                      .5205703    .6166846 
dcfrienc |   .4128686   .0254929                      .3629035    .4628338 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1557588   .0353707                      .0864334    .2250842 
         |  under Ho:   .0358164     4.35   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ho: proportion(dcfamch) - proportion(dcfrienc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  4.349               z =  4.349               z =  4.349 
    P < z =  1.0000        P > |z| =  0.0000          P > z =  0.0000 
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Test comparing criticism to women on women’s place being home, by husbands’ 
family (dcfamch) vs. neighbours (dcniegch). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfhusch: Number of obs =      396 
                                         dcneigch: Number of obs =      366 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfhusch |   .4949495   .0251247                      .4457061    .5441929 
dcneigch |   .4180328   .0257818                      .3675013    .4685643 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0769167   .0359993                      .0063593    .1474741 
         |  under Ho:   .0361262     2.13   0.033 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfhusch) - proportion(dcneigch) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.129               z =  2.129               z =  2.129 
    P < z =  0.9834        P > |z| =  0.0332          P > z =  0.0166 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to women on women’s place being home, by husbands family 
(dcfhusch) vs. friends (dcfrienc). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcfhusch: Number of obs =      396 
                                        dcfrienc: Number of obs =      373 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfhusch |   .4949495   .0251247                      .4457061    .5441929 
dcfrienc |   .4128686   .0254929                      .3629035    .4628338 
 --------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0820809    .035793                      .0119279    .1522338 
         |  under Ho:   .0359315     2.28   0.022 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfhusch) - proportion(dcfrienc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.284               z =  2.284               z =  2.284 
    P < z =  0.9888        P > |z| =  0.0223          P > z =  0.0112 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to women on women’s place being home, by neighbours 
(dcneigch) vs. friends (dcfriench). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcneigch: Number of obs =      366 
                                        dcfrienc: Number of obs =      373 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------ --+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcneigch |   .4180328   .0257818                      .3675013    .4685643 
dcfrienc |   .4128686   .0254929                      .3629035    .4628338 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0051642   .0362573                     -.0658988    .0762271 
         |  under Ho:   .0362572     0.14   0.887 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcneigch) - proportion(dcfrienc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.142               z =  0.142               z =  0.142 
    P < z =  0.5566        P > |z| =  0.8867          P > z =  0.4434 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands on women’s place being home, by wives’ 
family (dchfamch) vs. husbands’ family (dchfhusch). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfamch: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dchfhusc: Number of obs =      394 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfamch |   .5233415   .0247571                      .4748186    .5718645 
dchfhusc |   .4873096   .0251815                      .4379548    .5366645 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0360319   .0353132                     -.0331807    .1052444 
         |  under Ho:   .0353357     1.02   0.308 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfamch) - proportion(dchfhusc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.020               z =  1.020               z =  1.020 
    P < z =  0.8461        P > |z| =  0.3079          P > z =  0.1539 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on women’s place being home, by wives family 
(dchfamch)vs. neighbours (dchneigch). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfamch: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dchneigc: Number of obs =      363 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfamch |   .5233415   .0247571                      .4748186    .5718645 
dchneigc |   .3966942   .0256769                      .3463683    .4470201 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1266473   .0356682                       .056739    .1965556 
         |  under Ho:   .0360009     3.52   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfamch) - proportion(dchneigc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  3.518               z =  3.518               z =  3.518 
    P < z =  0.9998        P > |z| =  0.0004          P > z =  0.0002 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on women’s place being home, by wives’ 
family (dchfamch) vs. friends (dchfriench). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfamch: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      370 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfamch |   .5233415   .0247571                      .4748186    .5718645 
dchfrien |   .3837838   .0252819                      .3342323    .4333353 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1395577   .0353848                      .0702048    .2089107 
         |  under Ho:   .0357818     3.90   0.000 
--------------------------------------------------- ----------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfamch) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  3.900               z =  3.900               z =  3.900 
    P < z =  1.0000        P > |z| =  0.0001          P > z =  0.0000 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands on women’s place being home, by husbands’ 
family (dchfhusch) vs. neighbours (dchneigch). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfhusc: Number of obs =      394 
                                        dchneigc: Number of obs =      363 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]    ---
------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfhusc |   .4873096   .0251815                      .4379548    .5366645 
dchneigc |   .3966942   .0256769                      .3463683    .4470201 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0906154   .0359641                      .0201271    .1611037 
         |  under Ho:   .0361461     2.51   0.012 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfhusc) - proportion(dchneigc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.507               z =  2.507               z =  2.507 
    P < z =  0.9939        P > |z| =  0.0122          P > z =  0.0061 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on women’s place being home, by husbands’ 
family (dchfhusch) vs. friends (dchfriench). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfhusc: Number of obs =      394 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      370 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfhusc |   .4873096   .0251815                      .4379548    .5366645 
dchfrien |   .3837838   .0252819                      .3342323    .4333353 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1035259   .0356831                      .0335883    .1734634 
         |  under Ho:   .0359097     2.88   0.004 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfhusc) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.883               z =  2.883               z =  2.883 
    P < z =  0.9980        P > |z| =  0.0039          P > z =  0.0020 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on women’s place being home, by neighbours 
(dchneigch) vs. friends (dchfriench). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchneigc: Number of obs =      363 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      370 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchneigc |   .3966942   .0256769                      .3463683    .4470201 
dchfrien |   .3837838   .0252819                      .3342323    .4333353 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0129104   .0360344                     -.0577157    .0835366 
         |  under Ho:   .0360355     0.36   0.720 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchneigc) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.358               z =  0.358               z =  0.358 
    P < z =  0.6399        P > |z| =  0.7201          P > z =  0.3601 
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Test comparing gossip on working wives being promiscuous, by family (dgfamin) vs. 
husbands’ family (dgfhusin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamin: Number of obs =      404 
                                        dgfhusin: Number of obs =      394 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamin |   .2574257   .0217523                       .214792    .3000595 
dgfhusin |   .2994924   .0230755                      .2542652    .3447195 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0420666   .0317119                     -.1042207    .0200874 
         |  under Ho:   .0317284    -1.33   0.185 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamin) - proportion(dgfhusin) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.326               z = -1.326               z = -1.326 
    P < z =  0.0924        P > |z| =  0.1849          P > z =  0.9076 
 
 
Test comparing gossip on working wives being promiscuous, by wives family 
(dgfamin) vs. neighbours (dgneigin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamin: Number of obs =      404 
                                        dgneigin: Number of obs =      363 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamin |   .2574257   .0217523                       .214792    .3000595 
dgneigin |   .3085399    .024243                      .2610246    .3560553 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0511142   .0325712                     -.1149526    .0127242 
         |  under Ho:   .0325283    -1.57   0.116 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamin) - proportion(dgneigin) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.571               z = -1.571               z = -1.571 
    P < z =  0.0580        P > |z| =  0.1161          P > z =  0.9420 
 
 
Test comparing gossip on working wives being promiscuous, by wives family 
(dgfamin) vs. friends (dgfrienin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion        dgfamin: Number of obs =      404 
                                    dgfrieni: Number of obs =      373 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamin |   .2574257   .0217523                       .214792    .3000595 
dgfrieni |   .2225201   .0215365                      .1803094    .2647308 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0349056   .0306102                     -.0250892    .0949005 
         |  under Ho:   .0306967     1.14   0.255 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamin) - proportion(dgfrieni) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.137               z =  1.137               z =  1.137 
    P < z =  0.8723        P > |z| =  0.2555          P > z =  0.1277 
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Test comparing gossip on working wives being promiscuous, by husbands’ family 
(dgfhusin) vs. neighbours (dgneigin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfhusin: Number of obs =      394 
                                        dgneigin: Number of obs =      363 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhusin |   .2994924   .0230755                      .2542652    .3447195 
dgneigin |   .3085399    .024243                      .2610246    .3560553 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0090476   .0334694                     -.0746464    .0565513 
         |  under Ho:   .0334595    -0.27   0.787 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhusin) - proportion(dgneigin) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.270               z = -0.270               z = -0.270 
    P < z =  0.3934        P > |z| =  0.7869          P > z =  0.6066 
 
 
Test comparing gossip on working wives being promiscuous, by husbands’ family 
(dgfhusin) vs. friends (dgfrienin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfhusin: Number of obs =      394 
                                        dgfrieni: Number of obs =      373 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhusin |   .2994924   .0230755                      .2542652    .3447195 
dgfrieni |   .2225201   .0215365                      .1803094    .2647308 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0769723   .0315642                      .0151076     .138837 
         |  under Ho:   .0317692     2.42   0.015 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhusin) - proportion(dgfrieni) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.423               z =  2.423               z =  2.423 
    P < z =  0.9923        P > |z| =  0.0154          P > z =  0.0077 
 
 
Test comparing gossip on wives being promiscuous, by neighbours (dgneigin) vs. 
friends (dgfrienin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgneigin: Number of obs =      363 
                                        dgfrieni: Number of obs =      373 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgneigin |   .3085399    .024243                      .2610246    .3560553 
dgfrieni |   .2225201   .0215365                      .1803094    .2647308 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0860198   .0324275                      .0224631    .1495765 
         |  under Ho:   .0325364     2.64   0.008 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgneigin) - proportion(dgfrieni) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.644               z =  2.644               z =  2.644 
    P < z =  0.9959        P > |z| =  0.0082          P > z =  0.0041 
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Test comparing criticism to wives on wives being promiscuous, by wives family 
(dcfamin) vs. husbands family (dcfhusin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamin: Number of obs =      404 
                                        dcfhusin: Number of obs =      394 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamin |   .2277228   .0208641                      .1868299    .2686156 
dcfhusin |   .2563452   .0219963                      .2132332    .2994572 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0286224   .0303175                     -.0880435    .0307987 
         |  under Ho:   .0303191    -0.94   0.345 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dcfamin) - proportion(dcfhusin) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.944               z = -0.944               z = -0.944 
    P < z =  0.1726        P > |z| =  0.3451          P > z =  0.8274 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives on wives being promiscuous, by wives family   
(dcfamin) vs. neighbours (dcneigin). 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamin: Number of obs =      404 
                                        dcneigin: Number of obs =      362 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamin |   .2277228   .0208641                      .1868299    .2686156 
dcneigin |   .2237569   .0219045                      .1808249    .2666889 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0039659   .0302509                     -.0553248    .0632565 
         |  under Ho:   .0302615     0.13   0.896 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dcfamin) - proportion(dcneigin) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.131               z =  0.131               z =  0.131 
    P < z =  0.5521        P > |z| =  0.8957          P > z =  0.4479 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives on wives being promiscuous, by wives family 
(dcfamin) vs. friends (dcfrienin). 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamin: Number of obs =      404 
                                        dcfrieni: Number of obs =      372 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamin |   .2277228   .0208641                      .1868299    .2686156 
dcfrieni |   .2016129   .0208015                      .1608427    .2423831 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0261099    .029462                     -.0316347    .0838544 
         |  under Ho:   .0295307     0.88   0.377 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dcfamin) - proportion(dcfrieni) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.884               z =  0.884               z =  0.884 
    P < z =  0.8117        P > |z| =  0.3766          P > z =  0.1883 
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Test comparing criticism to wives on wives being promiscuous, by husbands’ family 
(dcfhusin) vs. neighbours (dcneigin). 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcfhusin: Number of obs =      394 
                                        dcneigin: Number of obs =      362 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfhusin |   .2563452   .0219963                      .2132332    .2994572 
dcneigin |   .2237569   .0219045                      .1808249    .2666889 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0325883   .0310426                     -.0282541    .0934307 
         |  under Ho:   .0311264     1.05   0.295 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfhusin) - proportion(dcneigin) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.047               z =  1.047               z =  1.047 
    P < z =  0.8524        P > |z| =  0.2951          P > z =  0.1476 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives on wives being promiscuous, by husbands’ family 
(dcfhusin) vs. friends (dcfrienin). 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcfhusin: Number of obs =      394 
                                        dcfrieni: Number of obs =      372 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfhusin |   .2563452   .0219963                      .2132332    .2994572 
dcfrieni |   .2016129   .0208015                      .1608427    .2423831 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0547323   .0302744                     -.0046045     .114069 
         |  under Ho:   .0304122     1.80   0.072 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfhusin) - proportion(dcfrieni) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.800               z =  1.800               z =  1.800 
    P < z =  0.9640        P > |z| =  0.0719          P > z =  0.0360 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives on wives being promiscuous, by neighbours 
(dcneigin) vs. friends (dcfrienin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcneigin: Number of obs =      362 
                                        dcfrieni: Number of obs =      372 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]    ---
------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcneigin |   .2237569   .0219045                      .1808249    .2666889 
dcfrieni |   .2016129   .0208015                      .1608427    .2423831 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |    .022144   .0302077                     -.0370621    .0813501 
         |  under Ho:   .0302032     0.73   0.463 
-------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcneigin) - proportion(dcfrieni) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.733               z =  0.733               z =  0.733 
    P < z =  0.7683        P > |z| =  0.4635          P > z =  0.2317 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands on wives being promiscuous, by family 
(dchfamin) vs. husbands’ family (dchfhusin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfamin: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dchfhusi: Number of obs =      393 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfamin |   .2358722   .0210438                      .1946271    .2771173 
dchfhusi |   .2824427    .022709                       .237934    .3269515 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0465705   .0309603                     -.1072515    .0141105 
         |  under Ho:   .0309723    -1.50   0.133 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfamin) - proportion(dchfhusi) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.504               z = -1.504               z = -1.504 
    P < z =  0.0663        P > |z| =  0.1327          P > z =  0.9337 
 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on wives being promiscuous, by family 
(dchfamin) vs. neighbours (dchneigin). 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfamin: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dchneigi: Number of obs =      360 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfamin |   .2358722   .0210438                      .1946271    .2771173 
dchneigi |   .2444444   .0226502                      .2000509     .288838 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0085722   .0309172                     -.0691688    .0520244 
         |  under Ho:   .0308956    -0.28   0.781 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfamin) - proportion(dchneigi) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.277               z = -0.277               z = -0.277 
    P < z =  0.3907        P > |z| =  0.7814          P > z =  0.6093 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on wives being promiscuous, by wives family 
(dchfamin) vs. friends (dchfrienin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfamin: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      371 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfamin |   .2358722   .0210438                      .1946271    .2771173 
dchfrien |   .2075472   .0210551                      .1662799    .2488145 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0283251   .0297684                       -.03002    .0866702 
         |  under Ho:   .0298488     0.95   0.343 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfamin) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.949               z =  0.949               z =  0.949 
    P < z =  0.8287        P > |z| =  0.3426          P > z =  0.1713 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands on wives being promiscuous, by husbands’ 
family (dchfhusin) vs. neighbours (dchneigin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfhusi: Number of obs =      393 
                                        dchneigi: Number of obs =      360 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfhusi |   .2824427    .022709                       .237934    .3269515 
dchneigi |   .2444444   .0226502                      .2000509     .288838 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0379983   .0320738                     -.0248652    .1008618 
         |  under Ho:   .0321689     1.18   0.238 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfhusi) - proportion(dchneigi) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.181               z =  1.181               z =  1.181 
    P < z =  0.8812        P > |z| =  0.2375          P > z =  0.1188 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on wives being promiscuous, by  husbands’ 
family (dchfhusin) vs. friends (dchfrienin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfhusi: Number of obs =      393 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      371 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfhusi |   .2824427    .022709                       .237934    .3269515 
dchfrien |   .2075472   .0210551                      .1662799    .2488145 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0748956    .030968                      .0141995    .1355917 
         |  under Ho:   .0311789     2.40   0.016 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfhusi) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.402               z =  2.402               z =  2.402 
    P < z =  0.9918        P > |z| =  0.0163          P > z =  0.0082 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on wives being promiscuous, by neighbours 
(dchneigin) vs. friends (dchfrienin). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchneigi: Number of obs =      360 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      371 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchneigi |   .2444444   .0226502                      .2000509     .288838 
dchfrien |   .2075472   .0210551                      .1662799    .2488145 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0368973   .0309249                     -.0237145     .097509 
         |  under Ho:   .0309281     1.19   0.233 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         
Ho: proportion(dchneigi) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.193               z =  1.193               z =  1.193 
    P < z =  0.8836        P > |z| =  0.2329          P > z =  0.1164 
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Test comparing gossip regarding husbands not being breadwinners, by wives family 
(dgfamch) vs. husbands’ family (dgfhusch). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamlz: Number of obs =      408 
                                        dgfhuslz: Number of obs =      395 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamlz |   .2745098   .0220935                      .2312073    .3178123 
dgfhuslz |   .2101266   .0204984                      .1699504    .2503028 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0643832   .0301382                      .0053135    .1234529 
         |  under Ho:   .0302679     2.13   0.033 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamlz) - proportion(dgfhuslz) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.127               z =  2.127               z =  2.127 
    P < z =  0.9833        P > |z| =  0.0334          P > z =  0.0167 
 
 
Test comparing gossip regarding husbands not being breadwinners, by wives family 
(dgfamch) vs. neighbours (dgneiglz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamlz: Number of obs =      408 
                                        dgneiglz: Number of obs =      365 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamlz |   .2745098   .0220935                      .2312073    .3178123 
dgneiglz |   .2739726   .0233444                      .2282183    .3197269 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0005372   .0321417                     -.0624593    .0635337 
         |  under Ho:   .0321428     0.02   0.987 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamlz) - proportion(dgneiglz) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.017               z =  0.017               z =  0.017 
    P < z =  0.5067        P > |z| =  0.9867          P > z =  0.4933 
 
 
Test comparing gossip regarding husbands not being breadwinners, by wives family 
(dgfamlz) vs. friends (dgfrienlz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamlz: Number of obs =      408 
                                        dgfrienl: Number of obs =      371 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamlz |   .2745098   .0220935                      .2312073    .3178123 
dgfrienl |   .2345013   .0219967                      .1913886    .2776141 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0400085   .0311766                     -.0210965    .1011134 
         |  under Ho:   .0312863     1.28   0.201 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamlz) - proportion(dgfrienl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.279               z =  1.279               z =  1.279 
    P < z =  0.8995        P > |z| =  0.2010          P > z =  0.1005 
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Test comparing gossip regarding husbands not being breadwinners, by husbands 
family (dgfhuslz) vs. neighbours (dgneiglz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfhuslz: Number of obs =      395 
                                        dgneiglz: Number of obs =      365 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhuslz |   .2101266   .0204984                      .1699504    .2503028 
dgneiglz |   .2739726   .0233444                      .2282183    .3197269 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   -.063846   .0310668                     -.1247359   -.0029561 
         |  under Ho:   .0310429    -2.06   0.040 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhuslz) - proportion(dgneiglz) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -2.057               z = -2.057               z = -2.057 
    P < z =  0.0199        P > |z| =  0.0397          P > z =  0.9801 
 
 
Test comparing gossip regarding husbands not being breadwinners, by husbands 
family (dgfhuslz) vs. friends (dgfrienlz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfhuslz: Number of obs =      395 
                                        dgfrienl: Number of obs =      371 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhuslz |   .2101266   .0204984                      .1699504    .2503028 
dgfrienl |   .2345013   .0219967                      .1913886    .2776141 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0243748   .0300673                     -.0833056     .034556 
         |  under Ho:   .0300433    -0.81   0.417 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhuslz) - proportion(dgfrienl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.811               z = -0.811               z = -0.811 
    P < z =  0.2086        P > |z| =  0.4172          P > z =  0.7914 
 
 
 
Test comparing gossip regarding husbands not being breadwinners, by neighbours 
(dgneiglz) vs. friends (dgfrienlz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgneiglz: Number of obs =      365 
                                        dgfrienl: Number of obs =      371 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgneiglz |   .2739726   .0233444                      .2282183    .3197269 
dgfrienl |   .2345013   .0219967                      .1913886    .2776141 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0394713   .0320752                      -.023395    .1023375 
         |  under Ho:   .0320948     1.23   0.219 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgneiglz) - proportion(dgfrienl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.230               z =  1.230               z =  1.230 
    P < z =  0.8906        P > |z| =  0.2188          P > z =  0.1094 
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Test comparing criticism to wives on husbands not being breadwinners, by wives 
family (dcfamlz) vs. husbands family (dcfhuslz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamlz: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dcfhuslz: Number of obs =      395 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamlz |   .2506143   .0214812                      .2085119    .2927166 
dcfhuslz |   .1746835   .0191046                      .1372392    .2121279 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0759307   .0287476                      .0195864    .1322751 
         |  under Ho:   .0289288     2.62   0.009 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dcfamlz) - proportion(dcfhuslz) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.625               z =  2.625               z =  2.625 
    P < z =  0.9957        P > |z| =  0.0087          P > z =  0.0043 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives on husbands not being breadwinners, by wives 
family (dcfamlz) vs. neighbours (dcneiglz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamlz: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dcneiglz: Number of obs =      363 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamlz |   .2506143   .0214812                      .2085119    .2927166 
dcneiglz |   .2258953   .0219483                      .1828775    .2689131 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0247189    .030711                     -.0354736    .0849115 
         |  under Ho:   .0307866     0.80   0.422 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dcfamlz) - proportion(dcneiglz) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.803               z =  0.803               z =  0.803 
    P < z =  0.7890        P > |z| =  0.4220          P > z =  0.2110 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives on husbands not being breadwinners, by wives 
family (dcfamlz) vs. friends (dcfrienlz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamlz: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dcfrienl: Number of obs =      371 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamlz |   .2506143   .0214812                      .2085119    .2927166 
dcfrienl |   .1994609   .0207459                      .1587996    .2401222 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0511533   .0298636                     -.0073783     .109685 
         |  under Ho:   .0300317     1.70   0.089 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Ho: proportion(dcfamlz) - proportion(dcfrienl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.703               z =  1.703               z =  1.703 
    P < z =  0.9557        P > |z| =  0.0885          P > z =  0.0443 
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Test comparing criticism to wives on husbands not being breadwinners, by wives 
family (dcfamlz) vs. neighbours (dcneiglz). 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcfhuslz: Number of obs =      395 
                                        dcneiglz: Number of obs =      363 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfhuslz |   .1746835   .0191046                      .1372392    .2121279 
dcneiglz |   .2258953   .0219483                      .1828775    .2689131 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0512118   .0290983                     -.1082434    .0058199 
         |  under Ho:     .02904    -1.76   0.078 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfhuslz) - proportion(dcneiglz) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.763               z = -1.763               z = -1.763 
    P < z =  0.0389        P > |z| =  0.0778          P > z =  0.9611 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives on husbands not being breadwinners, by husbands 
family (dcfhuslz) vs. friends (dcfrienlz). 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion          dcfhuslz: Number of obs =      395 
                                       dcfrienl: Number of obs =      371 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfhuslz |   .1746835   .0191046                      .1372392    .2121279 
dcfrienl |   .1994609   .0207459                      .1587996    .2401222 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0247774   .0282025                     -.0800532    .0304985 
         |  under Ho:   .0281716    -0.88   0.379 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfhuslz) - proportion(dcfrienl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.880               z = -0.880               z = -0.880 
    P < z =  0.1896        P > |z| =  0.3791          P > z =  0.8104 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives on husbands not being breadwinners, by 
neighbours (dcneiglz) vs. friends (dcfrienlz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcneiglz: Number of obs =      363 
                                        dcfrienl: Number of obs =      371 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcneiglz |   .2258953   .0219483                      .1828775    .2689131 
dcfrienl |   .1994609   .0207459                      .1587996    .2401222 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0264344   .0302013                     -.0327591    .0856279 
         |  under Ho:   .0302022     0.88   0.381 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcneiglz) - proportion(dcfrienl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.875               z =  0.875               z =  0.875 
    P < z =  0.8093        P > |z| =  0.3814          P > z =  0.1907 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands on husbands not being breadwinners, by wives 
family (dchfamlz) vs. friends (dchfrienlz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfamlz: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dchfhusl: Number of obs =      393 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfamlz |   .2260442   .0207328                      .1854087    .2666797 
dchfhusl |    .178117   .0193002                      .1402894    .2159447 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0479272   .0283257                     -.0075902    .1034445 
         |  under Ho:   .0284203     1.69   0.092 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfamlz) - proportion(dchfhusl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.686               z =  1.686               z =  1.686 
    P < z =  0.9541        P > |z| =  0.0917          P > z =  0.0459 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on husbands not being breadwinners, by wives 
family (dchfamlz) vs. neighbours (dchneiglz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfamlz: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dchneigl: Number of obs =      361 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfamlz |   .2260442   .0207328                      .1854087    .2666797 
dchneigl |   .2132964   .0215598                      .1710401    .2555527 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0127478   .0299111                     -.0458768    .0713724 
         |  under Ho:    .029952     0.43   0.670 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfamlz) - proportion(dchneigl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.426               z =  0.426               z =  0.426 
    P < z =  0.6648        P > |z| =  0.6704          P > z =  0.3352 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on husbands not being breadwinners, by wives 
family (dchfamlz) vs. friends (dcfrienlz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfamlz: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      370 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfamlz |   .2260442   .0207328                      .1854087    .2666797 
dchfrien |         .2    .020795                      .1592425    .2407575 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0260442   .0293646                     -.0315094    .0835978 
         |  under Ho:   .0294419     0.88   0.376 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfamlz) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.885               z =  0.885               z =  0.885 
    P < z =  0.8118        P > |z| =  0.3764          P > z =  0.1882 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands on husbands not being breadwinners, by 
husbands family (dchfhuslz) vs. neighbours (dcneiglz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfhusl: Number of obs =      393 
                                        dchneigl: Number of obs =      361 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfhusl |    .178117   .0193002                      .1402894    .2159447 
dchneigl |   .2132964   .0215598                      .1710401    .2555527 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0351794   .0289365                     -.0918938    .0215351 
         |  under Ho:   .0288813    -1.22   0.223 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfhusl) - proportion(dchneigl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.218               z = -1.218               z = -1.218 
    P < z =  0.1116        P > |z| =  0.2232          P > z =  0.8884 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on husbands not being breadwinners, by 
husbands family (dchfhuslz) vs. friends (dcfrienlz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchfhusl: Number of obs =      393 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      370 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchfhusl |    .178117   .0193002                      .1402894    .2159447 
dchfrien |         .2    .020795                      .1592425    .2407575 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   -.021883   .0283713                     -.0774896    .0337237 
         |  under Ho:   .0283444    -0.77   0.440 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchfhusl) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.772               z = -0.772               z = -0.772 
    P < z =  0.2200        P > |z| =  0.4401          P > z =  0.7800 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands on husbands not being breadwinners, by 
neighbours (dchneiglz) vs. friends(dchfrienlz). 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dchneigl: Number of obs =      361 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      370 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dchneigl |   .2132964   .0215598                      .1710401    .2555527 
dchfrien |         .2    .020795                      .1592425    .2407575 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0132964   .0299542                     -.0454128    .0720056 
         |  under Ho:   .0299495     0.44   0.657 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dchneigl) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.444               z =  0.444               z =  0.444 
    P < z =  0.6715        P > |z| =  0.6571          P > z =  0.3285 
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Tests comparing types of sanctions used by a particular reference group on a 
certain moral argument. 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfamch) vs. criticism to wives (dcfamch) on women’s place 
being home, by wives family 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamch: Number of obs =      409 
                                         dcfamch: Number of obs =      408 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamch |   .5892421   .0243264                      .5415631     .636921 
 dcfamch |   .5686275   .0245194                      .5205703    .6166846 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0206146   .0345395                     -.0470816    .0883108 
         |  under Ho:   .0345467     0.60   0.551 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamch) - proportion(dcfamch) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.597               z =  0.597               z =  0.597 
    P < z =  0.7247        P > |z| =  0.5507          P > z =  0.2753 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfamch) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfamch) on women’s 
place being home, by wives family 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamch: Number of obs =      409 
                                        dchfamch: Number of obs =      407 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamch |   .5892421   .0243264                      .5415631     .636921 
dchfamch |   .5233415   .0247571                      .4748186    .5718645 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0659005   .0347086                     -.0021271    .1339281 
         |  under Ho:   .0347839     1.89   0.058 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamch) - proportion(dchfamch) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.895               z =  1.895               z =  1.895 
    P < z =  0.9709        P > |z| =  0.0581          P > z =  0.0291 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dcfamch) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfamch) 
on women’s place being home, by wives family 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamch: Number of obs =      408 
                                        dchfamch: Number of obs =      407 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamch |   .5686275   .0245194                      .5205703    .6166846 
dchfamch |   .5233415   .0247571                      .4748186    .5718645 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0452859   .0348441                     -.0230073    .1135792 
         |  under Ho:   .0348799     1.30   0.194 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Ho: proportion(dcfamch) - proportion(dchfamch) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.298               z =  1.298               z =  1.298 
    P < z =  0.9029        P > |z| =  0.1942          P > z =  0.0971 
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Test comparing gossip (dgfamch) vs. criticism to wives (dcfamch) on working wives 
being promiscuous, by wives family. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamin: Number of obs =      404 
                                         dcfamin: Number of obs =      404 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamin |   .2574257   .0217523                       .214792    .3000595 
 dcfamin |   .2277228   .0208641                      .1868299    .2686156 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |    .029703   .0301409                     -.0293721     .088778 
         |  under Ho:    .030159     0.98   0.325 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamin) - proportion(dcfamin) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.985               z =  0.985               z =  0.985 
    P < z =  0.8377        P > |z| =  0.3247          P > z =  0.1623 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfamch) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfamch) on working 
wives being promiscuous, by wives family. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamin: Number of obs =      404 
                                        dchfamin: Number of obs =      407 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamin |   .2574257   .0217523                       .214792    .3000595 
dchfamin |   .2358722   .0210438                      .1946271    .2771173 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0215535   .0302656                     -.0377659    .0808729 
         |  under Ho:   .0302717     0.71   0.476 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamin) - proportion(dchfamin) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.712               z =  0.712               z =  0.712 
    P < z =  0.7618        P > |z| =  0.4765          P > z =  0.2382 
 
 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dcfamch) vs. criticism to wives (dchfamch) on 
working wives being promiscuous, by wives family. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamin: Number of obs =      404 
                                        dchfamin: Number of obs =      407 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]    ---
------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamin |   .2277228   .0208641                      .1868299    .2686156 
dchfamin |   .2358722   .0210438                      .1946271    .2771173 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0081495   .0296336                     -.0662303    .0499314 
         |  under Ho:   .0296363    -0.27   0.783 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dcfamin) - proportion(dchfamin) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.275               z = -0.275               z = -0.275 
    P < z =  0.3917        P > |z| =  0.7833          P > z =  0.6083 
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Test comparing gossip (dgfamlz) vs. criticism to wives (dcfamlz) on husbands not 
being the breadwinners, by wives family. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamlz: Number of obs =      408 
                                         dcfamlz: Number of obs =      407 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamlz |   .2745098   .0220935                      .2312073    .3178123 
 dcfamlz |   .2506143   .0214812                      .2085119    .2927166 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0238956    .030815                     -.0365007    .0842919 
         |  under Ho:   .0308275     0.78   0.438 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamlz) - proportion(dcfamlz) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.775               z =  0.775               z =  0.775 
    P < z =  0.7809        P > |z| =  0.4383          P > z =  0.2191 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfamlz) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfamlz) on husbands 
not being the breadwinners, by wives family. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dgfamlz: Number of obs =      408 
                                        dchfamlz: Number of obs =      407 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dgfamlz |   .2745098   .0220935                      .2312073    .3178123 
dchfamlz |   .2260442   .0207328                      .1854087    .2666797 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0484656    .030298                     -.0109175    .1078486 
         |  under Ho:    .030348     1.60   0.110 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dgfamlz) - proportion(dchfamlz) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.597               z =  1.597               z =  1.597 
    P < z =  0.9449        P > |z| =  0.1103          P > z =  0.0551 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dgfamlz) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfamlz) 
on husbands not being the breadwinners, by wives family. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion            dcfamlz: Number of obs =      407 
                                        dchfamlz: Number of obs =      407 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 dcfamlz |   .2506143   .0214812                      .2085119    .2927166 
dchfamlz |   .2260442   .0207328                      .1854087    .2666797 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |     .02457   .0298545                     -.0339437    .0830837 
         |  under Ho:   .0298669     0.82   0.411 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(dcfamlz) - proportion(dchfamlz) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.823               z =  0.823               z =  0.823 
    P < z =  0.7946        P > |z| =  0.4107          P > z =  0.2054 
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Test comparing gossip (dgfhuslz) vs. criticism to wives (dcfhuslz) on women’s 
place being the home, by husbands family. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfhusch: Number of obs =      398 
                                        dcfhusch: Number of obs =      396 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhusch |   .5502513   .0249358                      .5013779    .5991246 
dcfhusch |   .4949495   .0251247                      .4457061    .5441929 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0553018   .0353984                     -.0140778    .1246813 
         |  under Ho:   .0354523     1.56   0.119 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhusch) - proportion(dcfhusch) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.560               z =  1.560               z =  1.560 
    P < z =  0.9406        P > |z| =  0.1188          P > z =  0.0594 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfhusch) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfamch) on women’s 
place being home, by husbands family 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfhusch: Number of obs =      398 
                                        dchfhusc: Number of obs =      394 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhusch |   .5502513   .0249358                      .5013779    .5991246 
dchfhusc |   .4873096   .0251815                      .4379548    .5366645 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0629416   .0354388                     -.0065171    .1324003 
         |  under Ho:   .0355084     1.77   0.076 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhusch) - proportion(dchfhusc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.773               z =  1.773               z =  1.773 
    P < z =  0.9619        P > |z| =  0.0763          P > z =  0.0381 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dcfhusch) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfamch) 
on women’s place being home, by husbands family 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcfhusch: Number of obs =      396 
                                        dchfhusc: Number of obs =      394 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfhusch |   .4949495   .0251247                      .4457061    .5441929 
dchfhusc |   .4873096   .0251815                      .4379548    .5366645 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0076399   .0355719                     -.0620797    .0773594 
         |  under Ho:   .0355729     0.21   0.830 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfhusch) - proportion(dchfhusc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.215               z =  0.215               z =  0.215 
    P < z =  0.5850        P > |z| =  0.8299          P > z =  0.4150 
 
 
  
 
358 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfhusin) vs. criticism to wives (dchfhusin) on working 
wives being promiscuous, by husbands family. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfhusin: Number of obs =      394 
                                        dcfhusin: Number of obs =      394 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhusin |   .2994924   .0230755                      .2542652    .3447195 
dcfhusin |   .2563452   .0219963                      .2132332    .2994572 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0431472   .0318797                     -.0193359    .1056303 
         |  under Ho:   .0319168     1.35   0.176 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhusin) - proportion(dcfhusin) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.352               z =  1.352               z =  1.352 
    P < z =  0.9118        P > |z| =  0.1764          P > z =  0.0882 
 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfhusin) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfhusin) on working 
wives being promiscuous, by husbands family. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfhusin: Number of obs =      394 
                                        dchfhusi: Number of obs =      393 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhusin |   .2994924   .0230755                      .2542652    .3447195 
dchfhusi |   .2824427    .022709                       .237934    .3269515 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0170496   .0323755                     -.0464053    .0805045 
         |  under Ho:    .032382     0.53   0.599 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhusin) - proportion(dchfhusi) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.527               z =  0.527               z =  0.527 
    P < z =  0.7007        P > |z| =  0.5985          P > z =  0.2993 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dcfhusin) vs. criticism to husbands 
(dchfhusin) on working wives being promiscuous, by husbands family. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcfhusin: Number of obs =      394 
                                        dchfhusi: Number of obs =      393 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfhusin |   .2563452   .0219963                      .2132332    .2994572 
dchfhusi |   .2824427    .022709                       .237934    .3269515 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0260976   .0316154                     -.0880627    .0358675 
         |  under Ho:   .0316279    -0.83   0.409 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfhusin) - proportion(dchfhusi) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.825               z = -0.825               z = -0.825 
    P < z =  0.2046        P > |z| =  0.4093          P > z =  0.7954 
 
 
  
 
359 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dcfhusin) vs. criticism to husbands 
(dchfhusin) on husbands not being the breadwinners, by husbands family. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfhuslz: Number of obs =      395 
                                        dcfhuslz: Number of obs =      395 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhuslz |   .2101266   .0204984                      .1699504    .2503028 
dcfhuslz |   .1746835   .0191046                      .1372392    .2121279 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |    .035443   .0280209                     -.0194769     .090363 
         |  under Ho:   .0280493     1.26   0.206 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhuslz) - proportion(dcfhuslz) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.264               z =  1.264               z =  1.264 
    P < z =  0.8968        P > |z| =  0.2064          P > z =  0.1032 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfhuslz) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfhuslz) on husband 
not being the breadwinners, by husbands family. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfhuslz: Number of obs =      395 
                                        dchfhusl: Number of obs =      393 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfhuslz |   .2101266   .0204984                      .1699504    .2503028 
dchfhusl |    .178117   .0193002                      .1402894    .2159447 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0320095   .0281546                     -.0231725    .0871916 
         |  under Ho:   .0281822     1.14   0.256 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfhuslz) - proportion(dchfhusl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.136               z =  1.136               z =  1.136 
    P < z =  0.8720        P > |z| =  0.2560          P > z =  0.1280 
 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfhuslz) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfhuslz) on husband 
not being the breadwinners, by husbands family. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcfhuslz: Number of obs =      395 
                                        dchfhusl: Number of obs =      393 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfhuslz |   .1746835   .0191046                      .1372392    .2121279 
dchfhusl |    .178117   .0193002                      .1402894    .2159447 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0034335   .0271566                     -.0566595    .0497925 
         |  under Ho:   .0271564    -0.13   0.899 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfhuslz) - proportion(dchfhusl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.126               z = -0.126               z = -0.126 
    P < z =  0.4497        P > |z| =  0.8994          P > z =  0.5503 
 
 
 
  
 
360 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgneigch) vs. criticism to wives (dcneigch) on women’s 
place being home, by neighbours. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgneigch: Number of obs =      366 
                                        dcneigch: Number of obs =      366 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgneigch |   .5300546   .0260882                      .4789228    .5811865 
dcneigch |   .4180328   .0257818                      .3675013    .4685643 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1120219   .0366783                      .0401338    .1839099 
         |  under Ho:   .0369112     3.03   0.002 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgneigch) - proportion(dcneigch) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  3.035               z =  3.035               z =  3.035 
    P < z =  0.9988        P > |z| =  0.0024          P > z =  0.0012 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgneigch) vs. criticism to husbands (dchneigch) on women’s 
place being home, by neighbours. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgneigch: Number of obs =      366 
                                        dchneigc: Number of obs =      363 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgneigch |   .5300546   .0260882                      .4789228    .5811865 
dchneigc |   .3966942   .0256769                      .3463683    .4470201 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1333604   .0366046                      .0616167    .2051042 
         |  under Ho:   .0369393     3.61   0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgneigch) - proportion(dchneigc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  3.610               z =  3.610               z =  3.610 
    P < z =  0.9998        P > |z| =  0.0003          P > z =  0.0002 
 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dcneigch) vs. criticism to husbands 
(dchneigch) on women’s place being home, by neighbours. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcneigch: Number of obs =      366 
                                        dchneigc: Number of obs =      363 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcneigch |   .4180328   .0257818                      .3675013    .4685643 
dchneigc |   .3966942   .0256769                      .3463683    .4470201 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0213386   .0363869                     -.0499785    .0926556 
         |  under Ho:   .0363967     0.59   0.558 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcneigch) - proportion(dchneigc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.586               z =  0.586               z =  0.586 
    P < z =  0.7212        P > |z| =  0.5577          P > z =  0.2788 
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Test comparing gossip (dgneigin) vs. criticism to wives (dcneigin) on working 
wives being promiscous, by neighbours. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgneigin: Number of obs =      363 
                                        dcneigin: Number of obs =      362 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgneigin |   .3085399    .024243                      .2610246    .3560553 
dcneigin |   .2237569   .0219045                      .1808249    .2666889 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |    .084783    .032673                       .020745     .148821 
         |  under Ho:    .032829     2.58   0.010 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgneigin) - proportion(dcneigin) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.583               z =  2.583               z =  2.583 
    P < z =  0.9951        P > |z| =  0.0098          P > z =  0.0049 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgneigin) vs. criticism to husbands (dchneigin) on working 
wives being promiscous, by neighbours. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgneigin: Number of obs =      363 
                                        dchneigi: Number of obs =      360 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgneigin |   .3085399    .024243                      .2610246    .3560553 
dchneigi |   .2444444   .0226502                      .2000509     .288838 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0640955   .0331776                     -.0009314    .1291224 
         |  under Ho:    .033273     1.93   0.054 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Ho: proportion(dgneigin) - proportion(dchneigi) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.926               z =  1.926               z =  1.926 
    P < z =  0.9730        P > |z| =  0.0541          P > z =  0.0270 
 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dcneigin) vs. criticism to husbands 
(dchneigin) on working wives being promiscous, by neighbours. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcneigin: Number of obs =      362 
                                        dchneigi: Number of obs =      360 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcneigin |   .2237569   .0219045                      .1808249    .2666889 
dchneigi |   .2444444   .0226502                      .2000509     .288838 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0206875   .0315093                     -.0824447    .0410696 
         |  under Ho:   .0315161    -0.66   0.512 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcneigin) - proportion(dchneigi) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.656               z = -0.656               z = -0.656 
    P < z =  0.2558        P > |z| =  0.5116          P > z =  0.7442 
 
  
 
362 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgneiglz) vs. criticism to wives (dcneiglz) on husbands 
not being the breadwinners, by neighbours. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgneiglz: Number of obs =      365 
                                        dcneiglz: Number of obs =      363 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgneiglz |   .2739726   .0233444                      .2282183    .3197269 
dcneiglz |   .2258953   .0219483                      .1828775    .2689131 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0480773    .032042                     -.0147239    .1108784 
         |  under Ho:   .0320972     1.50   0.134 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgneiglz) - proportion(dcneiglz) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.498               z =  1.498               z =  1.498 
    P < z =  0.9329        P > |z| =  0.1342          P > z =  0.0671 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgneiglz) vs. criticism to husbands (dchneiglz) on 
husbands not being the breadwinners, by neighbours. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgneiglz: Number of obs =      365 
                                        dchneigl: Number of obs =      361 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgneiglz |   .2739726   .0233444                      .2282183    .3197269 
dchneigl |   .2132964   .0215598                      .1710401    .2555527 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0606762   .0317771                     -.0016058    .1229582 
         |  under Ho:   .0318716     1.90   0.057 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgneiglz) - proportion(dchneigl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.904               z =  1.904               z =  1.904 
    P < z =  0.9715        P > |z| =  0.0569          P > z =  0.0285 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dcneiglz) vs. criticism to husbands 
(dchneiglz) on husbands not being the breadwinners, by neighbours. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcneiglz: Number of obs =      363 
                                        dchneigl: Number of obs =      361 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcneiglz |   .2258953   .0219483                      .1828775    .2689131 
dchneigl |   .2132964   .0215598                      .1710401    .2555527 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0125989    .030766                     -.0477014    .0728992 
         |  under Ho:   .0307714     0.41   0.682 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcneiglz) - proportion(dchneigl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.409               z =  0.409               z =  0.409 
    P < z =  0.6589        P > |z| =  0.6822          P > z =  0.3411 
 
  
 
363 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfriench) vs. criticism to wives (dcfamch) on women’s 
place being home, by friends 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfrienc: Number of obs =      373 
                                        dcfrienc: Number of obs =      373 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfrienc |   .4423592   .0257164                       .391956    .4927625 
dcfrienc |   .4128686   .0254929                      .3629035    .4628338 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0294906   .0362108                     -.0414812    .1004625 
         |  under Ho:   .0362269     0.81   0.416 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfrienc) - proportion(dcfrienc) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.814               z =  0.814               z =  0.814 
    P < z =  0.7922        P > |z| =  0.4156          P > z =  0.2078 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfriench) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfriench) on 
women’s place being home, by friends. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfrienc: Number of obs =      373 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      370 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfrienc |   .4423592   .0257164                       .391956    .4927625 
dchfrien |   .3837838   .0252819                      .3342323    .4333353 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0585755   .0360625                     -.0121058    .1292567 
         |  under Ho:   .0361296     1.62   0.105 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfrienc) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.621               z =  1.621               z =  1.621 
    P < z =  0.9475        P > |z| =  0.1050          P > z =  0.0525 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dcfriench) vs. criticism to husbands 
(dchfriench) on women’s place being home, by friends. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcfrienc: Number of obs =      373 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      370 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfrienc |   .4128686   .0254929                      .3629035    .4628338 
dchfrien |   .3837838   .0252819                      .3342323    .4333353 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0290848   .0359035                     -.0412847    .0994544 
         |  under Ho:   .0359211     0.81   0.418 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfrienc) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.810               z =  0.810               z =  0.810 
    P < z =  0.7909        P > |z| =  0.4181          P > z =  0.2091 
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Test comparing gossip (dgfrienin) vs. criticism to wives (dcfrienin) on working 
wives being promiscous, by friends. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfrieni: Number of obs =      373 
                                        dcfrieni: Number of obs =      372 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfrieni |   .2225201   .0215365                      .1803094    .2647308 
dcfrieni |   .2016129   .0208015                      .1608427    .2423831 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0209072    .029942                      -.037778    .0795924 
         |  under Ho:   .0299532     0.70   0.485 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfrieni) - proportion(dcfrieni) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.698               z =  0.698               z =  0.698 
    P < z =  0.7574        P > |z| =  0.4852          P > z =  0.2426 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfrienin) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfrienin) on 
working wives being promiscous, by friends. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfrieni: Number of obs =      373 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      371 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfrieni |   .2225201   .0215365                      .1803094    .2647308 
dchfrien |   .2075472   .0210551                      .1662799    .2488145 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0149729   .0301188                     -.0440587    .0740046 
         |  under Ho:   .0301258     0.50   0.619 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfrieni) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.497               z =  0.497               z =  0.497 
    P < z =  0.6904        P > |z| =  0.6192          P > z =  0.3096 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dcfrienin) vs. criticism to husbands 
(dchfrienin) on working wives being promiscous, by friends. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcfrieni: Number of obs =      372 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      371 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfrieni |   .2016129   .0208015                      .1608427    .2423831 
dchfrien |   .2075472   .0210551                      .1662799    .2488145 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0059343   .0295977                     -.0639446    .0520761 
         |  under Ho:    .029598    -0.20   0.841 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfrieni) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.200               z = -0.200               z = -0.200 
    P < z =  0.4205        P > |z| =  0.8411          P > z =  0.5795 
 
  
 
365 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfrienlz) vs. criticism to wives (dcfrienlz) on husbands 
not being the breadwinners, by friends. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfrienl: Number of obs =      371 
                                        dcfrienl: Number of obs =      371 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfrienl |   .2345013   .0219967                      .1913886    .2776141 
dcfrienl |   .1994609   .0207459                      .1587996    .2401222 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0350404   .0302366                     -.0242221     .094303 
         |  under Ho:   .0302639     1.16   0.247 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfrienl) - proportion(dcfrienl) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.158               z =  1.158               z =  1.158 
    P < z =  0.8765        P > |z| =  0.2469          P > z =  0.1235 
 
 
Test comparing gossip (dgfrienlz) vs. criticism to husbands (dchfrienlz) on 
husbands not being the breadwinners, by friends. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dgfrienl: Number of obs =      371 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      370 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dgfrienl |   .2345013   .0219967                      .1913886    .2776141 
dchfrien |         .2    .020795                      .1592425    .2407575 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0345013   .0302703                     -.0248273      .09383 
         |  under Ho:   .0302991     1.14   0.255 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dgfrienl) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.139               z =  1.139               z =  1.139 
    P < z =  0.8726        P > |z| =  0.2548          P > z =  0.1274 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives (dcfrienlz) vs. criticism to husbands 
(dchfrienlz) on husbands not being the breadwinners, by friends. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           dcfrienl: Number of obs =      371 
                                        dchfrien: Number of obs =      370 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dcfrienl |   .1994609   .0207459                      .1587996    .2401222 
dchfrien |         .2    .020795                      .1592425    .2407575 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0005391   .0293739                     -.0581109    .0570327 
         |  under Ho:   .0293739    -0.02   0.985 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Ho: proportion(dcfrienl) - proportion(dchfrien) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.018               z = -0.018               z = -0.018 
    P < z =  0.4927        P > |z| =  0.9854          P > z =  0.5073 
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Tests comparing Social Sanctions by Town  
 
 
Test comparing gossip by wives family regarding women’s place being home, by 
town. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      196 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      213 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .5255102   .0356678                      .4556027    .5954178 
  chilac |   .6478873   .0327266                      .5837444    .7120303 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.1223771   .0484068                     -.2172527   -.0275015 
         |  under Ho:   .0486949    -2.51   0.012 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -2.513               z = -2.513               z = -2.513 
    P < z =  0.0060        P > |z| =  0.0120          P > z =  0.9940 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives by wives family regarding women’s place being 
home, by town. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      195 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      213 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .5025641   .0358053                      .4323871    .5727411 
  chilac |    .629108   .0330976                      .5642379    .6939781 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.1265439   .0487593                     -.2221103   -.0309774 
         |  under Ho:   .0490866    -2.58   0.010 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -2.578               z = -2.578               z = -2.578 
    P < z =  0.0050        P > |z| =  0.0099          P > z =  0.9950 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands by wives family regarding women’s place 
being home, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      194 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      213 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .4845361   .0358807                      .4142111     .554861 
  chilac |   .5586854   .0340226                      .4920023    .6253686 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0741494   .0494466                     -.1710629    .0227642 
         |  under Ho:   .0495682    -1.50   0.135 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.496               z = -1.496               z = -1.496 
    P < z =  0.0673        P > |z| =  0.1347          P > z =  0.9327 
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Test comparing gossip regarding working wives being promiscuous by wives family, 
by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      193 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      211 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2849741   .0324926                      .2212897    .3486585 
  chilac |   .2322275   .0290691                      .1752531    .2892019 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0527466    .043598                     -.0327039    .1381971 
         |  under Ho:   .0435479     1.21   0.226 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.211               z =  1.211               z =  1.211 
    P < z =  0.8871        P > |z| =  0.2258          P > z =  0.1129 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives regarding working wives being promiscuous by 
wives family, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      193 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      211 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2279793   .0301984                      .1687916     .287167 
  chilac |   .2274882   .0288596                      .1709243     .284052 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0004911    .041771                     -.0813786    .0823609 
         |  under Ho:   .0417696     0.01   0.991 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.012               z =  0.012               z =  0.012 
    P < z =  0.5047        P > |z| =  0.9906          P > z =  0.4953 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands regarding working wives being promiscuous by 
wives family, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      194 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      213 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |    .257732   .0314025                      .1961843    .3192796 
  chilac |   .2159624   .0281947                      .1607018    .2712231 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0417695   .0422026                      -.040946     .124485 
         |  under Ho:   .0421335     0.99   0.322 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.991               z =  0.991               z =  0.991 
    P < z =  0.8392        P > |z| =  0.3215          P > z =  0.1608 
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Test comparing gossip by wives family regarding husbands not being the 
breadwinners, by town. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      195 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      213 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .3435897   .0340087                      .2769338    .4102456 
  chilac |   .2112676   .0279699                      .1564475    .2660877 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1323221   .0440331                      .0460189    .2186254 
         |  under Ho:   .0442301     2.99   0.003 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.992               z =  2.992               z =  2.992 
    P < z =  0.9986        P > |z| =  0.0028          P > z =  0.0014 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives by wives’ family regarding husbands not being 
the breadwinners, by town. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      194 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      213 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2938144   .0327036                      .2297166    .3579122 
  chilac |   .2112676   .0279699                      .1564475    .2660877 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0825468    .043033                     -.0017963      .16689 
         |  under Ho:   .0430093     1.92   0.055 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.919               z =  1.919               z =  1.919 
    P < z =  0.9725        P > |z| =  0.0549          P > z =  0.0275 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to husbands by wives’ family regarding husbands not 
being the breadwinners, by town. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      194 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      213 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2835052   .0323583                       .220084    .3469263 
  chilac |   .1737089    .025959                      .1228302    .2245876 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1097962   .0414841                      .0284889    .1911036 
         |  under Ho:   .0415108     2.65   0.008 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.645               z =  2.645               z =  2.645 
    P < z =  0.9959        P > |z| =  0.0082          P > z =  0.0041 
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Test comparing gossip by husbands family regarding women’s place being home, by 
town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      190 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      208 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .5052632   .0362718                      .4341717    .5763546 
  chilac |   .5913462   .0340853                      .5245402    .6581521 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   -.086083    .049774                     -.1836382    .0114722 
         |  under Ho:   .0499228    -1.72   0.085 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.724               z = -1.724               z = -1.724 
    P < z =  0.0423        P > |z| =  0.0846          P > z =  0.9577 
 
 
 
Test comparing gossip by husbands family regarding women’s place being home, by 
town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      187 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      207 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .3262032   .0342837                      .2590084     .393398 
  chilac |   .2753623   .0310476                      .2145102    .3362144 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0508409   .0462528                      -.039813    .1414948 
         |  under Ho:   .0462106     1.10   0.271 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.100               z =  1.100               z =  1.100 
    P < z =  0.8644        P > |z| =  0.2712          P > z =  0.1356 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives by husbands family regarding women’s place 
being home, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      188 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      208 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .4574468   .0363339                      .3862336      .52866 
  chilac |   .5288462    .034611                      .4610098    .5966825 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0713993   .0501805                     -.1697512    .0269525 
         |  under Ho:   .0503135    -1.42   0.156 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.419               z = -1.419               z = -1.419 
    P < z =  0.0779        P > |z| =  0.1559          P > z =  0.9221 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands by husbands family regarding women’s place 
being home, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      188 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      206 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .4574468   .0363339                      .3862336      .52866 
  chilac |   .5145631   .0348219                      .4463135    .5828127 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0571163   .0503261                     -.1557537    .0415211 
         |  under Ho:   .0504157    -1.13   0.257 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.133               z = -1.133               z = -1.133 
    P < z =  0.1286        P > |z| =  0.2573          P > z =  0.8714 
 
 
Test comparing gossip by husbands family regarding working wives being 
promiscous, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      187 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      207 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .3262032   .0342837                      .2590084     .393398 
  chilac |   .2753623   .0310476                      .2145102    .3362144 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0508409   .0462528                      -.039813    .1414948 
         |  under Ho:   .0462106     1.10   0.271 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.100               z =  1.100               z =  1.100 
    P < z =  0.8644        P > |z| =  0.2712          P > z =  0.1356 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives by husbands family regarding working wives 
being promiscous, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      187 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      207 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2727273   .0325681                       .208895    .3365595 
  chilac |   .2415459   .0297495                       .183238    .2998538 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0311814   .0441102                     -.0552731    .1176358 
         |  under Ho:   .0440494     0.71   0.479 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.708               z =  0.708               z =  0.708 
    P < z =  0.7605        P > |z| =  0.4790          P > z =  0.2395 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands by husbands family regarding working wives 
being promiscous, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      187 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      206 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2994652    .033494                      .2338182    .3651123 
  chilac |   .2669903   .0308226                      .2065791    .3274014 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0324749   .0455179                     -.0567385    .1216884 
         |  under Ho:   .0454711     0.71   0.475 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.714               z =  0.714               z =  0.714 
    P < z =  0.7624        P > |z| =  0.4751          P > z =  0.2376 
 
 
Test comparing gossip by husbands family regarding husbands not being the 
providers, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      188 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      207 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2712766   .0324271                      .2077206    .3348326 
  chilac |   .1545894   .0251269                      .1053416    .2038371 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .1166872   .0410229                      .0362838    .1970906 
         |  under Ho:   .0410444     2.84   0.004 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.843               z =  2.843               z =  2.843 
    P < z =  0.9978        P > |z| =  0.0045          P > z =  0.0022 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives by husbands family regarding working wives 
being promiscous, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      188 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      207 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |    .212766   .0298486                      .1542638    .2712682 
  chilac |   .1400966   .0241242                       .092814    .1873792 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0726693   .0383786                     -.0025514      .14789 
         |  under Ho:   .0382535     1.90   0.057 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.900               z =  1.900               z =  1.900 
    P < z =  0.9713        P > |z| =  0.0575          P > z =  0.0287 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands by husbands family regarding working wives 
being promiscous, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      187 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      206 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2299465   .0307718                      .1696349    .2902582 
  chilac |    .131068    .023513                      .0849834    .1771525 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0988786   .0387268                      .0229754    .1747817 
         |  under Ho:   .0386456     2.56   0.011 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.559               z =  2.559               z =  2.559 
    P < z =  0.9947        P > |z| =  0.0105          P > z =  0.0053 
 
 
Test comparing gossip by neighbours regarding on women’s place being the home, by 
town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      180 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      186 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .4833333   .0372471                      .4103304    .5563363 
  chilac |   .5752688    .036244                      .5042319    .6463057 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0919355   .0519709                     -.1937965    .0099256 
         |  under Ho:   .0521833    -1.76   0.078 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.762               z = -1.762               z = -1.762 
    P < z =  0.0391        P > |z| =  0.0781          P > z =  0.9609 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives by neighbours regarding on women’s place being 
the home, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      180 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      186 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .3888889    .036336                      .3176717    .4601061 
  chilac |   .4462366   .0364492                      .3747974    .5176757 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0573477    .051467                      -.158221    .0435257 
         |  under Ho:   .0515706    -1.11   0.266 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.112               z = -1.112               z = -1.112 
    P < z =  0.1331        P > |z| =  0.2661          P > z =  0.8669 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands by neighbours regarding on women’s place 
being the home, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      177 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      186 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .3276836   .0352799                      .2585362     .396831 
  chilac |   .4623656   .0365578                      .3907137    .5340175 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   -.134682    .050805                     -.2342579   -.0351061 
         |  under Ho:   .0513697    -2.62   0.009 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -2.622               z = -2.622               z = -2.622 
    P < z =  0.0044        P > |z| =  0.0087          P > z =  0.9956 
 
 
Test comparing gossip by neighbours regarding working wives being promiscous, by 
town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion          miuahuat: Number of obs =      178 
                                         chilac: Number of obs =      185 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2921348   .0340845                      .2253304    .3589392 
  chilac |   .3243243    .034417                      .2568682    .3917804 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0321895   .0484384                     -.1271271    .0627481 
         |  under Ho:    .048495    -0.66   0.507 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -0.664               z = -0.664               z = -0.664 
    P < z =  0.2534        P > |z| =  0.5068          P > z =  0.7466 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives by neighbours regarding working wives being 
promiscous, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      177 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      185 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2372881   .0319766                      .1746152     .299961 
  chilac |   .2108108   .0299883                      .1520349    .2695867 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0264773   .0438383                     -.0594441    .1123988 
         |  under Ho:   .0438196     0.60   0.546 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.604               z =  0.604               z =  0.604 
    P < z =  0.7272        P > |z| =  0.5457          P > z =  0.2728 
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Table () Test comparing criticism to husbands by neighbours regarding working 
wives being promiscous, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      175 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      185 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2571429   .0330385                      .1923885    .3218972 
  chilac |   .2324324   .0310542                      .1715673    .2932976 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0247104   .0453422                     -.0641586    .1135794 
         |  under Ho:   .0453179     0.55   0.586 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.545               z =  0.545               z =  0.545 
    P < z =  0.7072        P > |z| =  0.5856          P > z =  0.2928 
 
 
 
Test comparing gossip by neighbours regarding husbands not being the providers, 
by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      179 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      186 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2793296   .0335352                      .2136019    .3450573 
  chilac |   .2688172   .0325076                      .2051035    .3325309 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0105124   .0467049                     -.0810276    .1020524 
         |  under Ho:   .0466975     0.23   0.822 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.225               z =  0.225               z =  0.225 
    P < z =  0.5891        P > |z| =  0.8219          P > z =  0.4109 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives by neighbours regarding husbands not being the 
providers, by town. 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      177 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      186 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2259887   .0314362                      .1643748    .2876026 
  chilac |   .2258065   .0306575                      .1657189     .285894 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0001822   .0439103                     -.0858804    .0862449 
         |  under Ho:     .04391     0.00   0.997 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.004               z =  0.004               z =  0.004 
    P < z =  0.5017        P > |z| =  0.9967          P > z =  0.4983 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands by neighbours regarding husbands not being 
the providers, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      175 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      186 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2228571    .031459                      .1611987    .2845156 
  chilac |   .2043011   .0295633                       .146358    .2622441 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0185561   .0431701                     -.0660558    .1031679 
         |  under Ho:   .0431395     0.43   0.667 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.430               z =  0.430               z =  0.430 
    P < z =  0.6665        P > |z| =  0.6671          P > z =  0.3335 
 
 
Test comparing gossip by friends regarding on women’s place being the home, by 
town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      183 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      190 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .3989071   .0361977                      .3279609    .4698533 
  chilac |   .4842105   .0362557                      .4131506    .5552704 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0853034   .0512323                     -.1857169    .0151101 
         |  under Ho:   .0514419    -1.66   0.097 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.658               z = -1.658               z = -1.658 
    P < z =  0.0486        P > |z| =  0.0973          P > z =  0.9514 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives by friends regarding on women’s place being the 
home, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      183 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      190 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .3770492   .0358262                      .3068312    .4472672 
  chilac |   .4473684   .0360723                       .376668    .5180688 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0703192   .0508402                     -.1699642    .0293257 
         |  under Ho:   .0509948    -1.38   0.168 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.379               z = -1.379               z = -1.379 
    P < z =  0.0840        P > |z| =  0.1679          P > z =  0.9160 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands by friends regarding on women’s place being 
the home, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      180 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      190 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |        .35   .0355512                      .2803209    .4196791 
  chilac |   .4157895   .0357556                      .3457097    .4858693 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |  -.0657895   .0504218                     -.1646143    .0330354 
         |  under Ho:   .0505822    -1.30   0.193 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z = -1.301               z = -1.301               z = -1.301 
    P < z =  0.0967        P > |z| =  0.1934          P > z =  0.9033 
 
 
 
Test comparing gossip by friends regarding working wives being promiscous, by 
town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      183 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      190 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2240437   .0308219                      .1636339    .2844535 
  chilac |   .2210526   .0301041                      .1620498    .2800555 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0029911   .0430842                     -.0814523    .0874345 
         |  under Ho:   .0430806     0.07   0.945 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.069               z =  0.069               z =  0.069 
    P < z =  0.5277        P > |z| =  0.9446          P > z =  0.4723 
 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives by friends regarding working wives being 
promiscous, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      183 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      190 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2240437   .0308219                      .1636339    .2844535 
  chilac |   .2210526   .0301041                      .1620498    .2800555 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0029911   .0430842                     -.0814523    .0874345 
         |  under Ho:   .0430806     0.07   0.945 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.069               z =  0.069               z =  0.069 
    P < z =  0.5277        P > |z| =  0.9446          P > z =  0.4723 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands by friends regarding working wives being 
promiscous, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      181 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      190 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2375691   .0316341                      .1755673    .2995708 
  chilac |   .1789474   .0278081                      .1244445    .2334502 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0586217    .042119                       -.02393    .1411734 
         |  under Ho:   .0421227     1.39   0.164 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.392               z =  1.392               z =  1.392 
    P < z =  0.9180        P > |z| =  0.1640          P > z =  0.0820 
 
 
Test comparing gossip by friends regarding husbands not being the providers, by 
town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      181 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      190 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2596685   .0325899                      .1957934    .3235436 
  chilac |   .2105263   .0295764                      .1525576     .268495 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0491422   .0440098                     -.0371155    .1353999 
         |  under Ho:   .0440064     1.12   0.264 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  1.117               z =  1.117               z =  1.117 
    P < z =  0.8679        P > |z| =  0.2641          P > z =  0.1321 
 
 
 
Test comparing criticism to wives by friends regarding husbands not being the 
providers, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      181 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      190 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2154696   .0305604                      .1555724    .2753668 
  chilac |   .1842105   .0281235                      .1290895    .2393316 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0312591   .0415315                     -.0501412    .1126594 
         |  under Ho:   .0415041     0.75   0.451 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  0.753               z =  0.753               z =  0.753 
    P < z =  0.7743        P > |z| =  0.4514          P > z =  0.2257 
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Test comparing criticism to husbands by friends regarding husbands not being the 
providers, by town. 
 
 
Two-sample test of proportion           miuahuat: Number of obs =      180 
                                          chilac: Number of obs =      190 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |       Mean   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
miuahuat |   .2444444   .0320322                      .1816624    .3072264 
  chilac |   .1578947   .0264539                       .106046    .2097435 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |   .0865497   .0415436                      .0051257    .1679737 
         |  under Ho:   .0416052     2.08   0.038 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Ho: proportion(miuahuat) - proportion(chilac) = diff = 0 
 
       Ha: diff < 0            Ha: diff != 0             Ha: diff > 0 
        z =  2.080               z =  2.080               z =  2.080 
    P < z =  0.9812        P > |z| =  0.0375          P > z =  0.0188 
 
 
 
Regression tests comparing gossip and criticism for different reference groups 
 
Only relevant tests, those where a significant sign was plausible, are displayed. 
 
Test gossip by neighbours on women’s place being home (gneigch) vs. criticism to wives 
by neighbours on women´s place being the home (cneigch). 
 
testnl [gneigch]gneigch=[cneigch]cneigch 
 
chi2(1) =        0.22 
Prob > chi2 =        0.6391 
 
Test gossip by neighbours on women’s place being home (gneigch) vs. criticism to 
husbands by neighbours on women´s place being the home (chneigch). 
 
    testnl [gneigch]gneigch=[chneigch]chneigch 
 
chi2(1) =        0.01 
Prob > chi2 =        0.9393 
 
Test criticism to wives by neighbours on women’s place being home (cneigch) vs. criticism 
to husbands by neighbours on women´s place being the home (chneigch). 
 
   testnl [cneigch]cneigch=[chneigch]chneigch 
 
chi2(1) =        0.17 
Prob > chi2 =        0.6801 
 
Test gossip by neighbours on women’s place being home (gneigch) vs. gossip to wives by 
wives family on women´s place being the home (gfamch). 
 
testnl [gneigch]gneigch=[gfamch]gfamch 
 
chi2(1) =        0.70 
Prob > chi2 =        0.4025 
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Test gossip by neighbours on women’s place being home (gneigch) vs. gossip to wives by 
husbands family on women´s place being the home (gfamch). 
 
testnl [gneigch]gneigch=[gfhusch]gfhusch 
 
chi2(1) =        0.80 
Prob > chi2 =        0.3722 
 
Test gossip by wives family on women’s place being home (gneigch) vs. gossip to wives by 
friends on women´s place being the home (gfamch). 
 
testnl [gfamch]gfamch=[gfriench]gfriench 
 
chi2(1) =        0.44 
Prob > chi2 =        0.5052 
 
Test criticism to wives by neighbours on women’s place being home (cneigch) vs. criticism 
to wives by wives family on women´s place being the home (cfamch). 
 
   testnl [cneigch]cneigch=[cfamch]cfamch 
 
chi2(1) =        0.14 
Prob > chi2 =        0.7061 
 
Test criticism to wives by neighbours on women’s place being home (cneigch) vs. criticism 
to wives by husbands family on women´s place being the home (cfhusch). 
 
 testnl [cneigch]cneigch=[cfhusch]cfhusch 
 
chi2(1) =        0.11 
Prob > chi2 =        0.7439 
 
 
Test criticism to wives by neighbours on women’s place being home (cneigch) vs. criticism 
to wives by friends on women´s place being the home (cfriench). 
 
testnl [cneigch]cneigch=[cfriench]cfriench 
 
chi2(1) =        0.06 
Prob > chi2 =        0.8033 
 
Test criticism to wives by wives family on women’s place being home (cfamch) vs. criticism 
to wives by friends on women´s place being the home (cfriench). 
 
testnl [cfamch]cfamch=[cfriench]cfriench 
 
chi2(1) =        0.38 
Prob > chi2 =        0.5395 
 
 
 
 
Test gossip by wives family on women’s place being home (gfamch) vs. criticism to wives 
by wives family on women´s place being the home (gfamch). 
 
testnl [gfamch]gfamch=[cfamch]cfamch 
 
chi2(1) =        2.10 
Prob > chi2 =        0.1473 
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Test gossip by husbands family on women’s place being home (gfamch) vs. criticism to 
husbands by wives family on women´s place being the home (chfamch). 
 
testnl [gfamch]gfamch=[chfamch]chfamch 
   
chi2(1) =        0.71 
Prob > chi2 =        0.3988 
 
Test gossip by neighbours on women being promiscous (gneigin) vs. gossip by friends on 
women being promiscuous (gfrienin). 
 
testnl [gneigin]gneigin=[gfrienin]gfrienin 
 
chi2(1) =        2.64 
Prob > chi2 =        0.1045 
 
 
Test gossip by wives family on women being promiscous (gfamin) vs. gossip by friends on 
women being promiscuous (gfrienin). 
 
test [gfamin]gfamin=[gfrienin]gfrienin 
 
chi2(  1) =    3.43 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0640 
 
 
Test gossip by wives family on women being promiscous (gfamin) vs. gossip by friends on 
women being promiscuous (gfrienin). 
 
test [gfhusin]gfhusin=[gfrienin]gfrienin 
 
chi2(  1) =    3.62 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.0572 
 
 
Test criticism to husbands by wives family on women being promiscous (chfamin) vs. 
criticism to husbands by friends on women being promiscuous (chfrienin). 
 
test [chfamin]chfamin=[chfrienin]chfrienin 
  
chi2(  1) =    2.63 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.1047 
 
Test criticism to husbands by husbands family on women being promiscous (chfhusin) vs. 
criticism to husbands by friends on women being promiscuous (chfrienin). 
 
test [chfhusin]chfhusin=[chfrienin]chfrienin 
 
chi2(  1) =    7.66 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.0057 
 
 
 
Test criticism to husbands by neighbours on women being promiscous (chneigin) vs. 
criticism to husbands by friends on women being promiscuous (chfrienin). 
 
test [chneigin]chneigin=[chfrienin]chfrienin 
 
chi2(  1) =    4.47 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.0345 
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Test criticism to husbands by wives family on women being promiscous (chfamin) vs. 
criticism to husbands by neighbours on women being promiscuous (chfrienin). 
 
test [chfamin]chfamin=[chneigin]chneigin 
 
chi2(  1) =    0.41 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.5196 
 
 
Test criticism to wives by wives family on women being promiscous (cfamin) vs. criticism to 
wives by friends on women being promiscuous (cfrienin). 
 
test [cfamin]cfamin=[cfrienin]cfrienin 
 
chi2(  1) =    0.60 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.4393 
 
Test criticism to wives by husbands family on women being promiscous (cfhusin) vs. 
criticism to wives by friends on women being promiscuous (cfrienin). 
 
test [cfhusin]cfhusin=[cfrienin]cfrienin 
 
chi2(  1) =    0.01 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.9155 
 
Test criticism to wives by neighbours on women being promiscous (cneigin) vs. criticism to 
wives by friends on women being promiscuous (cfrienin). 
 
test [cneigin]cneigin=[cfrienin]cfrienin 
 
chi2(  1) =    0.02 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.8768 
 
 
Test gossip by husbands family on husbands being lazy (gfhuslz) vs. gossip by friends on 
husbands being lazy (gfrienlz). 
 
test [gfhuslz]gfhuslz=[gfrienlz]gfrienlz 
 
chi2(  1) =    3.01 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.0828 
 
 
Test gossip by neighbours on husbands being lazy (gneiglz) vs. gossip by friends on 
husbands being lazy (gfrienlz). 
 
test [gneiglz]gneiglz=[gfrienlz]gfrienlz 
 
chi2(  1) =    1.62 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.2037 
 
 
 
Test gossip by neighbours on husbands being lazy (gneiglz) vs. gossip by friends on 
husbands being lazy (gfrienlz). 
 
test [cfhuslz]cfhuslz=[cfrienlz]cfrienlz 
 
chi2(  1) =    0.26 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.6101 
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Test criticism to wives by neighbours on husbands being lazy (cneiglz) vs. criticism to 
wives by friends on husbands being lazy (cfrienlz). 
 
test [cneiglz]cneiglz=[cfrienlz]cfrienlz 
 
chi2(  1) =    2.10 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.1473 
 
Test criticism to wives by wives family on husbands being lazy (cfamlz) vs. criticism to 
wives by friends on husbands being lazy (cfrienlz). 
 
 test [cfamlz]cfamlz=[cfrienlz]cfrienlz 
 
chi2(  1) =    4.88 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.0272 
 
 
Test criticism to wives by husbands family on husbands being lazy (cfamlz) vs. criticism to 
wives by wives family on husbands being lazy (cfamlz). 
 
test [cfhuslz]cfhuslz=[cfamlz]cfamlz 
 
chi2(  1) =    3.36 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.0668 
 
Test criticism to wives by husbands family on husbands being lazy (cfamlz) vs. criticism to 
wives by wives family on husbands being lazy (cfamlz). 
 
test [cneiglz]cneiglz=[cfamlz]cfamlz 
 
chi2(  1) =    1.01 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.3139 
 
 
Test criticism to husbands by neighbours on husbands being lazy (cfamlz) vs. criticism to 
friends on husbands being lazy (cfamlz). 
 
test [chneiglz]chneiglz=[chfrienlz]chfrienlz 
 
chi2(  1) =    0.85 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.3571 
 
Test criticism to husbands by husbands family on husbands being lazy (cfamlz) vs. 
criticism to husbands by friends on husbands being lazy (cfamlz). 
 
test [chfhuslz]chfhuslz=[chfrienlz]chfrienlz 
 
chi2(  1) =    1.40 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.2374 
 
 
 
 
Test criticism to husbands by wives family on husbands being lazy (cfamlz) vs. criticism to 
husbands by friends on husbands being lazy (cfamlz). 
 
test [chfamlz]chfamlz=[chfrienlz]chfrienlz 
 
chi2(  1) =    1.80 
       Prob > chi2 =    0.1803 
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Comparison between Gossip and Criticism for different Reference Groups  
Diff moral arguments 
 
 
 
Test gossip by wives family on womens place being the home (gfamch) vs. gossip by wives 
family on men bein lazy (gfamlz). 
 
testnl [gfamch]gfamch=[gfamlz]gfamlz 
 
               chi2(1) =        3.81 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.0511 
 
Test gossip by wives family on womens place being the home (gfamch) vs. gossip by wives 
family on women being promiscous (gfamin). 
 
testnl [gfamch]gfamch=[gfamin]gfamin 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.24 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.6248 
 
Test gossip by wives family on women being promiscous (gfamin) vs. gossip by wives 
family on husbands being lazy (gfamlz). 
 
testnl [gfamin]gfamin=[gfamlz]gfamlz 
 
               chi2(1) =        2.05 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.1521 
 
Test criticism by wives family to wives on wive place being the home (cfamch) vs. criticism 
by wives family to wives on husbands being lazy (cfamlz). 
 
     testnl [cfamch]cfamch=[cfamlz]cfamlz 
 
               chi2(1) =        4.37 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.0366 
 
Test criticism by wives family to wives on wive place being the home (cfamch) vs. criticism 
by wives family to wives on wives bieng promiscous (cfamin). 
 
testnl [cfamch]cfamch=[cfamin]cfamin 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.84 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.3605 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test criticism by wives family to wives on husbands being lazy (cfamlz) vs. criticism by 
wives family to wives on wives being promiscous (cfamin). 
 
testnl [cfamlz]cfamlz=[cfamin]cfamin 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.82 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.3646 
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Test criticism by wives family to husbands on wive place being the home (chfamch) vs. 
criticism by wives family to husbands on husbands being lazy (chfamlz). 
 
testnl [chfamch]chfamch=[chfamlz]chfamlz 
 
               chi2(1) =        1.21 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.2714 
 
Test criticism by wives family to husbands on wive place being the home (chfamch) vs. 
criticism by wives family to husbands on wives bieng promuscous (chfamin). 
 
testnl [chfamch]chfamch=[chfamin]chfamin 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.18 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.6739 
 
Test criticism by wives family to husbands on husbands being lazy (chfamlz) vs. criticism 
by wives family to husbands on wives being promiscous (chfamin). 
 
testnl [chfamlz]chfamlz=[chfamin]chfamin 
 
               chi2(1) =        2.48 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.1152 
 
 
Test gossip by husbands family on women´s place being the home (gfhusch) vs. gossip by 
husbands family on wives being promiscous (gfhusin). 
 
testnl [gfhusch]gfhusch=[gfhusin]gfhusin 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.52 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.4710 
 
 
Test gossip by husbands family on women´s place being the home (gfhusch) vs. gossip by 
husbands family on husbands being lazy (gfamlz). 
 
testnl [gfhusch]gfhusch=[gfhuslz]gfhuslz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.00 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.9627 
 
 
Test gossip by husbands family on wives being promiscous (gfhusin) vs. criticism by 
husbands family on husbands being lazy (gfhuslz). 
 
testnl [gfhusin]gfhusin=[gfhuslz]gfhuslz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.38 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.5393 
 
 
 
Test criticism by husbands family to wives on wive place being the home (cfhusch) vs. 
criticism by wives family to wives on wives being promiscuous (cfhusin). 
 
testnl [cfhusch]cfhusch=[cfhusin]cfhusin 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.09 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.7627 
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Test criticism by husbands family to wives on wive place being the home (cfhusch) vs. 
criticism by wives family to wives on husbands being lazy (cfhusin). 
 
testnl [cfhusch]cfhusch=[cfhuslz]cfhuslz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.01 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.9095 
 
 
Test criticism by husbands family to wives on wive place being the home (cfhusch) vs. 
criticism by wives family to wives on husbands being lazy (cfhuslz). 
 
testnl [cfhusin]cfhusin=[cfhuslz]cfhuslz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.15 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.7018 
  
  
Test criticism by husbands family to husbands on wives place being the home (chfhusch) 
vs. criticism by wives family to husbands on wives being promiscuous (chfhusin). 
 
testnl [chfhusch]chfhusch=[chfhusin]chfhusin 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.48 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.4900 
 
Test criticism by husbands family to husbands on wives place being the home (chfhusch) 
vs. criticism by wives family to husbands on husbands being lazy (chfhuslz). 
 
testnl [chfhusch]chfhusch=[chfhuslz]chfhuslz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.04 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.8374 
 
Test criticism by husbands family to husbands on wives being promiscous (chfhusin) vs. 
criticism by wives family to husbands on husbands being lazy (chfhuslz). 
 
testnl [chfhusin]chfhusin=[chfhuslz]chfhuslz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.20 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.6516 
 
 
Test gossip by neighbours on women´s place being the home (gneigch) vs. gossip by 
neighbours on wives being promiscous (gneigin). 
 
testnl [gneigch]gneigch=[gneigin]gneigin 
 
               chi2(1) =        1.29 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.2553 
 
 
 
Test gossip by neighbours on women´s place being the home (gneigch) vs. gossip by 
neighbours on husbands being lazy (gneiglz). 
   
testnl [gneigch]gneigch=[gneiglz]gneiglz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.01 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.9124 
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Test gossip by neighbours on wives being promiscous (gneigin) vs. gossip by neighbours 
on husbands being lazy (gfamlz). 
 
testnl [gneigin]gneigin=[gneiglz]gneiglz 
 
               chi2(1) =        1.11 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.2922 
 
Test criticism by neighbours to wives on women´s place being the home (cneigch) vs. 
criticism by neighbours to wives on wives being promiscous (cneigin). 
 
testnl [cneigch]cneigch=[cneigin]cneigin 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.50 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.4788 
 
Test criticism by neighbours to wives on women´s place being the home (cneigch) vs. 
criticism by neighbours to wives on husbands being lazy (cneiglz). 
 
testnl [cneigch]cneigch=[cneiglz]cneiglz 
 
               chi2(1) =        1.06 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.3039 
 
Test criticism by neighbours to wives on wives being promisous (cneigin) vs. criticism by 
neighbours to wives on husbands being lazy (cneiglz). 
 
testnl [cneigin]cneigin=[cneiglz]cneiglz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.23 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.6343 
 
Test criticism by neighbours to husbands on women´s place being the home (chneigch) vs. 
criticism by neighbours to husbands on wives being promiscous (chneigin). 
 
testnl [chneigch]chneigch=[chneigin]chneigin 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.17 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.6831 
 
Test criticism by neighbours to husbands on women´s place being the home (chneigch) vs. 
criticism by neighbours to husbands on husbands being lazy (chneiglz). 
 
testnl [chneigch]chneigch=[chneiglz]chneiglz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.43 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.5138 
 
 
 
 
 
Test criticism by neighbours to husbands on wives being promisous (chneigch) vs. 
criticism by neighbours to husbands on husbands being lazy (chneiglz). 
 
testnl [chneigin]chneigin=[chneiglz]chneiglz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.09 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.7678 
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Test gossip by friends on women´s place being the home (gfriench) vs. gossip by friends on 
wives being promiscous (gfrienin). 
 
testnl [gfriench]gfriench=[gfrienin]gfrienin 
 
               chi2(1) =        1.01 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.3152 
 
Test gossip by friends on women´s place being the home (gfriench) vs. gossip by friends on 
husbands being lazy (gfrienlz). 
 
testnl [gfriench]gfriench=[gfrienlz]gfrienlz 
 
               chi2(1) =        2.38 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.1226 
 
Test gossip by friends on wives being promiscous (gfrienin) vs. gossip by friends on 
husbands being lazy (gfrienlz). 
 
testnl [gfrienin]gfrienin=[gfrienlz]gfrienlz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.48 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.4881 
 
Test criticism by friends to wives on women´s place being the home (cfriench) vs. criticism 
by friends to wives on wives being promiscous (cfrienin). 
 
testnl [cfriench]cfriench=[cfrienin]cfrienin 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.42 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.5184 
 
Test criticism by friends to wives on women´s place being the home (cfriench) vs. criticism 
by friends to wives on husbands being lazy (cfrienlz). 
 
testnl [cfriench]cfriench=[cfrienlz]cfrienlz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.06 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.7996 
 
 
Test criticism by friends to wives on wives being promisous (cfrienin) vs. criticism by 
friends to wives on husbands being lazy (cfrienlz). 
 
testnl [cfrienin]cfrienin=[cfrienlz]cfrienlz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.92 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.3368 
 
 
 
 
 
Test criticism by friends to husbands on women´s place being the home (chfriench) vs. 
criticism by friends to husbands on wives being promiscous (chfrienin). 
 
testnl [chfriench]chfriench=[chfrienin]chfrienin 
 
               chi2(1) =        4.11 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.0425  
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Test criticism by friends to husbands on women´s place being the home (chfriench) vs. 
criticism by friends to husbands on husbands being lazy (chfrienlz). 
 
testnl [chfriench]chfriench=[chfrienlz]chfrienlz 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.17 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.6819 
 
Test criticism by friends to wives on husbands being promisous (chfrienin) vs. criticism by 
friends to husbands on husbands being lazy (chfrienlz). 
 
testnl [chfrienin]chfrienin=[chfrienlz]chfrienlz 
 
               chi2(1) =        3.76 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.0524 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
